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The New Era

Vol. 1

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THE NEW ERA

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— FORWARD.

INDIA AND MODERN THOUGHT.

By VISCOUNT HALDANE, O. M.*

THE British Empire is entering on a new stage in its development. The principles recognised and adopted two years ago for that development express what is latent in the new stage. Wherever a dominion has reached a sufficient level in the practice of self-government, it is now recognised that it has freedom to govern itself without interference from London. It is open to it to recede from the British Empire if it should elect to do so. The movement has however been accompanied by another movement. The dominions generally have shown that they attach importance for themselves to remaining within the Empire on terms of complete liberty of action. Not only is this important to them from the point of view of wealth and trade and commerce as well as of defence. It is important to them in another respect, which is each year growing more apparent that the Empire is consolidating itself in another fashion. Each year sees more of the best teachers of standpoints held in common going out to continue their work in the dominions overseas and more of the best teachers in these dominions are coming to Great Britain to teach our students, and to work co-operatively in the advancement of learning generally. The Empire is in short being unified intellectually.

Of course this step forward requires the attainment of such levels as can enable it to be taken. If the Dominions are to be equal among themselves and with the mother country, they must have developed their standards of excellence to the necessary point. It is this that is making people turn with increasing attention to the development in India of the deeper outlook which has characterised its thought. A common misapprehension, even among philosophers, is that the quality of thinking of a nation can be readily estimated by glancing at what are really its superficial aspects. Because much of what is said in the name of that nation

*Since receiving the manuscript of the above article we heard with great regret that Lord Haldane has passed away. E.—N. E.

TELEPHONE
5193 VICTORIA.

28, Queen Anne's Gate,
Westminster.

15 Dec 1928

Dear Professor Radhakrishnan

By a separate registered
letter I have sent off to you
an article for the new Journal.

Hope it will reach you in
time, and that it will be
of use - I enclose your
last article.

I have delayed
in sending you written
manuscripts, but hope of
a better kind! You can
of course deal with anything
much verbal, but not with the
imbalances. Yours very truly
Haldane

LORD HALDANE'S letter to Prof. S. Radhakrishnan,
A Member of our Advisory Board.

to-day does not seem to accord with Western sciences and all the ethical standards of to-day in the West, it is apt to be assumed that we may turn our eyes away from it. But this seems to be a profound error. To see what is the thinking of a nation which has produced a high level of idealism, we must understand the history of that idealism. It has been truly said that there is no one system of philosophy that will commend itself to all men individually. We have to study the history of reflection before we can appreciate what that history has brought to birth. The full truth lies in the development grasped as occurring from stage to stage. It is only so that the highest advances can be ascertained and estimated. Such an inquiry calls for the study of all phases of live history. It is useless to imagine that a reliable result can be reached by looking at what has been said, however apparently authoritatively, in any one generation.

This has for long appeared to me to be profoundly true of the history of Indian reflection. Of course, the language employed has been different, and there has been a lack of exact science and of the spirit of Baconian methods. But that is not the most important thing to search for. If we come by study to the highest quality in Indian thought, this must when found be given the first place, inasmuch as it is found to have influenced profoundly everything important that has come afterwards.

There has been study of Indian reflection in its various stages of development not only in Britain but in America and Germany and France, but this study has been confined to the few, and its results have not penetrated widely. In India, on the other hand, there has been study of European thought at least as keen. There too the study has been in few hands. But the hands are those of highly competent philosophers who have examined and mastered the idealism of the West more thoroughly than we have that of the East. The names of such Indian thinkers as Radhakrishnan, Das Gupta and Haldar are associated for us with penetrative insight into our idealism in the West and the mastery of its standpoint. It is but rarely that we find much insight of the same metaphysical quality over here.

What is needed is this. West and East should grasp the level to which each has attained in its own form and in its own language. For the more there is of mutual understanding the more there seems to be discoverable of identity in outlook on the foundations of reality. Nor has the common outlook really been affected by the development of modern Sciences. The principle of relativity for example fits in easily with philosophical reflection in India as well as here.

What, then, is it that is most called for just now? The new Journal will, I hope, produce an increased amount of reciprocal interpretation. What we need is to get down to the common foundation of metaphysical reflection in India and over here. This is not so difficult as it seems if we go behind words to their meanings. I will not repeat what I have sought to convey in an article written in the Hibbert Journal for July. The comparison of the doctrine to be found in the Vedanta and in the teaching of Gautama and elsewhere in the language of the leaders of Indian thought, with what has been laid down in much detail by Bradley in his "Appearance and Reality" and "Essays on Truth and Reality" and even more massively by Hegel in his "*Philosophie des Geistes*" points to the dominance with both sets of thinkers of conceptions required and employed in common. Bradley may pronounce thought to be essentially relational and therefore inadequate as an instrument for reaching what is ultimate. He may suggest feeling as a purer element of approach. But into these conceptions which belong to thought he lapses back unavoidably in his final analysis. His departure from Hegel, of whose legacy he so often declares himself to be the inheritor, is really much less than is popularly supposed.

When we pass over the seas to look at what the great Indian teachers have bequeathed to the world, we find the analogy to this. At their highest, when they go behind metaphor, they tell us, as Gautama for instance did, that the foundation of the real is mind. By mind they do not mean a substance, any more than Hegel did. What is said is that the ultimate reality is action, the activity of thought in giving actuality and meaning to experience. They do not indicate the activity of a finite or individual human mind. For such a mind is always conditioned by the natural organism which it requires in order to express itself and cannot stand for the full truth. They mean mind in the sense in which it signifies what is final and absolute, expressing itself in human minds and also in their objective experience, but in fact being always more than this. When one compares Indian teaching on this matter with the doctrine set out as a whole in Hegel's "*Philosophie des Geistes*" it is impossible not to be struck by the close resemblance in the teaching given with an interval of centuries between. The analogy is even greater than that between the Hegelian principle and the Philosophy of the Greeks. The concluding part of the "*Philosophie des Geistes*" brings this out.

It seems to me that it is the duty of modern thinkers to examine these resemblances more closely than has so far been done. For they indicate that the ultimate conceptions of metaphysics in all

its greatest forms have much that is identical in them. If so, however East and West have come to diverge over details, the essence of their final doctrines are not divergent. If this be so, it opens up a new avenue for hope in the quest after final truth. Much of the work has yet to be done, but the thinkers of India have in the recent works to which I have referred made a handsome contribution to it. If less has been accomplished over here it is perhaps because our people are less attracted by metaphysics.

Of course there is in both worlds of philosophy much metaphor and simile. For it is in images that we think even in the most abstract and exact sciences. But we can get behind such metaphors and similies to the general conceptions they embody with the expressions in the Vedanta and in the records of Gautama's teaching this has been so far done. What remains for further research is to compare closely the underlying conceptions so embodied in Eastern thought with the fundamental conceptions of western metaphysicians. Thinkers like Professor Radhakrishnan have shown themselves to be well aware of the analogies. Take for example the wider and deeper view of mind as it is expounded in the Hegelian Encyclopedia and particularly in the last volume "The Philosophy of Mind" which we have in an admirable translation. Hegel explains how this conception has nothing to do with what is called pantheism. It is concerned with the absolute as subject. "Only" he says towards the conclusion of Section 552 "in the principle of mind, which is aware of its own essence, is implicitly in absolute liberty, and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation, does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power, religion and the principles of philosophy coinciding in one, and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind, of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. Self realising subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality."

Compare with this what Professor Radhakrishnan says about the form which the history of reflection has assumed in India. Towards the end of his book on "The Hindu view of Life" he makes this observation :—

"There has been no such thing as a uniform, stationary, unalterable Hinduism whether in point of belief or practice. Hinduism is a movement, not a position; a process, not a result; a growing tradition, not a fixed revelation. Its past history encourages us to believe that it will be found equal to any emergency that the future may throw up whether in the field of thought or of history." Again earlier (Page 46). "Every God accepted by Hinduism is elevated and ultimately identified with the central reality which

is one with the deeper self of man. The addition of new Gods to the Hindu Pantheon does not endanger it."

This presentation of the history of religion and Philosophy in India resembles in material respects the presentation of the history of all such reflection in the West by the Western idealists. What we need further is to have attention more closely called to it and to have it worked out in detail.

Of course there are differences in such presentations. The spirit in the East is different from that of the West but the task is to discover whether there is not a basis fundamental in common to the spirit in both cases. For the reasons I have just given and for those assigned in the article on East and West in the Hibbert Journal for July, I think that a common basis exists. It is to me a source of much satisfaction that the new Journal is likely to stimulate the process of the necessary investigation of it.

LONDON.

HALDANE.

CHRISTIANITY'S SUPREME RIVAL.

By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK, D.D.

OTHERS are considering, because others must consider, the vital interests that are involved for them in the problem of nationalism and internationalism. That politics, for example, is concerned is clear. To be sure, our two great parties now are backing and filling because they are afraid that the issues involved in internationalism may spoil some local and temporary success, but, as with slavery so with this problem, politicians, hem and haw as they will, must some day face it and find it the rock of their standing or their falling.

That business has a tremendous stake in this matter is plain. To be sure, some businesses have customarily made large profits out of war, but this does not represent the general consequence of war on the economic situation. War is commercially disruptive. Indeed, one of the most hopeful signs of peace is the growing consciousness that not simply our ideals but our economic interests are against conflict.

While, however, books, newspapers, and magazines continually discuss the stakes which business and politics have in this matter, our concern is with Christianity. So entangled are Christianity and internationalism in their interests that if we in our churches try to content ourselves with the intimate and comfortable aspects of personal religion we are living in a fool's paradise, as though one fitted out a little room and made it very lovely in a large, unstable building that at any moment might come crashing down, room and all, about our ears.

I.

This concern of the Christian gospel with nationalism is not new. If you would see an ancient exhibition of it, turn to the sixteenth chapter of the book of the Acts. Paul has been preaching in Macedonia. He has just crossed over from Asia Minor into Europe—one of the great events in the world's history

*A sermon preached at the Park Avenue, Baptist Church, New York, on November 13, 1927.

because then, for the first time, Christianity invaded the western world. And there, at the beginning, the gospel was met, as it has been met ever since, by the challenge of nationalism. "These men" said Paul's enemies in Philippi, "being Jews, do exceedingly trouble our city, and set forth customs which it is not lawful for us to receive, or to observe, being Romans." Quite so—being Romans! This attack on Christianity, you see, was not launched from the citadel of an opposing religion but from the citadel of an opposing nationalism. These ancient patriots instinctively felt that, if they were to be Romans in the accepted meaning of that term, they would have to withstand Christianity.

Let us take it for granted that at one point we do not need at length to guard ourselves against misunderstanding. In one sense we are all loyal nationalists, as we are all loyal members of our families. It may be that God can look with absolutely equal eyes on all our homes and nations alike but we cannot, and it would be disastrous if we tried. Each man primarily belongs to his own family; there are the centres of his affection and there the tendrils of his devotion are entwined. Moreover, this unique allegiance to one's own family, when it is rightly used, is beautiful in its results. Because I have loved my own mother supremely I understand better the meaning of everybody else's mother and know, as I could not otherwise have known, the significance of motherhood around the world. Because I adore my own children as I never could adore anybody else's children I feel, as otherwise I never could have felt, the meaning of parenthood and childhood everywhere. That is what a home is for. It is a hot house where in a certain isolation of sheltered loyalties beautiful things are grown affections, sympathies, insights, devotions—which afterwards can be transplanted and applied to the common good of humankind.

Such is the deep meaning of a fine nationalism. No other nation can mean to us what our nation means. Here are the roots of our heritage, and here our central loyalties belong. But, just because we feel so deeply about our own land, we understand how other people feel about their lands, and, using our patriotism to interpret theirs we grow, not in bitterness but in understanding and sympathy. So all fine internationalism must be rooted back in the noble significances of nationalism.

Let us take it for granted, then, that nationalism has two meanings, one good and one evil, and that we are not forgetting the fine uses of it when we employ the word in an untoward sense. For, whatever words we use, we must somehow get at the modern counterparts of those patriots of Philippi who could not stand Christianity, being Romans.

The gist of the matter lies in the fact that the dogma of nationalism, as it has developed in the last two centuries, has become a competing religion. I think it the most dangerous rival of Christian principles on earth. The crucial conflict today is not primarily Christianity versus Buddhism or Christianity versus Mohammedanism, but Christianity versus nationalism, and until one has clearly envisaged that fact one does not understand the crux of our situation.

Here are the three major items in the nationalistic creed :

First, that each nation is a sovereign unit acknowledging no control save its own independent will. If its interests demand war it may make war, for it is free of all governance beyond itself, being by nature a sovereign unit competing with and, when necessary, fighting with other sovereign units for supremacy.

Second, that within its own borders each sovereign unit may exercise an almost absolute authority over the lives of its citizens. We must be ready on call to sacrifice to the nation our lives, our fortunes, our sons and daughters, even our consciences. Especially in war time the nation can conscript a man's food, a man's business, a man's money, a man's life, a man's family, and a man's opinion. If a pacifist finds his conscience in conflict with his nationalism, he may be compelled to give up his conscience or else go to prison.

Third, that each nation, in some point congenial with its pride, is supreme. This doctrine, highly coloured with emotion, is necessary to support the tremendous claim of the modern dogma of nationalism over the lives and consciences of its citizens. Cecil Rhodes said that he thought the British "the greatest people the world has ever seen." Voltaire prophesied: "Some day, to be approved of others, it shall suffice for one to say: 'This was the taste of the French; it is thus that this illustrious nation thought.'" Wrote Professor Lasson of Berlin: "We are morally and intellectually superior to all, without peers. It is the same with our organizations and with our institutions." Said a great American diplomat, my personal friend: "God has yet made nothing or nobody equal to the American people; and I don't think he ever will or can." That is nationalism: each nation a sovereign unit; each unit claiming almost absolute power over the lives and consciences of its citizens, and each nation on some point congenial to its pride thinking that it is the best.

Were there time, one might trace the history of this dogma, unravel the strands that, woven together, have produced it. In its present form it is a modern phenomenon developing from the eighteenth century on, but that it is now dominant in the world is clear. Our children's children, looking back upon our time, will know it as the era of nationalism, as we look back and call another

age the era of feudalism, and they will see, whether we see it or not, that Christianity's most crucial fight was with the sinister significances of this dogma.

II.

Consider, then, the sharp conflict between the principles of Jesus and this perverted dogma of nationalism.

In the first place, it makes any genuine monotheism impossible. Some people still think that monotheism is primarily an intellectual tour de force and they marvel at the flight of imagination and thought which enabled the great Isaiah, centuries before Christ, to think of this vast and varied universe as created by one Power and controlled by one Purpose. The fact is that the doctrine of monotheism developed not so much in spite of an opposing theology as of an opposing nationalism. Those primitive people believed in tribal gods because they wanted to, because they hated their enemies and did not wish them to have the same god, because they craved freedom to slaughter their foes untroubled by any haunting and to them blasphemous idea that their god cared for their enemies. One of the first great internationalist utterances in the world's history is in the nineteenth chapter of Isaiah, where the prophet hears God saying, "Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel mine inheritance." It is as if, during the great war, someone had imagined God saying, "Blessed be Germany my people, and Austria the work of my hands, and America mine inheritance." Thus the great prophets of Israel, amid international hatreds that exalted many gods, wrought out the high doctrine of monotheism to displace tribal deities.

One does not need at length to say to you who lived through the last conflict that, when nationalism works its inevitable consequence in war, we suffer even today a theological reversion to the primitive type. For war still rips God into tribal gods and sets us praying, each before his own deity, for the blood of his enemies.

Mark Twain was a humourist who often, in his humour, said more serious things than the most solemn preacher says. Once he wrote a prayer for war time :

O Lord our God, help us to tear their soldiers to bloody shreds with our shells ; help us to cover their smiling fields with the pale forms of their patriot dead ; help us to drown the thunder of the guns with the wounded, writhing in pain ; help us to lay waste their humble homes with a hurricane of fire ; help us to wring the hearts of their unoffending widows with unavailing grief ; help us to turn them out roofless with their little children to wander unfriended through wastes of their desolated land . . . for our sakes, who adore Thee, Lord, blast their hopes, blight their lives, protract their bitter pilgrimage, make heavy their steps, water their way with their tears, stain the white snow with the blood of their wounded feet ! We ask of one

who is the Spirit of love and who is the ever faithful refuge and friend of all that are sore beset, and seek His aid with humble and contrite hearts. Grant our prayer, O Lord, and Thine shall be the praise and honour and glory now and ever, Amen.

You see, humourists have a special license to tell the truth—like old court jesters who could take liberties with their lords that no one else dared and Mark Twain did tell the truth. When as nationalists we pray in war time, beneath our pious phrases that is what we are praying for. And as Mark Twain saw rightly, that is not monotheism but a return to tribal gods.

I am not speaking about this matter as though I were an economist—I am not an economist; or as though I were a politician—I am no politician; but as a man of religion. For religion is involved in war. I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth—we cannot really believe that and believe in the tribal gods of war time.

III.

In the second place, this dogma of nationalism not only spoils monotheism but enslaves the Christian conscience. The son of a friend of mine said to his father, "Dad, what is conscience?" and my friend answered, "Son, I don't know but when that telephone bell rings, you take down the receiver!" If it means anything serious at all to be a Christian, it means *that*. What God and our consciences say to us we must do. There is the supreme allegiance of a religious man. As of old, we must obey God rather than men.

But this runs into direct collision with the new dogma of nationalism. Listen to this announcement of an early nationalist: "The state, it seems to me, is not at all made for religion, but religion is made for the state. . . . The state has supremacy in everything. . . . When the state has pronounced, the church has nothing further to say." That is, all our religious loyalties are to be subservient to the nation and in a pinch we Christians must think what the nation thinks, do what the nation says, believe what the nation believes. No infallible church in all history ever tried to impose upon its devotees a more absolute obedience than this dogma of nationalism would impose upon the citizens. If you suppose that this process is not afoot here in America you only have to pick up one of the nation's most popular magazines and read at the top of its editorial column, "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." Right and wrong, God and conscience are to be bent to nationalism. The king can do no wrong, said the monarchists, and we transfer that idea to the republic.

It is strange how history repeats itself. Why did the Romans persecute the early Christians? Was it because of intolerance toward their religion? Not in the least! The Roman empire had no interest in persecuting anybody on account of his religion, and the United States today is hardly more free for all sorts of religious faiths and practices than the Roman empire was then. There is one central reason why the Roman empire persecuted Christians. They would not worship Caesar. They would not acknowledge the supreme authority of the state. They put Christ first, and because they would not even scatter incense on the burning altar before Caesar's statue as an outward symbol acknowledging his supremacy they went to the lions.

Our American forefathers in the early days of democracy would have agreed with those first Christians. They had just broken the shackles of absolute monarchy and they had not the slightest intention of putting in its place any kind of absolutist state whatsoever. They would have fought this developing dogma of nationalism as they would have fought Satan himself. Even in time of war they held to the primacy of their individual consciences. Abraham Lincoln in the House of Representatives lifted his voice against the Mexican war and on the floor of the same house Joshua R. Giddings called it "a war against an unoffending people, without adequate or just cause, for the purpose of conquest," and said, "I will lend it no aid, no support whatever. I will not bathe my hands in the blood of the people of Mexico, nor will I participate in the guilt of those murders which have been and will hereafter be committed by our army there." In Massachusetts, James Russell Lowell in the *Biglow Papers* poured out his withering scorn against the wickedness and folly of the nation, and in his Boston pulpit Theodore Parker thundered his denunciation against the nation's leaders.

The serious part of this is that if instead of Mr. Coolidge's admirable appointment of Mr. Morrow to Mexico we had been in the hands of some crack-witted government that had involved us in war with Mexico and some of us had done what our forefathers did, we would have been locked up for it. For this absolute religion of nationalism grows apace and while the old religions have gradually sloughed off external penalties for heresy, it is the religion of nationalism that now has its spies, its Judge Jeffreys on the bench, its prison cells. Within a few weeks a federal judge in this country, with much unnecessary insult and oburgation, has refused citizenship to a woman because in her opinions she is a Quaker about war.

So stealthily has this new conflict between freedom of conscience and the absolutism of the nationalistic dogma come upon us that many of us do not recognize its presence. But it is here. According to this dogma the individual conscience of the religious

man is not to be supreme but is to be harnessed. The bit and the bridle are to be put into its mouth and it is to be driven by the state. In 1897, in an audience with the German ambassador in Constantinople, Sultan Abd-ul Hamid, though a Mohammedan, said that he had often had occasion to marvel at the kaiser's true religious spirit and his deep understanding of the significance of religion. He shared the kaiser's conviction, he added, that religion alone is the foundation of obedience and hence of the welfare of the peoples. Quite so! Any sultan and kaiser can agree, though they be Christian and Moslem, on the value of religion if they are allowed to dress religion in nationalistic livery and make it their servant to further passive obedience. God save us from such subservience of conscience in this nation!

For one of the deepest needs of our nation is the very opposite: men whose supreme allegiance is God and their own consciences, and who, therefore, would never dream of saying, "My country right or wrong," but always, "My country right to keep her right my country wrong to make her right at whatever cost." There is the true patriot not in the puppet of the state that the dogma of nationalism would produce. There is the hope of the people—not in one hundred percenters ready to jump in any direction when the government cracks the whip, but in men of independent consciences, in time of peace or war, willing to defy the nation in the interests of the nation.

Every Sunday in the navy the white flag of religion is floated above the stars and stripes. It is the only flag that ever is floated above the national emblem. It is the symbol of what ought perpetually to be true about our consciences.

IV.

In the third place, this developed dogma of nationalism not only spoils monotheism and enslaves the Christian conscience, but it reduces Christianity to a harmless myth and keeps it from being a programme of real action. How easy it is to reduce Christianity to a myth! A pre-existent, divine Being, virgin-born into the world, who died an expiatory death, rose in the body on the third day, ascended in the body to the skies and thence straightway will return to set up his millennial government on earth—how easy it is to reduce the Christian gospel to its mythological framework! But what that Being said when he was on earth, the kind of life he lived, the principles of individual and social life he taught—how easy it is to neglect that! And when a man refuses to neglect that, when he finds there the very nub of the whole matter, he comes into irrepressible conflict with the dogma of nationalism.

For one thing, the dogma of nationalism means anarchy. If I should say this morning that I am an anarchist, that would cause

a stir. But what is an anarchist except one who says that each individual is a sovereign unit with no co-operative control over him to represent the interests of the community? And what is nationalism but that very doctrine that each nation is a sovereign unit, that if it wishes to make war it may make war, that if it wishes to build a great army and navy it is at liberty to do so, that being sovereign in war or peace it may do what it will so long as it is strong enough to get away with it. My friends, let us call things by their right names. That is anarchy. That is where we are now—in international anarchy. That is where we will be as long as the dogma of nationalism obtains.

This dogma loves to make itself respectable. It arrays itself in the panoply of patriotism. It moves in good society. But, for all that, it is sheer, shameless anarchy, and, because it is anarchy, it means war. While the forces of war are organized, those of peace are not, and the dogma of nationalism does not want them to be. This is the gist of the whole matter; nationalism long since organized the forces of war and now it is fighting with fell determination against every endeavour to organize the forces of peace. This dogma of nationalism therefore, involving anarchy in theory, involves war in fact.

And such war! There are people yet who think that you can clip the tiger's claws while the wild beast is still at large. They credulously believe that, knowing how to drop bombs on villages, we may be persuaded not to do it in war time; that, poison gases being in our control, so easy to make, so tremendous in effect, we may outlaw them from actual employment when war's passion bursts; that, having within reach the technique of infecting enemy populations with pestilential bacteria we may be beguiled into not doing it when we need it most. How credulous people are in spite of all the lessons of history! Believe in any superstition you will believe in witchcraft, believe in demoniacal possession, believe that an eclipse is caused by a dragon swallowing the sun—but how can one believe that when war comes enemies will fail to employ any agency of destruction they can lay their hands to? As each new instrument of death, from the days of bows and arrows to the days of gunpowder, has been ruthlessly employed in spite of all the cries of horror that have been lifted at its introduction, so now biological laboratories under theegis of national governments are perfecting the technique of infecting enemy populations with pestilential bacteria, and nothing will prevent the use of that or any other agency when war bursts.

We face, then, the indisputable conclusion that the dogma of nationalism, involving anarchy in theory and war in fact, must

work out to its climax : that, as long as that dogma obtains, it will repeatedly happen that one nation will conscript its Christians and another nation will conscript its Christians, and the two nations will hurl their Christians at each other's throats. Those Christians will drop bombs on each other's villages, murder each other's mothers and babies, consolidate vast blockades and starve each other by millions, poison each other with gas, and slaughter each other with pestilences.

Do you seriously mean that you think there can be any compromise or accommodation between this dogma of nationalism on the one side and the spirit of Christ on the other ?

Nationalism at its best can be beautiful ! At its best it is one of the unifying forces of the world. Here in this country it takes folk of every tribe, tongue, people, and nation and braids them together. It is stronger than creed, stronger than class, stronger than race. It takes diverse multitudes and makes them one, weaving America, like Joseph's coat, of many colours and yet unified. But just because we feel so deeply the beautiful meanings of nationalism when it is at its best we hate the more this new dogma of nationalism that rips our one God into tribal gods, tramples on the sacred heritage of a free conscience and makes of our Christianity an idle myth instead of a programme of serious social action. Ah, men of Philippi, not all dead yet, who, facing Christ, say still about his gospel : " . . . not lawful for us to receive, or to observe, being Romans !"

PRAYER.

ETERNAL God, thou seest how often in our imagination we turn back to great days when our forefathers stood at the cost of their lives against the public enemies of the gospel. Help us, we beseech thee, to see that we live in such a time, as real, as crucial, as ever the church has faced. Make us genuine Christians. Let the same daring and devotion with which brave soldiers have fought in war characterize our crusade for peace. Give us vision, intelligence, wisdom, and courage, and grant that before it is too late the nations may recognize that not ideals alone but the salvation of civilization depends upon following the path that once was blazed by the Man of Galilee. We ask it in his name. Amen.

RELIGION AND REALITY.

SIR HARI SINGH GOUR, K.T.

TRADITION, early impressions and the influence of elders are far more potent factors in moulding the thoughts of men than education, logic and reason. Indeed, the combined effect of one is the parent of that blind faith which refuses to yield to the stern reality of reason, the very approach of which is at times hailed with the missiles of derision angry protests and calumny. It is thus that fallacies and fancies have become perpetuated and passed into the very fibre of our being, and though the world is old and has made giant strides in the domain of science, in the domain of superstition and dogma, it has remained, and remains today, as backward as it ever was when the witches were burnt and the unbelievers impaled. The civilization of Europe and America has made cataclysmic changes in the political and social outlook of man, but in the field of religion its advance, if any, has been spasmodic and erratic. Its feeble movement towards advance has been ruthlessly checked by a counter movement towards a deeper orthodoxy. In India, where the refreshing breeze of new ideas passes unnoticed, the masses, accustomed to traditional faith and mechanical routine of life, remain unmoved by the preacher of a new dispensation. The Eastern Society is, indeed, an inert mass of unmoving matter which might be galvanized into a semblance of life but to which there is yet no hope of imparting real vitality. As such, the masses in the East and those in the West might be said to present a contrast and afford no room for comparison. But if we examine the psychology of the two people we shall find innate identity between the two the differences between them being those of degree rather than of kind.

The Western thinks the Eastern mind devoid of effort—originality and energy—the Eastern thinks the Western devoid of spirituality benevolence and charity. The Eastern regards the Western materialistic, the Western contemns the East as superstitious, which he in his ignorance and folly calls “spiritualistic.”

The fact is that both the East and the West are a prey to time-long domination of another power—a power which enslaved their progenitors and which by its gained momentum has imparted to the enslaved a feeling that their bondage is their birthright, their thralldom their excellence. It is by a process of perverse reflex action that a man can be led to believe that all his shackles are his golden amulets, that his abject subservience to the crafty priestcraft, the best guerdon of his personal purity and mental spirituality. This abject state of human depravity feeds upon its own venom and imparts it to those born free from it. Thus in time the virus inoculates the whole nation and the prisoner becomes his own gaol-keeper more vigilant and ruthless than any mere hireling can hope to be. This is then the ætiology of a people whose little lives are spent in their self-ordained torture chambers—believing, believing, and believing, but seldom thinking of what they believe and never putting their thoughts into the fiery crucible of reason.

If we examine the history of the world we shall find that humanity at large has from the days of its infancy been a victim to its own hopes and fears. These have been exploited by the unscrupulous and the wily who have, in course of time, spread a network of superstition, dogma and ritual, which, while arresting the play of reason, have reduced man to the abject condition of a lunatic or a child or one whose mental faculties have been benumbed by the paralysing passes of the hypnotist. And such is the vicious circle in which man moves, that if all the religions of the world were suppressed, and if all their priests hanged, it will not be long before another set of prophets and Pharisees will arise and engulf humanity into a new set of dogmas and nostrums, and one is not sure whether the new dispensation would not be worse than the old. The fact is that man cannot exist without a religion. To him religion of some sort is a psychological necessity. He must have a religion to satisfy his craving for immortality. He must have a religion to satisfy his yearning for greater happiness. He has invented religion to give his life a hope and remove from death its sting. This is the rationale of all religions. They are all man-made, and made, as it were, to order. Their viewpoints are diverse, because human cravings are diverse. If one wants quiet and repose in the Elysian fields after the heat and dust of a restless life, another wants the houris and almond trees to gratify one's wants which intensify the pleasurable sensations of an idle life. Contrariwise persons whose life upon earth is akin to hell need a more horrid portraiture of the netherland than those to whom the mere deprivation of their favoured pursuits would launch into a mental anguish compared to which the horrors of hell are but a crude pastime.

We may then safely premise that religion is a logical necessity to man to fill in the lacunae left vacant by science. The one fills by prophecy what the other cannot cover by ratiocination. Those, therefore, who decry religion as a snare and its institutions as a menace to human progress must not forget that no human device will stamp out religion, and if we can conceive of an Utopia in which the rule of life would be guided by reason we must not dismiss from our conception the misery of those who have no reason to guide them. Shall they then be left wholly guideless? Shall they, who cannot see, be refused the aid of those who profess to see for them? They may be themselves misguided, or they may be calculated charlatans anxious to profit by the weakness of their fellow-beings, but whatever may be the case, the fact remains that they are as much a social necessity as they are a social danger. The philosopher would let the religionist alone if he could be kept within his legitimate bounds. Let him peer into the Unknown of which the thinker knows not, let him offer an imaginary and attractive *el dorado* to those to whom the fancied beatitude of a future life gives solace to this. But this limit is seldom observed, nor is it possible to restrict them otherwise than by the rush of reason to dispel the idols of the market place. This is the arena for the conflict of Science with religion. The one addresses itself to the reality the other to the exuberance of human fancy fanned by human ambition to attain the unattainable, to idealize the real, and weave an imagery round the drab plain truths of life. The conflict between religion and science has been going on for time immemorial, and though religion has pilloried science and burnt its apostles meeting their truths with ruthless mendacity, science will continue to carry on its struggle, but whether it will ever triumph and knock off the shackles which religion has wrought around human endeavour can only be dimly divined. It is clear that the present century, and certainly the last decade, has shattered human belief in divine agency and the omnipotency of religion. It is beginning to be slowly realized that religion was invented to satisfy the human craving, but has lived to curb its manifold energies. But so long as science fails to plumb the depth of human ignorance religion will remain to regale the masses with its traveller's tales. And this will go on till man becomes more rational and less religious, more thoughtful and less superstitious, more determined to give a pause to his romantic fancy and less disposed to truckle to the fallacies of dogma.

In order to wean him from the confusion of ages what is required is a new method of education. Religion must be banished from the school curricula. The parental right to impose

upon his offspring his own religious idiosyncracies must be curbed by the State. It must stand for the elucidation of truth, for the development of human mind along the well-beaten track of known data and demonstrable knowledge. Education in the schools must be secular and that in the college sternly scientific. After the student has left the college let him delve in his hobbies—but so long as he is under tutelage let his mind not wander into the mysteries of after-life nor absorb its ready-made solutions. It is prophesied by the hierophants of religion that such an education would drive out all moral sense from the pupil and in a single generation degrade a god-fearing nation into a rabble of athiests. They, however, forget that it is much better to beget a race of truthful athiests than a rabble of religious hypocrites. What is good for the humanity? its training so that all that is highest, noblest and best in man should be given a chance to develop and subserve the cause of truth, or that a docile superstitious animalculæ be raised to carry on the tradition of their forbears and obey the behests of authority?

The problem is great and not only national, but international. The masses already steeped in the abysmal darkness of ages and surrounded by the phantoms of fear and dread of the unknown cannot be expected to take the lead. It is the thinking few all over the world who can combine to remove the religious menace to the growth of knowledge, and it is they who must stand and be ready to suffer the social martyrdom for their faith in the ultimate good of humanity as bound up with the study of reality and the banishment of religion from their academies.

NAGPUR.

HARISINGH GOUR.

INDIA AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS.

Pundit JWAHARLAL NEHRU.

AFTER a long period of not very splendid isolation India is again beginning to look to the outside world and to take interest in other countries. It is realised that the modern world is closely knit together and no part of it can ignore the rest. Science and industry and new methods of transportation have made each country dependent in a large measure on the others, and though the myth of nationalism flourishes and holds men's minds, it is an outworn creed and internationalism approximates more and more to reality. Wars can seldom be localised, nor can peace endure in a country when the rest of the world is at war. Idealists tell us that the only way to put an end to the ceaseless conflict between nations and to inaugurate an era of world peace is to create a super-state to which all nations will owe allegiance or to have a co-operative world commonwealth.

It is difficult for us in India to think of the larger issue, of world problems and world peace, when the problem that confronts us always is how to free ourselves from our present subjection. And yet our problem is but part of the larger one, and it may be that when we succeed in solving it we shall also have helped greatly in establishing world peace. If imperialism is the real cause of most of the exploitation and troubles in the world to-day, the classical and typical example of imperialism is the British Empire of India, and the freedom of India becomes an essential condition for world freedom.


Many of our friends in India and outside are therefore continually laying stress on the necessity for us to develop contacts with other countries so that we may appreciate the forces that are moulding the world today and be able to co-ordinate our activities to them; some of them tell us that we should co-operate with all other anti-imperialist forces to combat

imperialism; others favour an Asiatic federation; whilst a third group are sanguine enough to want us to utilise the machinery of the League of Nations for our benefit. But all these agree that international contacts are necessary for us. Some who are of a contrary opinion fear that too much of internationalism may make us forget the real work at home and make us imagine that we can achieve our freedom with the help of outsiders. The fear is a real one but perhaps it is a little exaggerated. No one who has come up against the hard realities of the struggle is likely to forget that there is little of charity in international dealings and no country can make good except through its own efforts.

The advantages of international contacts from a purely political viewpoint are evident enough. But there is another aspect of the question on which perhaps enough stress has not been laid.

Foreign rule and exploitation of a country have many sins to answer for. Some of the tragedies they bring in their train are obvious and frequent reference is made to them. But one unhappy, and yet unavoidable, consequence to which little attention is usually paid, is the concentration of nearly all activities in the struggle for freedom. The rich and many coloured life of a nation loses its variety and its diversity and only one hue is visible, brilliant enough at times, but usually a drab grey covering the uniform misery of the people. The creative spirit can find little expression and the strength and energy of the chosen in the land are diverted to the long fight for freedom. There are brilliant episodes in this fight when the soul of a whole people is exalted and for the sake of an ideal even men of common clay do heroic deeds. But this work is one of destruction in the main and destruction and creation seldom go together. Ireland offers us a sad and yet a noble example of such a struggle for freedom. For seven hundred years or more she carried on her fight for independence. Her history is full of heroism and sacrifice but the rich and noble culture that was hers has almost passed away. India is another sorry example of stagnation and cultural death brought on by long years of foreign rule.

And yet the struggle for political freedom brings with it an intense desire for one's own culture and traditions. The hatred of foreign rule extends to the foreigner's ways and institutions, and an escape is sought from them in dreams of the past when the foreigner was not there. We think of the golden age of past times, of Rama Raj. And this very looking back makes us still more stagnant and rigid and incapable of creative work. We do not try



to enrich the present with our thought and action. We merely worship the past and what we worship we make lifeless.

The culture of a people must have its roots in the national genius. It must smell of the soil and draw its inspiration from its past history. But it cannot live for ever on the earnings of its forefathers or on an old bank account to which nothing is added. It must be a live and growing thing responsive to new conditions and flexible enough to adapt itself to them. In India the moment we tried to make our culture rigid in order to protect it from foreign incursions we stopped its natural growth and slow paralysis crept in and brought it near to death. We talk vain-gloriously of our immortal civilisation, but what does it consist of today so far as the common people are concerned? Our religion is one of the kitchen, of what to touch and what not to touch, of baths and top-knots, of all manner of marks and fasts, and ceremonies that have lost all meaning; our very gods are manufactured in the factories of England or Japan; our music chiefly consists of painful noises which accompany processions and ceremonials and make the day or night almost unbearable, and usually result in broken heads, or the terrible din whereby our Muslim friends mourn an ancient tragedy that took place in Arabia twelve and a half centuries ago; our artistic cravings are satisfied with hideous prints from Germany; our literature largely consists of sentimental and soppy effusions; in our thought there is little new, we merely repeat and paraphrase and expound *ad nauseam* what was said ages ago, or else we denounce it equally irrationally. The few brilliant exceptions that we have produced in recent times only serve to heighten the surrounding gloom.

We had everything in the past that made for a rich and varied culture and a progressive civilisation. And yet we have landed ourselves in a stagnant quagmire from which escape is not easy. We can effectively escape from it only when the struggle for political independence is ended in our favour, and our energy can be diverted to more creative channels. But success in that struggle depends in some measure on our social and cultural progress. It is a vicious circle and we have to attack the enemy on all fronts, though necessarily the political and economic fronts will claim most attention.

Thus whether we consider our problems from the standpoint of politics or economics or of culture and civilisation in their widest meanings, we are driven to the conclusion that we must end the isolation of India and try to understand world currents and world happenings. We must in addition to our nationalism develop an internationalism which is prepared to profit by the

good things of other countries, and to co-operate with the progressive forces of the world. So far, practically our sole contact with the outside world has been through England and the English language. This has been unfortunate for we have seen the world through English eyes and with English prejudices. And even with England our relations could not be healthy. Between the rulers and the ruled there can be no wholesome co-operation.

Our international contacts must now therefore be largely with countries other than England. Only thus, can we gradually get out of the curious mentality of subservience to England, of the inevitability of the British connection, and see the world in proper perspective. Many of us imagine that because we are under British rule, England is the dominating force in the world today and we feel powerless before this Colossus. A wider knowledge of the world situation will convince us that England is no longer what she was and the days of British domination are numbered. But whatever the future of England may be the world is bigger than England and we cannot understand or profit by the varied cultures of different countries through England only.

We have had in our own day notable examples of eastern nations shaking the lethargy of ages and making rapid progress through contact with other countries. Every one knows of Turkey but an even more remarkable example is that of Afghanistan. In the course of a very few years Afghanistan has risen from being a back-water of Asia, a dependency of England to an independent position which commands respect everywhere. How did this happen except through the development of contacts with other countries? Today there are hundreds of young Afghan students in the universities of Europe. One finds them in large numbers in France and Italy and Germany and Turkey, even in Russia. But curiously enough out of the 1,600 or more young Afghans studying in Europe, there are hardly any in England. They prefer, and rightly so, Paris, Berlin, Constantinople, Rome and Moscow to Imperial London.

Afghanistan and Nepal have much in common. Their geographical and strategic position is similar, and till a decade ago there was little to choose between the two so far as their political position was concerned. A few years however have made a tremendous difference, and whilst Afghanistan is forging ahead and taking an effective part in world politics, Nepal still continues in the ancient rut and is daily becoming more subservient to British policy. The difference between the two has been caused principally by world contacts in the case of one and the entire absence of them in the case of the other. If the rulers of Nepal were farseeing

enough they would also claim their full independence and the right to determine foreign policy. They would also send their representatives to foreign countries and their students abroad to study the science and civilization of the modern world. No one, not even England can say them nay, and within a brief space of time they would make their country, rich in every thing today except wisdom and foresight, independent and strong and prosperous. But they live in their little shells isolated and ignorant of what happens elsewhere and their chief business appears to be to supply mercenary soldiers to England to be used against their own kith and kin in India.

Some amongst us feel that contact with the west is dangerous for our culture; it may not be able to survive the impact. If our culture is such a feeble thing the sooner it dies a natural death the better. But if there is any life left in it, it will derive fresh vigour from the healthy impact of other forces and will survive, changed it may be and more suited to the conditions of today, but still based fundamentally on the genius of the race. But the surest way of killing this culture of ours is to isolate it and keep it away from fresh air and make it die of suffocation.

International contacts are essential for India from every point of view. How then can we develop these contacts? Even today there are thousands of Indians, apart from students and labourers, settled in various parts of the world. One can find them not only in the frequented countries of western Europe, but in almost every country from China to Peru. There are exiles, who cannot return to their homes, traders, and adventurous spirits who have ventured out without help or favour and have made good. In India we discuss our inability to provide officers for our armies, but in distant countries Indians have risen to high military rank and have even commanded air forces. Unhappily however these Indians in foreign countries are completely cut off from their mother country. They are mostly forgotten by us and we can profit little by them, except in individual cases. Probably the only people who know much about them are the officers of the British Secret Service. It would be desirable however for our organisations to get into touch with these scattered children of the country, to help them where they can, and* to utilise their services for the service of the country whenever possible. There are many difficulties in the way, not the least of them being that most of these residents abroad are so much cut off from present day India that it is a little difficult for them to appreciate the conditions here. But nonetheless something may be done if an effort is made. The real difficulty in the past has been our fear of compromising ourselves before the British. For it is the

the privilege of our rulers, amongst other things, to decide what company we may keep.

To develop political contacts the straightest, though not the easiest, way is for the National Congress to appoint its representatives in certain foreign countries. A few places of world importance may be chosen for this purpose: Paris, the greatest international centre today, New York, Constantinople, or Angora for the middle East and the Islamic countries, Moscow, and Tokyo for the far East. These five places would cover all the live centres of world politics to-day. Through our representatives there we could keep in intimate touch with current happenings and with the men and women who count. We would also gradually build up a trained body of experts in international matters from whom will develop our diplomatic corps of the future. The difficulties in the way of the Congress are two-fold, one of finance and the other and the more serious one of finding suitable representatives. The Congress cannot send out second-rate men to represent it and unhappily we are very poor in politicians of ability who can be expected to undertake this work. There is such a lack of good workers at home that it is difficult to spare one of them. A third difficulty we might have to face would be due to the attitude of the British Government. They will not fancy the idea of our sending representatives abroad, specially to Moscow. But whatever the difficulties may be, if the Congress is really eager to do something in this direction there is little doubt that it could make a beginning.

Another way for us to develop international contacts would be for our chambers of commerce to keep representatives in some foreign countries. I was given to understand in the continent of Europe that such representatives, although they would be non-officials, would be treated with every consideration and every facility would be given to them. Their presence would be helpful in developing trade relations with countries other than England and thus in helping in the boycott of British goods. Machinery for use in India could be purchased at better rates than in England, and markets for Indian goods could be found. I have been told that the sports goods manufactured in India have been gradually spreading out in many countries. If our merchants and chambers of commerce develop direct relations with other countries they will gradually free themselves from the strangle hold of the British banks.

It is customary now for large numbers of professors and students to utilize their vacations in paying visits to foreign countries to study conditions there. Americans of this kind, probably because they have the most money, are very much in

evidence all over Europe, and even Russia is being invaded by them. I am afraid our students are too poor to visit foreign countries during the vacations but our professors should certainly follow the examples of their confreres in other countries. Our universities should send deputations specially with a view to study educational methods and other problems which might help. This is most necessary in the case of Russia which is passing through a most interesting and instructive phase and offers problems very similar to ours.

Lastly I would suggest that a definite and concerted attempt be made to divert the stream of Indian students which goes for study to England to other countries. Mere considerations of self-respect ought to have been sufficient to induce our students to keep away from England. We have all heard of the treatment that is meted out to them there, the difficulty of finding lodgings because most people object to Indians, the want of facilities for study, and the aggressive and offensive social atmosphere which an Indian has to encounter in England. But even apart from self-respect it is well known that continental and American universities teach much better and more thoroughly. If the Indian Civil Service or Indian Medical Service or the profession of the bar is the objective of an Indian youth then he has little choice. He must go to England and face all the discomfitures and difficulties which are the lot of Indian students there. But if he desires to do any kind of creative or useful work and not be a mere hanger on to the British Government or a member of an overcrowded and parasitic profession, then it is folly for him to go to England. He will get the best of training—Scientific, technical, medical, surgical and cultural—elsewhere and will be treated with far greater courtesy and consideration.

The question of language usually keeps many people away from the continental countries. It is certainly a handicap to have to learn a new language suddenly in the middle of one's university career. But the difficulty is not so great as it appears and the reward of knowing an additional language is certainly worth all the trouble taken. From the national point of view it is very desirable for Indians to acquire a knowledge of other languages besides English. Educated men in India should try to know at least one foreign language. Too many of them know English already and there is no danger of English suffering from want of patronage so long as we remain a dependency and even after. It cannot displace our mother tongue, but it has become, as a friend of mine put it, the step-mother tongue of our intellectuals. It is therefore necessary for us to encourage other foreign languages. Our universities have not done much, so far in

this respect and there is great room for improvement. Even where other foreign languages are taught the medium of instruction is English, which is an exceedingly foolish way of teaching a third language. The average student would often have to translate twice before he can express himself to begin with in the new language. As a matter of fact there are certain grammatical resemblances between Hindustani and for instance French which would facilitate the learning of French through Hindustani direct. Our schools and colleges should therefore start the teaching of foreign languages directly through Hindustani or Bengali or any other language of the country, without the intervention of English.

A knowledge of these foreign languages will make it easier for students to go to France or Germany or Italy or Russia. But even for those who do not go out of the country it will open out new literatures, new worlds of thought and action; and it will enable them to follow the throbbing day-to-day life of another nation by means of its publications, its journals and reviews.

"To understand all is to forgive all", says the French proverb, and to understand another people and another nation is to like them and appreciate their good points. International contacts promote mutual comprehension and the spirit of good will and are thus the surest guarantees of an enduring peace.

ALLAHABAD.

JWAHARLAL NEHRU.

COMMUNISM.

Prof. K. T. SHAH.

THE rapid growth of socialistic thought has been precipitated in the last fifty years as much by the growth and progress of the Industrial Revolution, and the consequent mechanisation of industry, as by the breakdown of custom and status, which had previously reconciled the individual to the lot in which it had pleased Providence to throw him; and which now makes the individual increasingly discontented, because he increasingly finds more room and less means for self-development and self-expression. The progress of mechanical industry, ever since the Revolution commenced, has resulted in the production of material utilities in such abundance, that, theoretically speaking, the poorest individual of our times is able to command a standard of life which would have appeared a veritable luxury even to princes two hundred years ago. In practice, however, thanks to a number of social institutions developed in the past owing to the exigencies of those days, - such as private property and its transmission from dead to the living, the social aspect of this growth of the wealth of mankind manifested itself in a growing intensification of riches and poverty at either end of the social scheme. The spectacle of great riches is by no means peculiar to our age. But the perception of the injustice of such excessive riches, so much that the owner does not often know what to do with his wealth, and frequently uses it in the most wasteful manner, is peculiarly modern. The injustice is brought home to the ordinary individual nowadays more than ever, because the individual comes into intimate contact with the process of production, though his role is confined to merely devoting himself to a small operation out of a multitude necessary for the particular production he may be engaged in. As he gets only a mere wage that is seldom greater than what just suffices to keep body and soul together on a most modest standard of living, while for undergoing no labour like his own his employer seems to take away the portion of the worker several times over, the worker naturally feels there is something rotten in the State of

Denmark. On the other hand, the practice of free competition, made almost into a fetish by the writers and statesmen of the last generation and their predecessors, ended only in the most anarchical exhibition of the brutal side of man. Catchwords like "the survival of the fittest" or "The Struggle for Existence" were used by half-baked economists and would-be scientists out of the context. They thus gave a turn to the social structure that no thinking reasonable human being could welcome. In course of time the competition-maniacs themselves perceived the immense wastage of a system of unrestrained competition; and so they began to evolve forms, which, while keeping up the fiction of competition, aimed at effectually destroying free competition in the only field in which it was harmless. The Trust and the Syndicate and Cartel were made expressly to restrict and to destroy competition among producers. And when the Trade Union perceived the possibility of concerted action for benefiting the workers, they sought a steady improvement in the conditions and emoluments of work through its means, and so to solve the one problem of the age, which now appears solvable only by the wholesale socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange.

This genealogy of Socialism is common to all the variety of forms and shades that that principle takes to day. It is, however, not completely satisfying as an explanation of the root origin of the ideals embraced in the term Socialism. The expression, besides, does not do full justice to the meaning embodied in it, at least as used in common parlance and everyday polemics. Socialism, in its several forms, is both an ideal as well as a scheme of life. It arises in both these aspects from : (1) a realisation of the immense waste of human energy involved unavoidably in the exclusive, proprietary, capitalistic organisation of society, and (2) an intense desire to seek the ways and means for so arranging everyday life for every human being as to dispense with this wastage to the utmost of our ability.

On the ideal side, Socialism, - particularly in its most complete comprehensive form, aims at securing to each individual all that the physical and mental needs of that individual demand, so that that individual may be in the fullest position to realise most completely the purpose of his being, and so to contribute the utmost possible to the well-being of his fellows. "To each according to his needs; from each according to means" sums up the ideal of the communist tersely enough to point to its root origin. The communist has perceived that there is, as things stand now, an immense disparity between the aggregate productive energy of the human race and its total consumption capacity. Man is a consumption unit beginning to count months before he is born,

But, with the progress of civilisation in mankind, the same human being does not become a fully developed productive unit until he is well into adolescence. Man has this trait in common with all animals marching onwards into the scale of evolution. Their young ones need a varying period for training to join in the productive process of life—in the full functioning of all the powers, such as they may be, of each such animal. Man being at the top of the scale of evolution necessarily needs the longest period for such training and fitting himself for the job before him; and the period, moreover, increases as the individual in the several groups within his species is more advanced, more sophisticated, more complexly developed. All that while, however, he continues to remain a consumption unit of a particularly exacting type, so that no inconsiderable proportion of the total adult productive energy of the species has to be diverted to the nursing and guarding and teaching and training of the child and the youth and the adolescent.

Who pays for this unproductive employment,—materially speaking,—of a large section of the human race? Why, the adult worker during the period when his productive faculties are at their best. It must be noted in passing at this stage that not all adults of matured faculties and sound productive capacity, are engaged during these years either productively or at all, thanks chiefly to the artificial, irrational, organisation of the modern commercial and capitalistic society, with its heavy incubus of a class of idle, wasteful, reckless rich. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that all adults, sound in body and mind, are productive workers, what is their total productive energy? And what is its relation to the demands upon it? Obviously man's powers of mind as well as body begin to decline and decay after life's fiftieth or at most sixtieth milestone is past, even in the most healthy and wealthy communities. Assuming the proper age for necessary retirement from strenuous productive work, the right age for compulsory pensioning, as it were, to be sixty; assuming the period of preparation to extend from birth to twenty; and taking the normal span of human life in the best cared for communities to be seventy—the Three—Score—Years— and ten of the Bible—nearly half the normal life is unavoidably non-productive; even though during both these periods at either extremity every human being functions fully as a consumption unit. 721

There is thus a deficiency between the sum total of our production energy and the aggregate of our consumption needs in the proportion of one to two. But even this is not enough. For the under-lying assumption so far has been that the adults are all working productively, materially speaking; and that they are at work *all* the days of the year, and *all* the hours of the day.

Obviously this cannot be. Man can work at his best for hardly more than eight hours per working day; so that the actual total production-energy is really not more than a third of the aggregate potential productive capacity of *all* the adults in a community employed productively. As a matter of fact, quite apart from the root vice of modern proprietary and commercial society, not all the adults are engaged, during their productive period, productively. Economic organisation, in almost every field, is still far from perfect. In agriculture, which still affords employment to more than half the human race, seasonal exigencies alone prevent man working for more than 200 days out of 365 each year. In the mechanised industry, too, no man can keep up steady labour for more than 300 days out of 365. And, added to these, there must be further deductions from the sum total of our production-energy on account of: (1) the social maladjustment creating and maintaining a class of the idle rich and congenital wastrels; (2) biological misapprehension, causing or allowing unemployment or malemployment for reasons of sex; (3) political misconstruction and social misfits requiring but not justifying—a horde of unredeemed parasites, euphemistically described as statesmen and soldiers, politicians and prostitutes, paupers and thieves, missionaries and ministering angels of all sorts. 721

Let us now recast, in the light of the foregoing remarks, the equation between supply and demand, between the production energy and the consumption requirements. Barely one-tenth of the aggregate energy of mankind is actually available, even in the best organised modern communities, for material production. The total consumption requirements of mankind on the other hand, are represented by the full force of humanity. They are, in proportion, more by those who themselves contribute little or nothing to producing material utilities. In proportion as a human being is disabled from production by age, or sex, or bodily infirmity, or economic incapacity, or social malorganisation, the consumption needs of that person are particularly greater. Supply can, therefore, equal demand, only if the actual producers impose on themselves a self-denying ordinance, and forego their seeming right to the whole produce of their labour. That is, of course, if we assume it to be the fundamental and infeasible right of every human being born amidst us to a decent, human, equal, share of life and its opportunities for self-development and self-realisation.

Hence the communist ideal: from each according to his means so that to each we may ensure according to his needs. This must be accomplished the moment our eyes are opened, if we would not have the inevitable wastage of human life and energy to be still

greater than it is today. But how is the accomplishment to be effected? Obviously, the groups and units now in possession of exclusive opportunities for self-expression will not suffer themselves to be deposed from their advantageous position of their own accord. They fatten upon the weakness, ignorance, and superstition of the multitudes that they have managed to keep out of the latter's human heritage for centuries. How can they be expected, humanly speaking, to forego their chances to indulge their brute instinct of preying upon the weaker? But, by parity of reasoning, how can we expect those who have been kept out of their due to ignore their rights? Class consciousness is inevitable, even if it seems unwelcome to those now in the saddle. And intensifying class consciousness must inexorably lead to class conflict, or to social revolution, which is the only means of rectifying the balance, and of purging human life once and for all of the original sin of private property and its senseless transmission in accordance merely with the accident of birth.

The term *Revolution* generally terrifies the representatives of the classes who have the best reason to apprehend the consequences to themselves of that mode of social readjustment. They conveniently forget that Revolution, as the expression is generally understood, is only one of the forms of social evolution, even as an earthquake is one of the natural modes of geological evolution. And because they command all the key-positions, as it were, leading to a domination of the mind and body of the people, they have succeeded in inculcating a healthy dread of the very name Revolution amongst the wage-slaves and the proletariat in our modern civilisation.

The mere dread, however, of a social Revolution has never prevented its occurrence, wherever the position is ripe for its advent. The communist would deliberately plan for it as the only means of realising his ideal, though it may be regarded as an open question how far such deliberate planning for a revolution works out as per programme. As a preliminary, he must declare a relentless war on ignorance and its brood of superstition, as well as on exploitation. The communist cannot but be opposed to the Throne and the Altar. The priest and the prince are alike a nuisance and an offence in his eye, as much as the capitalist and the proprietor, in so far as each stands out as a type of exploiters. Likewise the communist must also deny any kind or shape of private property in any form or guise of productive utility. Note, in passing, the apparent paradox that the communist is not so much against *property* as against *proprietors*, not so much against capital as against capitalists, or rather against Capitalism. For property, in so far as it is a means of production, and capital, in the sense of

an indispensable adjunct in production, we *must* have, if we would not stop the very process of production. The Communist would be the very last to agree to any suggestion which would increase the already very serious discrepancy between supply and demand, between production-possibility and consumption-necessity. He, therefore, encourages an all-round intensive mechanisation of the productive processes, with as much fanaticism as he invests in the disestablishment of any kind or degree of privileged classes that would prey upon those lacking in the privileges. Looking upon power-driven machinery as the only means to make up the equilibrium of demand and supply in human society, he necessarily must insist on all-round mechanisation. But if the central aim of such a mechanisation is not to be defeated altogether or perverted to the exclusive advantage of an unproductive few; *i.e.* if the surplus of produce due to mechanical power aiding human ingenuity is not to go to a select few only, the communist must take every precaution he can to prevent the unequal distribution of the produce regardless of productive effort on the part of the worker. He thus insists on holding all forms of property, all means and adjuncts of production, including human labour of all kinds, in common; so that the same might be employed for the common good by common consent, and secure eventually an equal share of life and its chances for all.

This is a curious ending to the modern industrial worker's first depressions on sight of a machine or labour-saving device. The first industrial workers almost always opposed machinery, and sought to break down--burn down factories where the machines were housed, any time their sense of grievance against machinery for causing their unemployment became unbearable. But they mistook their unemployment to be caused by machinery, whereas in reality it was caused by a faulty social system, which permitted such an unequal and inequitable distribution of the surplus produced. It is the same faulty reasoning which even now inspires in certain quarters the demand for a reversion to the non-mechanical age, to the handloom and the charka, as the only salvation of the social sore. By reducing the mass of material utilities producible in any community, we can have no reasonable hope to improve the real or even the apparent plight of the worker and the peasant. The real problem of the age lies in the department of Distribution, not in Production. As to the latter the more we increase the volume of available utilities,—and that can only be done by intensive all-round mechanisation,—the greater chance there would be of a better dividend for each producing unit in the community. And if

in spite of increasing the volume of material production, we are still faced with the spectacle of inequality,—not due to any initial disadvantage, infirmity or handicap peculiar to a given individual—we must necessarily scrutinise our organisation and mechanism of distribution to find out what and where are things amiss, and not upset the fountain-head of all production by denying the value of modern power-driven machinery.

In Russia to-day they are intensifying mechanisation with a grotesque, almost an indecent, rapidity. The gibe springs unavoidably to lips schooled in the clap-trap of all the superstition of an effete commercialism, that the Soviet regime is utterly soul-less. As though any government, — any social system, — ever had a soul, or could possibly have one! The purpose of all such accusations is to divert attention from the main achievement of the communist regime in Russia. Neither as an ideal of life, nor as a scheme of social organization, can we rightly say that the pure spirit and undiluted essence of communism is at work in Russia to-day. They started with it in 1917; but the combined might of circumstances, prejudices, and international hostilities has been too powerful for them. They have had to modify their programme; and at certain points to retrace their advance. The peasants have had to be allowed individuality of possession in the land confiscated from the privileged classes of the *ancien regime*, and intended to be held in common. And though in other industries the so-called New Economic Policy has not quite discarded, — as the rich imagination of their critics would suggest, — the essence of the communist ideal, inequality of a sort has made its reappearance in that department also. The workers' and the peasants' lot is nevertheless far superior in Russia to-day to any it was under the 'Tsarist regime; or to what it could be in any other country where these classes, in spite of being the only real producers of material utilities, are still compelled to remain mere wage-slaves. If the lot of the Russian worker and peasant to-day appears inferior on comparison to that of an industrial worker in the United States, that is largely because, with the best will in the world, the Soviet rulers have not been able yet to push on mechanisation to the extent and degree it obtains in the Western Republic. The potentiality of Russian productivity is yet unknown, even in Russia, but the ambitions of the Russian authorities must necessarily be kept in check, as long as the rest of the world refuses to fall in line with the Russian methods.

Herein lies the condition for the successful operation of perfect communism, which all its critics deliberately ignore, and which some of its professors carefully conceal under a sense of misplaced pride. Communism to be really successful— to yield the

best fruits—must be universal. All the fetish and formulas of nationalism and patriotism are the deliberate creations of the privileged classes to keep up their privileged position by keeping disunited and even at enmity the workers of the world for the sake of the drones. But while they held in their foul grip the mentality of countless millions of workers—even if they are mere wage-slaves,—any single country attempting at reconstruction, on fairer and more economic lines, of its own social system, must break down at every point of contact with the unsocialised—and, therefore, unsympathetic communities. Russia's experience suffices to prove beyond question that proposition; and the same must also suffice as proof for the corollary that further ventures in the potentialities of production cannot be made,—further experiments in the conservation of human energy cannot be attempted,—until the reign of reason is more general than it is to-day.

The achievement of Russia is thus both a model and a warning. Without a Social Revolution the accomplishment of the ideal—or even an approximation to it,—is impossible. A Revolution is a revolution, with a reasonable questionmark as to its being necessarily bloody. If bloodshed occurs inevitably in a social revolution, the greed of the possessing parasitic, privileged classes must be held to be responsible in at least an equal degree with the frenzy of fanaticism that needs must take possession of the new converts to communism, who are perceiving for the first time the criminal injustice done to them for generations. *The modus operandi* of the social transformation, whatever its salient features while in the process of accomplishment, must end in the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. For, if the injustice of ages is to be redressed, power under the changed regime cannot be vested in the individuals drawn from classes held to be offending *ex hypothesi*. Russia thus has had to disfranchise all those classes which in the Tsarist regime monopolised privileged positions. The nobles and the priests and the huge capitalistic employers have no vote, just as imbeciles and idiots have none. The class that can alone achieve results is the class which has had most to suffer in the past; for they only know exactly where the shoe pinches who have worn it. Fortunately, in spite of the assinine organisation of our modern commercial society, the real workers still outnumber the drones with all their *valetaille*—in the proportion of nine to one in most countries. So there is no great danger of substantial injustice in the reorganised society. With the liberation of the human spirit from the shackles and trammels of the modern wage-slavery, we may confidently expect such an advance in the aggregate of man's command over the yet unknown resources of

our ancient heritage, that the total mass of the material utilities available for distribution would be amply abundant for all the needs of human beings, on an infinitely superior standard of living. None need be destitute, for none would be a wastrel; and though some unfortunates—unequally endowed by what the superstition of our age calls Mother Nature,—may seem to be burdens, the ingenuity of man and the progress of Science would then be free to apply itself to solve the mystery of what we now label the inequalities of heredity. And Beyond what? Those who believe in the Destiny of man need not waste their faith on vagaries of an unknown god, nor need they seek to peer further in the vistas of future now when the root problem of merely material inequalities still remains unsolved.

BOMBAY.

K. T. SHAH.

THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE.*

A CRITICAL SURVEY.

I.

By B. K. MALLIK, M.A. (Oxon.)

Perhaps it is not even good taste to suggest, at this late hour, that this eminently readable book still remains to be understood ; but that seems to be the only way, however crude, I might offer my apology for this belated survey. I am aware how Oxford eagerly came to these lectures while the boats were busy splashing colours in the "Eights." I am aware, again, how even the warily scrupulous dons appreciated them, quietly ; and if it is not injudicious, I am aware, also, how the Professor with his devastating humanity precipitated almost a crisis in the Manchester College if not in the Christian Church. But what, to my infinite shame, I am not aware of, is whether the real point of the Professor ever crossed the seas ; or if, by any chance or mischance, it actually did, whether it could have stayed behind either by the nearer 'Isis' or the more distant "Cam." This is rather unfortunate, and I am the more distressed for it as I find, at the root of my misfortune, an acute suspicion that, perhaps the European mind would never see the Hindu point however heroically it might try. Whether this is my personal pathology or it is truly grounded in realities I do not know ; but what seems to have been almost rooted in me especially after a long sojourn in Europe, is the conviction that even the days of Vivekananda are gone, once and for ever. What this exactly means is certainly not what I obviously say ; but it was high time our Swamijis had realised the decline of those heroic days and the steady rise of "catholic wrath" in their trail. I would not deny, however, that a Russell or a Jacks, might, still behave, at times, as if the citadel of European absolutism had well-nigh capitulated. On the contrary we might even witness stray wanderings either into the vividness of our Rabindranath or the chastened twilight of

* The Hindu View of Life by S. Radhakrishnan, George Allen & Unwin 5s.

Sabarmati. But the western world, let it never be supposed, would cheerfully lose its "brass" if only to spare the Hindu faith. Even while it might be breaking down or tottering for a fall, it will have at least enough 'Shaws' and 'Mussolinis' to storm down the Hindu pride. But I have no mind to embroil Professor Radhakrishnan in this hopeless alarm. It might even hurt him if any of his friends suggested that he had been quietly sheltering such an unkind feeling against the stalwarts of the European home. As a matter of fact, judged by his obvious moods, he might well be credited rather with a softness for the European pride. At any rate, it would be fair to him to suppose that Professor Radhakrishnan would not have gone all the way to Europe if he had not believed in some real fellowship between the Hindu and the European. And, evidently it was this belief, more than any other, which helped him to put before the British public, the Hindu wisdom, perhaps for the first time, in its crystal purity. Never before had the University of Oxford the rare chance of listening to one who was, still, an independent Hindu, in spite of the besetting, European age. Here was a talk as brilliantly modern as you please, and yet it all flowed from one who was scrupulously a Hindu though curiously enough with neither its aloofness nor orthodoxy. Perhaps, it is too early yet to canonise Professor Radhakrishnan, but, indeed, there was so much of open and fresh air in his presentation side by side with keen advocacy, so much of humility and love along with a rigidity. And yet the lectures were, one and all, an intellectual treat, as strongly independent in tone as they were fresh and original in form. And why should it make any difference whether the Professor was understood or not? After all, the main issue never was, as it were, to sweep together the Hindu and the European. Fellowship was not a matter even of argument, much less of chance. And if it so happened that the distance between the Hindu and the European still did not shrink, even after the Professor had spoken, perhaps it was a calamity which even the Gods could not mend. Indeed, it need not be even officious to add that there must be considerable happenings in this universe of ours before we could seriously contemplate even an intimate alliance between them. At the very least, to raise only a practical issue, a quite fresh and original mode of social existence has to be devised; and that, for the whole of the human family; and, if the prospects are really to change, to any advantage, at least, the persistent claims for liberty and equality must be faced. But nobody can deny that it has been necessary for some time, precisely in the interest of that fusion, that the Hindu point of view should be put side by side with the European; and preferably by a Hindu who perchance had not lost himself. And that is precisely what, to his great credit, Professor

Radhakrishnan had undertaken to do; and he has done it, as a matter of fact, ever so well that he might well be rid of his European fame before even the next impact was due. For, after all, with all his humanity and goodwill, he did not quite succeed in showing how the European could be assimilated into the Hindu scheme. As a matter of fact, his real achievement lay, not so much in building up a common human family, as in defining the spirit and unity of the Hindu view, in shaping, as it were, its central theme. And one might be pardoned if one suggested that the more the western mind went into it the more was it bound to retreat either to its age-long antipathy or even to open hostility. Besides, this uneasy sense could only deepen as Professor Radhakrishnan did not conclude either as a mere historian or as an advocate of Hinduism but even rose to the prophetic pitch of offering its basic principles for the reconstruction of the human home. Perhaps the mood of the Prophet never left the Professor from the beginning of his meteoric tour right up to its very end. Perhaps, it was this mood, more than any other, which carried the day for him in the camp of his antagonists; for, after all, the European with all his loud insistence on liberty and equality always wanted to worship either a hero or a prophet if only to soothe his flaming soul. But let us proceed to find out what precisely, in his opinion, was the Hindu view especially in its relation to the Mahomedan and the Christian. And if it is sufficiently integral and unique as he thinks it is, let us see how it really meets the problems of the modern age as it is reputed to have done those of Classical and Medieval India.

There is, at least, one other obvious point to consider though only, as a preliminary viz., why did the Professor raise this issue at all, and at this late hour of the day? It sounds rather strange that a scheme which has stood out to times for hundreds of centuries, should have to make good its integrity to a recent and modern curiosity. At the very worst, its conceit--it was not a fraud by any means--might well have been construed as its bonafides. Did not "a mere accident" by an old adage, sanction even territorial dignity? But it was, as well, that the question was put, for the answer to it was owed by the Hindu to his antagonist, at least, in common courtesy. The modern mind or more strictly, the modern European mind, under a severe stress, came to entertain a doubt; and, what is more, the exigencies of political and economic existence made it rather unusually restive. How painfully did it not split even womanly modesty in the glare of the public gaze? How shamefully did it not knock about an otherwise peaceful soul? Whatever the pathos, the more Miss Mayo tore her hair

to sweep a Hindu's door-mat or recklessly piled up dirt as if to close up the public thoroughfare, the more she reflected the scorching agony of the Western pride. But apart from the question of laying this scorching doubt, a fresh interpretation of the Hindu scheme, perhaps, was due on its own account. A social scheme, after all, is not so much dead wood; so that each age has, not only, to recapitulate the old memories—even to the extent of exceeding its historic limits—but to put out, if possible, the whole structure in a form which only the latest experiences could devise. Perhaps even Viswamitra and Buddha did not put the question about its bonfides or integrity as the modern mind finds it necessary to do; and perhaps, our answer, if we can find any, might be equally peculiar enough.

But, in any case, it is necessary that we should look into the heart of the doubt which provoked the question; if only because:— (a) It ran out of its European home to infect even some of the honest and indigenous souls, (b) It might help us to see the point of Radhakrishnan's answer, the more easily, precisely because it would put the charges against Hindu integrity definitely.

Broadly speaking the doubt is based on a two-fold charge, viz, (a) That the Hindu society is a 'medley of practices or a museum of races, manners and faiths', (b) That the Hindu Polity makes no room for justice in its economy, i.e. for the freedom of the individual. Both in its responsible and popular mood, the European mind has, for long, questioned if the Hindu body of diverse races, faiths and practices could conceivably form a systematic unity. Was it not, on the contrary, as a matter of fact, but a hopeless gamble at cheap or even mock humanity? Any European not necessarily an Englishman, might be found, to be repeating this ancient doubt whether in strict, diplomatic confidence or in the exuberance of religious heat. On the other hand, in a different mood and under altogether different conditions, did it equally seriously question if the deliberate, over-centralisation of "caste" did not, after all, cut out the initiative and inspiration of the individual by an arbitrary regulation even about the details of human behaviour. How much of the uniqueness of the individual or the opportunities for a strictly individual life, could possibly survive even after this steady, and incessantly benevolent lead?

Obviously, the charges between them produced a contradiction. But is it, one might still ask, inevitable that the diversity of faiths and practices, as are justly associated with the Hindu Polity, was bound to cut across its unity, or that the caste-regulated individual was fated necessarily to miss his freedom altogether?

We happen to believe that no such calamity ever crossed the Hindu horizon ; at any rate Radhakrishnan is emphatic that there was a definite central purpose running through the entire history of Hindu culture which, instead of despoiling the individual of his birthright, freedom, rather guaranteed its security. What this central unity is, and how it preserved "freedom", especially according to the writer, we will, soon, have the opportunity to see ; as a matter of fact, our review of his work will consist mainly of a critical analysis of his ideas of 'freedom' and 'unity'. But before we proceed to discuss them, it might be, as well, if we contemplated, for a moment, the Hindu social scheme itself, if only to visualise the ground and origin of the charges. The persistence of the doubt is, by no means, an evidence of its intelligent appreciation ; and it need not be superfluous to do it justice by forcing it, as it were, from the very heart of the social scheme.

Obviously the difficulty about the Hindu scheme is not on the score of its being a social system ; there could be nothing in a social scheme as such *i.e.* a group of diversities, which need have isolated the Hindu scheme from its antagonist, the European, Christian or Mahommadan. As a social scheme, it was bound to be constituted by diversities with reference to which alone its unity had a sense. At least the priest, the soldier and the working man, for instance, had to be there in any scheme as, after all, it was, if anything, but an aggregation of diverse human interests. If, however the doubt still persistently arose about the Hindu scheme it must have been provoked by some peculiarity in the nature of its diversity. We have to assume that there must have been some special feature about the Hindu diversity which, while it isolated the Hindu scheme from its hereditary rivals, at the same time, set a doubt on the trail of its isolation. As a matter of fact, the peculiarity seems to have arisen as the result of a deliberate preservation of every conceivable type and form of life simultaneously, instead of only a selection from among their multiple varieties. For instance, while a European or a Semitic system happened to sanction only one form of marriage or one form of worship—whatever that might be,—the Hindu system sanctioned almost every form. As we shall presently see, the Polytheist and the Monotheist had equally a chance in the Hindu family exactly as the Polygamist and the Monogamist. Why however, the Hindu genius chose to build on such a peculiar plan is just the point at issue, but it was certainly not to cultivate a mood of romancing. On the contrary, the Hindu must have worked with a conviction which was less anxious 'to create or write human history' than to reproduce,

if possible, the cosmic ground-plan as if its model was the cosmic spirit itself, as it was perpetually lost in the reflection of its eternal history. What this precisely means, and whether it did not, after all, run close, to an apocalyptic dream, is another story; but it was not possible, certainly, that the European mind also, would look in the same direction, much less sympathise with this wide-reaching ambition. For, on the whole, it was 'History' and not 'totality' that appealed to the European genius more; and "selection" was the key note of its activity even while it was apocalyptic in its rarer mood. Besides, the social process, like any other was, to it, an evolution which did not preserve what is even technically called the 'earlier' or the 'less complete'; nor certainly gave a chance to the 'false' or the 'irregular'. Whether it was classical and medieval, or savage and barbarous, with the European, the interest, in question, had to go the way of doom if it happened to be "earlier" or truly primitive, not to say false and mistaken. The law of evolution was transcendence and supersession instead of preservation and continuance; so that unity was well nigh inconceivable if it had to eke out its existence on the combined fortunes of the so-called "earlier" and the "later". The Hindu scheme, naturally, was not even a cosmopolitan attempt to the European mind, like the "League of Nations"; nor certainly a 'concourse' like the late Austrian Empire or the still existing British ambition. It was really anti-social and anarchic if it was, at all, a logical and decent performance. No doubt the late Austrian Empire had, at least, the race problem and Russia and China even the religious problem in addition, while the British Empire came to hold by a peculiar chance, the Hindu system itself as one of its dark units; but none of these practised the diabolic art of making the "Lamb and the Lion" drink from the same spring i.e. of fusing such apparent contradictories as 'monogamy' and 'polygamy' into the same crucible. The British Empire, again, was even supposed to have had a mission in spite of its strenuous history; and if Providence had not passed it on to some remote generation in the far-off future, it might yet have seen to it that the Hindu scheme was smashed to bits by its own social and political dead-weight. Not even its worst enemies whether inside or outside its economy, ever advocated its wholesale assimilation. And if one, for the moment, looked back to its "political model" or its "cultural pattern" in classical history even the most liberal mood behind "Jus Gentium" or the "Platonic adventure" need not be supposed to have dreamt of the Hindu vision in its bid whether for 'Universal citizenship' or for 'immaculate perfection.' And it makes no difference whether one looked to Imperial

achievement or Humanitarian movement. Not even a trace of the Hindu idea of Toleration would be found whether in the Stoic or in his rival, the Christian or even the Mohammadan humanity. The note of universalism that they all struck though eminently brilliant and far reaching, fell far short of the evolutionary plan, not to say, the cosmic; precisely because its one aim was to level down the barriers inside a selected area, to standardise individuals, instead of a 'chosen race' or a 'chosen class.'

Almost by common consent, therefore, the Hindu system could be taken as, at least, unique, without a parallel anywhere in the history of the human race. At any rate it was this uniqueness which consisted in systematising the "heterogenous," which led the European mind to doubting if it could possibly have a central purpose or system at all. As luck would have it, what the Hindu happened to believe to be the only true form of unity, the European frankly suspected to be but a symbol of anarchy. Why this difference arose is another question, but once the Hindu came to hold so strongly that heterogeneity could not only be systematised but were the only media through which a 'society' could be formed, the other doubt, *i.e.*, about the absence of freedom, could not be very long in coming. Whether the Hindu would admit it as a matter of fact or not, the individual in his system had to stand despoiled of his free activity exactly to the same extent as he had security. So that it was not to be expected that the European should not accuse the Hindu of injustice if not of even crudity at times, Whether he was right or wrong in his accusation is another question; whether it was a shame on the head of the innocent Hindu is still a debatable point. It might be only an irony of fortune at the worst or even a blessing at the best. At any rate, the individual was not meant to be a mere tool or grind; on the contrary, if he was so frankly stripped of his social birthright, at all, it was only to guarantee his "preservation" on the one hand and 'spiritual fortune' on the other. But let us proceed to study Radhakrishnan's reply to the charges. We have had enough of the charges and the doubt.

He of course, does not take it for granted that it was not necessary to define the Hindu system; on the contrary he begins his lectures straightway by telling us precisely how difficult it was to define the term "Hindu." He says, "To many it seems to be a name without any content. It is a museum of beliefs, a medley of rites, or a mere map, a geographical expression. Its content, if it has any, has altered from age to age, from

community to community. It meant one thing in the Vedic period, another in the Brahmanical and a third in the Buddhist. It means one thing to the Saivite, another to the Vaishnavite, and a third to the Sakta." But the difficulties do not embarrass him; at any rate they did not precipitate a suspense, for one thing, about its historic continuity. On the contrary we find him arguing with great confidence about its unity from the two outstanding features in its career :-

(a) Endurance for hundreds of centuries, (b) Parentage of ever so many centres of culture. How could such a classic culture continuously endure and inspire so many other centres and yet never crystallise into a central unity?

But it was not humanly possible that the Professor of all others would pamper the European pride, much less stimulate the classic delusion that 'nothing moves in this universe except the Greek pride.' The utmost that he could gracefully concede to Greece was a monopoly in the European zone provided that, at least, the Asiatic sovereignty was reserved for the Hindu claim. Perhaps it is not altogether impossible that the facts of history might, to some extent, at least, bear him out, but what a comforting solution of the Indo-Greek controversy for the rest of the humunity? And who knows but Spengler after all might be more in the right than the Greek pride? Let us quote: "The dictum that, if we leave aside the blind forces of nature, nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin, has become a commonplace with us. But it is not altogether true. Half the world moves on independent foundations which Hinduism supplied. China and Japan, Tibet and Siam, Burma and Ceylon look to India as their spiritual home. The civilisation itself has not been a shortlived one. Its historic records date back for over four thousand years, and even then it had reached a stage of civilisation which has continued its unbroken, though at times slow and almost static course, until the present day. It has stood the stress and strain of spiritual thought and experience for more than four or five milleniums". The point that he came to make next was, perhaps, less controversial, or altogether immune, viz., that the Hindu culture was neither an Island culture nor even a mere semicontinental attempt. Sooner or later not less than 2,000 miles in length and 1,800 miles in breadth, came to contribute towards its vividly huge proportions. This by itself, was not extraordinary there was at least, a parallel; but it did not mean that it was more a mere 'regional' produce or a gift of 'natural selection' than a civilisation. He quotes Vincent Smith, "India beyond all doubt possesses a deep underlying fundamental unity, far more profound than that

produced either by geographical isolation or by political superiority. The unity transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners and sect." The point is that the Hindus remain, "as such a distinct cultural unit with a common history, a common literature and a common civilisation" and, one may add, in spite of their 'regional peculiarity' and a deep debt of gratitude to 'culture contacts'. Why, indeed, should 'region' and 'selection' control the Hindu destiny any more or any less than they are supposed to have done the rest of the human cultures? But the point which comes up for discussion immediately after is really the main issue and naturally most intensely controversial, viz. the nature of its unity. And it was all to the good that the Professor had actually devoted to it practically the whole of his lectures. He says "We see that the Hindu recognises one supreme spirit, though different names are given to it. In his social economy he has many castes but one society. In the population there are many races and tribes, but all are bound together by one common spirit. Though many forms of marriage are permitted, there is only one ideal aimed at. There is a unity of purpose underlying the multitudinous ramifications." This is the conclusion which the Professor reached after a very brilliant though rapid survey of the history of Hinduism and obviously it cuts like a keen point into the very heart, at least of one of the main charges against Hinduism. Here is, at any rate, a distinct conception of unity and whether it is altogether arguable or not, there can be no doubt that it knocks the European charge practically dead on the spot. But let us see how the Professor develops it. He says "The Hindu civilisation is so called, since its original founders or earliest followers occupied the territory drained by the Sindhu (the Indus) river system corresponding to the North-Western Frontier Provinces and the Punjab. The people on the Indian side of the Sindhu were called Hindu by the Persian and the later western invaders" We shall not wait to discuss the significance of the term "Hindu" There are other people who might be interested in the bare significance of a term, but the point which we should make by the way is that this civilisation, by whatever name you might call it, was neither Pre-Aryan nor pure Aryan. As a matter of fact India was peopled by communities and races,— we hope the Mahoenjodaro excavation will not close with only the Semi-Sumerian epoch— long before the Hindu civilisation had arisen; and it will be a mistake to suggest that it was a gift to them by the Aryan-speaking people who might have carried it over with them very much in the way the modern Europeans are still busy bringing their merchandise to us. But the question

arises that if the Hindu civilisation was neither a mere replica of the Aryan or the non-Aryan culture nor merely some clever manipulation of them, what exactly were the conditions that were responsible for it, and as it actually arose only after the Aryan-speaking people had appeared on the scene, in what precise way were these conditions connected with the Aryan-appearance? This, to us, is a very important issue, and it is unfortunate that the Professor had not the time to discuss it. Incidentally however he has made two points which seem to have a direct bearing on this particular question. Let us quote from him. "If we look into the past history of India, we see how the country has been subjected to one race invasion after another. Even at the beginning of her history India was peopled by various groups, the dark aboriginal tribes, the sturdy Dravidians, the yellow-skinned Mongols and the blithe, forceful Aryans. Very soon she developed intimate intercourse with the Persians, the Greeks and the Scythians and some of these settled down in India. No other country in the world has had such racial problems as India. The term Hindu had originally a territorial not a credal significance. It implied residence in a well defined geographical area. Aboriginal tribes, savage and half-civilised people, the cultured Dravidians and the Vedic Aryans were all Hindus as they were the sons of the same mother. The Hindu thinkers reckoned with the striking fact that the men and women dwelling in India belonged to different communities, worshipped different gods and practised different rites." Obviously what we get from the above quotations is that the people responsible for the scheme of Hindu organisation had at least two distinct things to face, (1) A diversity of faiths, customs, rites and (2) A state of violent opposition and conflict between them. The question before them was not, as a matter of fact, as to how a society could be raised with, for instance, only 'one race' or 'one religion' or a variety of faiths and customs, not necessarily in a state of conflict. It was on the contrary, a problem of raising a society which would make room for a conflicting variety. But nobody would suppose that a mere conflicting variety was sufficient to give rise to the Hindu system of caste. On the contrary the problem of society-building might well be supposed to have been nothing but the problem of unifying the multiple and the diverse; and no society, not certainly the European, was ever free from the task of organising the conflicting variety. Where then was the peculiarity of the Indian diversity? In what way did the variety of practices in India or the conflict among them, differ from that of the European or of any other centre of society-building? And a peculiarity there must have been or the

uniqueness of the Hindu scheme stood condemned and certainly it is too late in the day even to dispute that uniqueness.

At the very best, no other social scheme preserved the types, or the variety, whatever the consequences, in the manner the Hindus did. No other scheme developed caste system. Neither the ancient Greek in Athens nor the modern Christian in Brazil, not to say any other race developed anything but the class system built on a singular model or exclusive type. There was not even a suggestion of caste, so that what it is absolutely necessary that one must discover is the precise way in which the Indian variety had stood so as to lead, in the end, to the formation of the caste-scheme. But here again, the Professor had not time enough to raise these issues; as a matter of fact he had to take many things for granted by the awkward necessity of having had to discuss the Hindu outlook in the course of only four lectures. There are two points, however, which he has made with perfect confidence by way of indicating the Hindu peculiarity. For instance he is more than confident that the Hindu method of dealing with "conflict" was peculiar enough while according to him no race except the Hindus ever practised "toleration" in the place of "extermination" or "subordination." Whether he is correct in his belief or not is another question, and it will be our care to discuss it at great length as we go on: but there can be no doubt that he has reviewed the whole question of conflict in a masterly way; and if in the end, we venture to propose any difference from him it will be very much because of this illuminating analysis. But let us see how he makes out these peculiarities. To begin with he has classified the conflict between the Aryans and the non-Aryans under two heads: (1) conflict of faiths; (2) conflict of races.

This is certainly comprehensive enough but let us quote, "Regarding the solution of the problem of racial conflicts, the different alternatives which present themselves are those of extermination, subordination, identification or harmonisation." We would strongly recommend to the reader this illuminating survey of the historic methods. As it is, the Professor rejected one by one all the methods till he came to the last; and he offers it, with great relief, as the only safe course for democracy, viz., let us quote "Hinduism adopted the only safe course for democracy, that each racial group be allowed to develop the best in it without impeding the progress of others. Every historical group is unique and specific and has an ultimate value: and the highest morality

requires that we should respect its individuality." Perhaps this is much too precise a claim to pass unchallenged even among the advocates of the Hindu view; but the Professor be it noted, is emphatic that the method of harmonisation was necessarily a Hindu method, a creation by the Hindu genius par excellence. What is even more, the Professor is convinced that what gave a bottom to the uniqueness of the Hindu scheme was precisely this speciality. In so far as the Hindu did not choose, according to the Professor, either to exterminate or to subordinate his opponent, did he happen to develop his caste-scheme. But why, one might ask again, did the other races and peoples choose differently? How is it that they chose to exterminate or subordinate their opponents when, at least conceivably they could have equally harmonised their differences like the Hindus? And even if by an irony of fate they happened to do nothing as a matter of fact but exterminate or subordinate, was this ruthlessness the inevitable result of a racial mischance or of some accident and a perverse twist in their historic conditions? At any rate these are some of the questions which have to be answered before even the view of the Professor himself, strong as it is, could be fully appreciated. Of course the Professor was much too interested in dealing with the broad differences between the Hindu and the non-Hindu scheme to contemplate these particular issues; and we feel almost confident that he might well have stated his case in a different form if he had the opportunity to go into the whole question of social organisation more fully. But for ourselves we do not feel at all that so strong and sweeping a claim need ever be made either on behalf of the Hindu or against the non-Hindu. For one thing we do not think it is necessary that one must accept even the method of harmonisation as final, much less believe that it was not known at all across the borders of Hindusthan. To say the least of it, the problem of conflict is still a problem lying, as it were, red-hot on the anvil while at any rate the doctrine of the Medieval Church in Europe about the grades and classes in society was a clear plea for harmonisation if for anything at all. And it is well known that the idea of social organism was by no means either unfamiliar or uncherished in Medieval Europe. But we do not certainly mean that the Medieval Christian preached nothing but the caste system. Far from it. He was not broad or liberal enough even to conceive the idea. What we mean is that the notion of harmonisation was not necessarily a caste notion,

though outside the caste arena it might well have become both circumspect and deliberately compact. On the other hand, there might be evidence even in Hindu history to show that the Hindu himself might not have altogether avoided extermination or subordination. How could he, after his historic lineage from the Aryan and the non-Aryan? Indeed it might easily be no less absurd to suggest that slaughter and slavery were taboos in the history of Hindusthan than to believe that harmonisation was an unknown God in the non-Hindu pantheon. So that it was, by no means, inevitable that one was bound to get down to the real secret of the caste system if only one kept religiously to the track of the Hindu method; on the contrary, it might, with some confidence, be suggested that perhaps the mainspring of their uniqueness, that ultimately accounted for it, lay not so much in their method of dealing with conflicts as in the very nature of the conflicts themselves.

As the Professor himself has said, the conflicts which, in the long run, gave rise to the Hindu scheme were as acute as they could possibly be; and in this opinion he could easily command the assent of all who specialised in Indian history. Professor MacDonell's monograph on caste for instance bears on the point with illuminating lucidity. But we do not mean merely the 'intensity' or 'acuteness' of the conflict when we take the liberty of suggesting that the secret of the Hindu uniqueness was to be found in the nature of the conflict which preceded its orientation. It seems to us that Professor MacDonell was wrong in deducing the caste system from a mere difference of degree in the conflict. Surely it was not possible that the "caste system" would arise in India, a system qualitatively different from the "class system" elsewhere, simply because the conflict between the Aryans and the non-Aryans happened to be more intense than any that ever took place in the world outside. There must have been some qualitative difference in the nature of the Indian conflict to account for the qualitative change in the social scheme which happened to solve them. And this difference, as we have already suggested, seems to appear in the very nature of the interests that actually clashed. As a matter of fact, we feel it almost necessary to believe that in so far as the Aryans and the non-Aryans or the 'cultures' that they represented clashed, as no other cultures or races ever did within our knowledge, did they come to develop a social scheme consciousness by its absence from any other record that we have so far known. So that the question of real importance was not so much to discover how the clash of the cultures was

dealt with as to make sure what exactly these cultures were, and how they clashed with one another. What is wanted obviously is a fresh analysis of the momentous meeting between the Aryans and the non-Aryans that took place so very long ago; and it might not be altogether useless if we, for a time, deviated from our course to discuss the rise and the procession of the Hindu history.

CALCUTTA.

B. K. MAILLIK.

GLEANINGS.

TOLSTOY & BERNARD SHAW.

AN UNPUBLISHED LETTER.

'MAN & SUPERMAN' CRITICIZED.

Mr. Aylmer Maude, the well-known translator of Tolstoy, in sending to the press the following hitherto unpublished letter from Tolstoy to Mr. Bernard Shaw, writes:—

Mr. Shaw, when recently sending to a London evening paper copies of a letter from him to Tolstoy and of Tolstoy's reply, mentioned that he could not lay hands on the rest of their correspondence. I have since been able to supply him with a copy of the following letter, which deals with "Man and Superman." In replying to me Mr. Shaw said: "It is an admirable letter, and I am sorry I did not get it in time to include it with the other," and he suggested that I should have it published.

What appears clearly from the correspondence is that these two writers respected one another and were interested in each other's works, though they did not always agree, and Tolstoy, when he disagreed, had an emphatic way of expressing it.

Shortly before his death, speaking of the lack of good writers in all countries, he said: "There are none now," and with some hesitation, he then added: "Unless, perhaps, Shaw."

The letter, which bears no date, is as follows:

Dear Mr. Shaw, Please excuse me for not having thanked you before this for the book you sent me through Mr. Maude.

Now, on reading it and giving special attention to the passages you marked, I particularly appreciate Don Juan's speeches in the Interlude the Scene in Hell (though it seems to me that the subject would have gained greatly by being treated more seriously than as a casual episode in a comedy)—and "The Revolutionists' Hand book." In the former I was able without any effort to agree fully with Don Juan's remark that he is a hero "who seeks in contemplation to discover the inner will of the world . . . and in action to do that will by the so-discovered means"—or, in my way of expressing it, "to recognise the will of God in one's self and to do it."

Secondly, I am particularly pleased by your attitude toward civilisation and progress and the very true reflection, that however, they cannot improve the state of mankind unless men themselves alter. The difference of our views is merely this: that according to you, mankind's improvement will be accomplished when ordinary people become supermen or when fresh supermen are produced; while in my opinion, it will occur when men disencumber the true religions, including Christianity, from all the accretions which deform them, and when all, uniting in the understanding of life which lies at the base of all the religions, realise their responsible relation to the world's eternal origin and accept the guidance for life which flows therefrom.

The practical advantage my way of freeing people from evil has over yours is that one can easily imagine very large numbers even of little-educated or quite uneducated people accepting to evolve supermen out of people who now exist or to breed new ones would need exceptional conditions which are as far from being attainable as those required for the correction of mankind by progress and civilisation.

Dear Mr. Shaw, life is a great and serious affair, and we all in general, in the short interval of time granted us, must try to find our appointed task and fulfil it as well as possible. This applies to everybody, and to you especially, with your great gift of original thought and your penetration into the essence of all questions. And therefore, confidently trusting that I shall not offend you, I will tell you what seem to me to be the defects in your book.

The first defect in it is that you are not sufficiently serious. One should not speak jestingly of such a subject as the purpose of human life, the causes of its perversion, and the evil that fills the life of humanity today. I should like the speeches of Don Juan to be not the speeches of a vision, but the speeches of Shaw, and also that "The Revolutionists' Handbook" should be attributed not to the non-existent Tanner but to a living Bernard Shaw who is responsible for his words. The second reproach is that the questions you deal with are of such profound comprehension of the evils of our life and such brilliant capacity for exposition as yourself to make them the subject of satire may easily do harm rather than help the solution of these grave questions.

In your book I detect a desire to surprise and to astonish the readers by your great erudition, talent, and cleverness. Yet all this is not merely unnecessary for the solution of the questions you deal with, but often distracts the readers' attention from the essence of the matter by attracting it to the smartness of the exposition. In any case, I think this book of yours expresses your views, not in their full and clear development, but only in an embryonic state. I think that these views developing more and more, will arrive at the one truth we all seek and towards which we all gradually approach.

I hope you will forgive me if there is anything that displeases you in what I have said. I have said it only because I recognise your very great gifts and for you personally have a most friendly feeling, and so I remain, Leo Tolstoy.

PERSONALITIES OF OUR AGE.

PRIMATE'S ADDRESS TO JOURNALISTS.

Are there as many outstanding men in Europe, particularly in England, this day as there were 50 or more years ago?

Speaking to a gathering of journalists in London in mail week the Archbishop of Canterbury asked this question and answered it himself in the negative.

"We do not seem to have the outstanding figures we had in the days that I can first remember," he said.

To name but a few of the great Victorian figures, there were:—

In the Church—Benson, Temple, and Handley Moul.

In Politics—Palmerston, Gladstone, and Beaconsfield.

Science—Kelvin, Lister, Spencer, Darwin and Huxley.

Literature—Carlyle, Ruskin, Dickens, George Eliot, Thackeray, Tennyson, and Swinburne.

Music—Wagner, Brahms; and as singers, Patti, Jenny Lind, Sims Reeves, and De Reszke.

Painting—Leighton, Whistler, and Alma Tadema.

Architecture—Barry, Gilbert, Scott, Street, Pearson, Pugin, and Bentley.

Sculpture—Rodin, Chantrey, Thornycroft, and Gilbert.

Law—Russel, Alverstone, and Halsbury.

Nothing struck him so much, said the Primate, as the absence now, as compared with 40 years ago, of great personages outstanding above their fellows. They had men and women of high reputation in public service and important work, but they had nothing corresponding to the outstanding persons who dominated Europe and England in the times to which he had referred. Take the year 1888, when the gigantic figure of Bismarck was dominating Europe. At the same time in England great men were fashioning views with regard to what was coming to light. Gladstone's words, dominating words, were thundering forth, and Lord Salisbury was replying.

In these days something had happened, things were changed, and, though we had men of very high reputation, men of merit and activity, there did not seem to be the outstanding peaks. He did not suppose that England was peculiar from other countries, except perhaps Italy. (Laughter.) Their sufferings were of the same kind as those of other countries, if suffering it was, and that was exactly what he was not sure about. He thought it was a misfortune that there were no outstanding figures, but it might be that every one had been raised higher, so that the peaks did not loom so high today. It might be that the quick, competent, universal circulation of knowledge and the power to bring home to everybody what had happened had grown to such a scale that it was practically impossible for men in the midst of it to emerge with the size and opportunity for doing things that were possible in the old days.

The following opinions on the Archbishop's speech were obtained:—

LORD SYDENHAM: "In Mussolini we have an outstanding personality. I am strongly of opinion, however, that the general advance of democracy makes it more and more unlikely that the exceptional men of the present will be able to rise to conspicuous positions. On the other hand, I do not believe for a moment that we and Europe have not got men as good now as ever lived before.

CANON WOODWARD, OF WESTMINSTER ABBEY: "My view is very much the same as the Archbishop's—that the problems of the day are so much more enormous and world-wide that they dwarf even the biggest men.

"I believe we have got as big men as ever in the Church of England but they do not seem so big because the problems are so enormous.

"There are men like the Archbishop himself. I think he would have stood out as a great administrator at any period of the Church's history and in the realm of thought and intellect men like the Dean of St. Paul's, Bishop Hensley-Henson, and Bishop Gore stand out as great men."

SIR ISRAEL GOLLANEZ: "I have no doubt a great many men would accept the Archbishop's view. In the world of letters, people who may be great do not stand out so prominently as they did in the Victorian Age. The Archbishop himself is a good example. He might be termed a great Victorian. The average may be higher now than it was then."

SIR JOHNSTON FORBES-ROBERTSON: "I think it is a fact that the average acting is far higher to-day than it was when I went on the stage in 1874. But it so happens that at the present moment there are not any outstanding figures like Phelps, Macready, Irving, and Miss Terry.

"Nowadays there are no actor-managers, so that the theatres do not have a personal cache such as they had in the days of Irving, Hare, and Bancroft.

"That is a very great drawback. All those people were pioneers; the people knew when they went to Mr. Hare's theatre the kind of play they would see, or to Irving's and so on. Nowadays it is all a mix-up, with one Monday one class of entertainment and the next something else. There is no stability.

"At the same time, the plays are very well produced, admirably stage-managed, the average acting is very high indeed, and far more theatres are playing legitimate drama than in the 'seventies and eighties.'

"But there are no outstanding figures. The strong personalities do not stand out today."

MR. SHAW: -

"I am an old Victorian myself. I belong to the Archbishop of Canterbury's period. I think there were one or two noticeable people 40 years ago.

"The fact of the matter is that today there are so many outstanding personalities that they are not noticed."

Below are two lists of famous names the first of great personalities living in 1878 and probably known to all, and the second a list for 1928:—

1878.

Bismarck.
John Bright.
Disraeli.
Gladstone.
Robert Browning.
Victor Hugo.
Huxley.
Ibsen.
Garibaldi.
Manning.
Newman.
Tolstoi.
Ruskin.
Wagner.
Verdi.
Pasteur.
W. G. Grace.

1928.

Einstein.
Marconi.
Lloyd George.
Marie Curie.
Sir Oliver Lodge.
Shaw.
Tagore.
Maeterlinck.
Kipling.
Foch.
Amundsen.
Mussolini.
H. G. Wells.
Epstein.
D'Annunzio.
Paderewski.
Jack Hobbs.

Many more names known the world over could, of course, be added to both lists.—("The Statesman.")

"TWELVE BAD MEN."

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES.

BY ALDOUS HUXLEY.

What is badness? The title of Mr. Sidney Dark's latest volume ("Twelve Bad Men," Hodder and Stoughton, 12s. 6d.) gave me hopes that I might discover. But I have been disappointed. After reading the twelve rather perfunctory little biographies contained in the book, I find myself no wiser than I was before. All that I have discovered is that Mr. Dark dislikes autocrats, revolutionaries, and anti-clericals. Also that he does not read his proofs very carefully. And by the way, were the "Condotierri" (sic) "the most reckless and most efficient of mercenaries?" Most of the hired Italian captains were distinguished, surely, more for their cautiousness than for their recklessness. And was there another St. Dominic? I ask in ignorance. The only one I know of was certainly not responsible for the reforms of the Counter-Reformation, "reforms which were to come, alas, belatedly with St. Ignatius and St. Dominic." Of the nature and essence of badness I have learnt little or nothing from Mr. Dark's biographies. This is perhaps not surprising. For with the exceptions of Benvenuto Cellini and Casanova, all Mr. Dark's bad men are public characters. They are kings, diplomats, prime ministers, dictators. They owe their celebrity to the fact that they were the incarnations of special social functions. It is no doubt deplorable that human beings should be reduced to the level of incarnate functions, (of this I shall have more to say later.) But when they have been so reduced why worry about anything but the efficiency of the machine? "Though Frederick William had no thought for the happiness of his subjects, his economies were immensely useful to the State. Waste land was reclaimed, roads were made, schools were built."—In that case, Frederick William was surely a good ruler. The function of my motor-car is to transport me from one place to another. So long as it does so efficiently, I am quite content. I do not inquire whether the machine has any thought for the happiness of its owner.

Mr. Dark is very severe on Machiavelli. To read his strictures one would imagine that the Florentine had actually deserved the bad name which he still enjoys among those who have never read his books. But, after all, Machiavelli was nearly a realistic student of sociology setting down the facts as he saw them. The morality of public men, he perceived, is not and has never been the same as the morality of private men. If you wish to succeed in the profession of ruler, you must do what other successful rulers of your particular type have done. And he proceeds, in the manner of Mrs. Becton to give a few political recipes. Ruling is an art, and, like other arts, may be practised according to a variety of different convictions. You may dislike some of these conventions, in which case you will tend to dislike the artist who works in them. And the more successful he is in the abhorred convention the worse you will think him. This is Mr. Dark's case. His bad men are successful exponents of political conventions which he happens to dislike. Take the case, for example, of Thomas Cromwell. His crime, according to Mr. Dark is that he believed in personal, despotic, nationalistic government and that he put his ideas into practice at the expense of the Catholic Church. To judge from Mr. Dark's own account he was no better or worse, personally, than almost any ordinarily efficient business man or politician. Parliament and the city are full of Thomas Cromwells. They are the back bone of the country. If Henry VIII's Minister deserves to be put into the Chamber of Horrors, then so do almost all the pillars of past and present society. There may be, and indeed I think there is, quite good justification for this.

But to select one single vertebra from the national backbone and condemn it, just because you dislike its political opinions, seems rather unfair.

The public men whom Mr. Dark has chosen to brand with infamy are despots or the servants of despots, militarists, nationalists and anti-clericals. They "think, badly," and thinking badly, are bad. If they are, we are driven to admit that almost any statesman of today is better than any statesman of the past, which is, to quote Euclid, absurd. We shall be near the truth, I think, if we boldly affirm that all public men are bad men—necessarily, because it is impossible for standards of public morality to be the same as the standards of private morality. They are bad, however, in different ways at different times, according to the convention of ruling which happens to be in force. At the present time the art of ruling is practised in accordance with the humanitarian, democratic convention. In the past there was no democracy and little humanitarianism. Hence the badness of public men in the past was unlike the badness of public men today. Their besetting sins were different from ours. Thus, in circumstances where a public man of the past would have employed violence the public man of the present employs lying and the arts of propaganda. The statesmen of old were murderers. Those of the present day are confidence-tricksters and card-sharps. There is progress even in badness. Or, if not progress, at least change.

The good man, I take it, is the complete and harmonious man; the man who is to the highest degree alive in all his being physical and spiritual, rational and instinctive. The only absolute good is that which makes for increase of life. The only absolute evil is that which makes for a diminution of life. The bad man is the incomplete, discordant man; the man who is not alive through the whole of his being, whose development is lop-sided and disproportionate. Granted these definitions of good and bad, it is easy to see why the public man must almost necessarily be a bad man. A man in his position is condemned to partial death. A professional in the art of rule, he is debarred from reaching to human situations in the normal and natural human way; he must react professionally. The process is deadening and destructive. Hardly less deadening and destructive is the sense of superiority which comes of high public position. The man who, in his vanity, imagines himself in any way a superman and who tries to behave as though he were more than human, invariably ends by becoming less than human. The further they advance in their respective careers, the more obviously sub-human do men like Louis XIV, and Napoleon become. And the same alarming descent towards sub-humanity is observable in many of the saints and philosophers. The descent of the would-be superior ascetics is through relatively harmless imbecility, as exemplified by the early Franciscans, to sheer diabolism as exemplified by the Calvinists and the monks of the Thebaid. The lop-sided intellectual, the sage exclusively pre-occupied with his philosophy, generally sinks into infanthood. The babyishness of professors is proverbial. Those who wish to know how far an intellectual superman can sink into infantile sub-humanity should read the story of Kant and the dried fruits quoted by Mr. Havelock Ellis in his "Dance of Life". What applies to public men, to saints and philosophers, applies also, to some extent, to every member of a highly specialized society like our own. We are all in some degree living lop-sidedly, incompletely, disproportionately. We are almost all bad men. What shall we do about it? What, indeed? So long as civilization remains what it is, there is obviously precious little that we can do about it. All I feel fairly certain of is that those who imagine they are achieving human wholeness and harmony by imitating the exploits of Mr. Dark's ninth Bad Man, Casanova, are mistaken. The modern reaction against nineteenth century bourgeois respectability has too often taken the form of mere promiscuity. Our generation has exchanged the bad features of the nineteenth for the bad features of the eighteenth century.

The bargain is not a good one. All we have done is to barter one form of hatred of our instinctive nature for another form. For the conscious Don Juan is really just as much as a hater and despiser of sex as the Puritan. He gives vent to his hatred, not by suppressing his passions, but by promiscuously making love without passion; not by combating the instincts but by wearing them out with debauchery and then substituting for them the conscious impulsions of a prurient imagination. Casanova and his followers make love from the head, on principle almost, without any justifying instinctive impulsion. They reduce love to the level of an entertaining indoor sport, a sort of ping-pong. Often, however, a curious malevolence seems to enter into the practice of the game. There are certain Don Juanesque figures of whom one always feels that their amours are somehow a revenge. Much of Byron's loving, for example has a certain flavour of vindicativeness. Casanovesque promiscuity or puritanical repression—the man who would be always the little conscious specialist, functioning efficiently and successfully in a modern society, must choose between the two alternatives. He is afraid of the instinctive side of his being; there is no place for it in a world where men are not valued as men, but for the specialized social functions which they perform. Fearing and hating his instincts he must either kill them by repression or by intelligence. The modern fashion is to use indulgence. But the killing is just as effective as it was in the days of respectability. Emancipated youth laughs at the now almost mythical Victorians. But in truth the young are no less dead than their ancestors; and being dead are no less bad.—("The Nation and Athenaeum.")

LUDWIG'S DREAM OF GREAT WOMEN.

HEROINES OF THE WORLD.

(BY EMIL LUDWIG).

The loveliest thing I have ever seen done by a woman was when a danceuse, touching the leg of her partner, with the toes of her left foot only, seemed to flutter motionless in the air, barely moving the fingers of her out-stretched right hand. Even the musicians paused for an instant, so perfect was the picture, so triumphantly charming and graceful, as this lovely woman, a goddess almost, hung poised in the air as if unconscious of the weight of her limbs.

The most terrible thing I have seen done by a woman was in the course of the war, when a German middle class wife swept into a room waving an evening paper and exclaimed, her eyes beaming: "A big victory on the western front! Five thousand of the enemy dead!"

The difference between the two is not a difference in character; under certain circumstances these two women, had they been differently educated and influenced by other ideas, might have exchanged places.

During the German revolution, I saw women making stump speeches for freedom and against poverty; I saw actresses portraying in plays how women struggle and how they give their love, and I found little difference between them, for a great actress always forgets the stage, just as a great popular orator never forgets it. I have seen bored queens pass haughtily through triumphal arches; I have seen female scientists so absorbed in what they saw beneath a microscope that they forgot themselves and even their children. I have seen a poetess come towards me through her garden, a note-book in her hands, her eyes lost in dreamy thought; I have seen the keen glance of a woman painter seeing to guess the secret hidden behind the features of her *vis à vis*.

A COMMON QUALITY.

And all these women had one thing in common: They smiled. Yes, they smiled, every one of them, in a way that no man ever smiles either while he is working or after he is done with his work; they smiled as no man can smile without courting danger. Everything that had been exciting them—struggle, playing, art, the will to achieve—culminated in a smile or was dissolved in one, from which I deduce that a woman even if she be ugly or old, even if she be serious and earnest and entirely matter of fact, remains, nevertheless, in the last analysis an erotic being.

A real woman loves in her every action, in every work upon which she embarks. She loves beauty, justice, the human race, the poor and the oppressed, the strong. A woman devotes her life self-sacrificingly and altruistically to the idea with which she has fallen in love, in proportion as the flights of her spirit are loftier and the development of her powers greater. Women in the mass are entirely and absolutely dependent upon men. The worst defeat ever suffered by modern woman—the World War, which she was unable either to prevent or to shorten—revealed her to the mind of men as enslaved, since man's thoughts are turned towards war by the power of tradition and suggestion, whereas war, like everything that is destructive, is utterly alien to woman, who is essentially defensive.

BOURGEOIS ORIGIN.

The greatest women of all are known probably only to the man they love. From the handful of examples, we are enabled to judge the tremendous scope of

what women have achieved in privacy towards influencing our statesmen and captains of industry and party leaders, what they have done in the way of exerting suggestion upon them, spurring them on, holding them back; arousing strong feelings for or against those with whom the man is in conflict. This is characteristic of no one race or nation; it is as old as humanity, for it is essentially human.

On the other hand, it would seem that one class has the advantage over others when it comes to supplying great women. All the great women of the present day are of bourgeois origin all, that is, with one exception which I shall name. It is, the same as with men; bourgeois or proletarian families have provided all our present day rulers, inventors, artists, scientists, even army leaders; not one of these has come from the nobility, which was educated through generations for leadership.

Almost never has a woman become a great artist, because great artists must get away from themselves entirely in order to do great creative work. On the other hand, women actresses have always been greater than male actors because acting is essentially physical not personal. For this reason it might be right to name some actresses first of all in my article on great women of today.

ANNA PAVLOVA.

But, when it comes to beautiful bodies, I throw all such considerations to the winds and proclaim aloud the name of one woman—the name of her who within the last twenty years has brought the old world and the new world to her feet—Anna Pavlova. This lovely Russian dancer having danced first before the Czars and Grand Dukes swept triumphantly across all America, gathering such numbers of adorers, rich and poor, powerful and idealistic, as were gathered before her advent only by privileged potentates; who, by the way, have sometimes failed to realize how audaciously such a lovely creature has trod upon their august crowned heads.

Pavlova was the first danseuse who brought modern melody to the famous old art of the ballet as it was taught in Paris and St. Petersburg; it was she who, discarding the ballet music of tradition, danced to the tunes of the great masters, and yet preserved the traditional pirouetting on tiptoe. She retained also the regulation rococo ballat costume instead of swathing herself in pseudo-Greek garments. For this reason she might be recommended as official danseuse to any Coalition Cabinet in which representatives of the past and the present seek to govern together. Pavlova was famous all over the world when she was twenty-four.

AUTHORESSES IN CONTRAST.

But Selma Lagerlof, the Swedish authoress was known to few even when she was thirty-four; not until she was that age did the greatest living writer turn to the story of her childhood and her family. Long did she hesitate as to the form in which she should cast her narrative; then, with the touch of the real artist, she drew the portraits of the people of her own home-land. Since then everything written by her springs from the soil in which she is rooted, and in this respect she is akin to the great Norwegian Hamaun—indeed, the fact that she is a woman is seldom betrayed in her writings.

In striking contrast to Selma Lagerlof stands the German, Riccarda Huch. She lacks almost all the qualities which distinguish Lagerlof; but, on the other hand, everything which makes the work of Huch important is lacking in the Swedish writer. In the writings of the latter all is, so to speak, drawing; in that of the German all is music. The Swede deals with the soil, with idiosyncrasies with depth and narrowness; the German paints beauty, breadth, the things of the spirit.

Riccarda Huch combines in a striking manner the lucidity of a man and the devotion of a woman. Beginning as a lyrical poetess whose love songs

rank with the very best, she thereupon astonished readers with historical portraiture, achieved with a bold hand portraits wherein manner and interpretation, modelling and vision vie with one another in excellence.

FROM THOUGHT TO ACTION.

Among painters also a first place seems to belong to a German woman. But Katho Kollwitz, who like Riccarda Huch, is sixty years old, comes from a different world, or at least does her work in a different one. Brought up with socialistic leanings, she was guided towards her art at first by writers like Zolat and Tolstoy, which means that at first she placed drawing and etching before other things and developed a severe manlike style.

It was not until the war that Kollwitz found herself and developed greatness of style.

This woman painter, despite her mastery, displays so strongly the feminine desire to help and improve that she might almost be placed in the ranks of the active woman workers, since woman's work is always basically more organic than logical, always due far more to intuition than to thought.

The Irish woman, Annie Besant illustrates the transition from thought to action. There is, to be sure much manly will power in this eighty year-old fighter, and it may be that not only doubt but also ambition was among her early incentives to action.

When in her middle twenties, the wife of a severely pious clergyman, the mother of two children, she stood one day in an empty church, whither she had gone to practice playing on the organ, and felt herself suddenly overcome by the craving to speak from the pulpit, she obeyed the impulse and realized that she possessed the gifts of an orator; that all she needed was an audience.

Scepticism and an active mind soon brought her to break with the Church and with her husband; she went over to the atheists and wrote a pamphlet that caused her to be haled into court. But not until she was over forty did she find where she really belonged in religion between the two extremes. At that time Helen Blavatzky drew her into the ranks of the Theosophists.

Judged externally, she seems, above all else, an organiser; likewise, judged by her work in India, a politician.

MARIE CURIE.

Let us turn to Marie Curie. The world connects nothing at all with the name of this French Polish woman except one word, yet that word is a magical word. If this sixty-year-old woman, who after the death of her husband, the companion of her life and her work, refused to abandon her laboratory, ever glances back, she must vision her life as lighted by the rays of the magic gem which they discovered together, and she must feel herself bathed by the beneficent healing influence of these rays.

Having discovered radium, she found still another marvellous element which she named Polonium, after her mother country. Much more has this woman done towards the fame of Poland than a military general, even a victorious one. She heals the ailing, he kills the healthy. She wrests something unknown from the hidden recesses of nature; he carries his nation's flag a few miles further onward, in doing which he sacrifices as many of those who are already his countrymen as he acquires new citizens for his country. She creates something permanent, he something transient; whereas he serves his country only for a while she serves mankind and, in so doing, serves God.—"New York Times Magazine."

MODERN WORLD TOO FEMININE.

DEARTH OF HEROES IN WOMEN'S NOVELS TO-DAY.

WELL KNOWN WRITER'S VIEWS.

"Modern life is becoming over feminised and so is the modern novel" said Maud Diver, author of "Captain Desmond, V. C." whose "grandson" will appear in the new novel she is writing, a continuation of "Lonely Furrow," her recent success. We were sitting in the little sun-hut where the novelist works, at a convenient distance from her house and possible domestic distractions, surrounded by pine trees and facing the sea.

FOUR OUT OF SIX NOVELS BY WOMEN.

"I happen to be reading a good many new novels just now to keep in touch with my nineteen year old heroine of to-day. Roughly four out of six are written "by" women "about" women.

"And if these new women writers portray men with any detail these characters are apt to be feminised too. They are increasingly apt to be artists or authors; seldom, if ever, soldiers or men of action.

"I usually make a little bet with myself before opening a new novel that the leading character will be a writer. One excellent first novel, 'Cullum,' by a young woman writer, E. Arnot Robertson, actually went on better by portraying "two" literary people as hero and heroine.

"MANLY MEN" AT DISCOUNT.

"Manly men are more or less, at a discount today. Motor-bicycles and silk stockings, I have heard it said, have been their undoing. An Indian army colonel told me sorrowfully that twenty years ago he got subalterns who brought their guns and polo ponies to the hill stations. Now they bring gramophones and dance and play golf - and complain that they are bored!

SPORTS CLOTHES-- BUT FEMININE MINDS.

"Gradually, I think, men novelists are going back to the romantic, adventurous, masculine kind of story. Look at John Masefield, Somerset Maugham, and P. C. Wren! But to judge from the increasing output of novels about the women it is the heroine rather than the hero who interests the great mass of modern women readers. The mannishness of Eton crop and sports clothes seems to conceal a lack of interest in all else masculine.

"Twenty years ago, when women were more prone to admire 'manly' men, we women writers--there were fewer then--made the male character the centre of our stories. This meant that at a time when women's interests were supposed to lie in the home women novelists were dealing with men's lives and feelings.

WHEN WOMEN WRITERS DREAMED OF BATTLE.

"The early works of May Sinclair and Sheila Kaye-Smith were full of strenuous action. Flora Annie Steel, who had then been writing for sometime, had the same masculine quality.

"It was less possible, then, than it is now for women to lead the life of men of action. But the imagination, which it is not the fashion to trust nowadays, is often miraculously true to reality.

"You ask if life in India did not give me some knowledge of regimental routine. But it was not till I was forty, with my son at a public school that I began to write about the Indian Army. It was then, living quietly in England that I tried to project myself into a masculine life of action and movement.

HAPPY SOCIAL LIFE IN INDIA.

"Living in India for seven years from the age of 16, I had led the happy, social life of the young girl of the time acting in amateur theatricals, playing tennis, and not thinking of collecting material for military novels. There were dances innumerable to which I used to ride sitting sideways in the saddle without using the pommel, a shawl over the wide tulle skirts that were the fashion.

"This was hardly a masculine life.

"But, as I have said women writers were not afraid to project themselves into the lives of others, instead of turning their attention inwards upon themselves. They were also not afraid of having hearts and feelings.

SOLID BOOKS FOR LEISURED READERS.

"This did not mean a stream of sentimental nonsense. Readers of twenty years ago were people with ample leisure for long thoughtful books. But if the books were longer, they were fewer. Yearly their numbers increase, and yearly the world grows more restless, till one wonders who finds time to read half of them - unless it is infants and invalids. Yet the spate of novels continues, without so much as a close season once a year.

"Sometimes, compared with the carefully constructed stories of years ago, they are sheer 'mental babble'. Women are inclined to be garrulous, and the 'stream-of-consciousness' novel gives them their head!

"But the psychological novel of mood "can" be done superbly well. Though I feel that the modern novel is overfeminised, I am still devoutly thankful for the genius of women writers like Virginia woolf. - "Indian Daily Mail."

REVIEWS REVIEWED.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL.

The July number of the *Hibbert Journal* has an unusually large number of articles bearing on India. In an article on East and West the late Lord Haldane pleads for a deeper understanding of the Indian spirit and thought. He believes that the teaching of the East differs from that of the West in its copious use of metaphor "In the East the use of metaphor to give to life meaning is found in excess. Imagery comes in at every turn to illustrate metaphysical reasoning, to an extent that produces obscurity." Though such an account may be true of the early religious literature, Hindu and Buddhist, the later systematic expositions use metaphor only to illustrate general principles and make them easily intelligible. Lord Haldane describes, with intense sympathy, the metaphysical conceptions of the Upanishads and Buddhism and declares that their broad underlying principles are common to many of the profound systems of western thought.

In the Western world there has grown up a view of the nature of final reality which is akin to that which we have found in the history of Indian thought. Much attention has been devoted here, in every period, to the nature of knowledge itself. Psychologists have sought to dissect experience into constituent and self-contained elements out of which it can be treated as being built up. The initial simplicity of these elements of an experience thus broken up has been regarded as enabling the relation of object and subject itself to be reduced to a vanishing point. Time and space become relations between mere point-events and groups of such events. The other relations, such as those of substance and cause, and the apparently limitless multiplicity of categories, are resolved into simple relations of externality of elementary kinds, between the basic and simple events which are fundamental in experience. The process of investigation along these lines has been pursued with great keenness, and with much thoroughness and grasp of the scientific methods of thirty years ago.

Probably it was the want of knowledge of our scientific methods that prevented this line of investigation from growing up in India; possibly also its absence is characteristic of the Eastern mind which seems never, in older days at least, to have found attraction in such methods. At all events this mode of approach to the problem of reality is characteristic of the West alone, and in the West it has been keenly and powerfully followed.

But in its essence it is not exhaustive. Behind the supposed scientific search there lies concealed a problem of which many over here are keenly aware today. It is not merely the psychological object-world but the psychologist himself that has to be accounted for. That world implies his presence. Evolution can only take place within such an universe, and that universe has meaning and therefore existence only as object for some mind that knows it. Evolution pre-supposes mind, and not mind evolution. We cannot get behind our starting point, experience,

That was really why the Indian thinkers came back to mind as the *prius*. Just as they did, so in Europe men came to find that in every form of the constitution of the object world reflection of some kind was involved.

It is no part of the purpose of this article to defend this, the idealistic position. Many over here do not accept it. The important point is that it did emerge in the West, just as it had done in the East, and that the self came to be looked on, not as a substance, but as subject, itself the manifestation of self more liberally and widely conceived. That was how in both West and East God under whatever name, came to be looked on, not as an outside power, but as immanent. The human mind was only among the finite forms in which God expressed and so realised himself. However difficult it may seem to regard a finite mind as creative of its object-world, the difficulty is superseded if mind is given an absolute significance, beyond and outside which there is nothing even conceivable. The problem becomes one of knowledge that is all-inclusive, and no longer is one of substance confronting substance. That seems to have been the view shadowed forth in the Vedantas, and in Gautama's teaching, and it is also the view of modern idealists like Leibnitz and Hegel, and even of idealists of a very different type, such as Schopenhauer, who laid stress on impersonal and non-individual will rather than on intelligence.

Thus we find in East and West a common doctrine very differently expressed, but tending in the same direction. In the East it entered into popular thought more widely than it did here and gave shape to the religion of the people. We find it under their metaphors and in their hymns. There it has never assumed a shape in the same way. "Nearer my God to Thee" has for the East a special meaning. Nevertheless, from the time at least of Plato and Aristotle and Plotinus, we have a similar idea influencing profoundly the course of thought in the West.

We find a similar influence to-day in the writings, not only of our philosophers, but of our poets. It is a view which renders much of reality intelligible that must otherwise remain obscure. Of late it has been penetrating into our current theology. Many traces of the doctrine of the immanence of God in the mind are to be found in the sermons to which we sometimes listen on Sundays.

But we do not take the doctrine as seriously as we might well do. It has been for long in my mind that we in the Western world have been deficient in intellectual curiosity. We have not explored the philosophical systems of India and the East with the same keenness that we have brought to bear on philosophy and science in Europe. There have been exceptions, such as Schopenhauer and in less degree Hegel. But the work has been mainly left to scholars, great of their kind, but insufficiently trained in philosophical research.

The result has been unfortunate. In India it is thought, by competent Indian students, that we do not appreciate, much less understand, the work that has been done by a long series of Hindu metaphysicians. No doubt it is true that until recently the latter have not really shown familiarity with European philosophy, and have expressed themselves largely in images and metaphors. But it is said against us that underlying the popular creeds of India there is a system of analysis in truth not less comprehensive than that of the idealism of the West. It is, of course, far less precise in its language, and has suffered from insufficient training on the part of those who wield it, in the theory of logical forms. Still, it is added, there is the analysis and there are the ideas which have resulted. It is said that we over here are the more open to reproach because contemporary Indian writers of philosophy have not only shown in their works that they have mastered the principles of our Idealists, but have displayed alongside of them the fruits of speculative development in India.

His concluding reflections, we hope, will be noted by the Simon Commission.

When we send a Commission to India to devise a better form of Government, the last thing we think of is the spirit. We propose to confer with politicians, but not with the leaders of native thought of different schools who inspire the people in various forms. We seem to be determined, in this case as we were when dealing with the Irish, to put the cart in front of the horse. I doubt very much whether our political efforts can succeed until after a long day's work has been done, and the sympathy and confidence of the spiritual leaders in India has been gained by a further and different effort on our part. We have surely to convince them that we understand their outlook, though it is not ours, and that we have set ourselves to accord to them the fullest liberty and help in working out their own point of view. Some things we have already done, though on a comparatively small scale. We have founded Hindu and Mohammedan Universities. But we are far behind in effort to provide the children of India with primary education, and there remains everything to be done in securing co-operation in social reform. It is tasks like these that we have to enter on, and to get for ourselves in our work the sympathy and help of the leaders of Indian thought seems a condition even more necessary of fulfilment than that of the secondary stage of seeking co-operation from leaders in political subjects.

HINDUISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

Mr. Turnbull examines the claim set forth in the recent writings of Dr. Stanley Jones, Lord Meston and Dr. Farquhar that the deepseated religious instincts of the Hindu will find their true satisfaction in the personality and teaching of Christ and that the Hindu religious genius has important contributions to make towards the interpretation of genuine Christianity. After a somewhat scrappy summary of the main tenets of Hinduism, Dayanand Sarasvati's Satyarth-Prakash is quoted as "a revelation alike of the strength and of the weakness of the native Hindu intellect, and of its attitude towards Christianity." The main conclusions of the writer are stated as follows:-

(1) To the philosophic Brahman (there are, of course, Brahmans who have little or no philosophy), whose religion is Theism, Pantheism or Idealistic monism, and for whom the various popular Hindu deities possess only a relative and empirical truth, Christianity makes little or no appeal. He is quite satisfied with his belief that Brahma is the only reality, that the phenomenal world is maya, or illusion, that his soul, which is a portion of Brahma, reaps, what it has sown in good or evil deeds, is incarnated in successive births, till and unless, as the result of pure life and religious meditation, it breaks the chain of existence, flows into Brahma as a stream flows into the ocean, and so attains emancipation and reality. To the practical and secular European of today such a creed is anything but attractive, but it has distinct affinities to the Stoicism of the old pagan world, to the philosophy of Spinoza, to the world outlook of Mr. Hardy in *The Dynasts*, and to the recent speculations of Professor Wildon Carr.

There can be no doubt that to the reflective Hindu it is a consolation both in the sufferings of life and in the hour of death. The present writer remembers how one of his students, a charming and intelligent boy, the son of a minor chief, proceeded to England to complete his education with a view to assuming the responsibilities of the little State. His career at an English University was all that could be wished for, but just when he was about to return to India he was taken ill and died. It was the death-blow to all his father's hopes and plans. Yet the old man said, "I could not bear it, were it not for my religion." Could Christianity have done more for him?

(2) For most of the higher castes who are not philosophers, and for the great bulk of what we may call middle-class Indians, the worship of Vishnu—Krishna, Vishnu—Rama or of Shiva supplies an emotional and devotional element (bhakti), a promise of salvation, and of union with the Divine, which to them is quite as attractive as the doctrine of the Christian missionary, quite apart from their devotion to their religion because it is that of their country, and from unwillingness to abandon their caste and all that it means.

(3) The simple and illiterate peasant, for whom the local "godling" represented by a red-painted block of stone is often a *numen preesentius* than Shiva or Vishnu, has very much the same outlook as the European peasant of the Dark Ages. But his religion—superstition, if you will—is interwoven with his habit of thought and speech, and is a product of the soil to which he is so closely bound. The Holy Land of Europeans is far away; few of them have ever seen it. But, to the Hindu, India is full of holy places; the Hindu's devotion to his religion is intertwined with home ties and local tradition, with the sacred story of river, lake and hill. It was remarked by Hume that Christians who visited Palestine returned with a more vivid sense of the truth of Bible story. Not only are the Hindu sacred books Indian in origin, thought and expression, but for the unsophisticated Hindu their story needs no apologia, no setting forth of "evidences," for half of the evidence seems to be before his eyes. When he grows into a higher creed, he will move towards a purer Hinduism, not towards a religion from outside.

All the three of the above roughly-sketched classes of Hindus feel, consciously or instinctively, that Christianity is a menace to the age-old fabric of their social system. As in the days of the Abbe Duobois, only the out-castes or the lowest castes—those who have really suffered from their miserable position in the past, have nothing to lose in the way of status and probably something to gain—have any real desire to change their lot. Conversions, therefore, will be mainly confined to these people, but their Christianity will be of a markedly Hindu kind. We could not expect it to be anything else. If the Brahmins were converted, the rest of Hindu India would probably follow suit, but of the conversion of the Brahmins as a whole—in spite of the optimism of Dr. Jones—there is less chance than of the conversion of the Pope to Protestantism. Buddhism—a heretical offshoot from Brahmanism itself—seemed at one time likely to devour its parent and become the religion of Hindu India, but Buddhism today is practically dead in the land of its birth. Under Mahomedan invasion and Mahomedan Rule Brahmanism was subjected to every kind of pressure, persecution or persuasion, but it survived, and is still flourishing.

That Christianity succeeded in spreading itself over the Roman Empire has been by many accounted one of the marvels of history, but the paganism which it had to contend against was already dead or dying at the heart. There is much in Hinduism that is mere dead-weight ceremonial, but its heart is still very much alive. The very elasticity of Hinduism is its strength; like the banyan tree of the country, it is always capable of throwing out fresh branches and striking fresh root. It has behind it the wonderful caste system of the Hindu, which has survived so many changes and weathered so many storms, and which, though here and there may be modified on this or that point, and make concessions to the pressure of the modern spirit, seems likely to last for many generations yet.

Should Christianity ever succeed in overcoming these obstacles and bring 200 million Hindus into the Christian fold, it will have accomplished a marvel a hundred times more wonderful than the conversion of the Roman Empire.

Mrs. Rhys Davids has a scholarly article on the thesis--that Buddhism was not originally a negative gospel. The growing ferment in the world of Christian thought is reflected in the opening article by Mr. Albert Mansbridge on the *Reassertion of the Faith* and Dean Inge's paper on *Harnack and Liberal Protestantism*.

The Quarterly Review, July, 1928 has a number of thoughtful articles. "The soldier's faith which is a review of Austin Hopkinson's little book "Religio Militis" is easily the most interesting article. The book according to the author is a serious attempt to give an outline of the beliefs of the War-generation and to refute the allegations of those who complain that the present age is one in which faith is dying." It is unfortunate that the author and the reviewer are both strong defenders of the use of force and the profession of the soldier. Says the reviewer :—

"Mr. Hopkinson's exposition and defence of the soldier are timely. In their reaction from war, too many people now decry the soldier's calling and abuse the Art of War which, under God, have saved them. Hearing the hateful, petty wrongs that can flourish in a time of peace, we are earnestly convinced that there are ills greater and more hateful than even war, and few callings more intrinsically splendid and unselfish than that of the warrior. Mr. Hopkinson's standpoint throughout the book rebukes such pacifists, both noisy and noisome, who defile the name of peace; for a pacifism bred of the ingratitude of the living to the dead, and of a flabby internationalism which finds all countries right save one's own, is a travesty, a disgrace. The true pacifists are the soldiers, who have shown that they can kill their enemy yet not hate him; while others, though they do not kill, cannot withhold themselves from hating. There are some even who, while they profess a deep love of their enemies, show nothing but envy and malice towards their friends, and proudly boast that they did all that lay in their power to hinder us when we were fighting for them." (p. 2.)

"The true mark of the soldier is this, that he bears with a stout heart all the hardships of his calling, hopes ever that his sacrifice may not be in vain, believes that progress can come only through suffering, endures unshaken the horrors of science degraded to the service of slaughter, and in toil and pain learns to have compassion for the weak, to pity the coward, to feel no resentment for ingratitude, and in the end to love his enemy. Surely, then, it is fitting that soldiers, before all others, should take up the heavy burden of aristocracy, . . . and hold themselves ready to fulfil duties far more toilsome and difficult than any which war could lay upon them... We who have drunk delight of battle with our peers show but a graceless spirit if we do not consecrate to the service of our fellow-men our lives ennobled by that privilege, and thus preserve some memory of the time when from the sodden trenches of Flanders, under the mocking sunshine of Gallipoli, or through the cold mists of the North Sea, we saw the vision, lacking which the people perish. Some indeed, there are who do not recognise the privilege and its obligation, nor see in the war anything but shreds of human flesh rotting upon barbs of rusty wire. Of such things they make little songs, saying that never again will they witness them, no matter what ills may arise from their fixed purpose, suffer no further discomfort as long as they live. They write books . . . complaining of their disillusion and crying aloud their great discovery that war hurts. Such are not true soldiers, and we may well believe that they will never take up the sword again, except it be against their own fellow-countrymen. For as I have observed, many who find hatred of war a useful stepping-stone to the fulfilment of their political ambitions are apt to keep a soft place in their hearts for the cutting of throats in civil strife. Peace hath her holocausts no less renowned than war; and he who boasts his love of all mankind too often still contrives to hate his brother to the death' (pp. c. 7).

From these very sensible observations, the writer draws conclusions which are by no means necessary.

On the question of religion, Mr. Hopkinson holds very liberal views.

"For us there is but one sacrament, one magic necessary unto salvation, namely that a man should love his neighbour as himself. And be it understood that an essential part of the practice of those who believe this must be to look with charity and respect upon the worship of others. For my part, I gladly offer incense on the altar of any man's idol, if thus I may avoid offence and even confirm him in a faith where in I have no share' (p. 27.)

The reviewer dissents strongly from these sentiments. He is a whole hogger in religion too.

The Review of Reviews. August September, 1928.

Mr. Hamilton Fyfe pleads for a labour-liberal union in the next General Election in Great Britain, if they are to prevent another "six years of Tory Government and patronage and all that insult." The Editor, Mr. Wickham Steed has a very interesting critical appreciation of Mr. 'A.J.B.' - Earl Balfour.

"Unless I err, he lived for a time in early manhood the life of a rancher, if not of a cowboy, in one of the Western American States. In Parliament he won his spurs as a member of the "Fourth Party" years before his efficiency as Leader of the House enabled him to eclipse Mr. Goschen and to make men forget that Lord Randolph Churchill ever existed. In Lord Salisbury's Administration he was firm as a rock during the "Black Week" of the Boer War. His four years' tenure of the Premiership, which ended in disaster for his Party, were marked by elegant equilibrium on Tariff Reform and by a bad Education Bill. Yet to him belongs the credit for the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, for the avoidance of war with Russia over the Dogger Bank incident, and for the Anglo-French Entente. In the Great War, down to the signing of the Armistice, his resilience and tenacity were second only to those of Mr. Lloyd George. When the German submarine campaign was at its height, he crossed the Atlantic in the spring of 1917 to help the United States to avoid the mistakes Great Britain had made during the improvisation of the British armies. He was one of the first to foresee that peace could not be a mere matter of diplomatic re-arrangement but that it must involve revolutionary changes and embody new ideas. Thus, in November 1917, he made the well-known "Balfour Declaration" in favour of a "National Home" for the Jews in Palestine; he insisted that the re-union of Poland must be a condition of peace; and on August 9, 1918, he gave to the Czechoslovaks recognition as an Allied nation and to their three legions the status of an Allied army waging regular warfare. A man less open to ideas or less convinced of their power could never have done the Allied cause the service he did it as Foreign Secretary in 1917-1918. Even at the Paris Peace Conference, where he subordinated himself in an inexplicable degree to Mr. Lloyd George, he and Colonel House nearly got the Conference on to a sound basis during the temporary absence of President Wilson in the United States and of Mr. Lloyd George in London. There after he subsided again and took things so quietly as to give point to M. Clemenceau's gibe that, while the Italian representative would sleep before, and the American representative after, Mr. Balfour would sleep during sittings of the Supreme Council in August 1919.

Everybody who has known A. J. B. at one period or another of his life has probably made a theory about him. Each of these theories may hold some grain of

truth, though, by itself, each is likely to be inadequate. My own theory, which is no better than any other, is that he is a man of great intellectual power, delicate perceptions and deep faith, who has never been able quite to reconcile himself to the thought that his faith should be stronger than the reasons which his intellect is able to find for it. He is not ashamed of it but he does not parade it. He sets his negative reasons about it as a glittering fence to keep off intruders. Outside the fence moves the Balfour whom the world sees, an aristocrat, a man of rare charm, kindly of disposition yet, on occasion, hard withal and sharp as the fence itself. But behind all his irony, his wit, his scepticism, his apparent indifference and his aestheticism lies, in the depths of his being, the passion which he himself ascribes to poetic metaphysicians - the "passion for the Universal and the Abiding" and a steadfast belief that, in the Universal and the Abiding, there is a reasonable purpose."

THE CEREMONY OF NATURALISATION IN AMERICA.

The late Mr. Bonar Law's youngest daughter describes vividly the ceremony of naturalisation in Amercia. After her marriage in England to Lt. Kent Colwell, formerly of the United States Navy she went to live with her husband in the United States and has now acquired full American Nationality.

In the Federal Court, the Judge read the oath in which one "renounces entirely and absolutely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty and particularly to " then came the names of crowned heads in Europe, and of such republics as Poland, Lithuania, Greece, Finland, "the present government of Russia" (ominous words); a lengthy list. So to the most important, the creative part of the oath, "I will support and defend the Constitution and Laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and will bear true faith and allegiance to the same."

There were no words from us, only a tacit acceptance with hand upraised of the new loyalty which was to replace the old.

When the last rustle had subsided and the court room was still, the Judge spoke, clearly and to the point, for a few moments.

There had been, said the Judge, twenty different nations represented that morning in the room but since he entered, something had happened. The twenty had become one nation. We all came, he said, from countries which had a long and rich heritage. Circumstances were such that we had chosen to seek a new land. He did not wish that we should ever forget the old land to which our loyalty had been owed, but rather that we should add a new loyalty and continue to take pride in our land of origin.

He dwelt on the different motives which had prompted us to become Americans, and on the varied results which such a step would have on our lives. The effect would be far-reaching for each of us. Knowing how much it meant to many of us to give up an old allegiance, he remarked that America did not want its citizens to feel only a sense of renunciation. He hoped, rather, that they would feel they had added to their former status. Only in the case of war would they be called upon to support their new country against the old. The Judge hoped that, given the same amount of toil, the men and women before him would reap higher rewards than they had done in the past.

"You meet to day for the first, and probably the last, time in your lives; and you are bonded by a common sympathy. Look around you and remember the faces you have seen here. They also are Americans." So he ended."

CHANGING MORALS? In Nash's magazine Lord Birkenhead, discusses the question whether our morals are changing:

We all know that men were ardent and women frail during the agitated period of the war. When life itself was so fleeting, it was only natural that strict virtue should have been relaxed. We do not often hear today as we did then, of young men meeting and marrying almost chance acquaintances. We do not hear, except infrequently, of sudden disastrous elopements and the consequent breaking up of homes. Loveless marriages and unmarried loves exist to-day, as they always have existed, but the stern social morality which forbids the surrender to sudden temptation and punished, by one means or another, those who succumb to it, has re-established its supremacy.

It is arguable, none the less, that, in one way or another the social code, or rather the sexual code, is altering. We may, perhaps, still be too close to the change, too unconscious of it or too mistaken in our view of it, to realise its exact nature. Yet human nature alters very little. The proportion of frail to virtuous women is probably constant throughout the ages in any civilisation. It is true that at certain periods the opportunities for illicit amours are greater; the risk of detection less; the fear of social ostracism smaller. This is, perhaps, the key to the position today. We have not yet fully settled down from the war. Family life has not yet wholly reasserted its dominance over individual caprice. Until it does, we must be prepared to face an apparent laxity of sexual morals.

As for so-called social experiments such as trial marriages, Lord Birkenhead brushes them aside with contempt. "The trial marriage is a disgusting perversion of human emotions, suitable only for a monkey-house supervised by professional eugenisists."

There spring up nowadays from time to time colonies of long-haired men and short-haired women who claim to be devoting themselves to the simple sexual life. These loathsome apparitions are not more common today than they were before the war, and I cannot admit them as evidence of a changing state of morals. They also appear to me as human monkey-houses, but without eugenic excuse. To day, as yesterday, they never survive long. Nature always reasserts herself. It is only too true that in this world one gets nothing for nothing, and "free love" is a contradiction in terms.

Fortnightly Review August 1928. - Sir Wilfrid Malleon leads off the August Fortnightly with an article about his personal reminiscences of Curzon and Kitchener. It is interesting to know how acutely sensitive Curzon was to press criticism "Himself censorious in all things, putting the whole world right, from humble officials even to cabinet ministers he nevertheless squirmed like an eel on a hook when some anonymous scribe criticised him in the press, or when, still worse, his great Budget Speech, which had occupied three weeks in preparation and ought to have filled eight columns was condensed by the leading paper of India into a single paragraph". In the controversy with Kitchener he showed himself a partisan, politician, eagerly mobilising public opinion and the press in his favour. The whole article is a clever defence of Kitchener. Referring to the

Times' reviewer of Lord Ronaldshay's book, who gave it as his opinion that while Curzon's work in India endures, that of Kitchener failed under the stress of the great war, Sir Wilfrid Malleson writes:

"I admired Curzon and his work more than most people, and I should be sorry to say anything in serious disparagement, but this challenge calls for a few remarks. It is necessary to point out that, of Curzon's major reforms, one, the partition of Bengal, had to be rescinded after a few years, whilst another, his much-vaunted scheme of frontier defence, collapsed like a pack of cards under the first real test in 1919. To say that Kitchener's Army reforms failed in the Great War is simply not true, except that they proved inadequate, as did the military and civil machines of each one of the Allies, to meet a crisis infinitely more gigantic than had ever been anticipated by anyone. It must not be forgotten, too, that immediately after Kitchener's departure from India Lord Morley set about the undoing of much of his work. He even sent out a Commission under Lord Nicholson charged with this task, and though most of the recommendations of this body were eventually ruled out, years of work and preparation had been lost. It is said to have been the boast of the Indian Finance Minister of the post-Kitchener period that he had "bled the Army white", and it is he and his successor, together with Lord Morley himself, who should have appeared amongst the chief accused before the Mesopotamian Committee rather than the unfortunate Beauchamp Duff, who was made the scapegoat of the financiers and politicians. What no one who knows the facts can deny is this, that but for Lord Kitchener's reorganisation and reforms India would perforce have played a very much smaller part in the War than the stupendous effort she actually put forth.

It is unnecessary to discuss which of the two men was the greater. Both were great, and both did work of the utmost value to the Empire. Both were hard to know. Curzon was aloof, and perhaps believed he was of an altogether different clay to the majority of mankind. Kitchener was constitutionally shy, hated the talkers and politicians, and did not shine in their company. But to those who knew him he was kindness itself. He was an exacting taskmaster, but a pleasant one. For over six years I was in very close contact with him, and throughout that period never once, in spite of his reputed ferocity, did I meet with a harsh word or a sour look. I wonder if as much could be said of any other British General. Lord Curzon must naturally have enjoyed the admiration of his staff for his gorgeous talents, but I never heard that he ever gained that feeling of personal affection and devotion such as was felt for Kitchener by all those whose great privilege it was to serve and know him well."

Senator Borah's defence of Democracy in the article "Democracy has not failed" is of much interest.

The Edinburgh Review (July).— Captain Lodes gives a historical review of the Egyptian question especially during and since the war. Sir W. Lawrence's article on the relations of the Indian States to the British Government in India and to any future swaraj constitution is of topical interest though not very helpful. The other articles in the present number dealing with 'Old Indigo plantations', 'The Customs House' are not likely to appeal to Indian readers.

The Contemporary Review—(September.)—Sir Herbert Samuel describes two different conceptions of patriotism. "The one is the militarist view." It holds that the greatness of a country is a matter of armed strength. The qualities most to be admired, in a man or in a people, are the fighting qualities. Glory is the aim to be pursued, and glory is a matter of victory and conquest. If a moral justification is needed for this creed—and that is not usually thought to be necessary, for the creed considers itself to be apart from and above morality—such a justification can be found in the theory that military conflicts between nations are akin to the struggle for existence in nature; since the struggle for existence among plants and animals results, in the long run, in the survival of the fittest, so war contributes to the progress of mankind. The world will advance most if it is ruled by its most virile elements; and if you ask for a test of virility it is to be found in the capacity to seize power. So whoever is strongest is therefore fittest, and serves mankind best through the vigour of his self-assertion. As the history of the past has been one of warfare, so the history of the future will be, and should be, one of warfare also. Treitschke, a leading exponent of this philosophy, said in his political Lectures to the University of Berlin "War will endure to the end of history. The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any alternative, neither is one to be wished for."

"This is the creed in its most extreme form; but with dilutions and modifications it is to be found in many places and many periods outside pre-war Prussia. When we analyse the beliefs of some of our own old-fashioned Conservatives, and try to distinguish the elements that make up that muddled mixture, we find in it, half-understood and half-confessed, something not very different from this. In such a creed patriotism, in one of its interpretations, is the motive; and it is also the instrument. For men will not consent to make the immense personal sacrifices which this doctrine imposes except under the influence of an inspiring ideal. The ideal is found in devotion to country for its own sake, in patriotism.

But there is another view of patriotism, which has always been the Liberal view. Keats, in one of his letters, spoke of "the glory of patriotism, the glory of making by any means a country happier." To help to develop a nation which shall be at a high standard of culture and of comfort, which shall be prosperous and free, a help to other peoples through the example of its character and the worth of its civilisation—that also makes for the greatness of one's country, that also is patriotism."

Patriotism in the former sense is a mere survival of primitive human savagery. It is not the chief of civic virtues but one of the

worst of civic vices. Yet the spirit of patriotism is a preservative of distinctive qualities and customs revealing themselves in distinctive institutions and literatures, arts and crafts. If all the peoples were moulded to a single pattern life would be the poorer. But the world is not merely a congeries of separate sovereign states but a moral unity, divided for its own advantage into different nationalities and governments. Each nation must promote its own greatness, allowing full liberty for others to promote similar greatness. Nationalism and internationalism, patriotism and peace, these are not antagonistic, are not opposites but complements to one another.

Aylmar Maude has an article on Tolstoy and Luigi Sturzo publishes in an article form the purport of a discussion held 3 years ago in France on the question of the Right of Resistance to the State. Rt. Hon'ble Arthur Ponsonby's article on 'Egypt today' makes an interesting and instructive reading. "George III. and his Ministers" by Mr. J. L. Hammond, "Imperial History of the United States" by Mr. G. Reginald G. Trotter are also well worth reading.

The Round Table (September) has an intelligent and sympathetic article on the task of the Simon Commission. The spirit of the article is characteristic of the Round Table Group. While it states the problems, it does not suggest solutions. The Kellogg Peace Pact is discussed in a sympathetic and at the same time critical article. We reproduce here The Pact in its final form.

"The President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the Czechoslovakia Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland,

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made, to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and, by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force, bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilised nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

Have decided to conclude a treaty, and for that purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries . . . Who, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:--

ARTICLE I.—The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II.—The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III.—The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at . . .

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at . . . and the Treaty shall, immediately upon such deposit, become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers, parties thereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of . . . to furnish each Government named in the preamble, and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty, with a certified copy of the Treaty, and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of . . . telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in the French and English languages, both texts having equal force, and hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at . . the . . . day of . . . in the Year of Our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and twenty . . .

Fortnightly Review.—(September.) "Lord Haldane" by a Tory is a clear and an extremely readable account of the work of the dead statesman. The fact that the article was written before Lord Haldane's death gives it additional interest and shows how even in Tory circles, Lord Haldane's reputation, so basely traduced in the early days of the War has now been fully cleared up and the extent and value of his services realized.

In his article on the 'Outlawry of the war', Mr. J.H. Harley discusses the scope and the working of the Kellogg pact.

Aylmer Maude's article on 'Tolstoy's place in Literature' is one that could be expected of so ardent an admirer of the great Russian writer; "Dante in Modern Italy" by Mr. R.E. Gordon George and "Patronage and the English poets" by Mr. Robert Graves are of purely literary interest.

Nineteenth century and after (September.) Lord Sydenham of Combe leads this number with his thoughtful paper on "Quo Vadimus" and discusses how far sound statemanship can direct the social, economic, and the political forces of the modern world so as to ensure the highest national well-being. "Welfare of the Indian Agriculturist" by Colonel Aubrey O'Brien is of great interest to the Indian readers. "Babies in ancient literature" "the noise question" have no special appeal to the Indian mind, while those who are interested in literature will find that "Some glimpses of the poets at work" by Mr. Herbert Wright and the "English Theatre of the Romantic revival" by Mr. U.C. Nag repay perusal.

BOOK-REVIEWS.

I

THE DECLINE OF THE WEST.

BY OSWALD SPENGLER.

VOLUME I. (TRANSLATED BY C. F. ATKINSON.)

A review of this monumental work is bound to be more or less of an impertinence. It is a work in the grand style in which encyclopaedic learning and recklessly daring speculation are fused in the white heat of a volcanic imagination. It is emphatically a book of the moment and is a deliberate challenge thrown out to the strongest minds of our time. To the author himself, it is much more than a learned luxury: he claims in it to present *the* philosophy of the age and to work out his Destiny, which he takes to be the destiny of modern West-European Culture. Avowedly a philosophy of history, it is to him the inevitable self-portraiture of the great cultural epoch in its decline, the only epoch which in his view has envisaged the spiritual reality of History and Time.

Spengler's conception of history which is staggering in its grandeur is best introduced by a quotation.

A boundless mass of human Being, flowing in a stream without banks; up-stream, a dark past wherein our time-sense loses all powers of definition and restless or uneasy fancy conjures up geological periods to hide away an eternally-unsolvable riddle; down-stream, a future ever so dark and timeless—such is the ground-work of the Faustian picture of human history.

Over the expanse of the water passes the endless uniform wave-train of the generations. Here and there bright shafts of light broaden out, everywhere dancing flashes confuse and disturb the clear mirror, changing, sparkling, vanishing. These are what we call clans, tribes, peoples, races which unify a series of generations within this or that limited area of the historical surface. As widely as they differ in creative power, so widely do the images that they create vary in duration and plasticity; and when the creative power dies out, the physiognomic, linguistic and spiritual identification-marks vanish also and the phenomenon subsides again into the ruck of the generations. Aryans, Mongols, Germans, Kelts, Parthians, Franks, Carthaginians, Berbers, Bantus are names by which we specify some very homogeneous images of this order.

But over this surface too, the great Cultures accomplish their majestic wave-cycles. They appear suddenly, swell in splendid lines, flatten again and vanish and the face of the waters is once more a sleeping waste.

A Culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the proto-spirituality of ever-childish humanity and detaches itself, a form from the formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring. It blooms on the soil of an exactly definable landscape to which plantwise it remains bound. It dies when the soul has actualised the full sum of its possibili-

ties in the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and reverts into the proto-soul. But its living existence, that sequence of great epochs which define and display the stages of fulfilment, is an inner passionate struggle to maintain the Idea against the powers of chaos without and the unconscious muttering deep down within. It is not only the artist who struggles against the resistance of the material and the stifling of the idea within him. Every Culture stands in a deeply symbolical, almost in a mystical, relation to the Extended, the space in which and through which it strives to actualise itself. The aim once attained—the idea, the entire content of inner possibilities, fulfilled and made actual—the Culture suddenly hardens, it mortifies, its blood congeals, its force breaks down, and it becomes *Civilisation*, the thing which we feel and understand in the words Egypticism, Byzantism, Mandarinism. As such they may, like a worn-out giant of the primeval forest, thrust their decaying branches towards the sky for hundreds or thousands of years, as we see in China, in India, in the Islamic world. It was thus that the Classical Civilisation rose gigantic in the Imperial Age with a false semblance of youth and strength and fullness, and robbed the young Arabian Culture of the East of light and air.

This—the inward and outward fulfilment, the finality, that awaits every living culture—is the purport of all historic *declines*, amongst them that decline of the Classical that we know so well and fully, and another decline, entirely comparable to it in course and duration, which will occupy the first centuries of the coming millenium but is heralded already and sensible in and around us today—the decline of the West. Every Culture passes through the age-phases of the individual man. Each has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age.

History is opposed to Nature as *becoming* is opposed to the *become*, as destiny to causality, as time to space or as the will to the intellect. Nature is the sphere of the *actual* that is finished or past, of existence that is accomplished, of standing extension and timeless law. History is the sphere of present *actualising*, of accomplishing life, of directedness towards the future—with Nature as its petrified past. The actualising is of the *possible*, of the *idea* of the world, which to Spengler is just the Soul, the soul as it is felt, not as it is reasonably pictured. The primary logical notions then are the possible, the actualising and the actual or—as they are concretely put—soul, life and world, regarded as the three *grades* of Existence.

Existence again is half intuitively dichotomised into the felt and the perceived, the subjective and the objective, the 'proper' and the 'alien.' The distinction does not emerge in the *possible*: dreaming and the dreamt, idea and the ideal are not distinguishable except in words. But actualising life and the actual world—the two grades of waking existence—may each be understood either as felt or as perceived. Life as felt is called pure becoming or direction; as perceived, it is History, time as rhythm, form as a function, cosmic physiognomy. So the actual world as felt or 'proper' is the *become* as pure extension, number or concept; and as perceived or 'alien,' it is Nature, space as standing tension, eternal law or system.

History then is life or actualising, not as pure becoming that has only a felt reality, but as the becoming that dominates the become, as real time operating in the perceived or alien space-world. Nature—its antithesis—is the actual world as disposed in *depth*—the one dimension of space which is just time become rigid, and as a system of numbers or concepts rendered fresh as atomic constitution and concrete laws. Becoming and the become are subordinated each to the other according as one is in the historical or in the natural focus. For the historical eye, there is no single Physics but only a history of physics; and from the naturalistic or scientific standpoint, history is but a chapter of Epistemology. The fundamental concepts of Nature—number, space, force etc.—are not common to all ages: each culture entertains these in its distinctive fashion, evoking them from its inner soul as it does its artistic and religious symbols. Science is not one: there are as many sciences as there are Cultures and the scientific thought of any age is an important detail in its spiritual physiognomy. If history is interested in science as only an expression of a *particular* Culture, science is interested in the historical procession of Cultures at best as a dialectic of bloodless concepts, their concrete temporal embodiment being to it only the natural effect of previous causes.

To Spengler however, this scientific interpretation of history—whether logical, psychological or economical—is a falsification while the historical construction of science or the concept of Nature is a genuine stage in the life of a Culture. Time or Becoming is the fundamental reality and it precedes and underlies the spatio-causal world of the Become, the latter is the construction of the former, though neither illusory as to Bergson nor merely ideal as to Gentile. The soul of a living culture or historical age is a formative *nisus* with an absolute and abrupt beginning, which in its earlier stages knows no rigid causally ordered nature. But just before it reaches the limit of its creativity when it has a dim prescience of approaching Fate, it makes a self protective effort to evoke a kind of anti-Fate in the eternalised concept of nature or the scientific system of causality. Science is the last effort of a cultural epoch to save itself from the death with which it was born and to control the world that threatens to close in upon it. The effort is real and has a historic value for the culture though it does not avail against Fate. History itself comes to be self consciously apprehended only when it has put forth its scientific concept of Nature. Time is prior to space but is *known* only as the symbolic negation of space.

Spengler develops his theory of time, space and number in conscious opposition to Kant. Time to him is directed becoming

and no accomplished magnitude, a stress towards the future that is definitely real though unfixable by number or concept, intrinsically individual like the first person I and like it—as the symbolic negation of space—indeterminately many. To Kant, time is constitutive and not merely creative of the world, as much undirected as space and having extensive magnitude in common with it measurable by number, a constructive activity—it may be—but in a sense in which space is also an activity, an ideal or cognitive activity and not a creative activity of will or life. To Spengler as to Bergson, time is a real activity, accessible not to the cognitive or conceptual consciousness but to intuition or artistic imagination. Unlike Bergson however he holds that there are indeterminately many times, as many as there are collective minds—the minds of creative historical ages each with its distinctive culture. There is no *one* cosmic time, either as an objective blank or as an absolute activity: The unactual but actualising real time is only individual like the I which is neither singular nor universal in the ordinary sense. It is individual in its mystic quality of 'direction' which is something real and indescribable and is only symbolised by space-direction as what in space is not spatial.

Space is understood as a single dimension, the dimension of depth and is regarded as the unconscious efflux of the mind that would will, as time itself that is eternalised, not by virtue of what Bergson would call 'de-tension' but by a positive self-protective effort of the mind against such detension, against the inevitable onset of relaxation and decline. As time petrified, it is not a flabby blank but a tense void that comes to be figured as a system of necessary causal laws. The system is a purely intelligible reality and as such admits of many alternative geometries, the Euclidean three-dimensional geometry being only one of them, adapted specially to the representation of the order of sensible bodies. To Spengler as to Kant, space is necessarily constitutive of nature but while Kant takes it to be co-ordinate with time and real only as filled or applying to bodies and therefore as tri-dimensional (though as viewed from the observer's position outwards and not from outside inwards as in the Classical greek conception), Spengler declares it to be a derivative of time and organic like it—to will rather than to cognition, appearing as it does as a tension that is real by itself independently of the bodies that are its determinations. Motion is understood as a surd in the objective world, as what the mind would in self protection represent in standing space but never succeeds in representing. The Eleatic puzzles are to Spengler eternal puzzles showing that the so-called extensive magnitude of time—the Kantian undirected time—is but a phantom and that while space as depth or distance can be understood as immobilised

time, time is never pictured but only apologetically symbolised by a spatial line.

Number is to Spengler almost the same as a concept performing in any case a function parallel to that of the name, a timeless intelligible form, not constructed but apparently only discovered by numbering, counting or timing. Space and number are both the forms of the Become or the actual but whereas space (as depth) still appears to imagination as a becoming or actualising *for the moment*, number does not appear as a process at all, being viewed as eternally accomplished with its time-origin entirely effaced. Yet number like the concept, though the very principle of definiteness or demarcation, is indeterminately many, there being many number-systems or arithmetics as there are many languages. Each such system Greek, Indian, Arabian or West-European has a distinctive symbol or schema behind it, the individual style of a soul that appears in its artistic creations. If time as direction is immobilised as extension, time as a specific creativity, as an *individual* symbolising or mythopœic style shapes into an arithmetical system or language, space as formless depth which is still reminiscent of time gets figured as a timeless, intellectual, non-conutive *order* of presentation which is indifferently geometrical or arithmetical. There is no real demarcation between geometry and arithmetic, both being the elaboration of space and admitting of many alternative styles. The current notion unfortunately fixed by Kant—of geometry being connected with space and arithmetic with time is to Spengler a vulgar banality.

The creation of space is the unconscious work of the time-spirit, its instinctive construction of a medium for its artistic or symbolising life. The creation of a number-system however is a conscious self protective effort to ward off Death, an effort confined to the strongest minds of the age to fix its distinctive style of symbolism in a systematic world of timeless relations, in a knowable finished world of causality. This interest in knowledge or truth marks the late manhood of the age when it knows itself as completed and would no longer live adventurously. To knowledge, reality as life or stress towards an indeterminate future is mummified into timeless *truth*, a determinate changeless past, a system of objective laws. The heart of this knowable system is number or the concept: we have exact knowledge or science just to the extent we can name and measure. Knowledge is power secure of itself, power not of adventurous self expression but of mere self conservation, of making one self rigid and unchangeable, of forgetting but not of conquering Death—the power that is born of fear and the hatred of fate, that is meant to control the world but has no longer any real value to create out of it.

Science is the creation of an age in its maturity, its greatest conscious effort and the precursor of its decline. It is as much the pride of the age as its resigned stock-taking, its deliberate self petrification, its stoical culture of insensibility to the vague shadow of Death which as projected from within seems to come from nowhere. Science marks the rationalistic phase of a culture which shuts itself up within a closed chain of causality to persuade itself of the impossibility of a void beyond, the void from which the shades of decline now appear to emanate but in which also all its adventurous creativity was launched in the past. Rationalism implies a bold thinking distrust of the Death that is sensed. Death that has to it no place in the causal system, is no concept at all but is only a half-thought or symbolism bred of irrational fear. When an age thus shuts out the symbolism of Death, it has ceased to understand its own creative youth. Its atheistic boldness is symptomatic of the closing grip of death.

Death comes in spite of this elaborate preparation for self-protection. Its inevitability is realized only after it is felt to be beyond causal necessity and distrusted as intrinsically irrational. Death is necessary but not in a scientific or cognitive sense. It is necessary just in the sense in which life and artistic creation are necessary, being as much beyond nature as spiritual value. It is inferentially unpredictable but is felt real even as the will is felt real in the willing; and yet it is inevitable in the sense the completeness of a physiognomy is inevitable in the simplest feature of it that is actually presented. Life is unpredictable in Bergson's sense as outside the rational system that is its emanation but it is not therefore indeterminate and interminable in its course. Life is not an indefinite *one*, as it is to Bergson: there are many lives, each complete with a definite physiognomy and fixed duration. Its beginning and end are alike uncaused and catastrophical, set it may be by our impotent retrospective imagination in a single infinite phantom-time (which is indistinguishable from space) but having no rational continuity with what precedes it and inexplicable in its termination by anything outside it. It is spontaneously born as a complete entity with completion or death as an intrinsic feature rounding off its physiognomy. Its birth and course and death as set in our phantom-time are significant dates and duration, fate-laden chronological numbers utterly different from the bloodless numbers of mathematics, making up the world of genuine facts which is called History.

Life then is intrinsically linked up with death in a unity. Each such definite time-unity outside the spatio-causal world is called by Spengler *Destiny*, the most significant word in his

philosophy of history. It is a symbol that is emphatically not a concept, being realised only as the negation of causality, as non-conceptual, fundamentally irrational. Its congeners are the pseudo-concepts of chance and fate which though regarded as pariahs of science have never been effectually killed by rational thought. The exact significance of Destiny however is reached by a contrast with these notions which are like it set against causality. The same historical event may be taken as destined or as accidental or as caused. To take it as caused or as belonging to the world of law is to cease to regard it as historical or genuinely temporal: a causal science of history is to Spengler just the abolition of history. To take it as a casual incident however is to keep within history. Incident is to him not so much an object to cognition as something that is feelingly apprehended, contemplated in curious longing or anxiety, in passing joy or grief. Not that its caused character is denied: causation is regarded in science as starting from a collocation which in the last resort is, if not uncaused, not *known* to be caused so that every event that is caused is also in one aspect felt to be accidental. To take an event as a part of Destiny is not simply not to know it as caused – to feel it as accidental – but to explicitly realise it as *uncaused*.

Destiny has to be further contrasted with fate, predestination and our own *karma* or *adrshta*. Destiny is opposed to all causality while these latter notions imply only a denial of *natural* causality. Fate is understood as an uncaused blind causality that unlike natural causality is incapable of being counteracted or modified by our will. Pre-destination is divine causality and is uncaused like fate; but as our will itself is taken to be its effect, there is no sense in saying that it is affected or unaffected by the will. *Adrshta* is our own past causality that is foreign to our present willing but neither unaffected by it like fate nor affected by it like a natural cause. All these, as causal, are supposed to be objects of cognition though not belonging to the world of natural science. But destiny is a symbolic notion that emerges only with the surrender of the conceit of knowledge, with the recognition on the one hand of all causality as natural and of the entire causal system as uncaused on the other.

Causality to Spengler has nothing whatever to do with time. As a connexion between events independent of their absolute time-position, it has for its terms not genuine events but mere concepts or 'truths' and is itself timeless though set in a phantom-time that is only a kind of space. The causal world then is an immobile logical entity divorced from felt reality. Our feeling of life is a feeling of real time and so long as there is the joy of life with wonder or regret or wistfulness as variations upon it,

the complete immobility of a scientific world is never reached: we retain our interest in *incidents* as distinct from dead truths. The interest in petrified truth is the mark of an incipient world-care or fear of death stealing over the joy of life. The vague fear presently grows into a causeless and nameless terror, terror of something impossible to the intellect and yet inevitable; and there comes in a flash the vision of Destiny, of the spiritual reality of the life that has been, of its inherent terminability and of its last great effort of self stabilisation in science and the intellect. The visualising of the causal world in the jaws of Death—the fundamental humbling of the intellect—is the baptismal initiation into the mystery of time, History or Destiny.

Life as merely felt is unconscious of the death or limit within itself and reason is but the instinctive will to disbelieve it when it begins somehow to be dimly sensed. Life is explicitly apprehended when the spectre of Death is seen even with our eyes closed, when it is believed in spite of its being rationally judged to be impossible. The mystery of life is borne in upon us only when the ebbtide suddenly sets in. Others have spoken of life or the will as unquestioning belief in itself, as therefore incompatible with belief in its terminability. It may have its causeless ebb and flow but the flow alone is to them positive, the ebb being only a privation, not an incident in its fulfilment. To Spengler, the ebb is a positive self expressive feature of life, causeless indeed but not outside its conscious fulfilment, and real in the sense the onset and duration of the flood-tide are real. If the decline of a culture implies decline of faith in it, it implies also a complete visualising of its floating physiognomy, there is pessimism about the future but it is strong in the sense of a tragic fulfilment, in the vision of a real Past or Destiny.

The pessimism behind Spengler's philosophy of history is tragic in its inwardness, neither cynical nor sentimental. 'Our destiny is finished', he seems to say, 'our gods have departed, the future that we cannot see we face but neither in hope nor in despair.' There is no vain regret for the past as for a petty private loss, no forgetting of the present vacuity in the dream of a future, no stupid gazing into mere emptiness. There is the impersonal detached acceptance of Destiny, the strong waking realism that avoids the shallow complacency of atheistic negation and refuses consolation in an unpractical romanticism on the one hand and a spinozistic 'intellectual love' on the other. Destiny is to Spengler a prime spiritual reality envisaged, when it is finished, as our very self that is retracted but not therefore reduced to illusion.

With the retrospective intuition of the destiny of our own age, history as a whole begins to be seen in its true perspective. Other historical ages vaguely loom up as spiritual entities or destinies absolutely unrelated to our destiny. So long as an individual is immersed in a culture and cannot visualise its physiognomy, he cannot realise that there were other cultures, does not really believe in History; and if he happens to be in the rationalising self defensive stage of his culture, he has the perverted vision of History as a single march of circumstance converging towards his own age—the shallowest of visions that amounts to the rejection of real history and the autonomous spirituality of culture. Not to speak of the science of history, even the so-called philosophy that views history as a dialectic movement of the spirit is vitiated at its core by the conceit of reason which illusorily mechanises spirit into a clear cut teleology. Spengler, while rejecting with Bergson both mechanism and teleology as a description of life, avoids the sterile Bergsonian implication of a single formless unpredictable life. Life we first intuit as the cultural destiny of our age that is finished and that brings in the vision of *many* lives, destinies or cultures. Each culture has a definite form, any feature of which is predictable from any other as aesthetically though not causally necessary.

There is unpredictability however as to the birth and death of a cultural life, since between culture and culture there is no aesthetic continuity, causal continuity being altogether out of the question. A culture is to Spengler an organism with a spontaneous birth, a creative life-course and an abrupt climacteric after which it continues through an indefinite period of decline and barren existence. This course of decline is called by Spengler *civilisation* and is viewed by him as no part of real significant history and in no way anticipative of the culture that is to come. The indefinite discontinuous succession of cultures is what we call universal history which is not only no single entity but would not even admit of a single philosophy, had it not been for the fact that the cultures with their infinite dissimilarity are similar in respect of their duration and *tempo*. Each culture has according to the author a definite life-span (about a thousand years) and a uniform rhythm of childhood, youth, manhood and decline so that history is significant, not so much as a succession as a *parallelism* of cultures: What culture is to come next can indeed never be predicted; but from the rhythm that has obtained in other cultures, one can predict the next stage within a particular culture.

Spengler's dictum about the uniform span and rhythm of culture is neither *apriori* speculation nor causal induction but

a hard-wrung discovery of intuitive imagination. The faculty for History, Time or Destiny is this imagination, which not only envisages the moving yet complete physiognomy of a cultural age in all its creations political, religious, artistic and scientific, but also apprehends their 'homologues' in other ages and views the many ages or times as 'contemporary' and alternating embodiments of a single musical scheme. To the cognitive intellect, history is not a reality at all; and even the philosophy of history is not the creation of the mere intellect. Imaginative or aesthetic views do not shed their personal character and hence Spengler's concrete interpretations and expositions of particular histories or cultural unities may appear merely imaginary to others. Even his abstract philosophy of history to which this review has confined itself has its personal imaginative side. Still—barring his mystic pronouncement about the constant life-span and rhythm—his philosophy, with its profound symbolism of a procession of autonomous destinies and its penetrating criticism of other views of history, has the objectivity and power of an impersonal speculative creation in the grand style.

He claims it to be *the* philosophy of the age. History or Real time is to him the distinctive god of West European Culture. Time as a becoming beyond the become, reality as an infinite aspiration to be, space as a tense void, function as *the* fact, will flung indefinitely outward are the ruling symbolisms of this age which accordingly he calls the Faustian age and which an old-world Hindu may style the age of the *asuras*. Real time was recognised in other cultures—e.g. the Chinese and the Egyptian, but it was time with a different spiritual significance—as 'a wandering' or as 'the way', not as a symbol of daring will and measureless aspiration; and there were cultures like the classic Greeco-Roman or the Indian which were definitely *historical*. No culture but the Faustian, according to Spengler, had a real interest in history as the stress of the Past towards the future. 'The classical soul, he says, had interest only in the living Present, and the Indian soul we may imagine had interest in the deified Past; but the directed movement from the past to the future—time as life—is a symbol which would not have appealed to them. The ruling passion of the Faustian age is the visualising of the past for the indefinite creation of the future; and now that the age has entered on its decline, its greatest interest—the ghost of its passion—is in a philosophy of history.

KRISHNA CHANDRA BHATTACHARYA.

THE SON OF MAN BY EMIL LUDWIG (BENN 15s.)

Churches crumble down and creeds perish. Theology shifts from age to age. But at no time will the personality of Jesus cease to fascinate the mind of man. There is something irresistibly appealing in the story of this young Galilean who grew up to bear the burden of the entire world. It is exactly in this frame of mind that Ludwig approaches the life story of Jesus. "My aim" says he in the preface "is not to expound the teaching with which all are familiar, but to portray the inner life of the prophet." He does not say a word about theology, that rose later and he does not profess to understand it. His standpoint is essentially that of a humanist. While "far from its being his purpose to shake the faith which, those who live in Christ, have in the divinity of Christ, his aim is to convince those who regard the personality of Jesus as artificially constructed, that he is a real, and intensely human figure." It is just possible that this mode of treatment would be unacceptable to those, steeped in the strict dogmas of the church. Certain expressions used by Ludwig such as that "he had a King's sense of importance," that "he had spiritual pride" and that he was "trembling and afraid to be alone" may appear to a pious Christian as sheer arrogance. But it must be remembered that Ludwig regards Jesus as an essentially human figure, one who was human enough to drive the money changers in a fit of rage and shed those bitter tears in the moon-lit garden of Gethsemane. But the matter apart, no one can deny that it is a remarkable work. The same traits that made his study of Napoleon a superb classic of modern biography are to be seen here, the amazing penetrative insight into the mind of the hero whose story he is writing and the striking gift of tense and dramatic narrative. Strewn all over the book are passages of rare charm and singular power. They arrest attention and elicit admiration even when the author's heresies seem past forbearance.

INTELLIGENT WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SOCIALISM

BY GEORGE BERNARD SHAW (CONSTABLE 15s.)

There is a tone of assuredness about all that Shaw says or writes that attracts immediate attention. He seems to see clearly where others feel their vision is blurred. He knows his mind and makes others feel that he knows it very well. Half his genius is his self confidence. He has a superb talent for saying things that linger in the memory for long. He may look a trifle cynical but no other writer can give the world the shake that it badly needs. One may not agree with Shaw. But there is no ignoring him.

He must be heard. In this book he develops the thesis that socialism means nothing more than equality of income. He also recommends that the Government should nationalize all the industries by a series of properly compensated expropriations. The economic life of the nation is to be manned by an organization of very efficient civil servants. Indeed, it would be delightful if everybody should get the same income and this alluring prospect is only vitiated by its utter impossibility. In a world where every one knows what he or she gets there will hardly be any effort to get more. For why should one toil if he cannot enjoy the fruits of his extra skill? Where we do not strive we stagnate. Socialism all the world over makes the mistake of imagining that human nature can be modelled on plan. But these questions apart, Shaw covers an extraordinary range and variety of topics touching modern life and we can think of none who would not feel his intelligence quickened and thought stimulated for reading this extremely fascinating book.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

WHILE we are not blind to the great possibilities of the Kellogg Pact we are not sanguine enough to imagine that it has rendered war impossible. War is less the handiwork of scheming politicians and sinister diplomats and more the outcome of national temper and race prejudice. Peace will not be permanent in a world where one nation hates another, is ignorant of its history, and is contemptuous of its civilization. The truest guarantee of world peace is cultural understanding and harmony amongst the peoples of the earth. It is a matter for great gratification that all over the world an effort is being made by the saner section of every community to promote mutual knowledge and sympathy. The increasing interest which Europe and America are evincing in the life and thought of India and other Eastern countries is an instance in point. Turkey and Afghanistan, where hitherto the surge of life has been proverbially slow have enthused themselves by the stimulus afforded by the contact with the West. Thus culturally the world is being knit together as a unit, a process in which modern science has been a great help. We believe that India has her own contribution to make to the world thought and progress. If hitherto there has not been an adequate appreciation, outside her shores, of her heritage and capacity to co-operate with the leading nations of the world, in the realm of thought and aspiration, India cannot escape her part of the blame. She has been too proud of her splendid isolation, and too little eager to know and let know. We think the time has arrived when she should come out of her seclusion. A monthly magazine that secures articles from the leading representatives of Indian life and thought on difficult questions of contemporary interest may have its own humble measure of usefulness in broadcasting knowledge of India's problems and aspirations. Effort will be made to secure the collaboration of eminent writers and thinkers of other countries who will be invited to tell Indian readers not merely of all that happens in their lands, but how they view the problems of Indian life. This magazine will not articulate the views of any particular

party or section. Though its chief interest is cultural, reference to political questions becomes inevitable, since politics, at any rate, in the present stage of her evolution, is a part of India's effort to rediscover her soul. But where political questions will be discussed it will be in a spirit of sober and scientific enquiry. It is not possible to say more by way of preface, in a matter in which the work that this magazine will be able to do, will be the only justification for its appearance. We are, however, encouraged by the degree of approval that our undertaking has already received from eminent men in England, America and India, some of whose valuable contributions it is our privilege to publish in this opening number. Whether we can ever attain to the high ideal of stimulating, "an increased amount of reciprocal interpretation" between the East and West, as suggested by the late Lord Haldane will depend upon the measure of appeal that our endeavour makes to men of light and leading in the different parts of the world, on whose support and active assistance we, in the main, rely.

THE News of LORD HALDANE's death, coming so close upon his most courteous response to our invitation caused us no small measure of grief. We had counted a good deal on his

The Late Lord Haldane sympathy and on his readiness to help any endeavour seeking to promote cultural understanding and harmony between the East and the West. How well he liked our venture and how gladly he would have striven to help it, had he been spared, will appear from the letter he wrote to a member of our Advisory board, and from the spirit of his article to our opening number. To us perhaps falls the melancholy privilege of publishing Lord Haldane's final words to the world which he has enriched in so many ways.

Lord Haldane was born on the 30th July 1856, and had his early education at Edinburgh where he obtained the degree of Master of Arts with first class honours. At Göttingen he received the finishing touch to his philosophical studies and thus laid the foundations of his "spiritual home," a phrase for which Lord Haldane paid rather heavily. On his return from Germany he was called to the Bar, and soon gathered a lucrative practice in the Chancery division, and the Appeal courts; finally he rose to be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In 1885 he entered Parliament as a Liberal member for Haddingtonshire, and from that date began his close alliance with a group of highly intellectual politicians such as Asquith and Grey who used to gather in those days round that high priest of Liberalism, John Morley. In the great Boer war controversy Haldane backed up

Lord Roseberry and the group of Liberal Imperialists of which he and Grey were the chief spirits. In 1905 when the Liberals were returned to Parliament with a thumping majority, the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman chose him as the Secretary of State for War, which office he relinquished in 1912 to rise to the Woolsack. At the declaration of the War he proffered to go in again to the War office and actually did assume charge, only to renounce it soon after under most unfortunate circumstances. All the time the War was going on in Flanders, and in the years of reconstruction which were as distracted, Lord Haldane was a silent and thoughtful spectator of events. The new economic and social forces that were let loose by the Great War, had modified to a great extent his Liberal creed; and when, in 1923 Mr. Ramsay MacDonald formed for the first time a Labour Cabinet, Lord Haldane took up the Lord Chancellorship. Since its fall in 1924 Haldane had been keeping out of active political work though his interest in the march of events was by no means diminished.

While his Judicial labours entitle him to an honoured place among the great Jurists and Judges that have kept up the high morale and reputation of English law, it is as War

As War Secretary, that Lord Haldane will be remembered **Secretary.** and his memory cherished. It looks, indeed, a trifle

curious how this thinker accustomed to an atmosphere of quiet and calm reflection could have become England's greatest War Minister. A full account of that splendid work, a work that saved England from annihilation by the Germans would be quite out of place here. The tributes paid by responsible soldiers and statesmen are alone sufficient. In the years 1906—1912 Lord Haldane was alive, as much as any die-hard to the dangerous ambitions of the Kaiser. He was anxious therefore to improve the defensive organisation of England. The War books published by Grey, Asquith and Churchill, not to speak of Lord Haldane's own book 'Before the War', have refuted the oft repeated charge that the Liberals had mismanaged and bungled, that they could not read the German mind, and that they did nothing to prepare the nation for the terrible catastrophe that overtook it in 1914. Lord Haldane, both as a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and as War Minister, was anxious to do everything to further the defensive capacity of the nation while he deprecated everything that savoured of preparation for attack. What he did in that connection may best be described in his own modest words.

"There was, therefore, nothing for it but to attempt a complete revolution in the organisation of the British Army at Home. The nascent general staff was finally organised in September 1906, and its organisation was shortly afterwards developed

so as to extend to the entire Empire, as soon as a conference had taken place with the Ministers of the Dominions early in the following year. The outcome was a complete recasting, which after three years' work, made it practicable rapidly to mobilise, not only 100,000, but 160,000 men; to transport them, with the aid of the Navy, to a place of concentration which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain; and to have them at their appointed place within twelve days, an interval based on what the German Army required on its side for a corresponding concentration.

All the arrangements for this were worked out by the end of 1910. Both Sir John French, and Sir Douglas Haig took an active part in the work. Behind the first line army so organised, a second line army of larger size, though far less trained, and so designed that it could be expanded, was organised. This was the citizen or the "Territorial" army, consisting in time of peace of fourteen divisions of infantry and artillery and fourteen brigades of cavalry, with the appropriate medical, sanitary, transport, and other auxiliary services. Those serving in this second line army were civilians, and, of course, much less disciplined than the officers and men of the first line. Its primary function was home defence, but its members were encouraged to undertake for service abroad, if necessary; and a large part of this army, in point of fact, fought in France, Flanders, and in the East, soon after the beginning of the war, in great measure making up by intelligence for shortness of training."

It is not for halfpenny journalists and blatant politicians to pronounce verdict upon work so great. It is for the soldiers, charged with their nation's very life, in the greatest military struggle of human history to have the final say; and this is what Lord French the commander of the entire British forces in the early part of the war says in his book "1914"

"Backed up by the opinion and advice of a very few soldiers of experience, the Secretary of State for War cast all this prejudice to the winds, and determined upon a regular and complete divisional organisation for the Territorials. It was indeed a great and courageous decision. "What!" exclaimed the gold bedizened smart young horse artillery commander, "do you mean to say you are going to allot Territorial horse artillery batteries to your mounted brigade? You must be mad! It takes years even to approach the necessary degree of efficiency."

The field gunner, immersed in his latest developments to ensure the utmost accuracy of fire, the howitzer and heavy field artillery expert, the scientific and highly trained sapper, all joined in the hue and cry, until Haldane's conceptions almost collapsed and expired in a ferment of ridicule. But he remained steadfast. The mounted brigades received their Territorial batteries of horse artillery. Fourteen complete Territorial divisions were formed of three brigades of infantry, three brigades of field artillery one brigade of howitzers, one brigade of heavies, field and signal companies of Engineers, companies of Army Service Corps and Army Medical Corps.

Lord Haldane had only some eight or nine years to wait for his reward. Within that time he saw his Territorials doing splendid and invaluable work as complete divisions in the field, fighting with success against the most powerful and efficient army in the world. When I say "he got his reward" I may well be mis-understood. He got nothing but calumny and grossly unjust abuse; but the "reward" to such a man does not come in the ordinary way. He had proved the value of his great work, and that is all the reward he ever wanted.

. It is to this organisation that I largely attribute the success of the Territorials in the field throughout the war. Each unit learned by degrees

its own relative place and position in the great divisional machine. Enthusiasm was raised in the idea engendered in all ranks that they formed part of a great engine of war, furnished by their own counties and immediate neighbourhoods. At first certainly, they were crude and untrained but every day they improved through instruction, and developed great intelligence under a thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at.

The strength of the new arrangement lay chiefly in the fact that each division was commanded by an experienced general officer of the regular forces, assisted by a well selected and competent staff of regular officers."

Yet no statesman in recent history has been the target of a more widespread and virulent campaign of calumny. On every side there were vehement denunciations. He was called a traitor, one who sold his nation's secrets to the German

His Emperor. The purpose of his mission to Germany in **martyrdom**. 1912 was grossly misrepresented, while his abiding and avowed interest and admiration for German philosophy, and the German methods of organisation, lent a false colour of probability to all the bitter cries of vituperation. He was jeered when he appeared in public. The windows of his house were broken, the door was daubed with paint, and a policeman had to stand on guard. It is marvellous that amidst all this misrepresentation and ungrateful abuse Haldane did not show the slightest sign of bitterness. But "how" one asks "did this all come about?." How did Lord Haldane, who never made an enemy in his life, attract so furious an outburst of national temper?

It is not our intention to rake up wounds which the merciful time is fast healing, but lest we forget how much democracy injures itself by allowing its judgement to be stampeded by uninformed journalism we have to recount here the story of his fall, as told by the brilliant author of *The Mirrors of the Downing Street*.

"Accordingly Lord Haldane went down to the war office and knowing that speed was the one thing to save us from a German avalanche, began to mobilize the Expeditionary force. Some of the generals were alarmed. War was not yet declared. The cost of mobilization ran into millions. Suppose war did not come after all, how were those millions to be met? Lord Haldane brushed aside every consideration of this kind. Mobilization was to be pushed on, cost what it might. He had not studied his Moltke to no profit.

In leaving the war office that same day, after having mobilized the British army, he went across to the Foreign office and was there stopped by a certain soldier who asked him how many divisions he was sending to France. Lord Haldane very naturally rebuked this person for asking such a question, telling him that war was not yet declared and that therefore perhaps no divisions at all would go to France.

Never was a just reproof more fatal to him who administered it.

I believe this soldier went straight off to an important Civil Servant with the sensational news that Lord Haldane was holding back the Expeditionary Force, and afterwards carried the same false news to one of the most violent anti-German publicists in London, a frenzied person who enjoys nevertheless a certain power in

Unionist circles. In a few hours it was all over London that the Liberals were going to desert France, that Lord Haldane, a friend of the German Kaiser had got back to the war office, and that he was preventing mobilization.

I am quite willing to believe that the snubbed soldier honestly thought he was spreading a true story; I am sure that the frenzied publicist believed this story with all the lunatic fervour of his utterly untrained and utterly intemperate mind; but what I cannot bring myself to believe for a moment is that the Unionist statesman to whom this story was taken, and who there and then gave orders for a campaign against Lord Haldane, was inspired by any motive less immoral, less cynical and less disgraceful to a man of honour than a desire for office.

He saw the opportunity of discrediting the Liberal Government through Lord Haldane, and took it. The Cabinet was to fall under suspicion because one of its members could be accused of pro-Germanism. Lord Haldane, against whom his friend Lord Morley now brings the sorrowful charge that he was responsible for the war; Lord Haldane against whom all the German writers have brought charges of stealing their war office secrets and of defeating their diplomacy, was to be called a pro-German - a man actually doing Germany's work in the British war office. And this for a party purpose.

Mr. Arthur Balfour, by nature the most selfish of men, and also an intemperate lover of office, would never have stooped to such dishonour; but among the leaders of the Unionist party there was to be found a man who saw in a lie the opportunity for a party advantage and took it.

In these matters a statesman need not show himself. A word to one or two newspaper proprietors is sufficient. Nor need he hunt up any arguments. The newspaper reporter will not leave a dustbin unsearched. One word, nay, the merest hint is sufficient. So stupid, so supine, is the public, that Fleet street will undertake to destroy a man's reputation in a week or two.

It was in this fashion that Lord Haldane fell."

Lord Haldane was not a mere man of action. Great as he was as a statesman, he was greater still as a scholar, and an enthusiast for learning. But not even his warmest admirers

As philosopher and educationist would claim for Lord Haldane a place among the original thinkers of philosophy, those who stamp their age, and ages to come with the vigour and individuality of their thought.

He is not among the Greens and the Bosanquets, the Bradleys and the Bergsons. Still his great mastery of the general problems of philosophy, and his unrivalled grasp of the German metaphysics of the nineteenth century have made him, perhaps, the most distinguished of the Hegelians in England. His labours in philosophy were directed towards interpreting the great and growing problems of modern science in the light of Hegelian philosophy. This was the central plan of his Gifford lectures, which he delivered at St. Andrews in 1902-03. and were afterwards published under the title of "Pathway to Reality." The stimulus for his later philosophical activities came from Einstein's "Theory of Relativity" and his large volume "The Reign of Relativity" is an attempt to

affiliate this new conception in the domain of Physics with the main notions of Idealism. Latterly Lord Haldane had been evincing great interest in Indian philosophy, and being struck with the amazing resemblance between ancient Hindu metaphysics and some schools of western thought, he was earnestly encouraging thinkers both in England and in India to work out the points of identity in greater detail.

Next to metaphysics education came nearest to his heart. He believed in knowledge and only in its diffusion he saw the solution for the grave and menacing problems of social economy. When more than twenty years ago he suggested the formation of the Worker's Educational Association he said "Educate your people and you have reduced to comparatively insignificant dimensions the problems of housing, temperance and of raising the condition of your masses." After the War he felt the need for education more than ever, and he inspired the foundation of the British Institution for Adult Education. Regardless of his age and the inconveniences of public speaking he responded to every invitation to speak about the aims of that Institute. His great ambition was to see that the bracing air of University culture was carried to the door of those who for one reason or other have been denied the chance of breathing it.

Lord Haldane was no mere politician. Rarely have men brought to the problems of public affairs a mind so well informed and tidy, and a spirit so wistful and serene. Years of reflection on the eternal and abiding themes of life have destroyed in him all traces of personal ambition and the narrow combative spirit so common to the party politicians; few men gave less evidence of the last infirmity of the noble minds. He took part in public life, not because he had a flair for it—he was not a very impressive speaker—but because he regarded it as his highest duty to help the progress of his people. He had plans for all the knotty problems of administration. He had plans for a more effective imperial organisation, for a more efficient system of cabinet rule, and for the solution on principles of equity and reason, of the vexed tie between capital and labour. Only for these did he remain in politics. There was a streak of stoicism in his temper that made him sometimes a far away and distant person. His indifference to the noisy forms of social intercourse and his contempt for sentimentalism and the arts of the demagogue explain why he could never be a popular person. Of all the men of his generation he came nearest to the Platonic ideal of a Philosopher King. That he did not make the impression that by virtue of his knowledge and personality he should have, on the life and politics of his age, only shows that democracy is

still unprepared to be manned by men of real wisdom and high character.

HIS Highness the Maharaja of Bikanir in a recent utterance has given a "friendly warning that the Indian States would never submit, should any one so desire it, whether in British India or elsewhere, to painting red, that portion of the map of India which is yellow, and which represents the Indian States; that the Indian States will never accept a position inferior to that of British India, nor will they stand domination by British India nor any one else, or the exaggerated claims of British India to assume sovereignty or suzerainty over the Princes and States, regardless of constitutional facts; nor will they submit to interference in matters of purely individual concern to the State or States concerned." It is rather surprising that His Highness should have thought it necessary to sound any such warning. It is not the intention of the Indian Nationalists to paint red that portion of India which is now marked yellow. Again and again, politicians and responsible leaders of public opinion in British India, have assured the Native Princes that nothing will be done under Swaraj to impair their dignity or status which are now secured under treaties with the Paramount Power. The Nehru Committee have been anxious to preserve the the privileges of the Princes. They do not even suggest the introduction of responsible government in the Native States. There is absolutely no indication in the report of any desire to assign to these States a position of inferiority or subordination to the Government of India. The Nehru Committee have recommended that

(a) "all treaties made between the East India Company and the Indian States and all such subsequent treaties, so far as they are in force at the commencement of this Act shall be binding on the Commonwealth.

(b) The Commonwealth shall exercise the same rights in relation to, and discharge the same obligations towards the Indian States as the Government of India exercised and discharged before the passing of this Act." It is unfortunate that even after a statement so explicit, His Highness should have smelt in the Nehru Report and in the deliberations of the All parties Conference a desire to usurp rights which they now enjoy under the full guarantee and security of treaties with the Paramount Power.

THE rejection by the Legislative Assembly of the Public Safety Bill as it emerged out of the Select Committee, with the aid of the casting vote of the President marks the fitting finale of its chequered career through the House. Based, as it was on vague fears

of spreading of Bolshevik ideas, the Bill was not one that could appeal to impartial minds. In spite of the hectic denunciations by the Anglo-Indian press, we believe that the popular parties of the central

Legislature have a deep sense of responsibility and an adequate appreciation of the difficulties of the Government in the preservation of law and order. It was not fair to the House that the Home member should ask for its assent to a Bill, regarding which he would not reveal all the facts. It may be that he and the Government of which he is a member were aware of certain grave happenings justifying resort to this extraordinary legislation. But if the Home member thought he could not take the House into confidence it was not to the discredit of the Assembly that it refused to sign a blank cheque. No man, would, in our opinion, endorse the view of the "Englishman," which writes "The mere fact that they (Government) introduced the measure should prove to every reasonable man that they had evidence that showed the necessity of the Bill." But the most anomalous feature of the Bill and the discussion that centered round it, is the circumstance that the time honoured privilege of British Citizenship, the right of free and open trial before punishment, should have been championed by Pandit Motilal Nehru and his followers as against the Crerars and the Sassoons.

WE need not prove from Montesquieu and Blackstone that where the Executive usurps the legitimate functions of the Judiciary, there the chances of full exercise of the Law and rights of individual liberty will be extremely precarious. A careful survey of the tendencies of modern Liberty. legislation would tell us of the slow growth of Executive power even in England where the rule of law has been held hitherto to be supreme. This tendency attracted particular attention in connection with a certain clause of the Rating and Valuation Bill, which in spite of Lord Birkenhead's strenuous attempts to defend had to be abandoned. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Hewart stated that he was frankly alarmed at the growth of an Imperium in Imperio in the "Bureaucracy withdrawing more and more matters and topics from the jurisdiction of the courts and setting them apart for purely official determination." Lord Hewart points out that Representative Government is often helpless in the hands of "a vast army of anonymous officials, hidden from view, placed

above law and administering a topsy-turvy system whereby the servants of the public would be its masters." Hitherto it was the proud boast of England that her constitution would not permit the continental practice of *Droit administratif* by which the Executive can make departmental rules which cannot be adjudicated by ordinary courts of law. Gratification is felt even in Tory circles at this extremely courageous stand, which the judiciary has taken in this behalf. While opinion is so shaping England it is curious that Mr. Crerar should introduce such an extraordinary and arbitrary piece of legislation, whose effect would be, despite the amendment of the Select Committee, to vest the Governor General in Council with the power to decide the guilt of a suspected character.

WISHING godspeed to the Simon Commission on the eve of its departure to India Lord Reading questioned what had happened in India and why there should be any hostility to the Commission. He said "with all the history of the past before us, I can only wonder that there should be any section or community which should try to range itself always in hostility to the Government." If he did not know the reason for so persistent an opposition while he was here, it is not likely he can know it hereafter. No one in India denies that she has had internal peace and external safety and "freedom of religion for all communities." But these blessings had been conferred long before the Viceroyalty of Lord Reading who had to take India through the most critical period of her history. Supporters of Government may believe as Lord Reading does, that "there is a large body of sane opinion which is inarticulate and unorganized but which holds steadfastly and loyally to the Government of the King Emperor." It is easy to overstrain this belief. Lord Reading could not have forgotten that this "body of sane opinion" was most seriously affected during the stormy years of his rule when thousands of people of all communities were prepared to go to jail. It is idle to ignore the almost universal support given by all parties to the present Boycott movement, and to believe that it does not represent the opinion of the masses is to misread the obvious facts. Self complacency is not Statesmanship.

THE NEW ERA.

THE INVALIDITY OF LITERARY JUDGMENTS.

By C. E. M. JOAD.

It is usually held that works of imaginative literature differ in intrinsic merit; that one book is in fact better than another. It is also held, especially by literary critics, that it is possible if not to prove, at least to produce good reasons for supposing this to be the case; literary criticism consists indeed very largely of comparing and rating books according to their respective merits.

It is not difficult by means of a little dialectic to show that these beliefs are delusions. Before, however, embarking on the attempt, I should like to make one or two preliminary distinctions which, whatever their philosophical validity, do, I think, fairly represent the customary beliefs of common sense.

When a person knows something, for example a chair or a verse of poetry, I shall call the person knowing the subject, and the thing known, the chair or the verse, the object. A statement made about the state of mind or feeling of the person knowing, I shall call a subjective statement, a statement about the object known objective. In the light of these definitions it will be easily seen that some of the judgments we commonly make are subjective, while others are objective. If, for example, I say, "These gooseberries are sour," what I am really talking about is the effect produced by the gooseberries on my palate; the sourness is in

short not a property of the gooseberries but a sensation of mine. The statement, "These gooseberries are sour" is, therefore, subjective. Another person with a different kind of palate may very well find the gooseberries sweet; but his statement, "These gooseberries are sweet" will not really contradict mine, since each statement is about something different, his about one of his sensations, mine about one of mine.

Now let us take a statement such as that which asserts that two and three make five. This is not some private fancy or dogma of mine, an account of the opinions that exist only inside my brain, but a statement about the relations between certain objects, namely numbers, which are constituents of the outside world; the statement is, therefore, objective. For this reason anybody who thought that three and two make six would not merely be differing from me on a point of taste; he would be just wrong. Similarly if from a bridge I look at a pair of railway lines immediately below me and say that they are parallel, I am making a statement about the actual relationship of the lines to each other; that is to say, a statement which is objective. If, looking a mile along the track, I see them converge and say that the railway lines meet a mile away, the object of my judgment will be a subjective appearance which is due to a peculiarity of my vision. This statement will, therefore, be subjective.

Now let us consider judgments about books in the light of our distinction. It is not difficult to see that most if not all of them fall in the category of subjective judgments; they are not, that is to say, judgments about books at all, but about the effect produced by the books on the mind or taste of the reader. The language used by people in talking of books affords ample testimony to the subjectivity of their statements. They say of a book that it is enjoyable, horrible or interesting, when what they really mean is that it has aroused sensations of joy, or horror, or has stimulated interest in themselves. The object of their judgments is not, therefore, the book at all, but is certain states of feeling experienced by them as the result of reading the book.

The contradictory judgment passed about books, the rise and decline of authors' reputations, and the impossibility of finding any absolute standard whereby to adjudge their respective merits, all point in the same direction. As to contradictory judgments it is notorious not only that people dispute violently about the goodness and badness of books, but that there is no way of settling their disputes. A dispute which is capable of settlement is rarely interesting or prolonged, and it is because discussions about books are inconclusive that they are at once interminable and pleasur-

able. There is no disputing about anything but tastes; from which we may deduce that it is not in literary discussion the books at all but our feelings towards them that we are making the objects of our statements and judgment. And just as in the case of the gooseberries, it was possible for one man to think them sweet and another sour, because each was judging about a private feeling of his own, so it is possible for two completely contradictory opinions about a book to be both of them true, for the simple reason that the opinions are not opinions about one and the same thing, namely, the book itself, but that each opinion is about something different, namely, the feelings produced by the book in the speakers.

Just as the opinions of contemporaries differ about books in the same age, so do the opinions of groups of people differ in different ages. Congreve at whom the nineteenth century raised the skirt of disgust or the eyebrow of a leer, is to-day praised for the brilliance of his wit and his sense of the theatre. From an intellectual hawd he has become our most polished dramatist. Trollope, a best seller in the eighties, anathematised in the nineties because he wrote by the clock, has again come into his own as one of the greatest nineteenth century novelists. What are we to infer from these fluctuations of opinion? Not that the intrinsic qualities of a book change because the taste of the age changes; but that when an age thinks a book great it is passing judgment not about the book but about its reactions to the book. In a word, literary judgments are not judgments about books at all; they are statements about the tastes and feelings of certain groups of people. As these change, so does the reputation of a book rise or fall.

What follows? First that there is no way of determining the merits of a book. If X and Y have an argument about the temperature of a room, one or the other will ultimately get a thermometer. By the objective external standard which the thermometer affords, X can be shown to be right and Y wrong, or vice versa. But there is no thermometer for the testing of literary judgments.

Secondly, as Tolstoy asserted, the value of a book must be assessed entirely in terms of the effects it produces; books which produce no effect, good or bad, have no value. If, for example, Robinson Crusoe left the only extant copy of Shakespeare buried in the sand of his desert island, Shakespeare would cease to produce pleasurable and valuable effects; therefore Shakespeare would have no value; therefore Shakespeare's plays would no longer be great works.

Thirdly, if the value of a book is to be assessed in terms of its effects, that book is the best which produces the greatest amount of valuable effects. By valuable effects we mean pleasurable effects. Now we must suppose that the number of breasts in which the works of the late Mr. Garvice engendered a thrill of pleasure was in a given year greater than the number similarly affected by the works of Shakespeare. Certainly Garvice at the height of his fame had ten readers for Shakespeare's one, and we must suppose that people read him because they liked him. It seems to follow that during that particular year Garvice was a greater writer than Shakespeare. Not only does it seem to follow; it does follow. For we have seen that the greatness of a book must be assessed in terms of the pleasurable effects it produces.

But why pleasure, it may be objected? Surely people find in Shakespeare more than pleasure; or if it *is* pleasure they get from his plays, it is of a nobler, higher, richer, deeper, quality than that afforded by the common or garden best seller. The admirer of the best seller would answer this easily enough by the simple retort, "How do you know?" Nobody who does not experience them can tell what feelings the typist gets from Berta Ruck, or the errand boy from "The Blood-stained Hand." We have no right to insist that the feelings of intelligent and educated people must be superior to, let alone more pleasurable than those of others, merely because we happen to be intelligent and educated.

Finally, an appeal may be made to authority; the judgment of critics, of all those who really know about literature, of men of reading, of taste, of learning, and of scholarship, is, it may be said, unanimously in favour of Shakespeare and against Garvice. A man may go from Garvice to Shakespeare as his taste matures, but never from Shakespeare to Garvice. (This last of course is not true. We most of us read Shakespeare at school because we were made to, and took to Garvice from choice in our late teens).

Putting this argument in a nutshell, we may say that persons entitled to judge are unanimous in preferring Shakespeare to Garvice. But in the first place they are not unanimous, and in the second they make mistakes. They may, it is true, all dislike Garvice, but most of the leading critics have at one time or another abominated Shaw as a charlatan writer of cheap journalese and half baked philosophy.

But ignoring for a moment the contradictoriness of critics and the fluctuations in taste, how are we to decide who are the persons entitled to judge? As a possible qualification we might demand that they should possess wide acquaintanceship with literature combined with good taste. But how are we to estimate a man's taste

except by reference to the literature he approves? If you find a man reading and enjoying a railway bookstall novel, and demanding no more from literature than the mixture of thrills and treacle it provides, you regard his taste as bad; if he reads the classics and Virginia Woolf you call his taste good. Hence a man with good taste is a man who likes a good book. But what is a good book? We have just agreed that where different kinds of books give pleasure to different kinds of people, that must be adjudged to be a good book which is approved of by persons entitled to judge, that is, by people of good taste, that is by people who like a good book. The argument you see is completely circular: Shakespeare is better than Garvice because persons entitled to judge prefer him. Who are the persons entitled to judge? Those who prefer Shakespeare to Garvice.

Here we realise once again the complete subjectivity of all literary judgments. Having failed in our attempt to provide an objective standard of literary merit by appealing to the experts, we must fall back on the elementary device of defining a good book as a book that we happen to like. The highbrow derides the bourgeois at the picture gallery who says "I don't know anything about art; but I do know what I like"; but if our argument is right, the highbrow himself can say no more. He can only pretend to.

I do not myself agree with this conclusion, but I find it exceedingly difficult to refute. I have accordingly stated the arguments in its favour as cogently as I can, in the hope that they will provoke an answer which will provide me with material for its refutation.

LONDON.

C. E. M. JOAD.

EVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS*.

By Prof. S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

PHILOSOPHY in the larger sense of the term is the unseen foundation on which the structure of a civilisation rests. The Indian tradition gives the first place to the pursuit of philosophy, *adhyatma-vidya vidyanam*. It is the study which gives the impulse and direction to the general life of the community. Throughout the history of Indian thought, the quest for reality has engaged the mind of the country. The naive belief that the world is ruled by Indra, Varuna and such other deities, who watch from on high the conduct of men, whether it is straight or crooked, the faith that the gods who can be persuaded by prayer or compelled by rites to grant our requests are only the forms of the one supreme being; the firm conviction that the pure stainless spirit, to know whom is life eternal, is one with the innermost soul of man; the rise of materialism, scepticism and fatalism and their supersession by the ethical systems of Buddhism and Jainism with their central doctrine that one can free oneself from all ill only by refraining from all evil, in thought, word and deed - God or no God - , the liberal theism of the Bhagavadgita which endows the all-soul with ethical in addition to metaphysical perfections; the logical scheme of the Nyaya which furnishes the principal categories of the world of knowledge which are in use even to-day; the Vaisesika interpretation of nature; the Samkhya speculations and psychology; the Yoga scheme of the pathway to perfection, the ethical and social regulations of the Mimamsa and the religious interpretations of the supreme reality set forth by Samkara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka, Vallabha, Jivagosvami form a record of philosophic development of which any race could be proud.

But past glory does not confer present distinction. An explorer of recent philosophical literature in India finds little to report except a few sporadic attempts to reinterpret ancient doctrines. Tradition is still strong and authority is profoundly respected and in such an atmosphere philosophy cannot progress. Freedom of thought and fixity of belief are inconsistent with each other. Today we are content to let things take their course. We are crouching behind the wall when the storm is passing by. We

* Extracts from the Presidential Address of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Bombay, 1927.

may offer an explanation for this unfortunate condition. A culture that has flowered and reached a high standard of beauty and excellence tends to grow conservative and decadent and our political misfortunes turned our minds into conservative moulds. But explanations are no excuses.

If the philosophies of India are not to be regarded as mere mummies, enshrined corpses of once living ideas and dead very long since, we should rethink them in the light of the whole theoretical and practical experience through which we have passed. Truths, the most ancient, are endowed for us as the result of new experience, with greater certainty. The philosophic impulse is not independent of the other factors of life. Science, philosophy and religion are intimately connected. A reorientation of philosophical perspective is the task facing us to-day. We must make our philosophical views agree with the new dimensions of thought into which scientific extensions of our horizon have led us.

At the present day in the western world almost all the work in the field of philosophy centres round the problems in the borderland of science and philosophy as the foundations of science, the structure of the atom, the problem of continuity, vitalism and the laws of inheritance. The names of Russell and Whitehead, Broad and Alexander, Bergson and Driesch, Smuts and Lloyd Morgan leap to our mind. Recent disturbances in the world of thought caused by the evolutionary hypothesis have made it of surpassing interest to the general mind. The attempts to restrain the authorities from teaching evolution in public schools in some districts of the United States of America, the scene at St. Paul's Cathedral on the 16th of October when the Rector of the City Church denounced Dr. Barnes and left the service with some 400 members of the congregation, the letters exchanged between the Bishop of Birmingham and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Arthur Keith's presidential address at the British Association at Leeds and the bishop of Ripon's suggestion of a scientific holiday for about a period of ten years have made the subject of evolution of great popular interest. It may perhaps be of some use if I make a few observations on the philosophical implications of the theory of evolution avoiding abstruse discussions which are not of interest to the general reader.

When attacks are made on evolution from the camp of religion, it is not so much the scientific doctrine that is criticised as the naturalistic philosophy based on it. The scientific account is content with a statement of the facts observed while the philosophical hypothesis attempts to offer a metaphysical explanation. Within the limits of the phenomena observed, science may

speculate and argue and abandon inadequate descriptions for more adequate ones. It may give up Ptolemy for Copernicus, Newton for Einstein, but it has little to do with final causes. While it may trace the operation of the laws of nature and determine the rise, growth and decay of phenomena, it cannot explain why nature is what it is, how it came to be, and whether it will ever cease to be. When the scientist attempts to tackle these problems, he becomes a philosopher and generally a bad one at that. The world is pictured as a vast mechanism where natural forces automatically bring about all the changes. Descartes was the first of European philosophers to seek an explanation of all things in purely mechanical terms. "Give me extension and motion" said he "and I will construct the universe." His ideas received elaboration in the development of mechanical physics in the next two centuries. All qualitative differences in the world were reduced to quantitative differences of size, shape and speed of the motion of the particles of matter. Biological evolution was interpreted in the terms of mechanism. The processes of living organisms were explained by means of physics and chemistry. The actual creation of life from non-living matter is regarded as something that can be accomplished in the laboratory. Benjamin Moore says "Given the presence of matter and energy forms under the proper conditions, life must come inevitably." Consciousness is an inert spectator of life as ineffective and as ubiquitous as one's shadow. If we delete consciousness from the universe, nothing will be changed. Professor Watson, the leader of the behaviourist school, writes "Psychology, as the behaviourist views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science which needs consciousness as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics. The suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier which exists between psychology and the other sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms (*Behaviour*: p. 27). Psychology is a study of the physiological reactions of the human organism as a whole. As biology is a branch of chemistry, psychology is a branch of biology. Men are conscious automata and freedom is a delusion. Values as truth and beauty are mere byproducts of a universe whose reality is physical. Though some evolutionist philosophers like Herbert Spencer believe in an automatic law of progress, that the course of evolution is an upward one in spite of reversions, atavisms, loops and zigzags of reactions deflecting the straight line, others repudiate this view. There is no certainty that the human species is likely to outlive many of the so-called lower forms of

life such as the bacteria of the soil or the unicellular organisms which destroy mankind. There is more degeneration than advance and some even go to the extent of saying that degeneration is the rule and advance the exception. The religion of the mechanical scientist is best described in Bertrand Russell's Essay on the *Free Man's Worship*. Life is an incident in the cooling of the solar system. Man comes into being in the midst of unconscious forces which will eventually destroy him. His appearance on earth is as much an incident in the history of life on earth as his earthly abode is an incident in astronomical history. Humanity appeared on earth as inevitably as beetles on a dunghill. The cosmic fate of all values is to perish without trace. The end of it all is darkness, death.

While metaphysical theories of evolution were set forth by ancient thinkers of Greece and India, the scientific doctrine of evolution is the work of empirical investigators like Linnæus, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin, Wallace and others. It is restricted to the world of living organisms. Darwin's work on the *Origin of Species* does not formulate a philosophy of evolution but furnishes evidence indicating that life on this planet has evolved by a gradual and yet continuous process from the earliest forms of living organisms to the latest product, man. He mentions the factors by the operation of which new species arise out of other existing ones. His account is to be accepted or rejected not by a reference to the ultimate questions regarding the universe but by an appeal to the facts of Botany and Zoology.

Malthus' essay on the principle of population suggested to Darwin and Wallace the importance of natural selection. But natural selection cannot operate without the co-operative factors of variation and heredity. According to the former, no two individuals, plants or animals are quite alike. The offspring of the same parent or parents tend to vary in greater or less degree both from their parents and from one another. Otherwise, if all offspring entirely resembled their parents, the world would still be full of amoeba and jelly fish. The principle of heredity tells us that the peculiarities exhibited by the parents tend to be transmitted to the offspring in greater or less degree. The offspring are never exactly like the parents--this is due to variation--and yet resemble the parents more than they resemble other members of the same species--this is due to heredity. If we have in addition the fact of multiplication, struggle for existence results. Those members which happen to possess variations which equip them better for the struggle tend to survive and others get eliminated. The offspring of the

successful tend to resemble the parents in exhibiting the favoured variation to a greater degree than the parents and a new type becomes established by a gradual piling up of small accretions at each generation.

While Darwin accepted Lamarck's theory of the transmission of acquired characters, Wallace and other biologists are opposed to it. Weissmann distinguishes between germ plasm or reproductive tissue and somatoplasm or bodily tissue and holds that changes induced in the organism can be transmitted only if the germ plasm is affected. Mendel distinguishes between heritable and non-heritable variations and the latter, which are the reactions of the organism to the environment do not exert direct influence on the course of evolutionary change. Heritable variations represented in the germ plasm are called mutations while the non-heritable ones are called fluctuations. We cannot, however, say which is which until the test of heredity is applied. The theory of De Vries that heritable variations must be large and sudden and slighter variations are not transmitted is generally accepted.

Darwin's idea of the rise of a new species by the gradual accumulation in successive generations of insensible differences is now abandoned in favour of sudden and considerable mutations. Evolution proceeds by a series of wholly inexplicable jumps and not by the accumulation of minute variations.

The scientific doctrine of evolution has established beyond doubt that the sun and stars in their courses, the forms of matter and the varied classes and orders of plants and animals, human beings with their power of choice are not created in their present forms but assume their present forms in slow obedience to a general law of change. But when a causal explanation of the factors operative in this process is urged we are entering on debatable ground. Darwin was a scientist and not a philosopher. He held that his account of the origin of species was incomplete for "our ignorance of the laws of variations is profound" and "the laws governing inheritance are for the most part unknown" (Sixth Edition of the *Origin of the Species*).

As a philosophical interpretation of the observed facts, the theory of evolution is not satisfactory. Evolution presupposes an interaction between the organism and the environment, subjects with definite characters of their own and objects with determinate features. But the process of evolution cannot create the conditions of its own possibility. The hypothesis of evolution does not deal with origins but seeks to describe the changes which objects undergo in relation to the demands

of the environment. While it describes the *how* of the process, it does not answer the *why* of it. We may trace the egg or the hen to a still earlier evolution but the process cannot go on to infinity. We ask,—“What being, what impulse provided the conditions and started the process?” We assume that somewhere behind all evolution, there is something which is not the product of evolution and yet is its ground and power. How is that principle to be conceived? Is it one or many? Is it blind or intelligent? Is it immanent in the process or transcendent to it or both?

The term ‘evolution’ implies a break with the mechanical method of explanation. When we endeavour to account for the world of objective nature by ‘evolution’ and employ such concepts as growth, natural selection, struggle for survival, self preservation, etc., we are obviously interpreting the cosmic process on the analogy of human nature. A mechanical evolution is difficult to conceive even if it be not self-contradictory. If the changes of the world are completely mechanical, if they are merely an unpacking of the possibilities, then there is no *evolution*. The concept of evolution implies that changes cannot be explained on the purely mechanical hypothesis.

Variations, whether small or great, cannot be accounted for. While the changes within the world of living organisms are difficult to explain, the transitions from the non-living to the living, from life to mind, from mind to intelligence are absolutely inexplicable. The Taittiriya Upanishad mentions matter (*anna*),* life (*prana*), consciousness (*manas*) intelligence (*vijnana*) as the four crucial stages of the world’s development. Physico-chemical explanations are inadequate for the characteristic activities of organic life. Reproduction, heredity and even such processes as respiration and circulation do not yield their secrets to physico-chemical analysis. The mechanical view that there is no breach of continuity between the living and the non-living does not face the facts. The neo-vitalists like Driesch contend that biological phenomena are not properly explicable as physico-chemical processes within the living matter of organisms but that a non-physical principle interferes to regulate and control the physical and chemical reactions. The admission of a mysterious, non-mechanical entity which is neither an energy nor a material substance but an agent *sui generis*, non-spatial though acting in space, non-material though acting on matter is hardly satisfactory. Biologists who are opposed to mechanism, admit that distinctively

*Compare Samkara on B. S. 11 3-12. “The word food signifies earth “*Tasmat prithiviam annasabdeti.*”

biological phenomena cannot be explained in physico-chemical terms. The living organism itself and not some directive principle is dominant in organic activity. The organic is distinct from the inorganic and it exists as such and its structure and activities are the expression of its nature. The organic exhibits a new character though such an exhibition of new characters is more the rule than the exception. Highly differentiated physiological processes are accompanied by mental events. Without discussing the exact nature of the relation between the physiological and the psychological, we have to take the organism as a unit with its own specific characters. When we reach the human level, we have the new variation of reason, that which distinguishes the true from false, good from evil, beautiful from ugly. When Sir Arthur Keith quotes Professor Eliot Smith to the effect that the human brain shows no formation of any sort other than that of the brain of the chimpanzee, he is referring to the material structure of the brain. While we may admit that the body of man is a structure evolved through long ages and gradually improved from very early beginnings until the present frame is built, while its affinity to that of the ape may be conceded, we cannot get over the qualitative difference between the mentality of the ape and that of man. Man is a conscious responsible soul with a knowledge of good and evil. When a certain level of bodily development is reached the human mind emerges, even as life appears when matter reaches a certain complexity of organization. But has any biologist described the nature of the general change responsible for the rise of human reason? Can we explain any mental activity as the product of germinal alteration? Can it be said that "man under the action of biological forces which can be observed and measured, has been raised from a place among anthropoid apes to that which he now occupies?" Was not Darwin more modest when he confessed his ignorance of the working of the forces of variation and heredity? The evidence available does not offer a single hint of the working of these forces.

Evolution believes that it is able to account for the development in the sphere of organic or the inorganic, but strictly speaking even this is difficult of explanation. Evolutionary change, it is now admitted, proceeds by distinct leaps and not the slow accumulation of small steps. Every change is a jump. Discontinuity is the mark of the process. Novelty is a feature of all development. The product of evolution when it arises is genuinely new. We may make an exhaustive enumeration of the factors from which it has been developed, yet the thing itself is a unique entity, exhibiting a character which was not present in any of the

earlier factors and could not have been foretold on the strength of the fullest knowledge of the factors. Development or evolution is something more than a mere re-arrangement of pre-existent material. There is something genuinely novel about every individual. Nothing recurs in exact detail, no two leaves, no two events. Each individual is a new experiment. Only specially well-marked critical stages in the development are noticed by us. If every individual in the world varies from every other as the hypothesis of evolution assumes, then each is genuinely new. In other words, we cannot read its presence back into its pre-existent factors. Appearance of C is not accounted for by the characters of the factors A & B., for C is neither A, nor B nor A & B. It is C. On the other hand, there must be some reason why the combination A & B is succeeded by C and why the event C has the particular character of C and not any other character. Some reason there must be and it certainly is not the combination of A & B. The conditions of every development in the world include a good deal more than the constituent factors. A & B succeeded by C is a phase of the cosmic process but not a complete and self-contained phase. It is one phase of the general context of nature, not isolated from other phases. A & B are followed by C because the world process is what it is and its particular phase is open to countless other influences. It is a moment in the whole life of the universe and its setting in a particular context is one expression of the course of evolution. A product of evolution is not completely accounted for by a statement of the specific factors which have preceded it in a limited context. Its whole setting in the cosmic process conditions its rise though we cannot determine the precise manner of the conditioning. Though there are no empty gaps in time, every change is a new start. The new is said to be a continuation of the old, if it conforms to the normal and does not contradict what has gone before. It is said to be a new product if there is a change in the structure. When life supervenes on matter we have something new; when one organism succeeds another we have a continuation of the old. We may represent the former kind of change by a, b, c, and the latter by a¹, a², a³. But strictly speaking every change is new. It is literally true that we walk among mysteries. Instead of assuming a series of entelechies to account for the series of changes, it is more economical to posit a single supreme super-entelechy as responsible for the whole sweep of evolutionary advance with its marks of unity and continuity.

This supreme creative ground and driving power of the universe cannot be an unconscious force. If the pageant of evolution passed before us as quickly as a moving picture from the hour when the solar system was in a gaseous condition up till now,

the vision will undoubtedly demand more explanation than the blind working of an unconscious force. The harmonious working of the different parts of the universe cannot be dismissed as a piece of good luck.

Besides, even within the limits open to our observation, we cannot be certain that evolution is due to blind mutations selected by a blind environment. Lamarck's theory of the transmission of acquired characters is repudiated at the present time on the ground that there is no mechanism by which the changes in the organism could be represented by changes in the structure of the germ cell. It is also urged that there is no experimental evidence in support of the inheritability of the effects of use and disuse. Ignorance of the way in which the germ cell reacts to bodily changes does not commit us to the denial of any change in the germ cell as the result of bodily changes. Some experiments latterly have given positive results as those of Kammerer, Durkhen and Pavlov and those in which we fail to detect the inheritance of an acquired character may mean only that the effect is too small to be detected.

In his *Creative Evolution* (pp. 66 ff.) M. Bergson argues that if life manufactures like apparatus by unlike means or on divergent lines of evolution then a strictly mechanical explanation becomes impossible. The structural analogy between the eye of a vertebrate and that of a mollusc like the common pecten cannot be due to insensible accidental variations (Darwin) or sudden and simultaneous variations (De Vries) or the direct influence of the environment bringing about a kind of mechanical composition of the external with the internal forces. Bergson agrees with certain modern forms of Lamarckism and explains variations not as accidental or determined but as springing from the effort of the living being to adapt itself to the environment. Modifications of structure and function are achieved by more or less purposive efforts of individual organisms and are transmitted in however slight a degree from parent to offspring. The initiative of the organism and not germinal mutations or the influence of the environment is the main source of variations. Only such a view can account for the fact that modifications do not come singly but in complexes involving innumerable minor details. The change from the quadrupedal to the erect posture involves many profound alterations in almost every organ of the body and these numerous organic adaptations cannot be the result of random changes in the various structures. Evolution is not blind and mechanical but is the expression of a purposive force which creates living organisms and endows them with life and the striving to develop in pursu-

ance of a definite end. As the lower organisms are not gifted with intelligent foresight, their changes as a result of which new species occur are said to be the expression of the unconscious will of the organism acting in pursuance of the purpose of life. At the human level we possess creative freedom. The facts of evolution compel us to assume the reality of a single spirit inspiring the whole course of evolution and working in different ways at different stages. Samkara says: *Ekasyapi kutasthasya citta-taratamyat jnanaisvaryanam abhivyaktih parena parena bhuyausi bhavati* (Brahma-sutra-bhashyam 1.3.30). Almost all the philosophers who have reflected on the implications of evolution have come to a similar conclusion. Lloyd Morgan says: "For better or worse I acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose Activity emergents emerge and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed." Taylor repeats the scholastic maxim that no cause can contribute to the effect what it has not to give. The full and ultimate cause in a process of evolution cannot be found in the special character of its recognised antecedents but in the character of the Eternal which is at the back of all development and which must contain in a 'more eminent manner' all that it bestows though it may contain much more. God is the perfect real from which all variations arise.

What is the relation of the eternal spiritual background to the process of the world? This is the most difficult problem of all philosophy and has not been satisfactorily answered either in the West or in the East. That God is not external to the world is as much true as that God is not exhausted by the world. He is both in and out of the world. But a logical exposition of the relation between God and the world is yet a problem for philosophy. There are several other problems which are also perplexing the mind of man. If we are to help in their solution, it is very necessary that we should abandon philosophical orthodoxy. It is true that official solutions for all problems are handed down to us in our ancient scriptures. We want to-day not so much Indian thought as Indian thinkers who, soaked in the wisdom of a country, are prepared to face the problems of the ages with fresh eyes.

YOUNG INDIA AND YOUNG BRITAIN.

By F. G. GOULD.

BOTH Indian and English readers may be surprised if I open with the remark that India and Britain are very young communities. They may also be surprised if I say that, in a broad historical sense, India and Britain are of much the same age. I will very briefly explain what I mean before touching my main theme, namely, the vital importance of planning mutual knowledge of India and Britain through certain common elements in the education of Indian youth and British youth.

Modern research dates the rise of civilization in the island of Crete from about 3000 B. C. This civilization influenced the Greeks; the Greeks influenced the Romans; and the Greek-Roman civilization developed Christian ideas into a Roman Catholic religion which, by the century 1000 to 1100, was reaching its highest point of spiritual power. In this century, England was conquered by the Normans, who were feudal politically, Catholic in religion, and energetic in seafaring. Thus, by the year 1100, the British island was marked out as the home of seafarers who represented European culture, and whose insular situation would naturally enable them, in course of time, to act as principal carriers of the European tradition round the world. The result is seen in the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1928.

What happened in India in the same period (that is; 3000 B. C. to about 1100 of the modern era)? The Vedic civilization was evolved; the Gupta power, following on the Andhra power, unfolded the leading characteristics of Hinduism; the unifying philosophy of Sankaracharya ensued; and, by the year 1100, Islam had come to stay after the coming of Mahmud, and Al-Biruni had even sought for a basis of understanding between Islam and Hinduism. The results are seen in the India of 1928

Now, the human race, in its essential features, is a million years old or so. The two evolutions, British and Indian, have occupied only 5000 years. That is why I call India and Britain very young communities. One might almost say their inter-connexion has only just begun. Human genius being what it is, and geographical facts being what they are, a great relation

between India and Europe was bound to develop, and the British nation was bound to act as the principal channel of the development. The development is so overwhelmingly important for the order and progress of world civilization, that, when once clearly apprehended, it will give a new direction to history-teaching both in India and Britain. It will open a new social vision to the youth of India and Britain. In this new history-teaching, and in this new vision, the wars and mutinies associated with the British occupation and the Indian resistance will take a very subordinate place. The wars and mutinies will be classed as mere accidents, though painful and tragic, in a vast racial and ethical process. This statement may, to some older minds, appear a paradox, but I make it with the utmost earnestness and deliberation.

From the world view-point, I regard the Indian and British civilizations as of equal value. Obviously they differ. Obviously, a mutual adjustment must be difficult. Yet obviously also, a mutual adjustment is actually going on. Even if we suppose, for the sake of argument, that India could suddenly break off from political ties with Britain, the adjustment would not cease. As the wars and mutinies were (philosophically speaking) an accident, so also the political connexion is an accident. But the adjustment of India and Britain, of India and Europe, of India and the world, is inevitable; it is a stroke of destiny in the universal life of humanity. The adjustment is possible because certain basic values, or forms, are the same in the Indian genius and the British genius. The adjustment is difficult because, owing to geographical, and climatic, and racial conditions, the balance between material and spiritual factors in India has not been the same as the balance between material and spiritual factors in Britain. To put the case imperfectly, but with a kind of useful conciseness, it may be said that the British nature has emphasized economic and political factors, and, with a sort of detachment, has achieved great things in philosophy, science, in spirituality; and the Indian nature has emphasized philosophy and spirituality, and expressed a great capacity for stability in its caste-system and village life. The British character has exhibited immense energy, but lacked synthesis; the Indian character has exhibited immense synthesis, but lacked energy. The British people have been the most politically active of the peoples of the world; the Indian the most subjectively and synthetically religious. Modern evolution, bringing all types of racial genius into contacts, attractions and repulsions, has irresistibly brought India and Britain into a profoundly significant relation which must unfold itself for the world's good in spite of misunderstandings and conflicts, past and present. I put aside political aspects. The British and Indian

temperaments are not opposed; they are complementary. Their diversity provides the motive for co-operation in mutual benefit. Hence the importance of planning for the young people of both communities a method of education which shall imply mutual reconnaissance, mutual study, mutual knowledge, mutual sympathy. The chief instrument for this purpose is history-teaching.

We are, I hope and believe, on the eve of large changes in our mode of teaching history, whether of the human race, or of an ethnic division, or of a Motherland. When I had the pleasure of visiting schools in the Bombay Presidency and Baroda in 1913, I casually (and not as part of my official programme of ethical addresses to boys) entered a High School class-room. At the moment of my entry, the Parsi teacher was asking a group of Indian youths this question: "In the year 1626 what demand did the English Parliament make of Charles the First?" The boys answered correctly, for Indian memory-power is admirable. But the question illustrated a bad system of history-teaching which is still unfortunately in vogue in Asia, Europe and elsewhere. It gazes at the accidents and details, and forgets the soul and the ideal. But, in saying this, I do not mean that the teacher of history should lose himself and his pupils in a forest of poetry and meditation.

At various European conferences, I have urged the doctrine that the human genius, in all countries and ages, reveals itself in various forms, or expressions of order and progress, material and spiritual. I will therefore present the outline-plan exactly as I have presented it (with, of course, comments) to many educational meetings: --

History teaching should bring into relief, at each stage (early, mediaeval, modern), the following formative, or cosmic (order-making) factors:--

1. Observation of animals, plants, minerals; human and economic geography; action of nature on man, and of man on nature.

2. Industry; useful arts and crafts, and travels involving socially useful exploration; machinery.

3. Fine arts poetry and general imaginative literature, including myths and legends; music and drama; costume; painting; sculpture; architecture and decoration; gardening.

4. Science, from its crude origins (in early ideas of number, weight, measure, astronomy, physics, etc.) onwards.

5. Social order and progress. Sanitation, family ties, customs, manners, law, politics, religious organization; social value of

language, with such simple notes on etymology as may have a historical interest for young minds; phases of slavery, serfdom, guilds, trade unions, etc. Banking, finance, social credit. The same general doctrine could be stated in other ways. It could be stated more shortly and simply; it could be stated far more elaborately. It could be put into easier terms for the Primary School, and into a massive syllabus for a University lecture-course. The central point is this:—Whether you describe the life of a Malay tribe, or African Negroes, or Catholic Spain, or Protestant Sweden, or the English-Scottish-Welsh island, or ancient Rome, or modern Japan, or China, or Persia, or India, you will build up a sympathetic conception by picturing the people's agriculture, arts, crafts, aesthetic activities, science (if only germinal in fetishism and magic), and social organization and movement. You will invariably portray economics; you will always rise to the level where men strive to reach the Ideal and the beyond, whether in the crude myths of "Savages," or the imaginations of the *Ramayana* poets, or a Dante, or a Shakespeare. I do not want to abolish Cromwell or Clive from British history; or Akbar or Shivaji from Indian. Nor do I want to abolish the values of chronology, as represented by a chart of the ages, or a systematic tabular view of the centuries of British or Indian events and developments. And in telling the story of farming, or house-building, or law, or language, or poetry, you will naturally trace the line from earlier forms to later; just as a guide would show you the seven Rathas at Mahabalipuram, and explain that one was a copy of an ancient Buddhist cell at Gandhara, and the others revealed the quality of a later architectural time. In that sense, chronology is vital, just as maps are vital for geography. If I were in India, teaching youths British history, I should always have at hand good maps of Britain and the world, and a clear chart of the ages, —Stone and Bronze age, Roman, early English—Feudal-catholic, Modern. I should, in story and picture, tell of the British shepherd, miner, fisherman; of Cook the navigator; Wedgwood the potter; Wren the builder; Black the poet; Darwin the biologist; Owen the co-operator; Howard the prison-reformer; and the other Howard (died 1928) the Garden City founder; and so on; and Cromwell and Clive and Haig last, but with due historical respect.

I have often told teachers in England how I prepared for my educational visit to India in 1913, in less measure by reading ordinary history-books, but chiefly by studying the lives of Zoroastu, Buddha, Muhammad, and the moving pages of the *Mahabharata*. With vivid memories of Arjuna and Savitri, and with melodious echoes of the "Song Celestial" in my ears, I faced

Indian youth as if I were their blood and kin, and felt not the dividing-line of East and West. And I venture to add that, by such interchanges and mutual comprehensions of the spirit, the long-drawn problems of British-India politics would be illumined, rationalized and more speedily solved. I am not so wedded to one idea as to suppose even a vastly improved history-teaching in Britain, with a similar extension (supposing schools greatly multiplied) in India, would furnish all the needed motive-power for a finer and happier understanding. But it would render very effective aid. Each of our communities, Indian and British,—in extremely diverse ways, in extremely diverse atmospheres, and with extremely diverse materials,—has disciplined and purged its soul by patience, suffering, courage, faith and vision ; the one more familiarly in nature-conquest, sea-faring, commerce, manufacture and political struggle; the other in long-drawn peasant-toil, poverty, silent endurance, reverent submission to invisible powers, serene contemplation of things lofty beyond the touch of human language. The educators in our two communities would have no nobler task than that of teaching the young East and the young West to understand each other, to co-operate, to unite ; and to pass the great enterprise to their children in turn. The flood of Ganges, the height of the Himalayas, and the roar of British machinery are feeble images to symbolise the immensity of the work. But civilization is yet young : and its servants, India and Britain, are as yet only starting out on a long and splendid journey.

LONDON.

FREDERICK J. GOULD.

THE PROBLEM OF INVESTMENT IN INDIA.

Professor T. K. DURAISWAMI AIYER.

IT is a trite observation that the economic aspects of social life have assumed overwhelming importance under modern conditions. In advanced countries an elaborate machinery has been devised with a view to directing the funds destined for investment. Even under comparatively primitive conditions of life wealth was devoted to creating a simple apparatus of production which was helpful towards putting on the market an increased supply of consumable goods. But up to what has been called the Industrial Revolution capital did not play a dominant part in industrial organisation. In earlier epochs human forces counted for much more than capital. But in the nineteenth century the harnessing of the forces of nature for the purposes of man required large masses of capital and the economists of that century were loud in the appreciation of the part played by capital. The man who saved wealth never before had such praise lavished on him. England was the land in which these tendencies found foremost expression and large masses of English capital found their way into British industries and overflowed the frontiers of England into foreign lands. It was by such means that the Railways of the United States of America, Argentine, and India, the oil wells of the world, the tea gardens of Assam, the tin mines of Malaya etc., were developed. Financial houses, investment trust companies, discount houses, commercial banks, and stock exchanges constituted an organisation appropriate to such a development.

Let us direct our attention to the economic conditions of India and see what aspect the problem of investment assumes in India. The production of wealth *per capita* in India compares unfavourably with that in the countries of the West and consequently the amount of capital available for investment in this country is not as large as in countries like England, Germany and the United States of America. Conflicting estimates are given of

the amount of capital which might be drawn into investment in India. We have often been treated to an account of hoards of silver and gold buried beneath the earth in India which if directed to productive enterprise would increase immensely the wealth of the country. To our mind this is largely a myth. It is true that the uneconomic habits of the Indian peasantry contribute in some measure to their backward economic condition. But to rely on any large accumulated gold drawn out of hoards fertilising industry and commerce in India is to rely on a broken reed. For ages India has been subject to political vicissitudes of a kind which did not put a premium on security of person and property. In those conditions there was not much scope for the accumulation of capital. Further the large masses of capital which Industry and commerce run on modern lines require have, all the world over, been very largely the creation of the period since 1800. India cannot be said to have yet come quite within the scope of the Industrial Revolution since the characteristic economic developments of the nineteenth century in the form of the application of science to Industry and Agriculture are not a marked feature of Indian economy. Nothing is more striking than the fact that India lags very far behind the advanced countries of the world in respect of the *per capita* amount of capital applied to agriculture, industry and commerce. It is often remarked that the facilities for the investment of capital do not exist on a fairly large scale in this country. Let us examine this question. One of the conditions for the creation of capital is the existence of a surplus of production over consumption. It cannot be maintained that such surplus is large in this country. But whether large or small there does exist a surplus due in no small measure to a faulty system of distribution of wealth. There is no more alarming symptom than the fact that while on the one hand our agriculture and industry require to be modernised by means of the intelligent application of large masses of capital, on the other hand the complaint is often made that masses of funds lie idle in the Co-operative Banks especially in the Madras Presidency without an adequate outlet. It may be, as we trust it is, that this paradoxical state of affairs is of temporary duration; but there are other indications pointing to a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. For the last few years we have been witnessing the spectacle of the investment in India Rupee paper bringing a less yield than those in India Sterling paper. This is not a phenomenon due to any maladjustment arising from post-war developments. Even before the war often the net yield from India Rupee paper was less than that got from India Sterling paper. On the face of it it is extraordinary that the nationals of a confessedly poor country like India who

invest in Government Rupee paper should be content with a lower yield than that secured by the corresponding class of investments belonging to a rich country like England. This is largely accounted for by the fact that those who have spare funds in this country play for safety and could not find any better investment than a security which yields even less than what is enough to attract Englishmen who invest in India Sterling paper. Thus is witnessed the melancholy spectacle of very high rates of interest ruling in the countryside while on account of a lack of enterprise people with funds are content with a very low yield of interest rates. If the industrial development of the country is satisfactory, if the social and political conditions promote leadership in the economic sphere and if there is a co-ordinated system of banking organisation overspreading the country including within its scope the villages as well as towns such a state of affairs as has been described above will cease to exist.

Our conditions recall to a very large extent those that existed in Europe in the eighteenth century. Our spare money finds an outlet in the main in investment in land and Government securities. Private money-lending also constitutes a resort. Even highly educated men in our country have, on account of inadequate facilities for investment, to resort to private money lending which on the whole may be said more often than not, to degrade the borrower as well as the lender.

Let us compare the progress made in countries like England and the United States of America in the realm of investment with conditions in India. During the last fifty years an elaborate apparatus has been built up in England with a view to help investors. A number of joint-stock concerns called Investment Trust Companies have come into existence. It is well that we make a study of them and see if something of that kind cannot secure the needs of this country. In the absence of active development of industry and commerce on modern lines the amount of capital seeking investment and the facilities for such investment are not as great in India as in more industrially advanced countries. Members of the upper middle classes and the richer classes find themselves in possession of spare funds which they find it rather difficult to invest profitably. Agricultural land does not offer sufficient attraction especially since many of them are town dwellers and consequently are not in a position to profit from agricultural investment which will pay only under continuous personal supervision. Houses except in big towns and cities are not an income yielding property and consequently are not an attractive object of investment. Private money-lending is, as has been already pointed out, besides being abhorrent to fine

natures is attended with considerable risk. Government loans and Post Office Cash Certificates are first class security but the return realised from them is not sufficiently attractive to most people.

In these circumstances one would expect spare funds finding an investment in the shares of joint stock companies engaged in industrial and commercial enterprise. The habit of investment in industrial securities is spreading steadily though slowly. The spirit of mutual distrust among Indians and the absence in many cases of a lofty code of commercial morality except among the representatives of certain castes with a tradition for business enterprise act as deterrents to investment. Except in big cities there are no reliable middlemen who specialise in stock exchange securities.

When we observe the vast strides that facilities for investment have made in countries like England, France and the United States of America we realise how conditions in India are yet far from satisfactory. The individual citizen in possession of funds to invest is in most cases not able to choose the right kind of securities. Economic development on sound lines cannot therefore be furthered unless there are a variety of institutions for furnishing the right kind of guidance for the employment of capital. There is thus need for a specialised agency which is competent to carry out the investments of funds belonging to those who are for a safe and steady return, higher than that realised from gilt edged securities and who also require a slight capital appreciation. Investment Trust Companies are organised for this purpose. The individual citizen is thus relieved from exercising his mind on the choice of securities. Instead he buys shares in an investment trust which employs the funds in buying securities of different kinds. Risk is thus distributed over a very wide field geographically as well as by industries. Such companies are increasing in popularity in England. Since the War a large number of Investment Trust Companies have sprung into existence and the old established companies have increased their capital. In India though the field for the operation of such Investment Trust Companies is not so large, there is a need for a few good companies springing into existence. Such companies will help those who want a steady return higher than that of gilt-edged securities and who for lack of such companies at present are led into unwise investment of funds resulting in loss of capital and discouragement to business enterprise. A fairly large capital is required for such a company. The management of the company should be intelligent and honest. If the public in India are approached properly sufficient funds will be forthcoming for Investment Trusts to be started.

There is a fairly large amount of funds waiting for employment on such terms as will yield a return higher than the rate of interest realised from gilt-edged securities.—An Investment Trust Company can command the services of experts who will assess the value of different kinds of securities and invest the funds in such a manner as to yield a steady and safe return. The capital of such a Trust must be fairly large say about forty or fifty lacs of Rupees so that it might employ persons of great ability. With a view to spread the risks satisfactorily the Trust will have to go in for different kinds of securities; *viz.* debenture bonds, preference shares and ordinary stocks of different industries. In India at present the field for investment is widening, the main lines being Cotton, Jute, Iron and Steel, Tea, Rubber, Oil and Electrical Industries. Instead of the individual investor being left to his own devices the Investment Trust provides an agency which will do the investing much more satisfactorily. An Investment Trust Company under reliable and competent auspices will fill the need on the part of those Indian investors who do not want to gamble in shares but require a steady and safe return slightly above that realised from gilt edged securities. It will be a great relief to those who find it now a hazardous thing to invest in mortgage of houses, private loans and chetty accounts.

MADRAS.

T. K. DURAISWAMI AIYER.

GERMANY'S BUSINESS PARLIAMENT.

By HARIKISHAN DEVI LALL.

THE idea of the Third House of Parliament in Germany was unquestionably inspired by the Russian revolution. Nevertheless the conception of government by trades and the representation of various economic groups in the government, advocated by the Bolsheviki, is not new. It can be traced back to Bismarck, who, in 1880, created the Prussian People's Economic Council. Bismarck's plan was largely wrecked by the distrust and jealousy of the Reichstag, which suspected that the desire to strengthen the monarchy at the expense of Parliamentary government was the real motive of Bismarck.

To understand exactly, where this new body fits into Germany's present-day life, it should be recalled that the Constitution of the German Republic provides for three definite Parliamentary bodies: 1. The Reichstag, corresponding to the House of Commons of Great Britain or to the House of Representatives of the United States; 2. the Reichsrat, representing the States of the German Federation as such, a body analogous to the United States' Senate, and 3. the Reichswirtschaftsrat, or the Economic Council, which is a distinct innovation in representative government.

The Economic Council is composed of ten groups, numbering three hundred and twenty six members. 1. Sixty eight representatives of agriculture and forestry; 2. Sixty eight representatives of industry; 3. Forty four representatives of commerce, banking and insurance; 4. Thirty six representatives of handicrafts; 5. Thirty four representatives of traffic and public enterprises; 6. Thirty representatives of consumers; 7. Sixteen representatives of government servants and liberal professions; 8. Twelve persons nominated by the Reichsrat (the Senate), who are especially familiar with the economic conditions of the States of the German Republic; 9. Twelve persons who have either rendered distinguished services to German economic thought or to the economic system, or are especially qualified to render such services, are nominated by the government; and 10. Six representatives of fishery and gardening.

Appointments to the Council are for life. Death, resignation, recall by the appointing organisation, or loss of the qualification

on the basis of which the selections were made, deprive the members of their seats. The members enjoy Parliamentary immunities, such as, the freedom of speech, and receive such compensation as agreed upon by the Ministers of Finance, Traffic and Economy. They have the right to refuse testimony as to their sources of information like the members of the Reichstag, provided they have received such information in their capacity as members of the Council; and they are pledged not to abuse confidential information, and are not permitted to reveal in public what transpires in closed sessions.

The Council elects its own officers, *viz.*, a president and nine other officers representing the various groups mentioned above, and four clerks. The Council is further divided into three groups, *viz.*, the workers, employers and consumers, each of these groups has one representative as its leader or spokesman to safeguard the interests of the group which he represents, in the Council. There are five permanent committees to conduct the business; and a special committee is appointed from time to time to handle the matter of extraordinary nature. Each of the permanent committees is composed of thirty members. Most sessions of the Council are public, unless secrecy is desired, which can only be secured on the application of twenty members and when resolved by two-third majority of the House. But the meetings of the Committees are not public, unless determined by two-third majority of the committee concerned. The business is done in two readings; and the votes are by groups, except on question of business procedure, in which case usual Parliamentary method is adopted. Members of the Government are entitled to admission to all meetings of the Council and of its separate committees. They must be heard. On the other hand the Council can demand the presence of the representatives of the Government at its sessions. The various States of the German Republic are likewise entitled to place their opinions before the Council. Article XI of the instrument creating the Economic Council is very important, as it specifies that the Government must submit all social and economic legislation of basic importance to the Council for its opinion before such measures are introduced in the Reichstag. What is more significant, is that the Council has the right to demand legislation; and the permanent committees of the Council must be heard by the various Ministries before they promulgate new regulations. If the interpretations of the committee differs from that of the Government, the latter may demand a vote on the subject by the Council at large, unless the vote of the committee stands three to one. The committee may likewise appeal to the Council at large under certain conditions.

The Council may insist that the Federal government avail itself of its right to conduct enquiries on various social and economic questions, and may demand that the information obtained be placed at its disposal. The Council represents a curious transitional stage between a council and a Parliamentary body. It enjoys Parliamentary immunities without being able to legislate.

Germany is trying an experiment, attempted in no other country west of Russia, to superimpose a federal council (the Economic Council) representing labour, capital and the consumer upon its Parliamentary system. In many countries possessing a Parliamentary Government, especially France, powerful economic cliques are forced to buy or intimidate politicians, parties and Parliamentary majorities. The German Economic Council, on the contrary, enables labour, capital and the consumer to exercise their influence upon the Government and the Legislative body openly and legitimately. The members of the Council are the representatives of the nation as a whole, and not of any particular class. They meet on equal terms to discuss questions of economic importance. Another important feature is, that a variety of interests is represented. In other words, every conceivable occupation, from bank president to ordinary household servant, is represented on the Council. The members are chosen without regard to part affiliation, but solely as spokesmen of the various economic groups. The captain of industry or the labour leader who could be tempted to sponsor or support selfish measures through obscure agents working in the dark, would not sully his reputation by yielding to sordid self interest or corruption. Because when responsibility is thrust upon them, an opportunity is given them to argue their case in public and to compare opinions with their fellows; they will be found worthy of the trust reposed in them. To think otherwise is to despair of democracy.

Despite the difficulties the Economic Council has to contend with, the fact that it is playing a role of increasing importance in the determination of the German economic policy at home and abroad, is likely to lead to its steady growth in influence and power. Being an institution without precedent, it is rather difficult to forecast its evolution. Nevertheless, it is a fantastic notion, if at all imagined, that the Economic Council, or a similar body, representing capital and labour, will eventually replace Parliamentary government. Personally, I prefer to regard it as a valuable means of co-operation on the part of the industry and labour with the legislative bodies and with the Federal Administration. The Council could not completely supplant Parliamentary government, for the simple reason that the great questions of world power and world politics require a different field of vision.

SIMLA.

HARKISHAN DEVI LALL.

HEART-STREAM.

DR. RABINDRA NATH TAGORE'S *Hridaya-Yamuna*

TRANSLATED BY HRISIKESH BHATTACHARYA.

I.

Wilt thou fill thy jug? Come, O come, down into my heart-stream
'The deep waters will splash plaintive about thy fairy feet.
Solemn and rainy are the heavens today, and clouds like thy dark
copious curls have come down on both my banks. Ah, the known
music—the tingling jingle of the anklets about thy feet! Who art
thou, O lonely spirit, pacing slowly on? Wilt thou fill thy jug?
Down, down into the heart-stream.

II.

Sit, if thou wilt, on the bank,—the jar afloat,—losing self and
losing all. The light green is on the earth. The new-born blue
is on the sky. The wood is gay with blooms. Out thro' those
dark eyes of thine the dear heart shall melt—thy veil drop down in
sweet abandon. Seated on a bed of grass by the green embowered
shore—with thine eyes fixed on the deep dense forest—to thee
shall memories come of things thou knowest not what. Losing
self and losing all,—sit if thou wilt,—and put away thy jug.

III.

Wilt thou lave thyself and play? Come softly gliding down
below. Fling on shore thy clothing's blue-hued lumber,—my
liquid blue shall mantle all thy shame and fawning billows close
thee in their arms, moving high in lover's rounds all about thy
bosom and thy cheek. Here and there and everywhere to thee
the fond ones closely cling, joying now and now complaining,—
syllabbling love in splashing tones. Wilt thou lave thyself and
play? Come softly gliding down below.

IV.

Wilt thou court delicious death? Come into my bosom. Calm,
cool and deep—bottomless and shoreless—the blue water stands
like death serene. Measureless as Infinity, the Deep within—it
knows no sun—it brooks no night. Breaks not any sound that
stolid quiet of this deaf Immensity—stirs not any music its infinite
depths. The past to oblivion consign. Break—O break—the bonds
of the present. Put back thy stirs and affairs—O leave them
beyond the shore—and come.
Art thou in love with death? Down, down into this profundity.

PARTING.

(FROM DR. RABINDRA NATH TAGORE.)

TRANSLATED.

The honeyed spring-tide runs endless thro' thy delicious bower, and the dear ecstasies of meeting and parting swim across thy breeze.

The pilgrim that departs—he alone is lost—and the blooms cease not, though the fading rose faints away with dying day.

When by thy side, dearie, what a pretty store of my heart-songs did I make unto thine eyes!

Now is the hour of parting—and shall I look in vain for one final gift?

Beneath thy jasmine shade do I keep interred the hope that thy flaming Phalgun melt thro' dripping anguish of the long rainy day.

LAHORE.

HRISIKESH BHATTACHARYA.

**ALL THEY THAT TAKE THE SWORD SHALL PERISH
WITH THE SWORD.* (MATT. XXVI 52).**

By Professor G. D. WATKINS.

MOST Christian students who have the privilege of reading "The Student Movement," the organ of the British Student Christian Movement, as it appears month by month, have been impressed, no doubt, by the leading article in the March number of this present year. It was headed, it will be remembered, "Does the Federation want world Peace?" and the gist of its argument was very brief. The small group of men, who founded the S. C. M. did so because of their passionate desire to bring the Christian faith to Africa and the East, and their action has altered the whole scope and range of Christian Missions. "Judged by its results, the greatest event in the history of modern missions was the founding of the Student Volunteer Movement in Great Britain and in America, which gave rise shortly after to the S. C. M. and the World's Student Christian Federation." That Federation is to hold its Executive Committee meeting in Mysore in December, and the question of World Peace will no doubt figure prominently in the agenda.

This leader however was concerned because the Federation is not giving a lead to the student world on any great modern problem today. At the time of the Peking Committee Meeting it looked as though the Federation would give the students of the world a lead in relation to the question of war. Since then little has been done to put into action the resolutions of that Conference. So the writer of the leader calls upon every student movement in the Federation to train its members to think of war as "the greatest social evil in the world," and as something which can be brought to an end, "as a hideous evil which must be eradicated." The writer ends by a stirring appeal to the Federation to launch a whole-hearted campaign against war. This leader is significant of much. Since then the world has been discussing the plans of a brave American, who by his plan intends to outlaw war as far as the Big Powers are concerned.

*An address delivered in the Madras Christian College.

Mr. Kellogg has dared to propose this thing, and bids fair now to bring his plans to something like fruition. Needless to say "The Student Movement" in its May number welcomed the idea with open arms.

Put very briefly this simple and far-reaching proposal made by America to Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, is a proposal that the six powers should mutually agree to renounce war for ever as a method of dealing with their disputes with one another. Other countries may be invited to join this pact later on. "The Student Movement" calls upon the 300,000 Christian students inside the S. C. A.'s to bestir themselves in the cause of peace by influencing public opinion towards the renunciation of war along these lines. As the writer says "Let the student class make up its mind that war must be renounced and it *will* be renounced."

It is therefore with no attempt at apology that we bring this subject forward. It is a vital question, if not the most vital of all questions we have to face today, for on this depends the future, for which we are building. Nay, rather let us be quite frank and say that on this point depends whether there shall be any future at all, for which we may be permitted to build.

Perhaps it may be said that to talk about non-participation in war to Indians is like whipping a dead horse, for India is known as the home of peace. Her history is one long story of non-resistance to the invader, except for very brief periods. Even then it was not the indigenous peoples, who fought, but the survivors of previous invading nations. That may indeed be so, but nevertheless there is today a very real danger, even in India, of a military spirit growing up. Perhaps, as never before, there is an apprehension of war troubling the minds of Indian leaders. Indeed a number of the nationalist politicians are basing their policy today on the probability of war. Mr. Fenner Brockway has stated that during his short stay out here, nothing impressed him so much as that. We ourselves know it, if we have followed the events of the last two years at all closely.

May be this school of military thought is not strong yet, but it is daily growing stronger. The Pacifism of Gandhi has not such a strong hold on Indian policy as formerly it had. Many of his former colleagues are even now advocating compulsory military training for students. What has happened of course is that the Western idea has taken root that national status depends on military strength, and a great power must necessarily be a warlike power. Let us make no mistake here. India will become militarist, if ever she does, not for love of militarism, but because

she is not at present sufficiently pacifist to reject militarism in competition with the West. There is indeed a great danger that India may find herself committed to a military policy unless something can be done to save her in time.

The words of our text were spoken two thousand years ago, and only to-day are we beginning even to realise their truth. When they were uttered by the Master they seemed to the crowds who heard them, to be the most ridiculous nonsense ever uttered. Was not the whole Roman Empire, the mightiest of all Empires, founded on the use of the sword? Did not the use of the sword imply riches and power and glorious pomp? Surely this man was mad; yet Jesus had one of those surprising insights, by which far ahead of the event He saw an obscure truth, which only long afterwards would "emerge clear, unmistakable, imperative, so that all men would believe it."

Now today we know how true those words are, for war is suicidal, and civilization cannot survive it. The last Great War showed men in letters of blood-drenched suffering that "if mankind does not end war, war will end mankind." And why is war suicidal? Is it not because all war is fundamentally regression? We say it is human nature to fight, and by that we mean that some deep instinct prompts us to pugnacity. But do we really realise exactly what we imply by that. Psychologists are now telling us that this war-urge within us is founded on the two instincts of acquisition and pugnacity, and in both cases is a regression to more primitive forms of life. In other words we allow "the ape and the tiger" in our natures to be supreme at such times as we seek to war.

Rivers studied the first instinct, that of acquisition, very thoroughly in this connection. He found the hoarding instinct very strong in lower forms of life. In the case of certain male birds the instinct to hoard extended itself to the acquirement of territory before nesting-time, and the eagerness to fight any other male bird venturing within that territory during that period. A cuckoo, for example, may acquire several fields in this way and hold them against all comers. The peculiar part of his attitude is that the pugnacity is present only when the bird finds itself on the acquired territory. Elsewhere the bird may be quite friendly with other males. This acquisitive instinct is also strong in little children and normal development implies a growing-out of this instinct, and a willingness to share more and more with others. A successful business man is often merely one in whom this acquisitive instinct is strong and persistent even after his primary biological needs have been satisfied. Rivers

found many tribes, like the Melanesians for example, which had so far outgrown this instinct as individuals as to have all things in common. This gives us hope that we may some day be able to socialise this instinct, so that it takes its place in the system of the gregarious instincts. There is no psychological ground for thinking this impossible, and if this were done we should be a great step nearer abolition of war.

As regards the instinct of pugnacity Mr. Perry has put forward some very strong arguments, based on ethnological grounds, against the assumption that such an instinct need be assumed. He does not quite prove his case, it is true, but he does show that pugnacious behaviour between social groups is a much less constant phenomenon in the history of civilization than is commonly supposed. The food-gathering communities of the primitive stage were peaceful, and cruelty and violence were rare. Warfare he contends, was an acquired habit from the development and decay of archaic civilization. The peoples of Egypt and Babylonia, for example, underwent a progressive education in violent modes of behaviour beginning with hostility between two sides of a dual organisation. Even today we see this process of education in violent modes of behaviour taking place in Fiji and elsewhere. So the common theory that the pugnacious instinct, which leads to warfare, is ineradicable in human nature does not appear to be so sound as was formerly imagined, and if Perry is at all right this mode of behaviour finds no ground in instinct.

It would seem, therefore, that pugnacity is an acquired tendency rising largely from the acquisitive instinct being allowed to develop abnormally. As civilization has placed restrictions on its expression, men have resorted to more peaceful methods of settling their disputes, these disputes themselves being largely rooted in the acquisitive instinct. Actual physical fighting amongst civilized men generally appears as a regression to the primitive modes of behaviour. Drunken men, their centres of higher control being numbed with alcohol, fight readily. Similarly men undergoing great hardship, as in the case of Arctic explorers, show a peculiar tendency to quarrel over trivial things. During experiments on men to ascertain the effect of the deprivation of oxygen, a similar quarrelsomeness was manifested. It would appear therefore that the tendency to fight belongs to the lower parts of man's nature, a grafting upon, or a distortion of, an abnormal development of the acquisitive instinct. The old Chinese philosophers were right surely when they despised the warlike man, who was eager for wars and spoil.

In the past, collective pugnacity has been valued by the group, especially in countries of the West, and social approval of fighting

men has been a cherished thing. The warrior has long been an esteemed member of the social group, and we have, by our esteem placed him in many countries in an exalted position in the community. What that led to, especially in the case of some continental countries, we know from bitter experience now. We must try and remedy that mistake in future by a sane perspective of things. No longer must warriors be allowed to lead us into wars of their own making in many cases.

Before leaving the psychological side of the matter it might be as well to examine another supposedly strong argument for the continuance of war. We are constantly being told that human nature cannot change and therefore war must be retained as an outlet for Man's pugnacity. Put very baldly the argument would seem to imply that any activity which is instinctive in origin must remain and continue in its most primitive form. If this were so then our law courts are no less futile than the League of Nations. Both these valuable institutions exist because human instincts *can* undergo large modifications from primitive expression. We know now that the suppression of primitive pugnacity in individuals sets free a large amount of energy for useful employment elsewhere. It was a sublimated pugnacity, which gave William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, that driving force he used so well in constructive religious work.

Is it then too much to assume that what can be done for the individual can also be done for the group? Cannot the impulses of collective pugnacity be similarly controlled, and given to socially valuable struggles against forces of moral evil and hostile elements in our physical environment. Psychology gives no reason for assuming that the impulses of pugnacity cannot be transformed into forces of social value in a peaceful community. What we need is a "Cultural substitute" for the present practice of requiring young men to prove their manhood by the wasteful social method of killing young men of other nations. A sublimation of the warlike spirit is imperative if we are to save civilization. As a German wrote in 1913, just before the War "Every individual, who acquires the soldier's mind in his youth is a warrior lost for the struggles of the spirit."

We must have no place in our international life for acquisitive strife, which is the real foundation of War, but we must concentrate on a generous sharing practice. This we shall do perfectly only when we have attained to the insight of Traherne when he wrote "Perceive yourself to be the sole heir of the whole world, and more than so, because men are in it, who are every one sole heirs as well as you."

Seeing, therefore, that we have hope of conquering these demons of War, if we are willing to devote our energies to the task, it might be good to examine what can be done, firstly by the Christian state, then secondly by the Christian Church and lastly by the Christian individual, in this matter.

There is no doubt that war not only calls the best out of a state for the time being in many respects, but it also calls forth the worst. It is this latter point which we are so apt to forget when we think of this question. Now in this respect it is probably the question of dishonesty, which seems most apparent. As Mr. Baldwin said the other day "War means a holiday for truth." True it is that lies in wartime are dignified by the title of propaganda, and are said to be necessary for victory, but they are nevertheless lies for all that. Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was the Head of the German propaganda section at Crewe House during the War, and looking back on his work he said recently, "We lied and we lied brilliantly, but we lied." Let us take an example of this.

It was found necessary during the last Great War to throw the blame for the origins of the war on the German Empire and more especially the Kaiser, himself. Millions of men went to the fight, firm in the belief that Germany had started the War. They had been told it was so by their statesmen and leaders. Since the War finished, and finished so disastrously for victory and vanquished alike, statesmen have been telling the truth about the matter.

On December 3rd 1920 Mr. Lloyd George said "No one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided or rather staggered and stumbled . . . and a discussion I have no doubt would have averted it." But this was not what Mr. Lloyd George said during the war, when he accused the Kaiser of plotting war long before it came about.

Then Lord Grey, who was Foreign Secretary when the War began, and was responsible ultimately for the Cabinet decision to enter the War, has been saying recently "If matters had rested with the Kaiser there would have been no European War arising out of the Austro-Serbian dispute". But Lord Grey told another story in 1914.

Then Signor Nitti, the ex-Premier of Italy has also been talking about this same subject and he said "We used the argument of Germany's sole responsibility for the War because it was a good weapon to use. But now the War is over, it cannot be used as a serious argument". But the people of Italy were

made to think it could be so used during the war, and therein lies the evil.

This is what war does for a state and if more is wanted to show how far it is possible for a state to go in this direction, a little book called "Falsehood in War Time" by the Hon. Arthur Ponsonby M.P. should be read. It has recently been published and is well worth careful study. If it is read alongside Lord Beaverbrook's book dealing with the schemings and plottings in high circles during the War, there will be no doubt left in the reader's mind that War is bad morally and spiritually for any state to embark upon. This is the case with every state engaged in the last Great War on both sides of the conflict, and truly Hell was let loose during those years.

Then there is the futility of modern warfare to achieve any good purpose whatever. The one shocking revelation of the last war was the indiscriminate ruin into which war plunged victor, vanquished and neutrals alike, "the ferocious and untamable way in which war, once let loose, tore at the garments of civilization as a whole so that, regardless of who won it, half the world found itself unclad and shivering when the storm was over." "To fight with the gigantic paraphernalia of modern science to make war in our intimately inter-related and delicately balanced modern world, where our most indispensable means of existence already have become international; to make war now, when an average five hours of fighting burns up the endowment of a great university . . . that is obviously futile to achieve any good thing for which a Christian state might wish or pray" says Dr. Fosdick.

Then he continues; "The old appeals for war in the name of a good cause fall coldly now on the instructed ear and cease to carry conviction to thoughtful minds. A modern war to protect the weak is a grim jest. See how modern war protects the weak: ten million soldiers known to be dead, three million more presumed to be dead, thirteen millions of dead civilians, twenty million wounded, three million prisoners, nine million war orphans, five million war widows and ten million refugees. What can we mean by saying modern war may protect the weak? Modern war is *no* way to protect the weak."

All Dr. Fosdick says here relates to a war which in itself, we know now, was merely a perfecting of instruments, which might be used in any future war. Mr. Winston Churchill in his book on the Great War is careful to point out that the Campaign of 1919 was never fought, though mighty preparations in the way of gas, aeroplanes and tanks had been made. There

has recently been published a book by Sir Frank Fox, which he has named "The Mastery of the Pacific," and in the foreword he has an illuminating passage on the logical conclusions we must make from these preparations for the next war.

It is usual when painting a picture of the next war to stress the place of aerial warfare and poison gas in the conflict. Fleets of powerful aircraft armed with tons of explosives will, we are told, attack the centres of population, and reduce them to ruins, while poison gases showered in liquid form from the skies will in a single night decimate the population. There are gases in preparation, a single drop of which placed on the skin of a man will kill him, and placed in suitable bombs, and dropped from the skies, such gases could reduce a busy metropolis to a silent graveyard. There are not lacking therefore prophets, who realising this danger from the air, would have us prepare huge air fleets to meet it, and prepare more terrible gases to counter those of some hypothetical enemy. But few of these prophets seem to have carried the argument to its logical conclusion, which shows how false is this urging to prepare.

It is almost certain that air fleets cannot do much to act as a defence against air attacks, and so they would almost invariably be used for attack. This would mean that enemy nations would seek to do as much damage in as short a time as possible, and paralyse the nerve centres of their respective enemy states. Statesmen would therefore be wise, if they wish their countrymen to survive, to persuade them to cease all building above ground forthwith, to disperse all art collections, to cease to devote any more care to the beautifying of the surface of the Earth. Instead they will encourage the concentration and provision of subterranean accommodation for the population. Scientific research must then seek out some fungus, which being capable of being grown underground, could provide human beings with food during war-time. In fact such statesmen would do well to invite their countrymen to go back to the troglodyte life and scrap all civilization, which depends on joy in Sun and Air, and field and seashore. That is the logical conclusion to such arguments and it is just as well for us sometimes to look at logical conclusions to our arguments.

War in brief, as far as the State is concerned, is an *obscene* word. There can be no such thing as a Holy War. The word is especially obscene when it is used in relation to the affairs of two nations professing the same humane ideals, using day by day the same prayer invoking the Kingdom of God to come on Earth, and beseeching the Almighty not to "lead us into temptation." Metternich used to say that the word "War" ought

never to be used familiarly because familiarity with the word breeds familiarity with the idea. So let us not talk of any next war. There must be no next war.

When we come to examine the work of the Christian Church on this question, we have reason to be glad that something at least is being done today. The conscience of organised Christianity is awakening to the duty it owes to the world to make a stand against war, and we have every reason to hope that soon the Christian Church will speak with no uncertain voice in condemnation of all war of every kind.

One most cheering piece of news comes from Jerusalem, where the International Missionary Council has been meeting recently. One resolution of that Conference reads as follows, dealing with the protection of missionaries "that in as much as missionaries wish to identify themselves with the people of the country of their adoption, and to rely on the goodwill of the people among whom they live, and in as much as the threat of armed forces of the country from which they come being used for their protection created widespread misunderstanding, the International Missionary Council places on record its conviction that the protection of missionaries should only be by such methods as will promote goodwill in personal and official relations, and urges upon all missionary societies that they should make no claim on their governments for the armed defence of their missionaries and their property." This is certainly an advance upon the attitude of some missionary societies during the unhappy events in China in recent months, and if followed to its logical conclusion must entail not only the abandonment of defence by armed forces for missionaries, but for all those who are professing Christians.

Another symptomatic event in this direction has happened in Brighton in May last. It is the custom there to hold an annual musical Festival, and last year the choir of the Union Church of Brighton secured first place for mixed choirs. This year however the test piece chosen for the competition is Kipling's "Hymn before Action," and the choir in protest have unanimously decided to withdraw from the Festival. In voicing their disapproval the choir master and the choir secretary stated the views of the choir as follows. "In the mouths of a troop of savages bent on slaughter, calling upon their tribal deity, such words as are used in this poem might be appropriate enough. But the sentiment of the piece is completely at variance with the spirit of the New Testament, it presents a primitive and unworthy conception of the Deity and is quite unfit to be sung by the choir

of a Christian Church. To this choir the solicitation of the aid of the Father of Jesus Christ for purposes of human slaughter and his invocation as "Lord God of Battles" are very deeply repugnant." It is to be hoped that the lead given by Brighton will be taken up by more Churches still.

But pleasing as these items of news are, they only touch the problem now facing the Church of Christ. As a Church we are doing all too little to combat war. There are 576 millions of professed Christians on earth, and if a fraction of these had flung themselves into the struggle for peace as enthusiastically as most professing Christians flung themselves into the war, conditions would have been more satisfactory to day. It has been said again and again that if another war befalls us and shakes civilization to its foundations, as it surely would, the Christians of the world will be to blame. Surely that is true. The continuance of war will advertise that the Christian Church has not had an earnest conscience about its Master's view of life; it will bear evidence that while the Church has called him, "Lord, Lord" they have not been willing to do what He said.

The first Christians saw this view of life and adopted it whole-heartedly. As one recent writer put it "The early Christian Church was the first peace society." "Then came Christianity's growing power, the days when Christians, no longer outcasts, were stronger than their adversaries, until at last the Imperial household of Constantine himself accepted Christianity. Then Christianity joined with the State, forgot its earlier attitudes, bowed to the necessities of imperial action, became sponsor for war, blessing of war, cause of war, fighter of war. Since then the Church has come down through history too often trying to carry the cross of Jesus in one hand and a dripping sword in the other, until now when Christians look out upon the consequence of it all, this abysmal disgrace of Christendom making mockery of the Gospel, the conviction rises that we would better go back to our first traditions, our early purity; and see whether those first disciples of the Lord were not nearer the right than we have been" (Dr. Fosdick).

Ideally the function of the Church is to inspire a public opinion on vital matters so that the State may use that opinion. The Church must go on ahead of the statesmen and do pioneering work. It must take risks, for an ideal the world may at present condemn as unpracticable and must work for that ideal until the releasing power of God brings about the accomplishment of that ideal. It must declare boldly that Christianity and War are incompatible. "People of the ordinary type are ready for a

surprising amount of Christianity" says Dr. Sheppard, better known as Dick Sheppard of St. Martins, —in the Fields, and of all men he ought to know. "But" he continues "they must be shown by their leaders the vital heart of the gospel. Countless thousands are now disillusioned by the results of the Great War and are now wondering if Christ's so called unpractical Kingdom of Love may not be more promising as an experiment than our present very unpromising kingdoms of hatred and violence. They see that the Gospel of Christ is nothing less than that the end of human life is fellowship with God and fellowship with man. The principles of the kingdom are Truth always and never lies, kindness always and never violence, love always and never hatred, trust always and never fear. So the Christian Church must not rest until these things are the commonly accepted things of international and national life.

But such a problem as this one can never remain simply a problem for the social group whether it be the State or the Church. It must be met and solved by each individual soul for himself or herself, and the answer rests with the individual conscience. This is a delicate matter, and care must be taken here not to intrude upon convictions firmly held and cherished. On that point it is necessary simply to say that if our convictions are founded upon honest Christian thought, in the light of the life and teachings of Jesus, no argument must be allowed to move us from our stand on those convictions. Like Luther of old we must say "Here I stand, I can no other." So for those of fixed convictions nothing more can be said, except to exhort them to examine the foundations of their faith, and see if those foundations are rock or merely shifting sand of prejudice and illogical bias. It is rather to the perplexed young men of this generation that we would address ourselves. In this question of war, many of these young men are troubled to know what they must do. They realise that politics to-day makes this question complex and the more exalted their view of the State the more complex their position becomes.

In the past, two positions were possible, both of them theoretically simpler than the present position. The Early Church regarded the State as a non-moral fact, which "cannot be cured and must be endured." In the Middle Ages politics were regarded as an aspect of the Christian Republic, but today the problem is too complex for either of these two positions. The state exists to provide an arena for the good life for all, and the Christian theory of the State tends to make the warring theories of the Divine Right of the State and the Social Contract one.

The State *has* a Divine Right in that it is obviously God's will that men should live together in association. There is therefore a *prima facie* case for obedience to the commands of the State. But surely this honour is due only when the State pursues its legitimate functions in harmony with Christian aims, namely the consecration of the corporate life and salvation of the individual within the State. The kingdom of God is not a reconciliation hereafter of those at present pursuing different interests, but rather a co-operative effort here and now to do God's will. The state is not an end in itself, for it owes allegiance to God's purposes.

An actual economic fact must also be faced here, which adds still more to the complexity of the position. In many respects the State has passed already from the position of *Umpire* between powerful interests within itself to the *Instrument* of one or more of them. In this way it must immediately forfeit the spontaneous loyalty of some part of the community. Immediately men begin to regard the State as a machine to be captured for their own interests, they have begun to favour State Absolutism. There is no denying the fact that State Absolutism is gaining a hold today, and in two countries particularly it has reached a certain completeness, those countries being Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy. The danger of State Absolutism is that it denies rights to persons and substitutes coercion for will. It falsifies the social facts for the sake of uniformity.

In such a position the State may demand of a Christian as a citizen, conduct which Christ forbids. What is the individual to do then? This problem now facing many Christians is very acute. It is the problem of how to disagree with people, and yet go on living with them. It is one of the crosses of the Christian life that we may be misunderstood, and because of our adherence to what we consider to be Christ's commands, we may be considered failures and inefficient. Yet Christ was judged no doubt by the Roman and Jewish standards of His day an utter failure and woefully inefficient. So that should worry us little if we are Christians.

The difficulty for most young men is to 'reconcile obedience to the demands of the State with the commandment which forbids murder. Unfortunately for their peace of mind they have seen the falsity now of the appeal to die for their country, and to give their lives for a cause. The old fallacy of war was centred more on "dying" than on anything else, and there is no doubt that millions of young lives responded to that subtle argument in the last Great War. But what the State asks of a man is not to die so much as to kill and kill wholesale if possible. It is not to

the advantage of the State that any man in its Army should die if it can in any way be prevented, and the State would much rather the man lived and went on killing his enemies. It is not by the number of casualties a State incurs that wars are supposed to be won, but rather by the number of casualties of a fatal character that it can inflict on the enemy. So the prime duty of a soldier is to *save* his life if possible and kill others.

Our young men see this today and many of them feel troubled in their souls as to what they are going to do, supposing that another war should unfortunately occur. They realise that by killing at all we make the world less Christian. Those of them, who went into the last Great War believing as they were told that Christian ends could be attained through war, are now disillusioned. No Christian end can ever be secured by non-Christian means, and killing, the essence of war, is definitely non-Christian.

Many of these young men feel that if only they could be given guarantees before-hand that if they chose the way of non-resistance, nothing dreadful would happen to their homes and loved ones, they would be willing to follow their consciences in this matter. But such guarantees cannot of course be given, for their mere absence is in itself a clear call to faith. Otherwise by demanding guarantees and expecting to receive them we confess that we do not think it possible to apply the way of Christ to this actual world, now so full of evil. We, as it were, relegate His way to the future, as a way suitable only for some future state of things to be known as 'The Millenium'. But surely in the days of the Millenium no man will want to smite another on the cheek, and therefore there will be no necessity to turn the other also. In that Golden Age there will be no evils to be met by the methods of love, and so Christ's way cannot be intended only for that day. The ways of the Master are the means rather of introducing the kingdom, and not merely the ways of life after it has been established.

Those of us, who have had the privilege of reading those penetrating and yet reverent articles in "The Presbyterian Messenger," written by Dr. Herbert Gray on "Christianity and its Implications," have been brought face to face with these facts of our faith once again, and one may be forgiven if in closing this analysis, reference is made to some of the searching reminders Dr. Gray uses.

Non-resistance has never yet been tried on a large scale in war-time, and so it is futile to prophecy results of such procedure. But this we know. It is resistance most often that awakens brutality, and non-resistance puts the aggressor in a false position. Of course suffering of many sorts, poverty and worldly insignifi-

cance may follow non-resistance but together with these would come such a clearing up of the moral atmosphere of the World, that it might well usher in a new era of human history. There is great power for good in quiet unresisting suffering, as we in India know from recent history.

In conclusion let it be said that there *is* a Christian alternative to war. Non-resistance does not necessarily mean doing nothing. It is a positive and constructive way of overcoming evil by the way of love. Our trouble today is that we know so little by the higher ways of love, and until we learn more about them let us refrain from referring to them in contemptuous words or turning to the ways of force in impatient unwillingness to learn.

It is the privilege we possess as Christians to be permitted to pioneer along those paths, and show men the way to better things than the crude methods of compulsion. We must be as willing in this connection to do something that costs us much, as the soldier is willing to fight and die if necessary for what he considers to be a righteous cause.

There is a Divine art of Reconciliation, and there are no limits to the results it can achieve. Jesus called it overcoming evil by good, and there is no doubt at all that evil must be overcome, only it will not be overcome by the old methods of war and force. These have failed miserably, and the World awaits Christ's way of love. So we are to fill the World with the love-spirit so that peace may have a chance to thrive and grow. Our Christianity will indeed be judged in these present days by the quality of our contributions to this Central problem. "If we do not use *all* our powers for the prevention of War" says Dr. Gray, "and if we are not found in possession of great power born of love, we shall have failed mankind in one of its sorest needs."

So as individuals first, and then as members of Christ's Church in the second place, and finally as members of a State we love, we are to work for peace and love and avoid all war. It may be that we shall be called madmen before the work is finished, but we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that we are in good company. Two thousand years ago the words of our text sounded as the vapourings of a madman, but today we know them to be the most profound wisdom. "It is madness to sail a sea without knowing the way, to sail the sea no one has traversed before, to make for a country, the existence of which is a question. Yes it is madness to do this. But if Columbus had reflected thus he would never have weighed anchor. It was with this madness that he discovered a new world." We are called in similar faith to weigh anchor, and discover a new world where War shall be no more.

NEHRU REPORT AND THE SIMON COMMISSION.

By B. K. MALLIK, M.A. (Oxon.)

I.

It is not necessary that we must say exactly and right out how much praise we could cheerfully offer to this brilliant contribution. It would be difficult, indeed, not to spare it even the scruple of a hostile critic. But it is, after all, our maiden attempt at constructive politics and we do not certainly want the rest of the world to be either unduly severe or unnecessarily tolerant. We had reason to be diffident and there was actually a high tide of distrust sprawling on all sides. It is enough if we succeeded in maintaining a level of scrupulous precision and wise restraint. What was wanted, above all things, was statesmanship and no mere legal advocacy; we simply could not afford to be either flippant or academic, much less visionary and sentimental. Perhaps none of us knows when or how we shall complete the last milestone of our travel with the British people; but it does nobody any good to be impatient and throw all sagacity by the board. It is better far, on the contrary to be generous even to the point of weaving tradition with a foreign blend and conceding points to historic prejudice. The real mischief comes not so much from a deliberate halt as from a hasty move to precipitate action. What is called compromise in practical life is more often a fiction than a waste; the real truth, often enough, is that we patiently endure for a fresh break in the clouds instead of rushing madly all over the place. We must say we owe Pandit Motilal and his colleagues our hearty gratitude for so nobly carrying us through our recent crisis.

But it might be easily stretching a point too far to take this note necessarily as a forecast of the Indian State, much more as an effort to stabilise our opportunities. On the contrary, it would be both juster and more accurate if we took this valuable contribution, more as a scheme of administration and less as a draft of constitution. Apparently the conditions under which it

had to be produced were not exactly those in which constitutions as historical documents, generally appear. They had obvious limitations much too severe to admit them as even pale imitations of historic occasions. And it need, by no means, be a discredit to our politicians to suggest that they could have easily produced a more responsible and original document if they had even the semblance of the Irish if not the American chances. Not that, what Pandit Motilal or any of his younger colleagues exactly wanted was a declaration of Indian independence before they could even settle down to the need of a constitution. On the contrary, they might still be harking back, in the heart of their hearts, to the pride of restraint which our forbears had so devoutly cherished. But it could easily be a shame if we suspected that they pooled the best of Indian statesmanship in all its variety only to stake their country's future on the prospects of a British mission. Not to talk of such astute diplomats as Pandit Motilal and Sir Ali Imam, even the naive and the unsophisticated in Indian politics might well refuse to accept this sinuously robust commission as either a challenge or invitation to foreclose the future of the Indian State. Because, in the first place, whether one liked it or not, the British people never had the right, legal or moral, to dictate, much less determine the future constitution of India. After all, the British connection, to be precise and correct, has never been a political relationship unless one chose invariably to swear by the British judgment. There has been, at least, no serious historical event or legal document that we know of, from which one could justly trace its political ambition. In the second place, even if one granted for the sake of argument that there was a political right and no mere accidental arrangement, this right could not obviously be utilised for the purpose of dictating the Indian State. Simply because this right could not attach itself so much to India as such, as to the organisations which the Hindu and the Mahommedan between them have hitherto formed. Not that there was no India, as a matter of fact, for it, easily to attach itself to; and it would be the height of shame, indeed if loyalism meant to question her integrity if only to make up an argument. But it so happened that the English mind, by a curious irony of political history, missed it absolutely clean and steadily believed that there was nothing in the four quarters of the Indian horizon if not only the Hindu and the Mahommedan. No doubt, to be fair to him, the Englishman never denied that there was a geographical India which had its peculiar ethnology and even cultural achievement; and obviously it lent itself to a systematic treatment, political or economic. But it was, by no means, this India which formed the

subject for conquest or treaties or any of the legal and extra-legal methods by which the Englishman so energetically sought to acquire or defend his claim over the Indian soil. Obviously if the Englishman ever conquered anything on this side of the Himalayas, it must have been only the Hindu and the Mahommedan groups but never an Indian nation or an Indian State or even an Indian Community. For, after all, what is called the history of India never produced, according to the English historian, such a thing as India at all inspite of strenuous Hindu and Mahommedan effort. On the contrary, it is writ large, to their infinite shame, with a colossal failure at nation-building and the serious menace to humanity which necessarily resulted from it. Besides it is not merely that there never was an India hitherto known and politically integral, but that there never would or could be such a unity even in the near or distant future. Indian unity, in the nature of things, is inconceivable. And what is the reason of this tenacious English faith as if it was one more commandment to the good? It is simply that diversity and disharmony, lie like a leviathan across the whole of that continent as far as the English eye could see. The fact is that the India which the Englishman ever came across as a historian either within the classic dimness of the Hindu Age or the more precise though Mediæval confusion of the Mahomadan Era was only an aggregated mass of types and groups much too innocuous to yield to a political formation. To him the Indian horizon never cleared for a compact unity nor ever held out signs of a political future. As luck would have it, it never lost its nebulosity and consequently never reached any higher than a barbaric brilliance.

Whether these emotional reactions, however honestly held, is, at all, correct is another story; perhaps they are no less true than they are false. And at least, rightly or wrongly, they have held sway for over a century. But the point is that unless and until the English mind had actually gone back upon them, it is not clear, how they could consistently launch out for the discovery of an Indian State. Could even Providence help in this adventure if the Englishman had not bargained with his logical sense? But we do not mean to imply that the English mind could not seriously think of changing its method of dealing with the Hindu and the Mahommedan; on the contrary he might be ambitious in his rarer moods to try and build up even an independence by a fusion of the Hindu and the Mahommedan in his own ancestral manner. And who knows but he might be actually working out this long-cherished European dream in the Simon Commission. But unless and until he practised *volte face* and unguardedly qualified for the bitter taunt of the Emperor Napoleon about the English

nation, it is not conceivable how he could step into the shoes of the Hindu and the Mahommedan and literally reopen the question of Indian Nationality or Indian Statehood exactly or very nearly as the Indian today, whatever his political creed, is naturally bound to do. The point, however, is that while the Englishman could do almost anything under the sun, however strenuous, he could not, without some severe rude shock, go back upon a century of political faith about India. And yet perhaps it is not a mere question of changing his political conviction, however cherished if, to day, as a matter of fact, not a single Englishman in the political arena is willing to recant a blunder about India, it might well be that, such a recantation would involve the ruination of a British Institution. The fact is that the British Rule in India will not survive a day too long, the moment its rock-bottom is taken from under its feet, namely the faith that the Hindu and the Mahommedan had no political capacity and were utterly at the mercy of passion and greed. What even the most hidebound of the extremists amongst us, has to remember is that the British Rule in India did not quite stand on a physical gospel, however deficient might be its moral creed. And it is, by no means, machiavellian to argue that where national solidarity failed without at all creating a social break up, a political occupation vested as a moral duty. How could, for instance, the Englishman help turning his innocent commercial mission of the nineteenth century into a full-blown political adventure when India did not even offer him the protection of a sovereign state for his legitimate commercial need? How, again, could he look on with philosophic indifference when the country was totally at the mercy of either internal stupidity or external greed. Whether, however, he was at all correct in his apprehension that India had, altogether, ceased to be a political unit with the break up of the Moslem power is another question. Most decidedly he was not; and what is more, the main ground of his anxiety not to change his political conviction today might well be not so much a fondness for an idea or conviction as a necessity, in his own social economy, of the British Rule. As the proverb says the Englishman loves his Institution more than his Philosophy; it costs him nothing to hold it if necessary even by a bad argument. But the point of our contention is that the Englishman judging by all the cards would have to preserve the British Rule in India in its present form or some other if he does not literally propose to put on sack cloth and ashes as a political being. And it makes no difference whether Sir John Simon is a good liberal and someone else is a red socialist. None of them could possibly afford to upset the balance of the British empire by changing the British view of

Indian individuality. Where then is the need for us to be gratuitous and commit our countrymen to the serious belief that the Simon Commission, after all, was to orient the Indian State as a gift from the British people?

On the other hand if the Englishman cannot consistently appoint a Commission to draw up the constitution of India, much less can the Indian even concede to him the right or the opportunity to do so. Nobody would, for a moment, deny the need of an Indian State to be both primal and urgent; perhaps it is necessary for the Englishman no less than for the Indian. And there are moods and phases of ultra-loyalism in the economy of every country however independent. But if it is obviously impossible for the Englishman to keep on ruling this country with a faith in the unity of India, it is equally impossible for the Indian to preserve even a dream of his Indian State if it could arise only as the handiwork of a foreign people. The question of the possibility of an Indian State, in the last analysis, is necessarily bound up with the question of the validity of Indian integrity. If only there happens to be an India, as a matter of fact whatever its political attitude, it is, at all, possible that there could or would be an Indian State; and what is more, it would be for that India and India alone to decide and determine what its structure should be. The cardinal point in Indian politics must be a faith in Indian individuality and all those who are anxious to raise it either by a fiat of individual will or by the dictate of an external authority are really chasing the wild goose in a mood of despair. It is almost a crime to have the birth of a nationality at the mercy of imperialism whether as a gift of pity or the produce of imagery. No doubt individuals count in all economy; and even foreign hostile communities. But it is not for the individual even to create but to carry out and realise, while a foreign community can only serve with criticism and an experience sufficiently general to work as a safe-guard. Indeed it need be no reflection if we add that Sir John Simon is as far remote from the heart of India which he is so ambitious to put into an English mould as any well-grown conservative has almost a right to be. The Indian, therefore, we might repeat, again, unless he is dead to his own tradition cannot lay the axe at the root of his beloved mother-land by delegating any portion of its service to the British tradition.

(To be continued.)

CALCUTTA.

B. K. MALLIK.

GLEANINGS.

ENGLAND'S CULTURE.

AN AMERICAN HITS BACK.

The worm was bound to turn some time. Now the worm that has represented America's patient endurance of Britain's patronage is turning and showing more than one head. Mr. Struthers Burt, after serializing his charges against England's wilful misunderstandings of America, publishes them in a book. Now Mr. Berton Braley takes up the theme in the September "Century" and writes what is termed a "friendly go at England's manners and methods." Part of this has to do with that condescension in "visiting British representatives," mainly lecturers, who "so patronizingly look down on our 'moron minded' people." What of the culture of England, he asks, and takes as one of his tests the reading habits of the people :

"A book that sells forty thousand copies in Great Britain is at the top of the 'best seller' list. My authority for this figure is Hugh Walpole, the British novelist. Now what is the top in the United States? Forty thousand is inoderate. The 'top' runs as high as four hundred thousand. Twice the population—ten times the sale. Add that up.

"What kind of books reach the forty-thousand mark in Great Britain? As a rule the cheapest, trashiest novels. Only once in years will you strike a phenomenon in this British hub of culture at all like the sale of one hundred thousand copies of 'The Story of Philosophy,' fifty thousand copies of 'The Education of Henry Adams,' one hundred thousand copies of 'The Outline of History' in the 'barren intellectual domain' of the United States.

"Ask Mr. Wells, Mr. Walpole, Mr. Kipling, Mr. Galsworthy, and Mr. Bennett, where the bulk of their royalties come from. Ask Mr. Shaw—who, never having been in the United States, nevertheless calls us a Nation of Villagers—which village, New York or London, first produced and best patronises his plays?

"My individual opinion is that the avidity with which Americans call for Mr. Shaw's remarks about 'Villagers'—but I doubt if that's why he said it.

"Now let's glance at the magazines. It's a shibboleth of the Intelligentsia in the United States to sneer at "The Saturday Evening Post." But it's also a fact that no other country—least of all Great Britain—boasts a 'popular' magazine that averages one-fifth as much good literary meat. Two-thirds of the popular magazines of England are so cheap, trashy and namby-pamby that it is impossible to imagine a brunette housemaid from Harlem finding them worth perusal. But English people—what kind of English people I can't say—devour them by millions.

"What about 'highbrow' magazines? Blackwoods is heavy, highbrow, and dull. "The London Mercury," the occasionally sprightly, in the main cannot compare in interest, in vigor, color, and wit with its American contemporary. I am not enthusiastic about Mr. Menckon or his works—but so much kudos is due to him.

"And if there are any magazines in Great Britain that rank with the Century, Scribner's, Harpers, the Forum, the Atlantic, or the New Republic in combining literary flavor with charm and color—I can't name them. And heaven knows that I have dug into everything on English news-stands, looking hopefully and cagerly."
—"The Literary Digest."

FAMOUS MEN OF BIG FAMILIES.

HEREDITY RULE.

Some of the most brilliant men and women who have ever lived would never have been born had their parents limited their families to two or three children.

This is what Mr. Anthony M. Ludovici demonstrates in his new book, "The Night-Hoers, or the Case Against Birth-Control and an Alternative" (Herbert Jenkins, 7s. 6d. net).

"Although, generally speaking," states Mr. Ludovici in his plea for the existence of the large family, "heredity guarantees that there will be no violent aberration from parental and stock qualities in the children of a given couple, it does not by any means guarantee that the permutations and combinations of those qualities will necessarily lead to the best results in every child, or in the early children of the marriage.

"It may so lead to the best results in the early children, or it may not. And that is why it is of the utmost importance from the standpoint of the welfare of any race or nation that heredity should be given as many chances as are reasonably possible to achieve the best and happiest combination.

"FEW CHANCES"

"In a small family the chances are few, and the likelihood of the best possible child of which the parental and stock qualities are capable of being produced is therefore necessarily more remote than in a large family. And the consequence is that small families, by taking everything on the earliest three or four children—not to mention those of only one or two children—must be the cause every year of a very heavy loss in the best possible product of which each couple is capable.

"Among first children who may be assumed to have been most successful combinations of their parents' and their stock qualities we may mention:—

Thomas a Becket, Velasquez, Hobbes, Bolingbroke, Hawke, Mathew Arnold, Julius Caesar, Alexander, Milton, Dr. Johnson and his biographer Boswell, Bismarck, Heine, Corneille, Moliere, Racine, Edgar Allan Poe, Shelley, Keats, Swinburne, Browning, Bunyan, Carlyle, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Buffon, Burns, Addison, Columbus, Dryden, Gibbon, Goethe, Adam Smith, Thackeray, Macaulay, Cardinal Newman, Ruskin, George Meredith, Herbert Spencer, Abelard, Clive, Harvey, Hegel, Leonardo da Vinci, Robespierre, Linnaeus, Chopin, Locke, Marat, Napier (inventor of logarithms)—Newton, Hogarth, Paley (of Paley's Evidences), Sir Robert Walpole, Du Maurier, Lord Acton, Watts (the artist), and Rossini.

"LATE IN THE FAMILY"

"But, on the other hand, the following people who came late in their families were not only more distinguished than any of the same family who preceded them, but would also never have seen the light if the birth-controller's rule of four children to each couple had been adopted by their parents:—

Edward Lear, the youngest of twenty-one children.

Charles Wesley (eighteenth).

Sir Thomas Lawrence (sixteenth).

John Wesley (fifteenth).

Albert Moore, the painter (fourteenth).

Sir Richard Arkwright (inventor of cotton-spinning machine), Josiah Wedgwood, and Pierre Prud'hon, famous French artist (thirteenth).

Sir John Franklin, the Arctic explorer (twelfth).

Thomas Campbell (poet), Charles Reade (novelist), Ignatius Loyola, and Richard III, were eleventh children.

Benjamin Franklin (U. S. author and statesman), John Hunter (physiologist and surgeon), and Coleridge were tenth children.

Sir Walter Scott, Archbishop Richard Whately, Gainsborough, and Archbishop A. C. Tait, the author and discoverer were all ninth children, while Lord Cromer, Henry Moore (painter), and Granville Sharpe were ninth sons.

Johann Sebastian Bach was an eighth child, and seventh children included Herrick, Mungo Park, Van Dyck, Huxley, Jane Austen, Grace Darling and Sir Joshua Reynolds.

Botticelli was possibly an eighth child, but certainly a sixth, and Emily Bronte, Darwin, De Quincey, Felicia Dorothea Hemans, Pepys, Voltaire, Oliver Goldsmith, Oliver Cromwell, Sir Walter Besant, and Rembrandt were fifth children. The list of famous "fifth sons" included Cecil Rhodes and Horace Walpole.

"The above lists," adds Mr. Ludovici, "which are by no means exhaustive and were merely compiled at random, are significant enough. But, when it is remembered that birth control, as Sir Thomas Horder has pointed out, and as statistics prove, leads very much more often to families of one, two or three children than it does even to four, we feel sure that it would interest our readers to realise how much is possibly being lost to the nation and the world by the limitation of families to one, two, or three children.

THREE CHILDREN.

"The following people would never have been born if their parents had limited their families, as thousands are doing to-day by means of birth control methods, to three children :—

"Schubert, Sir Martin Frobisher (explorer), Emerson, Christina Rossetti, Tennyson, Tolstoy, Cobden, John Evelyn, (diarist), Sir William Herschel, Rowland Hill, James Watt, Charles Kemble (actor), Thomas Sydenham (physician), Wellington, Gladstone, Gordon. W. G. Grace, Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), George Herbert, Sir Henry Lawrence (Indian Mutiny), Sir William Siemens (electrician), Horace Walpole (author and wit), Charles Furse (painter)."

Nelson and Napoleon would not have lived if their parents had been content with two sons, and, similarly, there would have been no Lord Clarendon, Bulwer Lytton, Vasco da Gama, Landseer, Joseph Chamberlain, Charles James Fox, Montaigne, Trollope, Roger Ascham or Samuel Wilberforce to illuminate the history and literature of the world. — *The Forward*.

THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

(BY DEAN INGE.)

Civilized nations do not regard war as a sport, declared Dean Inge, in preaching on the subject of the League of Nations, at Geneva. They do not enjoy fighting, as the head-hunting tribes of Borneo are said to do. Nor is it true that wars are made by the manufacturers of armaments, or by groups of financiers. The influence of such trades and groups is not great; and "big business" has far more to lose than to gain by a general conflagration.

The notion that wars are made only by kings and emperors and that to make world safe for democracy is to make it safe for peace is utterly untrue and extremely dangerous. The old proverb, *Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi*, requires to be amended in the light of recent events. It should run *Deliriant Achivi, plectuntur reges*. Nations go mad and make scapegoats of their rulers. My study of modern history convinces me that in bellicosity and injustice to weaker nations there is not a pin to choose between monarchies and republics.

There is, unfortunately, rather more justification for the charge that some wars have been wars of exploitation—economic wars. These are always attacks by some great Power on barbarous or ill-armed nations. This is precisely the kind of war which the League of Nations ought to be able to prevent. As for wars between great nations on the same level of civilization, like the Great War of 1914, we may surely say without fear of contradiction that no one who has anything to lose is ever likely to vote for such a war again. Frankly, I regard this as the trump-card in the hand of the friends of peace. It gives the opponents of war a most potent argument which they have never been able to use with such convincing force before.

DEADLY MENACE.

As for those persons—and I fear they are numerous—who wish to abolish international rivalries only in order to clear the way for a ruthless and probably sanguinary civil war of classes in the bosom of every nation, the friends of peace may pray to be delivered from such allies. In that direction lies a deadly menace to the whole movement.

Having thus, to the best of my ability, deprecated some of the mistaken diagnoses and unhelpful remedies which too often darken counsel in this great problem, let me try to suggest to you what are the real causes which place serious obstacles to the triumph of the cause which we all have at heart.

The first of these is the form which the spirit of patriotism has taken in modern times. The love of country has burnt with a peculiarly intense flame in the time in which we live. There have been times when the privileged classes in different countries have felt more sympathy with each other than with the masses in their own country. This sympathy mitigated patriotic ardour in the eighteenth century. But ever since the French Revolution and Napoleon kindled into a fierce flame the national consciousness which they wished to extinguish, patriotism has been by far the strongest of the generous emotions which make the European man ready to sacrifice his property and his life, without counting the cost.

These sentiments of love, pride and devotion, continued Dean Inge, were not to be condemned outright. And yet this megalomaniac nationalism was

one of the chief causes of war. To the patriot in an exalted mood the questions at issue between his own country and its enemies seemed to be simply questions of right against wrong.

We know, alas (he said), who when the sword has once been drawn, every Government tries to stimulate these prejudices by unscrupulous propaganda, and how, when terms of peace are to be discussed, hatred and indignation, thus artificially exaggerated, stifle the desire to show justice and generosity to a beaten foe, which enlightened self-interest no less than chivalry and Christian charity should encourage. In this way a passionate wish for a war of revenge is generated in the minds of the losers, and each war sows the seeds of another.

ROMANTIC PATRIOTISM.

But this sentiment of patriotism is far too noble a thing to be condemned outright. It needs only to be directed into right channels, to be purified from its base, vulgar and archaic perversions. The question is not whether we ought to love our country, but what kind of success and glory and happiness we should desire for it. Instead of the childish wish to paint the map of the world red, or whatever our national colour may be, our pride should be to make it honoured, respected, and even beloved by other nations.

Romantic patriotism, which is only the distortion of a noble sentiment, is one of the causes of modern war. But the main cause is simply fear—fear of sudden and unprovoked attack. And here again we must beware of passing thoughtless censure. The plain truth is that the fear is justified. I need not point out to you how fear drove all the chief belligerents in the Great War to take up arms. In our own case the one convincing and unanswerable argument was that of the Prime Minister: "If we remain neutral we shall be left without a friend in the world, the predestined victims of the next coalition."

I have named the two chief causes of war; but no doubt there is a third. The Government of a country may see that the nation is disintegrating and heading for civil strife. An appeal to patriotism, to defend the country against a foreign enemy, may seem to be the only chance of averting internal disruption. It can hardly be doubted that this argument did weigh with more than one Government in 1914. The consequences, however, were so disastrous that it seems very unlikely that this gambler's stake will be played again.

THE LEAGUE AND SECURITY.

We are left therefore with the two causes which I mentioned first—patriotism and fear. Can the League of Nations remove the well-grounded fear of the nations that they may be attacked and destroyed without provocation? Hitherto, unwarlike nations have found no mercy. We need only think of the treatment of China all through the nineteenth century. Or must we go on as we have done hitherto each nation naturally desiring to be secure, and realizing that it cannot be secure unless it is stronger than any probable assailant? Can the League offer the nation's security not against nations which are willing to keep the covenant, but against any nation which may choose to break it?

Let us concentrate on this point—that the removal of fear—of quite reasonable fear—is the riddle of the Sphinx. If the League can solve it, it will have succeeded in its work; if not, it will have failed. What can we do—what can you and I do for peace?—We can put away hatred and vindictiveness from our hearts. We can try to understand the point of view of other nations, and to hold our country-men to understand it.

DISARMAMENT DOES NOT STOP WAR.

(BY GEORGE BERNARD SHAW.)

M. Briand, France's Foreign Minister, has just warned the Powers against the proposal that the whole world should disarm.

In this remarkable interview, Mr. Bernard Shaw asserts that disarmament does not stop war. Disarmament conferences talk about disarmament, and nations never disarm. What is the use of such a conference? What good can possibly come of it? The Powers will boast of the millions saved by limiting the construction of dreadnoughts or battle cruisers, but as likely as not will double the amount expended on aeroplanes or some other scheme for "preparedness."

Before the Great War I sat at dinner with a number of German officers. They were, they said, prepared down to the last cartridge and last first-aid bandage for the war that came shortly afterwards. They were demonstrating on the table exactly how the German army would march through Belgium and take Paris in less than two weeks.

There was not a sceptic in the room but myself. Preparedness had made the success of their plans a certainty.

The probability or possibility of failure was dismissed as something not to be thought of.

DEFEATED AT LIEGE.

Yet, when the war came, Germany, in spite of all her boasting of preparedness, was really defeated in the first few days. The war was lost at Liege, and Germany lost it because she did not know the strength of Liege. She had expected confidently to batter the city into a rubbish heap in a few hours with field artillery. She could not.

The German high command said, and the German people believed, that every possible contingency was provided for, and that Paris would be in German hands in a fortnight. Even the German army, with all its carefully thought-out schemes, was not prepared in August, 1914.

Mr. Winston Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of the war, received many pats on the back because he had the entire British Fleet mobilised in British waters and "thoroughly prepared" in July, 1914.

NAVY NOT READY.

Had the Germans only known it, they could probably have defeated the British Fleet early in August, 1914. This is assuming that the German Fleet was thoroughly ready to fight.

As for the British Fleet, it was in a woeful condition. At Portsmouth, a man who knew what he was talking about pointed out to me ship after ship as having something wrong with it.

All were undermanned. Ships that should have had, in order to be ready for action, a crew of 800 men, were manned by 300. Any number of ships were out of condition because of defective boilers or machinery. The British Navy was not ready at the out-break of the war. It is not ready today and it will not be ready tomorrow.

Disarming the nations does not do any good; it will not stop war. The Russians were not armed. Many of them were fighting with sticks because there was but one rifle for five men. What has disarmament to do with it, if men will go to war with sticks? It is man that makes war and not machines.

NOTHING WORTH WHILE.

There is not a nation in the world today that could go to war properly equipped. It would be several weeks before even a small force could be assembled fully prepared to take the field. Nations are in many respects like individuals.

Are you prepared to meet your God? Of course, you are not. Neither am I. We do not even see to it that a last will and testament is in order.

Yet lightning may strike us down at any moment; a blood vessel may burst, or a thousand and one other things happen, only to find us totally unprepared for it. It is the same with nations. War may come suddenly and unexpectedly from any quarter and find any nation unprepared.

Nations will not disarm, nor are they ever prepared. The Disarmament Conference will do nothing worth while in either direction. It is all nonsense.

SCORNING THE PACIFIST.

About all it will do, will be to give the politicians a fine chance to say: "Look what we have done." And if they had not this to talk about they would find enough elsewhere. In talking the mark is usually missed completely.

Disarmament is a supposedly pacifist move. Today it is hailed by the unthinking. But when war comes the man who advances the ideas of a pacifist will be listened to with nothing but scorn.

Shortly before the war I was asked to attend a pacifist meeting. A distinguished man of letters was in the chair. I listened to the many proposals advanced for maintaining peace. Then I told them that if they dared to advance such views once the country were at war they would all go to jail.

I must have convinced the chairman, for he conceded the error of his views.— "*Sunday Chronicle*."

MEN OF LETTERS.

STORIES OF THEIR IDIOSYNCRACIES.

Not the least notable aspect of the dictum that the style is the man is illustrated in the literature of anecdote. It is remarkable how often the idiosyncrasy of famous personages is touched off either in the piquant stories which they themselves tell or in those which are told about them.

In "Art and Anecdote" (Hutchinson, 7s 6d.) M. H. Stephen Smith has written very interesting reminiscences of her uncle, W. F. Yeames, R. A., and many celebrities of the art world of the nineteenth century are portrayed in characteristic stories.

Swinburne was a member of the Arts Club, to which all the members of the Yeames "clique" belonged.

"Having dined well but not too wisely at some festive board, Swinburne ordered his cabby to drive him to the Arts Club and, on the way, unfortunately lost his hat, or threw it overboard.

When he arrived at the Club he ordered himself another 'toast' or two, so that when the time for departure arrived, and he went to look for his hat amongst those hanging in the cloak-room, he could not find it. He began to try each one on in turn. No luck, none fitted, and he became more and more annoyed. However, he was not to be beaten, so coming to the end of the line he began all over again, and as each displeased him, he took it off and jumped on it to the amazement of 'Lord Leighton, who happened to enter the room at that psychological moment and caught him at it!'

AN INFORMAL AUDIENCE.

Yeames met several times Rossini, the Italian composer, of whom Czar Nicholas I. was a great admirer. It was in Paris that the author first met the composer. "The weather had been very warm, and Rossini feeling the heat considerably whilst composing grand opera in his room, threw off his coat. Warming to his work—in more senses than one—he divested himself of his waist coat. Then finally, as the Muse spurred him to still greater efforts, and his braces were tightening beneath the strain, he slipped them off also, and thus untrammelled plunged with renewed vigour to his task of making melody. So engrossed was he, that he did not hear heavy footsteps mounting the stairs, and great was his surprise and indignation when the door was suddenly flung open, and in walked a tall stranger, unannounced.

"Rossini," he said, 'I have just arrived in Paris, and my first visit is paid to you.'

It was the Czar Nicholas of Russia.

'Rossini sprang to his feet to make obeisance. But being 'unbraced,' his trousers slipped down, and the great composer found himself holding audience with the Emperor of all the Russians clad in his shirt!'

Another Italian musician with whom Yeames was acquainted was Mario, the great singer. 'He married Mme. Grisi, the great soprano, and had three children, of whom my uncle used to tell an amusing story. Some great lady I think it

was Queen Victoria, on meeting Mme. Grisi one day with her three little girls, said, playfully: 'And these I suppose are the little Grisettes?'

"'No, Madam,' replied Grisi. 'They are the little Marionettes!'"

THE BAILIFFS FROM 'TUSSAUD'S.

Count d'Orsay, the "Last of the Dandies," was a friend of Landseer. One morning he surprised the artist by calling on him before breakfast with the explanation that he could only visit a friend before 10 a.m. and after 6 p.m., to be arrested for debt.

"Having breakfasted, he suggested that Landseer should walk back with him to his lodgings. On the way they passed Madame Tussaud's exhibition of wax-works in its old quarters in Baker Street, and strolled in. Presently d'Orsay became uncomfortably aware that not only had it passed 10 o'clock, but that two seedy-looking individuals were evidently shadowing him, following his footsteps from room to room.

"Taking them for bailiffs d'Orsay tried to dodge them. . . . Escape seemed hopeless. They had him as completely as a rat in a trap. In despair, he saw the prison gates closing behind him, gates that could never open again, for his debts were colossal. But there was no help for it, and so he determined to meet his fate like the gentleman he was. He seeing round, drew himself to his full height, folded his arms across his chest, and demanded in his grandest manner what their business was with him.

"The seedy individuals bowed meekly, were most apologetic, and explained that they had been commissioned by Madame Tussaud to ask him, if he would be so very kind as to do her the honour, the very great honour of giving her a sitting for a model of himself. In a moment d'Orsay's attitude changed and in his most condescending manner he consented to pose."

A MARK TWAIN STORY.

"Mark Twain I heard several times, but except on one occasion, I was very disappointed. The exception was when he was speaking at a dinner in the magnificent great hall of St. Bartholomew's Hospital. He was replying for 'Literature.' 'This he declared to be dead in England 'Macaulay is dead; Scott is dead; Carlyle is dead;' and, after rather a long pause, 'I am not feeling very well myself.' He then went on to propose the health of the Medical Staff and dwelt on the great qualities which go to the making of a successful physician. Looking round at the pictures of great doctors and surgeons in the room, Abernethy and other distinguished men among them, he pointed out how remarkably their faces showed gentleness and sympathy. At last he arrived at the great life size portrait of Henry VIII, by Holbein, and, pretending he did not know who it was, he said, 'Look at that great man, does not every line of his face show that he was a very attentive ladies' doctor?'"

MAXIM GORKY'S LETTER TO ROMAIN ROLLAND.

Some time before Maxim Gorky's recent triumphal visit to his native land of Russia on the thirty fifth anniversary of the publication of his first literary work, the author wrote a letter to Romain Rolland. The French author had requested an opinion on the anonymous appeals of a group of Russian writers, living in the Soviet Union, who alleged that present-day Russian literature and literary workers were enslaved by Communist tyranny and had asked the free writers of the world to raise their voices against such a condition.

From his home in Sorrento, Italy, where he spends most of his time because of his health, Gorky, as quoted in "Pravda" the official Moscow organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wrote to M. Rolland as follows:—

"My Dear Friend,

"I have read the 'Letter of Russian Writers Living in Russia.' I doubt if such writers could have written it. These writers could not have written that 'the classics are forbidden in Russia,' at the very time when the state publishing concern had just put out a splendid edition of all the Dostoyevsky's work including, even his counter-revolutionary Demons and also those of Pushkin and Gogol and was preparing to publish the works of Turgenyef and a complete edition of Tolstoy in ninety volumes with Tolstoy's friend Teherikof on the editorial committee. Right now there are being published selected works of Bunin, Kyprin and Shmelef, not forgetting those of the old writers like Mamin Sibiryak and Garin Mikhailovsky.

"From the reports of the libraries where Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Gogol occupy first place, these writers also ought to know that the classics are not banned.

"Every year young Russian writers from across the border visit me. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of 'beggary' with long trips abroad. It seems to me that I am honoured with the confidence of these youths. But when in intimate conversation I have asked them 'What group could have written this complaint?' I have received for answer only a sceptical shrug of the shoulders.

"One writes to you that there is no great literature in Russia. What a strange assertion! I am greatly astonished at the young literary men. At the present moment there are hundreds of writers in Russia and their number is growing rapidly. And I am able myself to explain this talent of all my people. At last the Russian people is beginning to become conscious of its own self, of its worth and of its right to the liberty of its creative forces in all fields of human activity.

"This year brought to us some very big people who give us great hopes, namely, Fadeyef, author of the novel 'Destruction'; Leonid Borisof, Nina Smirnova and the poet N. Mikhonof, who has written a beautiful book.

"Very talented writers, for example, are Leonid Leonof, Babele and Vsevolod Ivanof, now working editorially on the journal "Krasnaya Nove", although he is not a Communist. All of these have created for themselves important positions, as have Kenstantin Fedin, Vladimir Ladin, Boris Pilenyak, Sergei Semenof (a worker gifted with very original talent and under the influence of Kunte Hamsun) and Zestchenko, who is wasting his time with short stories which do not nullify his talent, however and who is beyond a doubt gradually turning from humour to

satire. And to them belongs Kataef author of 'Wastrels,' something written in the style of Gogol. One may note the rapid growth of Alexander Yakovlef, Kaverin and others.

"It's difficult for me to write you a list of all those who are worthy, not only of mention but of praise.

NON-REVOLUTIONARY WRITERS.

"Among the non-revolutionary writers I can name Sergeyef-Tsensky, Mikhail Prishvin, Kenstantin Trenef, Nikanidrof, Feresae, Ivan Volenof, Olga Forsh, Alexei Tehapygin, who recently published the splendid novel 'Stepan Razin' and the poet Sergei Klytchyof, who works hard and successfully.

"Alexei Tolstoy writes zealously and remains an excellent short story teller. Ivan Novilk lately put out a volume of short stories.

"It seems to me that at present the two masters of Russian literature are Sergeyef-Tsensky and Mikhail Prishvin. The latter recently sent you his latest book, 'In Pursuit of Happiness.'

"Quite probably I have forgotten to name for you a whole list of other talented writers. I haven't the time to read all of them and I fear to weary you by listing all collaborators of the magazine, 'Siberian Fires.' Among them are very able persons.

"And I did not speak of the poets, among whom there is already whole series of recognized writers, such as Basterhak, Tikhonof, Aseye Zharof, Kazin, Selevinsky, Oreshin et al.

"A whole new literature is being created among the Caucasin peoples, both among the Circassin and the Osetins, as well as among the Tartars of Kanzan.

"Yes a beautiful literature is now living and growing in Russia. And being delighted with it, I am sorry that Europe pays so little attention to this great movement, to these working forces and that it so zealously looks for the black side, displays so much enmity, not knowing that there are good things there.

"Doubtless (and I admit this, the good things do not yet exist there to a satisfactory degree taking into consideration that the country has 150,000,000 inhabitants. But we must not forget that only ten years have passed since the day that the Russian people suddenly won a cultural life and understood what a thirst for culture meant. In Russia there are already villages with only 150 inhabitants subscribers for thirty two publications. Newspapers, magazines and popular and scientific pamphlets are making their appearance by the thousands. I am convinced that hundreds of the writers both in prose and poetry, who are now entering for the first time the literary arena will become, within five or ten years, brilliant stylists.

"P.S. It appears that the Letter of the Writers' about which the Russian press published abroad made so much noise, was refuted by the organized writers in Russia. And these organizations include in their ranks writers of all nationalities. With the exception of myself, there is not in Russia so far as I know, one single writer not belonging to this union.—M. Gorky.'

The attention of Romain Rolland had been directed to the alleged letter from the Russian writers by Konstantin Balmont and Ivan Bunin, Russian authors, living in exile in Paris, and M. Rolland appealed to Gorky for some data that might throw light on the present situation of literary men and their work in the Soviet Union,

SHOULD WE ABOLISH FAMILY LIFE ?

REMARKABLE SUGGESTION BY A WELL-KNOWN WRITER.

COMMUNAL HOUSE-KEEPING.

The family as a self sufficing unit has practically ceased to exist, and it is a nice question whether such individual functions as the family retains ought not, in the interest of economy, to be swept away.

I live in a street of perhaps a hundred houses, writes F. E. Baily in the "Sunday Express." Along its length twice or three times a day, a hundred people cook a hundred meals or a hundred fires or gas stoves, whereas in a communal restaurant possibly ten people could cook for the whole street over three or four fires or gas stoves. The doctor goes from door to door visiting the sick, who are indifferently nursed by amateurs or expensively by hired professionals.

IT HAS ALREADY STARTED.

If all the sick were concentrated in a communal nursing home the doctor could do twice the work in half the time and one nurse could look after twenty people.

All the mothers in my street who are sufficiently well off, employ a children's nurse to superintend their little ones; in a communal nursery four or five nurses for the street would be enough, better companionship for the children would result, and snobbery die a natural death.

Before those who disagree with me hurl the ever ready brick or write the reproving letter, may I beg them to pause and reflect that among other countries, this decentralisation has begun ?

In Paris the middle-class worker does not prepare breakfast at home ; he or she takes coffee and rolls at a cafe on the way to business.

AT THE MERCY OF SERVANTS.

In New York the middle classes make a habit of dining out as well as lunching out. Rents are too high for family kitchens to be possible, and the wages of servants are altogether prohibitive.

Even in Great Britain the middle-class housewife already complains that servants have her at their mercy, that she is overworked and harassed into nervous breakdown by housekeeping worries.

It seems incredible that this middle class housewife should endure her present agonies for the sake of a mythical independence and isolation that to all intents and purposes have disappeared. She and her family are no more original or set apart from the rest of the world if they eat Smith's sausages or Jones' marmalade at 119, Haig-street, than if they eat these delicacies in a communal restaurant with the rest of the street's inhabitants. All she and hers have to overcome is a mere animal instinct to take one's food into a corner and growl over it. The short walk to the restaurant would do them a great deal of good,

No one can pretend that any priceless amenities need be lost through the habit of eating in public. The average family meal is not so rich in marital tolerance or sisterly and brotherly love that tears need be shed over its pressing. I am convinced that in the communal restaurant the standard of good manners would improve, and peace passing all understanding prevail, because in the communal restaurant children under fourteen would take their food in a room of their own.

HOUSE BUILT THE WRONG WAY.

At this moment the unfortunate middle class wife struggles in vain with a house built in the days when servants were cheap and plentiful money bought twice what it does now, and rates and taxes were ridiculously low. Very little short of rebuilding them can be done to make these houses easy to run and labour saving. London and the provincial towns teem with Victorian three floors-and-a-basement atrocities where the dining room is a flight of stairs from the kitchen and the bedrooms very nearly as far away as heaven. Some have been turned into flats, but these represent rare cases in a heart-breaking wilderness of bricks and mortar.

Personally I see every advantage in communal catering, doctoring, nursing and child management and no disadvantage if we neglect out of date sentimentality. It is inaccurate to suppose that every woman becomes on marriage a highly competent house keeper. Some do and many do not.

I cannot envy even the competent woman who tries to cater on a small allowance for the varying tastes of herself, her husband, and three or four young people. Great variety is impossible when buying in small quantities out of a limited income. The communal restaurant would offer a wide choice of dishes and each member of the family could please himself.

The individual sick person in a private house is often far too selfish and exacting. He or she could not help benefiting from the mild discipline and tonic atmosphere of a ward in a communal nursing home, where everything happened like clockwork according to time-table, and personal fads were not taken too seriously.

Moreover, the nightmare of anxiety as to the expenses of illness which haunts every middle class husband would disappear. The payment of his annual subscription would give him the right to a bed in the nursing home if necessary, and for minor troubles he and his family would simply attend the nursing home clinic.

Incidentally the value of this clinic in pre-natal and post-natal care of mothers and babies would be inestimable. The busy present-day general practitioners simply cannot find time for the detailed routine supervision which expectant mothers and new-born babies ought to have.

Young people above all are likely to benefit from the abolition of family life. Complaints might arise from middle-aged parents accustomed to booming and bossing around the home (like which, it has been said, there is no place for which, it has also been said thank heaven!) but the pleasures of booming and bossing belong to the leisured, autocratic past.

Young people are too often lonely and miserable in their good homes and no home in which one is lonely and miserable is really good. They find themselves the victims of pious cliques and castes by whose virtue their parents have filtered from life everything of which they disapprove. The sterilised air of such cliques chokes the young. They want to join hands with others of their

own age and experiment and adventure and savour life before life has passed them by. Frequently they languish between the Scylla of those whom their parents will not know and the Charybdis of those who will not know their parents.

A RENDEZVOUS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

Communal restaurants would form a rendezvous for all the young people in the neighbourhood, a neutral ground where the knowledge that the Browns own a six-cylinder car and the Robinsons cannot even afford to own a motor cycle and sidecar need not detract from Ethel Robinson's slender loveliness or prevent Clarence Brown from admiring her.

I see in my communal restaurant a fortress armed against the stuffiness and dulness of urban and suburban life; dances would take place, not to mention concerts and dramatic entertainments arranged by the younger set who meet there day by day.

As Matthew Arnold said: "Yes! In the sea of life ones lead we mortal millions live alone," but there is no need to go on doing so. The country we inhabit need not remain, as it is now, a series of compartments from which the younger inmates look forth longingly, wishing all barriers might be broken down. Just as an interchange of visitors between countries tends to prevent war, so breaking down the barriers between homes tend to defeat snobbery and promote good understanding.

AN END TO MARRIED DRUDGERY

Women are supposed to be the practical sex. If this is true, I do honestly wonder how long the middle class wife will let her life revolve itself into one long struggle against dirt, dust, and the kitchen stove. She has only to combine with her sisters to make this struggle a thing of the past.

I foresee the day when, beyond the maintenance of her bedrooms and sitting-rooms, having children, and devoting herself to them while they are quite little babies, her days will be reasonably free so that she can devote a percentage of her time to cultivating her mind and body. At present I fear her mental outlook is limited; but, then, the kitchen stove looms so large in front of her.

With meals provided by the communal restaurant, her older children safe at the communal nursery, and her sick cared for in the communal nursing home, she will enjoy a fair chance for the first time in history.



EDGAR WALLACE.

NOVEL OF 70,000 WORDS WRITTEN IN FIVE DAYS.

How long does it really take Edgar Wallace to write a book or play? And how much does he make?

Everywhere you go in London these are the topics of conversation (says a Daily writer). Three nights running at dinner I have heard the conversation turn first to plays and then to Mr. Wallace; and almost immediately came the inevitable questions: "Does he really write a play in a week?" and "Does he really make £50,000 a year?"

People even ask Mr. Wallace himself, so he told me at luncheon. "And what do you reply?" I inquired.

"I say: 'How much do you make?' Where upon they blink hard, remember the tax collector mutter something about 'Not as much as you, and shuffle off,'" replied Mr. Wallace.

Before I had luncheon with Mr. Wallace I did not know how much he made, but thought I could guess pretty closely. Then he gave a whole lot of figures, and now I haven't the faintest idea.

To begin with, he pointed out he does not sell his plays to producers on a royalty basis, which makes it fairly easy to estimate roughly an author's earnings. He puts them on himself, taking all the risks and all the profits, if any.

"For a good long time I worked for others," he said. "It then occurred to me that it was time I started to earn something for myself. My first success, 'The Ringer,' was put on by the late Frank Curzon. He made £20,000. After that I decided to form myself into a one-man company and be my own producer and business manager, with the help of my wife, who handles my money and signs my cheques."

Judging by the fact that he has three plays on in London at the moment, as well as three companies, on tour, his system seems to be working pretty well. When all the companies are doing well at the same time he may make anything up to £3,000 or £4,000 a week—apart, of course, from novels, short stories, journalism and film production.

When something goes wrong on the other hand, it is Mr. Wallace who pays.

"People wonder how much I make," he remarked. "I never hear them wondering how much I have to spend. Being my own backer I have to foot all bills out of my own pocket. Wages cost me £600 a week at the Lyceum and £700 at the Apollo, and the three touring companies bring the total to £2,100 a week. The last month's hot spell has delighted a good many millions. My enjoyment has been tempered by the fact that it has cost me well over a thousand pounds a week.

Mr. Wallace is a modest man and not given to talking much about himself, but by questioning I extracted the following vital statistics (no figures guaranteed accurate after 24 hours). He has written:

140 novels (though he might have forgotten ten or a dozen);

Half-a-dozen plays (at least);

Two hundred (or it might be four hundred) short stories;

About 9,000,000 words.

Mr. Wallace has just returned from holiday.

"I am a lazy devil and haven't done any work for four months," he lamented.

"Not even a play?" I asked.

"Not one. But I have to deliver one in a week. I have a plot and must make a start soon."

I asked him which of his novels he had written in the shortest time and which had taken him longest.

"A firm of publishers asked me on a Thursday for a novel of 70,000 words by noon on Monday," he told me. "Working seventeen hours a day, dictating it all to a typist, with my wife doing the corrections. I delivered 'The Strange Countess' on Monday morning. If any one wants to give me a present he might send me a copy. I should like to read it."

Mr. Wallace's most dilatory effort was "The Gunner," which took him several weeks. This apparent lethargy is explained by the fact that during the same period he had to write the novel called. "The Flying Squad," the play of the same name, and the play called "The Man Who Changed His Name."

"And a short story—how long?" I asked.

"After dinner and before lunch," replied the one-man company briefly.

BOOK REVIEWS.

AN INTELLIGENT WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM." By G. B. SHAW, Constable & Co., Ltd.

THOUGH entitled an Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism, Shaw's latest excursion into polemics is a compendium of all the social problems of our age, and an epitome of all the social philosophy of the day. The interest of the book will, therefore, be equal to the Intelligent Man as to the Intelligent Woman, notwithstanding the title and its implications. Taken all in all, the work is a masterly exposition of common sense applied to subjects, which their professors or pretenders needlessly make a mystery of. The Sections dealing with Money and Banking, for instance; or even those concerning themselves with Taxation, Capital Levy, Nationalisation, and Compensation; are masterly as they are orthodox. Without being unaware of all the fancy ideas on monetary systems of the day, the sterling common sense of the writer plumps definitely for a stable money, and preferably for an intrinsically valuable coinage.

"The most important thing about money is to maintain its stability, so that a pound will buy as much a year hence.....
.....as today, and no more. With paper money this stability has to be maintained by Government. With a gold currency it tends to maintain itself even when the natural supply of gold is increased by discoveries of new deposits, because of the curious fact that the demand for gold in the world is practically infinite. You have to choose between the natural stability of gold and the natural stability of the honesty and intelligence of the members of the Government. And, with due respect for these gentlemen, I advise you, long as the capitalist system lasts, to VOTE FOR GOLD." (p. 263)

The quotation is long, but characteristic of the author, and of his work. Chapters like the one on Speculation afford a proof, were it necessary, of Shaw's familiarity with even those institutions, which, like the Stock Exchange, are not likely to be much in favour with him. It has been said of Ibsen and his excellent sense of "business" that, had he elected to be a stock-broker instead of being a dramatist, he would have shown his genius just as clearly. I would hesitate to say exactly the same thing about Shaw, not because Shaw is entirely a stranger to the workings of our existing institutions for legalised robbery, but because it may well be doubted if he has any taste for enriching himself in that way, or, more cynically, if he has not reached the satiation point in his own income. That, however must not diminish from the essentially high degree of common sense, evidenced in plenty throughout this work. Among the classic Indian dramatists Kalidas stands pre-eminent, because of the simplicity of his style, which combines the most exquisite literary beauty with the highest degree of intelligibility. One ingredient of this intelligibility of Kalidasa is due to his wonderful imagery,--his unrivalled richness in similes of the most appropriate kind. By a touch and a dash, the most intricate idea is conveyed by the poet, so that nothing more remains to be said in explanation. Shaw has this same

faculty of making himself intelligible to the most mediocre intelligence, and by the same device.

"A civilised country depends on the circulation of its money as much as a living animal depends on the circulation of its blood." (p. 280)

Or: "Human society is like a glacier; it looks like an immoveable and eternal field of ice; but it is really flowing like a river; and the only effect of its glassy rigidity is that its own unceasing movement splits it up into crevasses that make it frightfully dangerous to walk on, all the more as they are beautifully concealed by natural whitewash in the shape of snow." (p. 308)

The entire work is full of imagery of this kind, a single touch illuminating, as by a flash light, the entire field,—till every detail of the argument stands portrayed before the mind's eye never to be overlooked.

Hence its appeal. It is addressed primarily, or at least officially and titularly, to the Intelligent Woman; but there does not seem to be any reason why it should not have been addressed to the intelligent Man as well. Neither Socialism nor Capitalism, as explained in this work, have any particular significance exclusively for Woman, intelligent or otherwise, unless, indeed, the author wishes to imply that Man is so hopelessly a creature of prejudices masquerading as reasoning, and woman so entirely a creature of instincts and impulses, that, of the two, the latter is distinctly more Intelligent. Or, it may be, that Shaw has realised that if a real change in our socio-economic system is to come, the decisive factor will be the woman; and so he addresses himself more particularly to the Intelligent Woman. There are sections, indeed, in this work,—like those on Eugenics, or Socialism and marriage, or Socialism and Children,—which may sound like having a special interest for woman. But when you have waded through the mass, you cannot conscientiously affirm that woman and woman only will be interested in them. The general style of the work is characteristically Shavian. By the very strangeness of his suggestion, he shocks the reader into reading carefully. When one reads that:—

"The clearest case in the world of a person producing something herself by her own painful, prolonged, and risky labour is that of a woman who produces a baby; but then she cannot live on the baby; the baby lives greedily on her." (p. 21)

Or:—"Imagine her hiring a husband by the hour, like a taxicab,"

one is forced to think of Production, or of the social relationship as created by the institution of Marriage, in a way and from a stand point utterly more radical than one is generally accustomed to adopt.

This is the real merit of the work: that the ideas conveyed in it are not likely to be wasted merely because of the strangeness of the idiom or the imagery in which they are clothed. The plan of the work is most carefully laid out in the exhaustive List of Contents occupying some thirty pages of close type-matter. Shaw crystallises Socialism in equality of incomes for all, and has scant sympathy for all those Liberals, Philanthropists, Trade Unionists, *ad hoc genus omne*, who would give you any other idea of the Socialist ideal. He has no illusion about the relative position of Capital in the social organisation for Production. While inculcating a relentless war against *Capitalism* he has no objection to preserve and increase Capital, since that is an indispensable aid in Production. Wealth, he urges, must be produced by each worker, in quantities much greater than what would suffice for the worker's own

needs computed on the most liberal standards in a most advanced society. For those who by age or infirmity are precluded from productive employment must be provided for; and that provision can only be derived from the surplus produced by those who are actually productive workers. Shaw might have added that provision must similarly be made for those other sections of society, which, though not themselves unable to work productively, are never the less not producing material utilities, but are engaged in either looking after or educating the children and the old men and women of the community, as well as for those others again who are doing the governing, directing, managing the community. The surplus, therefore, which each actual productive worker would have to produce,—I mean of material commodities,—would have to be equal to provide, on a footing of absolute equality, for all these classes of citizens, whether they are mothers, teachers, policemen or even judges, bishops or soldiers. He is perfectly clear that not all work results in producing material utilities, though most if not all of such work is useful and even indispensable. He desires a proper gradation of wants, and the arrangement of the hierarchy in production according to this gradation of wants, whereby the provision for babies will come before provision for lap-dogs. The stock objection, on the side of Production, has been carefully examined and exploded in the sections dealing with "Incentive" (23) and "No Wealth without works." In fact all the sections beginning with 21 upto 26 concerning the Positive Reasons for Equality of Income make a most interesting reading, packed with reasoning utterly unanswerable. The only criticism,—if it is a criticism,—that might be urged against the general treatment of the question in hand, is that the writer writes with special reference to the conditions with which he is personally familiar; that in countries, like England, where they have advanced a long way on the road to Socialisation it is easy to demonstrate unanswerably that not to take the next logical step, and the one next to that till the final goal is achieved, is sheer folly; that speaking of countries where socialisation is yet very far away, even as an ideal, the argument may apply, but the application will have to be made from a slightly different angle of vision. There are convinced socialists in India, who would accept almost every one of the propositions enunciated in this work, not merely as applied to European countries, but also and particularly as applied to this country as well. But they are often driven, by the irony of circumstances into advocating, or at least supporting, policies and measures which are not calculated immediately to result in socialisation. It is not the case with the Socialists only, that in India they are often obliged apparently to go against the accepted socialist ideas in particular cases. Capitalists are not the less inconsistent in a hopelessly logical arrangement such as we have in India. In the last Session of the Indian Legislative Assembly, while the so-called Bill against Alien Communist agitators was before the House, a representative of the Indian Capitalist constituency par excellence,—and himself as fully class conscious as any of his tribe,—nevertheless voted against the Bill, not because the Bill was a gross outrage of the fundamental right of the freedom of person, of movement, and of thought and expression, but because he and his like did not know what the irresponsible and non-Indian Government of India today might use such extraordinary powers for.

This, however, is a matter of detail. The main argument is exhaustive as it is unanswerable, at least in regard to those sections of the science of Economics which are handled in this work. The examination of the seven alternative plans of Distributing the wealth created in and by every community:—

"To each what she produces, to each what she deserves, to each what she can grab, to the common people enough to keep them alive whilst they work all day, and the rest to the gentry,"

distribution by classes, equal within each class but unequal as between classes, *laissez faire* and Socialism,—Sections 7 to 13, make a most interesting as much by the common sense embodied in the entire argument, as in the wealth of illustration conveyed. The notion as to "How much is enough" ends in a vague but not insuggestive generalisation, particularly when read in conjunction with those dealing with "Eugenics" (16), and "Population" (25). These two make highly suggestive reading, not only because of the originality of the idea that there is no general over population,—as economists have only too distressingly in the habit of assuring us, —even though in places there may be criminal congestion of people, but also because of the implied answer to one of the acutest queries concerning Socialism, which will be mentioned in this Review a little later on. The positive side of Socialism, in Production as well as Distribution, is strengthened by confronting and exploding the vain longings of the impracticable idealists, who, like Tolstoy or Gandhi, would put the clock back. If we are to live as human beings, we must make up our mind that mechanisation of industry has got to be. Only if the Socialist ideal is adopted, the vast amounts, representing equivalent energy of present or past generation of workers, invested in the mechanised industry of to-day "will be public and not private property" (p. 140) And the workers engaged therein will be public servants and not private slaves, as we are all to-day. (ibid.) Incidentally, there is a most refreshing distinction drawn between leisure and idleness, including the positive harm of the Idle Rich classes. It is a delusion, says the sage of Adelphi, even against the economic oracle of the Victorian era, — J. S. MILL,—that the rich provide employment even by their demand for stupid luxuries. In that way of reasoning, even murder must be held to provide employment for the hangman, and the cardmaker, not to say the detective, the jailer, the judge and the advocate. Shall we, because of this, have our society made up of murderers, or even tolerate murderers?

The evils of Capitalism not of Capital, be it noted, are next as stringently examined. The seeming paradox of the workers, crying for internationalism, being yet more patriotic than the capitalists insisting in season and out of season on the virtues of Patriotism, affords another bit of very diverting, and withal instructive, reading. Socialism and socialisation being entirely a matter of regulation, the very first Section informs the Intelligent Woman that Distribution is entirely a matter of human regulation. It would be absurd to begin socialising each on one's own unco-ordinated impulse.

"You see, it is one thing to understand the aim of Socialism, and quite another to carry it into practice. . . . Jesus tells you to take no thought for the morrow's dinner or dress. Mathew Arnold tells you to choose quality. But these are commandments without laws. How can you possibly obey them at present. . . .

The first thing civilised people have to learn politically is that they must not take the law into their own hands. Socialism is from beginning to end a matter of law. It will have to make idlers work; but it must not allow private persons to take this obligation on themselves." (p. 98)

This is not for padding. It disposes of the usual cheap jibe against convinced or professed socialists, like Shaw, who has himself as high an income as any capitalist of his country probably, that they preach one thing, and practice a totally different one. Society cannot be socialised by misdirected, unco-ordinated, impulsive denudation of a few earnest individuals depriving themselves of a substantial part of their earnings, and that, too, without there being any institution to re-employ that portion with any guarantee of a proper use. *Per contra*, while

the established institutions of the country continue to be motived by an individualist or capitalist ideal, the laws would ordain, or at least maintain, a scheme of distribution of the annual accretion of material wealth in the community, which makes many an able-bodied man a parasite, and many a hefty, healthy, handsome woman a prostitute. The Section dealing with the wages of women (48) in the capitalist society is particularly effective and deserves to be made into regular texts for daily sermons to the capitalist world, which yet professes to be moral? and religious (?).

The *modus operandi* for achieving the socialist ideal as recommended in this book is practical as it is praiseworthy. The problem is pithily stated to be rather metaphysical than political. There must be the *Will to Equality*, before any such radical reconstruction of society as is implied in the socialist ideal can be attained.

"We need no longer be worried by demands for what people call constructive programme. There it is for them; and what will surprise them most about it is that it does not contain a single novelty. The difficulties and novelty are not, as they imagine, in the practical part of the business, which turns out to be quite plain sailing, but in the metaphysical part: that is, in the will to equality." (297-8).

It might even be called a problem in psychology. And that is why the eminently practical socialists of Russia have begun with the absolute control of the national system of Education. They are content to take charge of the child mind, in the full faith that the child of to-day is the statesman of to-morrow, and to yield wherever they have been obliged to yield from the pure doctrine of Marxism under the exigences of the day. Shaw is a Fabian; and, quite naturally, his work shows a perfect faith in the Fabian motto: Make haste slowly. He would have nationalisation of all industries and services, like coal-mining and Banking respectively. But he takes care to add that nationalisation should come bit by bit, one at a time. He frankly does not believe in Revolutions achieving the Socialist ideal, though the Russian exponents of Marxism are unanimous in the belief that the Prophet of Communism taught class-war as the indispensable breeding ground for the communist society. "They (i.e. nationalised Industries and Services Departments of the State) cannot be done by revolutions, or by improvised dictatorships, or even by permanent states in which, as in America, where in some cases the Civil Services are still regarded as the spoils of office, a new set of officials oust the old ones whenever the Opposition ousts the Government. What a revolution can do towards nationalisation is to destroy the political power of the class which opposes nationalisation. But such a revolution by itself cannot nationalise; and the new Government it sets up may be unable even to carry on the nationalised services it finds in existence." (275)

The moral is exemplified in the Russian Experiment. Shaw would nationalise industries and services, not only bit by bit; he would also postulate, and insist upon, the payment of compensation to the capitalist owners of the nationalised industry or service." Always vote "he advises the Intelligent Woman," against the no-compensation candidate unless you are opposed to nationalisation, and are subtle enough to see that the surest way to defeat it is to advocate its being carried out vindictively without a farthing of compensation." (271)

The book is full of such wise saws and pithy sayings. Hence its claim to be a compendium of social problems, and a guide to their solution. One might multiply indefinitely these quotations; but the question which would interest most, perhaps, an earnest enquirer seems to have been least dealt with by the author. The present writer can well remember a most absorbing debate in the London School of

Economics in 1913, when Mr. G. B. Shaw spoke on "Equality" By way of criticism of the doctrine then laid out, and the argument of the present book would not at all sound strange or even unfamiliar in the ears which had listened to that debate. The speaker was asked if by equalising incomes, mankind would be able finally to remedy those other inequalities, which seemed to be ordained by nature, or at least over which man seems to have so little a control. I instanced particularly such cases as the differences in height or bulk, in beauty of person or its lack, in sharpness of intelligence or dullness. The answer is more elaborated in the present work. Let us first remedy the root cause of most mischief, inequality of incomes, and then there will be time enough to set about considering more seriously these other cases. After all, our present knowledge of Biology and Heredity, our notions in Eugenics, are, to say the least, most elementary. It may quite possibly be that Biological science may yet have such discoveries in store for the earnest researcher, as would reveal the secret of race-building, of race-cultivation. Medical science has even now brought definitely under control some of the deadliest scourges of humanity, and as a consequence the death-rate has declined remarkably, in some communities absolutely, in regard to some diseases comparatively but yet astounding. May it not be, by parity of reasoning, that the same trend of evolution may supply us with the key to the breeding and beauty and brain of a child to be? "There was a veil past which I could not see. There was a door to which I had no key" said the inspired Camel-Driver of Bagdad, six hundred odd years ago. There are still many doors to which we have found no key,—as yet. That is no reason, however, to conclude that we shall never find the missing key. It may even then remain an open question as to What is the aim of life, what is the purpose of Man? But mankind will be in a far better position to solve the riddle of the universe, and pierce through the mystery of life, when each child born in the world is not condemned, simply for lack of material necessities, to an untimely death,—or worse still, to a stunted, suppressed, miserable life. Shaw does not seem to like Contraception, particularly as a means to prevent the fruition of womanhood; but he would much rather approve of contraception,—and any other similar means, to prevent the unwanted child from being born, rather, than, after giving it birth, to rob it of its indefeasible right to a decent, human standard of living. And so he is content to conclude this long, but never dull, sermon by saying:—

"The only way in which you can set their natural virtues free from this omnipresent trade union and governing class corruption and tyranny is to secure for them all equal incomes which none of them can increase without increasing the income of everybody else to exactly the same amount, so that the more efficiently and economically they do their work the lighter their labour will be, and the higher their credit.

Then the coveted distinction of lady and gentleman, instead of being the detestable parasitic pretension it is at present, meaning persons who never condescend to do anything for themselves that they can possibly put on others without rendering them equivalent service, and who actually make their religion centre on the infamy of loading the guilt and punishment of all their sins on an innocent victim, . . . will at last take on a simple and noble meaning, and be brought within the reach of every able-bodied person. For then the base woman will be she who takes from her

country more than she gives it; the common person will be she who does no more than replace what she takes; and the lady will be she who, generously overearning her income, leaves the nation in her debt and the world a better world than she found it.

By such ladies and their sons can the human race be saved, and not otherwise."

The reviewer can only say :—AMEN !

BOMBAY.

K. T. SHAH.

RECORDS OF FORT ST. GEORGE, DIARY AND CONSULTATION BOOK OF 1704; DIARY AND CONSULTATION BOOK OF 1705 AND JAMES STRANGE'S JOURNAL AND NARRATIVE OF THE COMMERCIAL EXPEDITION FROM BOMBAY TO THE NORTH-WEST COAST OF AMERICA WITH AN INTRODUCTION IN EACH CASE. BY Mr. A. V. VENKAKATARAMA IYER M.A., L.T., Curator, Madras Record Office, Government Press, Madras 1928. Priced Respectively, Rs. 5-8, Rs. 7 and Rs. 8-8.

The Madras Record Office seems to have obtained a sudden access of vitality, for three volumes of the Records of Fort St. George have succeeded one another rapidly in a single year in attaining the light of day. These records are the "source-books" which can enable the historical investigator to construct a very accurate picture of the transactions of the East India Company, long before it dreamt of becoming the divinely-ordained agency for the slow expansion of the protoplasm of the British Empire in the East. The Diary and Consultation Books are what will now be called the Minutes of the Meetings of the Governor and Council of Fort St. George which in those days controlled not only the affairs of this Fort but also the Company's factories on the Coast and the Far East.

These Minutes contain, besides the Resolutions of the Council on matters discussed by it, statements of accounts, copies of petitions, indentures and such other matter which throw light not only on the progress of the Company's trade, but accounts of the development of fortifications, dealing with the officials of the Mughal Empire, such as bribes and presents to keep them in good humour, stories of villages acquired—all of which have become suburbs of Madras—of speculations of the Company's officials, for those were days in which the 'pagoda tree' was very vigorously shaken, and notes about the social life of the Europeans and the Indians in the neighbourhood of the fast-growing city of Madras. A very rich mine is thus thrown open for the student of real history to delve into.

These books were all written by the writers of the Company, who were not men who possessed a public school education. Not only is the style quaint, but these writers indulge in a plethora of capitals which make their appearance wherever they are not wanted and delight in omitting punctuation marks wherever they are needed. Reading through them, though interesting in its own way, is somewhat wearisome except to those who are familiar with the eighteenth century English with all its peculiarities of style, syntax and spelling. Old Indian copyists of literary masterpieces on *Ola* or birch bark too omitted punctuation marks; but that does not give the reader much trouble, for rhyme and rhythm, assonance and alliteration and other graces of poetry, besides their metrical

form enable one to dispense with punctuation marks, but to read long, complicated sentences following one another endlessly without those marks or capitals where they are necessary, make it rather hard work to wade through these records. We welcome therefore all the more the help that the careful Editor has rendered us. He has skimmed the cream of these records and served us several dishes of it in his short and sweet introduction. Evidently the Editor's tastes are catholic. He notes such varied items as these:—Dr. Bulkley claimed a palanquin allowance to enable him to go through his rounds. The reader may be reminded that palanquins were the only mode of conveyance available in Madras in those days. 'The quarrelsome hackney-coach driver, the patient man-buffalo that drags the rickshaw, even the sonorous owner of the rattling jutka were totally unknown. A new *marakkal* was struck in 1704 to prevent fraud. Toddy drawers then, as now, put *datura* into the liquor and this was put a stop to by the Governor. Daud Khan, the Nawab of the Carnatic, a great devotee of Bacchus was presented with liquor to the value of about 30 pagodas. But it will not be fair, however tempting, to transfer to the pages of a review all the interesting notes which the Editor has picked up with great trouble.

James Strange's Journal is quite a different kind of literature. The great spirit of adventure which animated the people of Tudor England did not die out in the Civil Wars of the 17th century. James Strange, we learn from the Editor's introduction, was the elder brother of the Chief Justice Sir Thomas Strange, whose name is even to-day heard now and then in the Madras High Court. He undertook a voyage to the Nootka Sound in August 1785, and returned to Madras in 1787. This "Expedition to the Northwest Coast of America with a view to establish fur trade between China and America was not a success from a commercial point of view"; but though the successes and failures of the East India Company's experiments are a thing of the past, the story of travel to foreign lands has a living interest and will not willingly be laid aside by readers, so long as human nature is what it is. We are therefore highly thankful to the learned Curator, Madras Record Office, for rescuing from oblivion such an interesting Journal of Travel.

MADRAS.

P. T. SRINIVASA IYENGAR.

LIFE OF LORD CURZON BY EARL OF RONALDSHAY. Vol. III. (21sh. Benn.)

With this volume under review, Lord Ronaldshay completes one of the most notable political biographies of our time. Of the gifts of Lord Ronaldshay as a biographer it is not possible to speak too highly. He has sympathy and judgment; he has style. His admiration of Curzon though high, is discriminating. He does not fall into the Boswellian mood of apotheosis. He is conscious of Curzon's faults. On some matters of acute controversy he has not been able to defend Curzon. But all through blame is apportioned without harshness as approval is meted out without flattery.

In this volume we are presented with the final picture of Curzon. He is no longer the youthful prodigy who 'flashed like a comet across the horizon of undergraduate life' of Eton and Balliol; nor is he the aspiring politician and ambitious globe-trotter. He is not here the imperious satrap holding memorable sway over a vast Oriental Empire. He is depicted in this volume as a mature statesman framed in the epoch of world's greatest crisis.

That explains to a degree the only defect (if defect it could be called) of a work of this nature. The facts are too near the writer and apart from the question of perspective the contemporaneity of the happenings make full knowledge either extremely difficult or their divulgence highly indiscreet. While on some of the crucial episodes of recent politics, the Peace conferences, the Irish settlement, Indian Reforms, the Eastern question, the rise of Turkey so much is known of Curzon's policy, it is probable there is a large body of material to which the biographer either has not got access or could not lay bare and which might explain and exculpate.

There is a streak of pathos running through the whole volume. We are told that Curzon was a much misunderstood man. The gibe 'Superior person' stuck to him till the end. Even when he meant well he was misread. He was by no means the self satisfied, haughty person that the legend would make us believe. At heart he was an affable and a sensitive man. Unpopularity pained him. And he was too proud to complain.

There is an unfortunate impression that Lord Curzon was a favoured child of fortune, that he was blessed of the Gods and that he carried everything before him. Indeed he had brains, an imposing and pleasing presence, political fame, social distinction and affluence, things that would make any man happy. But he was not happy. The Gods are not so generous after all. What he prized most was denied to him and the pain of a thwarted ambition wore out his heart to bitterness and death. Lord Ronaldshay tells the story of Curzon's tragedy with dignity and great economy of words.

"It was Lord Stamfordham's unpalatable task to convey to Lord Curzon the decision of the King that, since the Labour Party constituted the official Opposition in the House of Commons and were unrepresented in the House of Lords, the objections to a Prime Minister in the Upper Chamber were insuperable. This possibility had occurred to Lord Curzon himself some years before.

Yet, in his heart of hearts, he could not really bring himself to believe that with his long record of public service behind him he could be passed over. And he asked leave to submit for consideration certain aspects of the case which he thought might not have been given due weight. When, however, he learned that it was too late and that Mr. Baldwin had already been summoned to Buckingham Palace, bitterness flooded in upon his soul. And in the account which he committed to pages of this, the most galling experience which life had brought him, he poured out his pent-up feelings in a torrent of agonised despair.

"Such," he exclaimed, "was the reward I received for nearly forty years of public service in the highest offices; such was the manner in which it was intimated to me that the cup of honourable ambition had been dashed from my lips and that I could never aspire to fill the highest office in the service of the Crown."

Even if Curzon had been in the House of Commons, it is not certain whether he would have become the Prime Minister or even if he became one, a successful one at that. His temperamental defects were grave obstacles. He was not liked; and a man for whom the team has no genuine affection is sure to be a bad skipper. It is significant that Lord Ronaldshay devotes an entire volume to Curzon's Indian administration and rarely mentions those who co-operated and helped the masterful viceroy. The reason is obvious. Curzon's work was one man's work. Such a man can never become the leader of democracy which is deeply averse to geniuses who have little faith in none but themselves. Modern politicians without tact and capacity to work with others will soon find themselves isolated.

For all the many valuable virtues of Lord Curzon there were none that would secure him the tenancy of 10. Downing Street.

This disappointment was acute enough. Yet another was in store for him. It was not without pain that he allowed himself to be superseded by Sir Austin Chamberlain at the foreign office. Ambition flickered out of his heart and with it interest in public affairs flagged. Again and again he contemplated retirement but was sustained and supported by his wife who encouraged him to persevere. To her he writes shortly before his last disappointment:

"Politics, as we have often remarked, are a dirty game and the mud which others stir seems to settle with an almost malignant monotony on me. As you know, I would never have swallowed what I have done or consented to take office again were it not that you so strongly wished me to do so and that I am always urged, and indeed expected, to do the big thing."

Lord Ronaldshay says that Curzon died a disillusioned and disappointed man—to those who understood him a lonely and infinitely pathetic figure.

Lord Ronaldshay rightly draws attention to the heroic struggle that Curzon put up against growing infirmities and deepening disappointments. With a body torn with pain and a spirit smarting under injustice he carried on. Lord Ronaldshay paints the picture of the broken man in these pathetic words.

"His vitality had been sapped by a long and exhausting illness. He entered the Cabinet room haltingly and sometimes in obvious pain. The foot-rest, from which he never dared be parted, was arranged for him under the Cabinet table.

He took his seat slowly and often painfully. When strongly moved his hands would shuffle irritably with the papers in front of him; and from conflict, engendered by the vigorous expression of views with which he was unable to agree, he instinctively recoiled.

C. P.

THE RELIGION WE NEED BY S. RADHAKRISHNAN, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY. ERNEST BENN, LTD. 1/- NET.

In the series of little books upon *Affirmations* in religion, Professor Radhakrishnan's brochure finds an appropriate place. He is possessed with a healthy desire for reality, and, so far as in him lies, avoids technical language. He clears the ground of all dogmatic presuppositions, emphasises the unsettlement due to the application of methods of science, and illustrates the inadequacy of the so called theistic proofs. But we think that a greater number of educated men than he imagines have accepted all the disturbing elements and yet won through to something more positive. If, as he says, "it has become a sign of good breeding to avow disbelief in traditional religion" we should also remember that there is a good deal of inverted hypocrisy in cultured circles, and that many a man who is loud in verbal disavowal, yet possesses a very real core of positive belief.

In his efforts at reconstruction Professor Radhakrishnan is admirable. In a few short paragraphs he shows the inadequacy of a merely mechanical point of view, and especially the foolishness of behaviourism, revealing incidentally a refreshing partiality for the Lamarckian hypothesis in evolution. He shows the necessity of assuming a single supreme spirit at work in the whole course of cosmic evolution. While he repudiates the idea of a single religion for all mankind, he yet fully admits the idea of progress in the religious sphere, which

is equivalent to the admission that the best, the inclusive best, must triumph in religion as elsewhere. The progress, of course, is not mechanical or fatalistic, but "waits for man's willing and heroic service."

The concluding paragraphs are beautifully expressed. The ideal of religion—"the religion we need"—does not lie in dogma or in ceremony, in "sentimental adoration or cringing petition", but in the conviction that love and justice are fundamental, and that the deep-lying yearning of mankind for perfection implies a Divine spirit that will further that perfection. And the ideal must be universal in its application and lead to a brotherhood of all. The way to realisation is through deep meditation and strenuous self-discipline, but the realisation itself is in the practical sphere. "The religious soul must seek for divine fulfilment not only in heaven above but on earth below."

CALCUTTA.

W. S. URQUHART.

CARVAKASASTHI BY DAKSINARAYANA SASTRI, M.A., SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA. (The Book Company.)

The book brings together many of the chief available Sanskrit texts on the Carvaka creed. The long introduction of 94 pages is devoted to a learned discussion of the date, authorship etc., of the materialist school of thought, though there is little in it that marks a real advance on the present state of our knowledge of the subject. Those who wish to study Indian materialism from Sanskrit sources will find the book extremely useful and we hope that it will have many readers as materialism has its value as a corrective of rigid orthodoxy. Indian thought is not all theism or idealism.

The enterprising publishers of the book will help the readers and enhance their own prestige very much if they insist on more careful proof reading.

C. S. R.

HOW WE ARE GOVERNED. BY J. A. R. MARRIOT. (WORLD'S MAMMALS. Oxford 2 6.)

In his introduction the author says that this little book is meant to be an introduction to his own two larger books "English Political Institutions" and "The Mechanism of the Modern State", and has placed references to these books at the foot of each chapter. Though brief and elementary, this little volume is a very readable account of the present system of government in England and would serve as a corrective to out of date impressions that people might form by reading older writers Walter Bagehot, Anson, Maitland and Dicey. There is an instructive summary of the working of the departments and the local self-governing institutions of Britain. There is a chapter on the Empire.

S. C.

REVIEWS REVIEWED.

THE September Number of the CRITERION (a quarterly review edited by T. S. Eliot) is over-weighted on the literary side. There are hardly any articles of general interest, though the specialist will find of great value the contributions on "John Milton," "The Ambassadors" "Double Titles in Early English Drama." The book reviews are interesting. The Editor's comments on the withdrawal from circulation of Miss Radcliffe Hall's novel, the *Well of Loneliness* are balanced and sensible. Emil Ludwig's recent peace propaganda elicits the following remarks. Mr. Ludwig seems to be one of those who desire to propagate the theory that pre-war Germany may have been bellicose because of the Hohenzollern monarchy, and that post-war Germany must be pacific because it is Socialist socialist, that is in that safe, humdrum, capitalist, middleclass way that is comforting to everybody. There are many people in France and England who fall in with this theory, and who congratulate everybody in a comfortable liberal way, whenever the nationalists suffer reverses in the German elections. But this theory does not honour either our intelligence, or the German Nation, or human nature. A nation is neither more nor less aggressive because it has a King or an Emperor, or a President, or a Committee as its nominal head. The fact that the people does not want war is no security against war; and a "people" is not a whit more reliable than an individual sovereign. The causes of modern war and "war" means here war between peoples on the same level of civilization lie deep in economic and financial matters. All that the common man who is not a specialist in these matters can say is this, that the more individuals there are in a nation who can think intelligently and independently, the less inclined for war that nation will be. And the more uniform public opinion is in any country, the more stereotyped in prejudice, the more dangerous will that nation be. And things being as they are, such soporifics as Mr. Ludwig are dangerous. All people above the barbaric level desire peace in general; but they should not be allowed to persuade themselves that the desire for peace is enough to ensure it; though intelligent vigilance and independent criticism will help to preserve it.

HINDUISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

The October number of the *Hibbert Journal* contains a spirited reply by Dr. Farquhar to Mr. Turnbull's observations on

the relations of *Hinduism and Christianity*. Dr. Farquhar's *obiter dicta* are useful as revealing the workings of a devoted Christian mind which is determined to trace everything good in Hinduism to Christianity. Our readers should know what others think of Hindus and Hinduism and the prospects of Christian missions. Dr. Farquhar sets forth the following reasons for his conviction that "in the future the Hindu people will accept the crucified Saviour and become a glorious Church for his service."

During the first twenty years of my life in India practically my whole time was spent in direct Christian work among many educated Hindus, first in Calcutta, later in visits to many other parts of India. The most significant sections of my experience during those years were the long conversations I had with individual Hindus on religious matters. In some cases a convinced Hindu did his utmost to show me the error of my Christian way of thinking ; on other occasions a Hindu student would read portions of a Gospel with me and would attempt to get its real meaning and value ; but in a very large number of cases a Hindu, young or old, poured out the need, sorrow, repentance, anguish or aspiration of his soul and asked for sympathy and Christian advice. A part of my work was thus of the nature of a clinic, and in that my experience gradually reached form and clearness ; and the outcome of the whole was the conviction that *in Hinduism there is nothing that can take the place of the Living Saviour who, in Love for Man, became Man, died for our redemption, but rose again, and now lives to lead us, through Repentance and Spiritual Cleansing, to a New Life of Devotion, obedience and dependence on him for all our Religious Needs*. Such, in barest outline, was my experience in dealing with many men through many years.

There are then certain large facts of a more visible order which suggest to the reflective mind that forces are already working in India which seem to presage a great overturning in the future.

(1) I begin with the most important fact that *Hinduism is a polytheism*, while modern thought carries within it the conviction that the whole universe, in all its inconceivable vastness, is one, and is therefore the creation, the expression, the garment of a single Supreme Spirit. Hence to open-eyed men *nothing less than a faith which acknowledges, obeys and adores the supreme spirit* can be the religion of modern men.

(2) There is a widespread feature of modern Hinduism which fits perfectly into the idea which we have just emphasised, that the necessary outcome of the pressure of modern science and

philosophy upon educated minds is the conviction that nothing less than monotheism is fit to be the religion of thinking men.

The future of present-day Hinduism to which we refer is this, that although Hinduism is actually a polytheism, *practically every educated Hindu calls himself a monotheist* and expects to be recognized as such by Moslems, Zoroastrians and Christians. What justification do they offer for the claim? It is built on the position of the chief god in the case of each of the great Hindu sects.

(3) In India during the last 100 years practically every form of Hinduism, and also Zoroastrianism and Islam, have come under Christian influence so seriously that some thirty fresh religious organisations have been formed, each created with the definite purpose of leavening the old religious system with just so much Christian and modern reform as shall enable the constituency to weather the serious storms in which the new ideas and practices of the Church and the advance of modern thought have involved the educated classes in all parts of the country. Perhaps the *Brahma Samaj*, the *Prarthana Samaj* and the *Arya Samaj* are the most influential of these movements, but all have proved vigorous and effectual in varying measure. They form the second perhaps the most noticeable indication of the extraordinary impact of Christianity.

The truth is that in these movements Christianity is omnipresent. All teach either monotheism or some form of theology which can be dressed in monotheistic robes. God in each is called Father of men; and the brotherhood of all men is emphasised, even in those organisations which represent *caste* as a most healthy form of community life! Idolatry is in most cases abandoned; but some leaders defend it and use it. In a number of these organisations one finds, instead of temple-worship, a religious service, consisting of *Prayers, Praise, Readings from a Sacred book and exhortation*, precisely like a simple Protestant service. The methods of propaganda used by these groups are in all cases copied from Christian Missions. Here, then, is Christian influence being disseminated by Hindus through their own defensive organisations.

(4) The educated class in India to-day is dominated by the idea that the people of India must become a vigorous, self-governing, modern nation. They also see plainly that national vigour and the capacity for self-government are impossible without the peculiar acquirements and characteristics of a modern people. Hence their passion for the spread of education and enlightenment, for the uplift of all backward communities for

the strengthening of the press and for the introduction of certain measures of social reform.

Most of these social and religious changes are, on the one hand, *Inconsistent with the rules and customs of the national religion, but, on the other, are all in full accordance with the teaching and the spirit of Jesus.*

(5) About one-sixth of the whole population of India *i.e.* a mass of humanity larger than the whole population of Great Britain and Ireland, are *outcastes*, *i.e.* people of such low origin and culture that for more than 2,000 years Hindus have regarded them as too foul for ordinary human intercourse. They have thus been kept *outside the caste system* and Hindus take care not to touch them: hence they are frequently called "The Untouchables." The result of this severe and long-continued ostracism has necessarily been that these poor people have made no progress, but remain gross, unclean, uneducated, untrained, with only the slightest rudiments of culture to this day.

Missions have drawn scores of thousands of those human brothers of ours into the Christian Church, and the work still goes on. But the point of living interest in the story lies here, that the touch of Christ soon fills these people with another spirit: they become new men and women; they cultivate cleanliness, take a pride in their houses and eagerly seek education for their children. Above all, their character at once begins to rise and expand in the love and sunshine of Christ. Hindus frankly recognise the very great value of the influence of Christ in their case; and the Christianised Outcaste is no longer treated by Hindus as an Outcaste. In many a Christian High School the son or grandson of an Outcaste holds good position as a teacher, and frequently has Brahman boys as pupils. Thus does Jesus "lift up the needy from the dunghill".

(6) In every section of India one meets numbers of educated Hindus who are impressed with the character of Jesus, and some of them use the Lord's Prayer and read from the Gospels daily. I have met Hindu fathers who read selected passages from the Gospels with their children daily. Every Christian educationalist in India knows Hindu parents who deliberately send their children to Christian schools and colleges, in order that they may hear the Gospels read and expounded and may have the ethical teaching of Jesus planted in their hearts from their earliest years. Yet these men do not intend to become Christians themselves nor to make their children Christians.

Thus it is not merely the multiform service done by Christian Missions for the afflicted, the sick, the poor and moral movements (mediated by Christ, as we have seen) which are slowly leavening Hindu Society, but the moral and religious principles of the Saviour in all their depth and strength.

(7) But if Christ has already done so much for India, and if men in general recognise in a greater or less degree the value of His teaching, what do the educated classes think of Christ Himself: Mr. Gandhi calls him "the Ideal Man", and if my experience is trustworthy a considerable percentage of educated Hindus would be ready to use the same phrase. It is heard also, nowadays, in the Far East; especially in China and Japan.

Yet neither Mr. Gandhi nor any other Hindu seems to realise what the phrase implies. Jesus is "The Ideal Man"; no other human being has approached him. Whence, then, came this perfect mind and character, alone, unapproachable, among the crowding generations of men? How are we to account for this unparalleled miracle?

But the recognition of Jesus as the Ideal Man raises a much larger issue. It is recognised on all hands that he is the very embodiment of the religion which he preached. If when he is the Ideal Man *Christianity must be the Ideal Religion*. How can Mr. Gandhi escape from that inference?

Thus a day will come when the light will break into the hearts of the leaders of Hinduism. Her most intellectual and spiritual men will at last see that Jesus brings light and life and that the Hindu needs His help. Then will they recognise in Jesus the Saviour of India and will fall at his feet in inexpressible gratitude and adoration.

If a well educated christian missionary can sincerely believe all this, it only shows the extraordinary difficulty which men have in penetrating to the spirit of other religions. The article on '*Philosophy without Metaphysics*' by Edmond Holmes and "*The Birth of Great Poem*" by Mr. Middleton Murry are noteworthy.

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO MISSIONS?

Mr. Kenneth Scott Latourette, Professor of Missions in the Divinity School of Yale University writes in the Autumn number of *The Yale Review* on "*What is happening to Missions.*" He mentions two causes which "strike at the very root of Missions." There is a questioning of missions in circles from which the support must come,

"Some active church members are wondering whether christianity is the best and the final religion, or simply one among many, and, like others, imperfect. Historical study—the "higher criticism"—is shaking the Protestant belief in the infallibility of the Bible, and science in its multifarious forms—behaviouristic psychology among the latest—is raising questions about such fundamental beliefs as the existence and nature of God and the validity of the religious experience. Many, aghast at the weaknesses in Western civilization disclosed by the war, are wondering whether we ought not to make America and Europe more nearly Christian before venturing to teach other peoples. The criticisms of the hundreds of foreign students in our midst have enhanced this query. Foreign travel and the increasing flood of books about the non-Occidental world are adding their effect: a consciousness of the excellencies of other civilizations is becoming widespread. The trip around the world is almost as easy except on the pocket-book, as is a summer in Europe, and hundreds are making it now who fifteen years ago would not have dreamed of attempting it. Many of them see little and understand less, but they come back with decided opinions, which are often unfavourable to missions. Books and magazines, moreover, and such figures as a Gandhi and a Tagore have given us a greater respect for the Orient. Where once the movement of influence was only from the Occident to the Orient, now, as in the latter part of the eighteenth century—and even more—the Orient is beginning to invade the Occident. He who listens with respect to Hindu lecturers or admires Gandhi is not prepared to declare that religion which nourished them evil or to be as enthusiastic about sending missionaries as he once was. The kind of missionary enthusiasm which was based upon a conviction that all "heathen" are damned is passing.

The second disquieting cause assigned for the decrease in giving is the division which has occurred in Protestant ranks in the attempt to adjust the missionary's message and programme to the conditions just outlined. For more than a hundred years, Protestant missionaries were fairly unanimous as to what constitutes the fundamentals of the faith. Spiritually they were the children of the revivals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, called themselves Evangelical, and were in general agreed as to what Salvation is, and the way in which it is to be attained. Differences, of course, there were—between Calvinists and Armenians, and over church polity and the sacraments. These, however, fell more and more into the back-ground and co-operation became the rule. National Christian Councils in India, China, and Japan, the International Missionary Council and co-ordinating committees in

Great Britain and North America came into existence. The new issues, however, have brought fresh divisions. Denominations have been almost rent in two between Fundamentalists and Modernists. In China "The Bible Union" is attempting to purge the missionary body of Modernists, and Fundamentalists have been waging the same fight at home. The bulk of the missionary body is still Conservative theologically as is the home constituency, but uncertainty is in the air. Agreement no longer exists as to what constitutes the missionary's message. The old shibboleths are being uttered by a declining majority. The increasing minority have not agreed upon a substitute. In many circles we are witnessing the passing of religious convictions which some of us still in early middle life can remember as the fruit of the movement led by Moody and his great predecessors. No equivalent has yet taken their place. The rapidly growing Protestant liberalism often gives out an uncertain sound—and men and women do not stake their lives in an alien land on an attempt to propagate a question.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW (October 1928) has a good number of articles on topics of current interest. Sir George Paish discusses the American Presidential election from the point of view of its bearings on British finance. Lord Olivier writes a review article on Mr. Raymond Buell's *The Native Problem in Africa*. Dr. Gooch contributes an article on Lord Haldane. While much of the information contained in it is familiar to our readers, the personal touches are interesting.

"Haldane's affections were as keen as his intellectual interests. A picture of his wonderful old mother lying in bed occupied a place of honour over his mantelpiece, and his contribution to the exquisite little volume *Charlotte Elizabeth Haldane*, edited by his sister, reveals something of a unique relationship. To his sister Elizabeth, who kept house for him in London, he was bound by their common interest in philosophical studies. His kindness to younger men was in-exhaustible; and Lord Morley, critical though he was of his colleague's politics, once told me that if he were in trouble he would rather go to Haldane than to anyone else. No man of our time had a fuller, richer or more useful life, and few have left a larger number of friends and causes to mourn their loss."

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (October 1928) opens with an article on *The Safeguarding of British Industry* by Mr. Cyril Atkinson. Mr. Benn writes a very helpful article on the relation of culture and commercial training in the Universities.

"From the experience of nearly half a century of such co-operation in America it is now possible to estimate how far the university system there has been

influenced by contact with industry. The corresponding development in England has been slow, but the question is now receiving increased attention, as, for example, is Lord Eustace Percy's new investigations into the provision of technical schools. The value of such training to industry cannot be over-estimated, yet its extension in the English universities may constitute a grave danger to the cultural studies which it has hitherto been their traditional heritage to guard. The admirable practice of under-graduates getting experience of agricultural and engineering technique during the summer vacation—an American practice now spreading to England—is something quite distinct from the intrusion of such subjects into the general curriculum of the universities. In the United States this latter tendency has been very marked in recent years, as I observed from experience as an under-graduate at Princeton University, where I spent a year before proceeding in orthodox manner to Cambridge."

The chief characteristic of an American university is the absence of constituent colleges, and the under-graduates are divided by seniority instead, each year forming a unit for organisation purposes. At Princeton there are 2000 students, and as four years are required for a degree, each year—or 'class', as they term it—forms a group of about 500 students. All the courses of instruction are therefore graded into four standards suited to consecutive years.

Two obvious results of this arrangement are the absence of the college tutors and hence the placing of emphasis on lectures, which are almost always compulsory in America. Owing to the size of the units—the 'classes'—it is impractical to tutor each student individually, apart from the fact that the university cannot afford to pay an army of tutors who have no other function. In England the numerous college posts of bursar, dean, and so forth, supplement the available salaries and provide a means of employing tutors and supervisors who do not necessarily also hold a university appointment. Princeton admittedly is a pioneer among American universities in introducing a tutorial system, but even there it does not compare in completeness with our Cambridge college methods.

The American freshman is obliged in any subject to take the first-year course, which is a further handicap to brilliance. The well-prepared under-graduate in England can work with third-year men if his standard is sufficiently advanced; in America—except, I think, at Harvard—he must go through the regular machine. Originality is therefore discouraged, and early in his university career the under-graduate finds himself becoming standardised. Furthermore, the examination comes to be regarded as the chief test of ability, and the emphasis is placed on passing examinations rather than on studying for the sake of study. This weakness is encouraged by the absence of external examiners, for as the professors themselves usually set the papers, these tend to become a test in the lecture syllabus rather than in the subject as a whole.

The organisation and compulsion of the American under-graduate possibly had its origin in the common practice of matriculating at seventeen. Certainly a fourth year's residence is required for a degree in America instead of our three, and the disciplining of freshmen compares with the supervision in senior year English schools. Whatever its beginning, this compulsory element in American universities has been the subject of heated debate, yet, curiously enough, its academic discussion has overlooked its secondary, but important, function in relation to training for commerce. The question hinges on whether it is better to require a compulsory standard of the great mass of students, or, as in England, to cater primarily for the few brilliant men, and to let the majority work out their own academic salvation.

On the other hand, whether the subjects taught at the American universities are good is a very different question, and in my opinion more fundamental. The

provision of technical training is not so general as is sometimes supposed, but many of the courses would only be found in England at the purely technical school. As illustrating this tendency in America Sir Arthur Shipley once met a young lady student who intended to supplement Greek History and Shakespeare with lessons in chemistry and pottery. 'It is only fair to add,' Sir Arthur said with characteristic humour, 'that such a course is unusual.' But even among my own few friends is a Harvard student who is now reading Medicine, having tried his hand already at everything from Romantic literature to the study of stained glass. Here again an explanation may be found, for, as a critic once remarked, even a university course in the scientific management of a hotel has its advantages for those who may have to spend much of their lives at the mercy of hotel managers!

The purely material outlook that may arise in the absence of humanising studies make practical efficiency the paramount consideration. The example may seem at first sight irrelevant, but probably the increase in divorce in America is a symptom—it reflects, at least, a want of being able to adapt one's outlook to circumstances and showing consideration for the whims and wishes of others. The American tends to do everything in such a matter-of-fact, deadly serious way, when a little more recreation and ability to amuse himself, even to laugh at himself, would work a wonderful change in his outlook on life.

As regards the advent of technical training in England, I cannot do better than refer to a correspondence appearing in *The Times* in recent weeks. Dr. James Bowie, of the Manchester College of Technology, started the discussion in a letter advocating technical training, interspersed with actual experience in business, as the desirable course. He suggested that the English universities should take the situation—to use his words—'by the forelock,' and initiate at once more facilities for technical training, and he quoted in his favour the Balfour Committee's Report on this tendency in America. The approach to Dr. Bowie's proposal must necessarily differ in the universities of such industrial towns as Manchester and Leeds, where many technical classes are already provided, but to replace the more cultural studies of the older universities by technical training would seem to show a lack of perspective, if not an actual error.

To recognise that the matter turns on what is the function of a university does not detract from its importance to industry. Indeed, it will surely be a sad day for industry itself when cultural studies are given second place. Technical ability is always wanted, but what appears to be even more necessary to-day are breadth of mind and a sense of proportion. These factors may often be acquired through other channels, but are certainly forthcoming from the period for disinterested study and reflection which the years at our English universities provide. A knowledge of business principles may usually be obtained afterwards if a methodical approach to study has been acquired in even small measure at the universities, yet if the business sense is altogether lacking no amount of special training will inculcate it.

Then has the English university nothing to learn from America? If you resent the intrusion of technical training, what contribution have Oxford and Cambridge to make to industry and its many problems?

Most emphatically we have much to learn, but just as the American's lesson concerns the intangible art of living, so our problem is chiefly a psychological one. I suggest that our older universities as they stand can do more to change the pace of our industrial life than by all the vocational and technical training that could possibly be added to their existing curriculum. Briefly, they have got to recognise

the moral service rendered by business and industry and, instead of secretly fostering the traditional contempt for commerce, to take the lead in encouraging the spirit of service.

The modesty of business is a worthy characteristic, and cultural matters rightly are given first place, but I suggest with a full sense of reverence that Cambridge has got to abandon once and for all the God *versus* Mammon attitude. The enlightened professional man has hitherto joined hands with the academic, while the wretched business man was regarded with prayerful commiseration. His charity—which incidentally included much towards the cost of running the universities—has been often regarded merely as conscience money. As a result, even the business man has tended to share this view and devote his spare time to good works, so it can hardly be wondered at if the university man has not devoted to his business all that zeal and enthusiasm with which, for instance, he would have approached the teaching profession or the Bar. He has, in fact, lacked the conscious justification for his existence which is essential to a full life, and this, I suggest, in the science of living is as much a serious defect as the American's lack of the art of living.

How deeply ingrained is this conception of service is well illustrated by the practice of students earning their expenses while resident at the university. If business were regarded with the least contempt, this would reveal itself among under-graduates, whose motives the world over—whatever the outlook of their seniors—are certainly stamped with integrity. Princeton is often classed as being rather select among American universities, yet 25 per cent—or 500 out of the 2000 under-graduates—are earning part of their expenses by work of one kind or another. They serve as clerks in the local banks, assistants in book shops, and run newspaper agencies under the supervision of a University Bureau of Student Employment. Many of these men could not afford a university education but for this supplement to their means; others by earning can give themselves just those little adjuncts which make all the difference between pinching and plenty. Altogether over 40,000 dollars was earned last year by Princeton under-graduates. All the waiting at table in the university dining-halls is done by students, who are able to earn entire board by serving a certain number of tables per week, and a good bonus for anything above this minimum. They put on their white aprons and carry trays at one meal and sit with their friends at the next; and such is the general recognition of service that those who take on such work do not suffer in social status thereby. The whole scheme is run on a sound financial basis; it is in no sense of charity, and there is a complete absence of condescension towards these men. Personally I found it the most usual thing to be seated at a table with one's best friend as waiter, and naturally to have a lively conversation with him. Everyone, in fact, may work for his living without prejudice in America.

It is of course, arguable that it is undesirable for students to have to work at all and that scholarships are a better solution; that is an incidental problem which I shall not discuss. The point I want to make is that there is no contempt for business in American university circles, an attitude which we in England would do well to copy.

In the matter of practical organisation, we cannot introduce the American compulsory methods, even if it were desirable because, for one thing, the tutorial supervision we enjoy makes them largely unnecessary. Yet in the interests of the growing numbers of university men going into business we might well meet them half-way by requiring stricter discipline as regards their studies, at least in freshman year. Anything which will lessen the difficulty afterwards in settling down to hard and uncongenial work is worthy of serious consideration. As to the

most suitable studies, here again I will venture repetition—that the university should avoid providing special training, which is the function of the technical school, and that the business man in embryo should take philosophical courses rather than those of a so-called practical nature.

Personally I hope Oxford and Cambridge at least will always continue to provide, as hitherto, for the Church, the academic world and the professions, which certainly have first claim on the cultural facilities of the universities. Let us learn from the position in America to avoid at all costs the purely technical studies, but in so doing we must be quite clear that we are not influenced by any secret contempt for practical commercial pursuits.

To look at the matter purely from the academic view, the adoption of this new attitude is essential. Once business men feel they are understood and that their service is a worthy one, they will endow and encourage the development of the universities. I know this appears a low basis of approach, but after all someone has got to pay for education, and you cannot reasonably expect business men to help those by whom they are despised. English benefactors are coming again to the fore, as in the case of the generous gifts of Sir Edward Brotherton, the chemical manufacturer, to the University of Leeds, and of the Wills family to Bristol. But in America, at Princeton in particular, every graduate regularly subscribes to his university, and funds are seldom lacking for adequate remuneration of the faculty, for new buildings and libraries, and all the other provisions essential to a healthy and progressive university. The suggestion is sometimes made that in consequence American university 'presidents'—as they term their chancellors—are merely pawns in the hands of finance. Undoubtedly its hold over some institutions is oppressive, but having met President Lowell of Harvard as well as Dr. Hibben, of Princeton, I have no hesitation in dismissing such criticism as applied to the important universities."

It is very clear that American Universities are more democratic in spirit, and distinctions between the rich and the poor count for little. Indian universities will profit much by bearing in mind the educational developments of America. Mr. Mayo's contribution on *Unemployment and Examinations* shows that we have the same problems the world over. Mr. Fox-Strangways writes with enthusiasm of the 'Rotary' ideals. We may also mention here Brigadier General Store's article on the *Trades Union Congress* and Mr. Dodd's paper on *The Increasing Value of Sunlight*.

FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW (October 1928) Dr. Well's article on *Macaulay as a man of Letters* is a sort of belated reply to the criticisms of Matthew Arnold, Morley, Cotter Morrison and Raleigh. Sir Lionel Cust gives his recollections of Eton days when he was a school fellow of Curzon and other well known figures. Apart from the usual political articles, the discussion of *Tolstoy's Heroines* is interesting.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

LORD BIRKENHEAD'S RETIREMENT.

THE news of Lord Birkenhead's resignation has been received in India, without any great regret. It was not so when the late Mr. Montague quitted the India Office. The reasons for Lord Birkenhead's resignation seem to be personal and the correspondence between him and Mr. Baldwin so far published does not disclose any difference on questions of policy. When four years ago Lord Birkenhead became the Secretary of State for India his undisputed talents and undisguised ambition raised great expectations of an eventful term of office. That such anticipations came to nothing is to say the least of his administration of Indian affairs which was marked throughout by an unfortunate pose of condescension. But to judge his worth on the basis of these four barren years is to do scant justice to a man whose record of achievement in other spheres (particularly in Law) has been singularly fruitful. That he is quitting the stage of public life, where he had been no mean figure in quest of a commercial career in the city raises a question of great importance to the future of British politics. It is well known that Lord Birkenhead never regarded modesty as a virtue and had always rated his worth at a much higher figure than £5000 a year. Indeed, at the very height of his practice as a barrister he was making a much larger amount and there is no reason why commerce should not treat him handsomely. If service of State had ceased to be paying, a man of Lord Birkenhead's philosophy of life cannot be blamed for turning to more remunerative occupations. But this exodus of first class brains from the Downing street to the Lombard Street is a new feature in British politics where hitherto ministership under Crown has been regarded as the goal of honorable ambition. To attempt to retain the services of eminent men by raising ministerial salaries is to plan for what is manifestly impossible, for in no event can the State compete successfully with commerce, if emoluments be the sole consideration. Public service is only for those that regard it as a privilege and they should not expect more than a modest wage.

INDIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

IN the recent session of the League Assembly Lord Lytton, speaking on behalf of India made a notable pronouncement. While commenting at length on the League's financial methods, he advanced a very justifiable complaint that the annual quota due from India was far too heavy. He pointed out that it was higher than that of any State except the permanent members of the Council. It is well known that the proportion of benefit that India is deriving from the activities of the League is far from being commensurate with her share in the expenditure. The same funds might, as suggested by Lord Lytton, be used with advantage in India. We hope that the League of Nations will mind the warning given by Lord Lytton that there is a widespread feeling in India not only that the League did not carry out work of value to the Eastern countries but that its tendency is chiefly to strengthen European interests at the expense of other continents and races. There is no gain-saying the fact that the League has made very little appeal to the Indian mind. While we commend so much of what Lord Lytton has said we cannot, however, agree with him in respect of the solution he has suggested. It is not enough that the League widens its sphere of activity and interests itself in Eastern affairs. A wider propaganda and increasing collaboration between East and West may make the League more popular than it is now. But the real solution lies in the engendering of consciousness among Indians that their country can participate on terms of equality with the other members of the League. The Indians should also feel that those who represent India on the Councils of the League are persons chosen by the Legislative Assembly. So long as these two ideas are operating it is not reasonable to expect the Indians to enthuse over the League of Nations, whose decisions they can now little help to make. Meanwhile the claim put forward by Lord Lytton for limitation of India's financial contribution is a very urgent one.

THE BRAHMO CENTENARY.

THE celebration of the Brahmo centenary is an event of great national importance. It is not merely the Brahmos that cherish the memory of Raja Ram Mohan Roy with grateful reverence. Even those who do not belong to the fold regard him as not merely one of the notable figures in recent Indian history but one of the great makers of modern India. The Brahmo Samaj of which he was the founder started as a movement of revolt against

Hinduism. But in truth, it is an off-shoot of it. The ground-work of its philosophy is drawn from the Upanishads. Its austere monotheism, its simplicity, its catholicity are the features of purer and truer Hinduism. It is true that an appalling mass of superstition and dead ceremonial had disfigured the essence of Hinduism in Ram Mohan Roy's time out of all recognition. Raja Ram Mohan Roy did what Erasmus and Luther have done in a different epoch and in a different continent, of rebelling against what could no longer be tolerated. By his great labours the conscience of the race was quickened. The weaknesses of the parent religion were laid bare and the needed correction was imparted. In a sense the work of the Brahmo Samaj is over in this land. Its mission is fulfilled. It has liberalized the Hindu mind and enlarged its horizon. Hinduism has absorbed and assimilated the central idea of Brahmoism and in doing so it has simply repeated the process that has gone on for ages in this land. While the contribution of Brahmo Samaj to the philosophical doctrine of India is not very great, its value as a movement of social purification has been unique. If today Hinduism is able to be on the threshold of a new epoch, a career of high spiritual adventure and social reconstruction, it is because of the work that the Brahmo Samaj has done.

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL REFORM.

THE Government's attitude towards Social Reform has doubtless undergone a change since Raja Ram Mohan Roy's time. It is no longer enthusiastic in supporting the advanced opinion. We miss to-day the heartiness with which Lord William Bentinck helped to abolish Sati. We very much wish that the Government should evince more helpful interest in the various bills bearing on social reform. It is not enough if the Government is acting up to the spirit of the Queen's proclamation. It was not the intention of that great document that the Government should do nothing to put down social abuses. Though the passage through the Council of State of the Women's Inheritance Bill is very gratifying, the postponement of Sardar's bill to the Delhi Session has caused great disappointment. Besides, the unexpected opposition from the Moslem section has created a new complication. Unless the Government backs up the bill, there is every chance of its defeat. There is no use in leaving these things to the people. The enlightened opinion is not organized, while obscurantism has on its side the prestige of the Matathipathis whose guardianship of religion takes the only form of a bigoted opposition to all healthy reform. The Social reformers look to the Govern-

ment and it is the business of the Government to give, not merely what the people want but what is good for them.

TWO NEW UNIVERSITIES.

THROUGH the princely munificence of Sir Annamalai Chettiar it has been possible to establish a teaching and residential University in Chidambaram. The objects of the University as stated in the Act are to establish faculties for Arts and Sciences and to promote Oriental research and scholarship. At the instance of the Council the Minister agreed to include technology among the faculties to be developed in the new University. It is unfortunate that the Minister should have resisted the motion of Mr. C. V. Venkataramana Iyengar to include commerce among the faculties to be developed. Education in India has been overweighted on the literary side, and it is not too much to expect that the new Universities at least would develop the faculty of Industry and Commerce and thus demonstrate that a commercial or industrial training is by no means less honorable or less useful than a course in humanities and sciences. It is a pity that even our new ventures are like our old ones. Still if the Chidambaram University could succeed in serving the cause of higher learning by promoting research in various fields of knowledge, it would not only do credit to itself, but would justify the unique benefaction of the generous founder. We hope that in the important years of its infancy the University will secure sound direction.

The Andhra University which has been functioning since its inception two years ago has not fulfilled the hopes that were raised of it. The reasons are not far to seek. In addition to the inadequate financial backing, the creative work of the University has been seriously crippled by an unedifying wrangle in respect of the location of its Headquarters. The select committee of the Madras Legislative Council which considered the various amending bills asked that the council should determine once for all the character of the University. In vain was the Vice-Chancellor's passionate plea that a unitary type of University spread over different centres is inconceivable and that for promoting higher learning and engendering a spirit of co-operative endeavour, it was necessary that the post-graduate and honors courses should be concentrated at one place; which should be the headquarters of the University. The house, unable to make up its mind adjourned the question for another three months. While the wrangle continues, the University suffers; and a Vice-Chancellor of first-rate ability who combines constructive imagination with expert knowledge has been unable to do all he can.

LIBRARIANS' TASK.

The remarks of Dr. A. D. Lindsay, in connection with the 51st Annual Conference of the Library Association are well worth attention :

Referring to the important part the public librarian could play, Dr. Lindsay said, "We must be on our guard lest the standard of the specialist dominate us and lest we should think the main thing was done when we got books into a well-ordered library. Nothing was falser. Science and history and philosophy existed in the minds of the scientist, the historian, and the philosopher, and in the minds of the ordinary people in whom the thoughts of those leaders could be recreated. To that end the library was an instrument, but it was only an instrument. In the use of the instrument he suggested there was a great field for the activities and the personality of the librarian as the person who could help the student and the reader to a knowledge of standards and of values. If it were objected that it was too much to expect the librarian to be the guide, philosopher, and friend of everyone who came to borrow a book and that the librarian would need an impossibly huge staff, he was quite sure that, if public libraries were to take advantage of their opportunities in adult education, present notions of what size of staff a public library required would have to be completely revised, and secondly he could already see that in this great university of adult education that was growing up in all directions before their eyes, informal talk and advice about books given in the public library would play a part which nothing else could."

These remarks are to be noted particularly in India where well equipped libraries are so few and the direction available to the reader is not very satisfactory.

TOO MANY BOOKS.

IN a recent utterance, the Master of Balliol is reported to have said that there were times, when he felt that there were too many books and feeling that, if we could only retain the Bible, Shakespeare, Plato's Republic and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason all the rest might be burnt. Many would like to keep a few more and Sir John Lubbock has fixed the number at a hundred of what he regards as the best books. It is true that the present age suffers from a plethora of books; and a Wells or a Phillip Oppenheim may be trusted to fill an entire shelf. Not merely many books are written; but books are written on many subjects. We do not see how this could be helped. Knowledge has grown and its departments have multiplied. Tastes have become many and complex. There are people wanting books on Egyptology, Relativity, Horticulture and Arctic expeditions. The demand for 'light literature' has grown. The habit of running through a novel during railway journeys and the still more fashionable habit of reading oneself to sleep has created a huge demand for fiction; and in spite of the appalling quantity of 'publishers remainders' books do have a sale. Even here the economic law of demand

and supply operates. So long as books are wanted, they will be published. The only danger is that such prodigious supply might engender, promiscuous reading. If it does, it is not the fault of the producers, it is the reader's.

QUEEN VICTORIA AND RECENT LITERATURE.

RECENTLY two books have been written which in different ways bring the great Queen into limelight. One is the fantastic Tragedy of Edward VII written by Mr. W. H. Edwards, who in spite of the unmistakably English name is a German. The book has been found to contain some glaring inaccuracies not to speak of much unbalanced criticism. One of the assertions in the book is in respect of the contemplated abdication of Queen Victoria. Lady Oxford has vehemently asserted that "Queen Victoria never at any time thought of abdicating the Throne." Mr. Buckle recalls attention to the Queen's letters to Lord Beaconsfield and points out that she did play with the idea though she might not have been quite serious about it. It is useless to pursue this controversy especially in respect of an extraordinarily long and dutiful reign. The most surprising thing, that has been said about her is in a new play written by M. Maurice Rostand, called Napoleon IV and produced last month in Paris. The author has adopted the sensational view, that the Prince Imperial was assassinated by England and that Queen Victoria was privy to a conspiracy to have him put out of the way. Though we do not see why this reference should lead to diplomatic trouble and should tend to impair cordiality between France and England, we cannot commend the writer who brings in episodes which are of recent history and involving the reputations of persons who are near and dear to people still alive.

KAMALA LECTURER FOR 1928.

WE are greatly gratified that Mr. M. R. Jayakar has been appointed by the Senate of the Calcutta University as Kamala lecturer for 1928, and that the subject of his lectures will be the "Ideals of Indian culture." We hope these lectures will be a welcome contribution to the work of interpretation and restatement, that is going on in the world of Indian thought. While Indian culture has to be rescued from the Pundit, it has also to be protected from the scoffer. We have no doubt that Mr. Jayakar who brings to bear on his deep learning a progressive and liberal mind, is eminently fitted to do this. We are sure that his lectures will be awaited with great interest.

THE NEW ERA

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THE VICISSITUDES OF THE STATE.

I

THE EASTERN IDEA OF THE STATE.

By M. RUTHNASWAMY, M.A., (Cantab). Barrister-at-Law.

THE history of the State forms as interesting a subject of study and investigation as the history of States. The vicissitudes through which the State has gone in the course of time ought to be as instructive a subject as that of the vicissitudes that have been the lot of the several States of the world. There has been a rise and fall in the esteem in which the State has been held by men, as there has been a rise and fall in the fortunes of individual States. The State has been looked upon at one time as a divine institution, at another as the *fons et origo* of evil. Some peoples have put it up and worshipped it as the golden calf, others (or the same people at a different epoch in their history) have discovered its feet to be of clay although its body may have been gold. One school of political philosophers have cursed it with bell book and candle, while another has sung pæans in praise of it, reminding one of those other pagan priests who shouted till they were hoarse "Great is Diana of the Ephesians". Statesmen and Churchmen and political philosophers and pamphleteers, after the age of political discussion had begun, have spoken for or against the State in a babel of tongues. Although we may agree that there is a consensus of opinion among political theorists and practical politicians as to the necessity of the State, the confusion of voices creeps in as soon as questions begin to be asked about the authority of the State, its jurisdiction over the individual, and the respect which men owe to it.

The two voices and more that are heard about the State and its influence and authority are by no means peculiar to the State but are the common fate of all institutions that possess a complex texture and present more than one facet to the observers' eye. One or other of its several qualities gets exaggerated from time to time and distorts the picture of the *ensemble*. The best of all good qualities when developed out of proportion and unaccompanied by the parallel development of its fellows is apt to make a monstrous excrescence. It is difficult enough to hold in proper and harmonious balance the different qualities of a human personality. But in men, at least, the presence of a commanding will keeps improper and monstrous developments of character in check and the rule of the

golden mean is often observed. But in a State the undue development of one or other of its institutions or powers is difficult to control. Circumstances rule the situation and each power of the State takes its colour and strength from the reigning needs of the time. The circumstances of an England, distracted by the chaos of the Wars of the Roses and the futility of a premature constitutionalism allowed the Tudor King to become Pope and Emperor in one. The Polish Diet with its fantastic *liberum veto* was the institutional expression of the strength of, perhaps, the most powerful nobility of the middle ages which was interested in keeping down the power of its alien kings. A sickly suspicion of the power of a strong executive and a strong legislature, however well grounded in historical circumstances, accounts for the sovereign powers granted to the Judiciary from which the United States of America has already begun to suffer. Even rulers of men like a Moses or a Napoleon cannot always or completely dominate the development of the institutions of a State. Napoleon, like Augustus before him could not do away with deliberative assemblies although his contempt for them is well known. The traditions of the Revolutionary debates are illuminated by that scene of 18th Brumaire when Napoleon blenched before the gesture of the *Corps des Anciens* and, when the fortunes of Bonapartism were saved by the nerve of his more resourceful brother Lucien. Institutions have a life of their own and all of them do not obey their *primum mobile*. The theory of the separation of powers is easy enough to state and easy enough to realize, as the constitutions of England and of the United States of America have proved in different fashions. But the usurpation of sovereignty by one or other of these powers is a common event in history and accounts for half the disrepute into which the State has fallen from time to time. The State is often judged by one or other idea that dominates it for a time or by this or that prominent institution, rarely by the picture which it presents as a whole.

Conscious and continuous political thought began with the Greeks. But some casual political thinking there was even before them. The government of men is such a daily occurrence that man, whatever the stage of his political development and whatever his political organisation may be, cannot help thinking, however fitfully of it. What did the State mean to the ancient Hindus, or to the Medes or the Persians or the Egyptians or the Chinese? It is difficult in the absence of any specific political literature among these ancient peoples to reconstruct their attitude to the State. Some of them were not grown up enough to think of the State, among others the State was not grown up enough to think about. But from stray references, from the general philosophy of life of the

people or from historical facts, one can form a picture of the general attitude of these ancient peoples to the State. The first State of history is probably to be found in Sumer and Akkad of Mesopotamia. It is interesting to note that the first peoples of history were practical, positive, realistic men. The first rulers of Chaldea, the Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Elamites were genial rulers compared to their successors, the Assyrians, and the State was to their people a useful organisation which pressed neither very hard nor very light on them. But the *esprit positif* and freedom from religious preoccupation of Chaldaea were exaggerated in the Assyrians and led to their standing out as the most cruel people of history. The Assyrian inscriptions drip with blood. "The harness, the armour, the trophies of my victory" says Sennacherib¹ in one of them, "float in the blood of my enemies as in a river". After a victory over revolted subjects Assurbanipal commemorated it in these terms "I have killed half the population. I built a wall before the great walls of the city. I impaled alive the chiefs of the revolt and I covered the wall with their skins. Some were walled up alive in the masonry others were impaled around the wall . . . I heaped up their heads in the form of a crown and their corpses in the form of a garland".² What could the State have been to a people governed by such rulers but a nightmare of blood and dust? No State could have roused such undying hatred among its subjects as the Assyrian.

If we go from Assyria to India we enter upon a new world altogether. While the State in Assyria pressed heavy and hard on the people, in ancient India it touched the people very lightly indeed. Ancient India with its religious and philosophic preoccupation thought, it must be confessed, little of the State, nor was that little flattering to it. The social organisation *par excellence* and of paramount authority in Hindu India was Caste which dominated both ruler and ruled. Society dominated the State, whereas, elsewhere, the State has dominated Society. It was Custom and not Law that regulated the relations between individuals. The necessity of the State was, no doubt, recognized but it was tolerated as a necessary evil. According to Manu, punishment was the bond that held the State together and Danda Niti is one of the most important chapters in Hindu political theory. Fear, says Manu³, was the origin of the State. With a philosophy of life which had Caste as its atmosphere it is not to be wondered that the State and its representative, the King, were kept in their proper place in ancient India. It did not require all the patriotic scholarship of the modern renaissance in India to prove that the power of the ancient Hind^u King was limited. His power

¹ Quoted in De Morgan's *Les premières civilisations*.

² *Ibid.*

³ The Laws of Manu VII 3-vi.

was limited not because the government was constitutional but because the State was only half alive. Large provinces of ancient Indian life were outside the jurisdiction of the State. The Dharma Sastras regulated the whole of the social life of the people without let or hindrance from the King, the titular head of the State. The Brahman priesthood kept the religious life of the people outside the influence of the secular power. Caste and Custom ruled the rest of the private and public life of ancient India. The ancient Indian State was a tax-gathering rather than a law-making State. *Arthashastra* was the science and art not so much of Politics as of public administration, especially of public finance. The chief duties of the State were the punishment of crime and the filling of the King's treasuries. That is why it had so few contacts with the people. That is why it was of so little account to the people. They asked little of it and it gave little to them, beyond maintaining the irreducible minimum of political organisation, with what precarious success the history of India is there to tell.

It may be difficult for us to whom the State is the most important institution of social life to think of a time when the State occupied the smallest place in the life of a people. But such times have been. One such period was in the transition between the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the formation of States in mediaeval Europe when the State was nowhere and the Church in the person of the Bishops was everywhere keeping law and order. In ancient India, Caste, Custom and Religion squeezed the State into a very small corner of Indian public life. The state of things that was normal under the influence of the Hindu philosophy of life was only made a little more intense by Buddhism. As G. K. Chesterton points out in a recent essay,* whereas the Christian philosophy of life holds out to us the hope that if we seek first the Kingdom of God everything else will be added unto us, the Buddhist philosophy of life enjoins us to seek the Kingdom of God because nothing else exists. The State was, with the things of the earth, the result of desire. Buddha leaving his palace in the middle of the night, the subject of so many of the Gandhara sculptures, was not only renouncing a State but called upon his followers to renounce the State. Asoka calling a halt to his conquests in mid-career refused even to dream the dream, which never came true, of every great Indian ruler of achieving the unity of India. He made the great refusal not because he felt himself unequal to the task but because he did not think the task was worth while. The State was not such a fine thing that the

* The Everlasting Man.

jurisdiction of one single State must be extended over all India. Buddhist institutions carried a step further than Hinduism the ancient Indian indifference to the State. The monastic life and its institutions not only withdrew large numbers of people from political life but reduced the quantity of life lived in the State. Asoka's decrees are veritable sermons in stone. As we learn from Fa Hien's Travels monasteries were the most important buildings of the Buddhist period. The organising genius of the people found its expression in the *ganas*, the *sanghas* and *sabhas* of Buddhist ecclesiastical life. The history of Buddhist India is largely the history of Buddhism in India. The State was of little consequence in Buddhist India. Nor did Buddhism contribute much to the prestige or power of the State elsewhere. In China, it was not able to displace Confucius or ancestor-worship or the family. In Japan it shelved the Mikado and created that gulf between the spiritual headship of the Mikado and the temporal power of the Shogun which, together with its consequence, the feudal strifes of the Samurais, was the chief cause for the late flowering of Japan as a powerful and progressive State. Harakiri (one way of renouncing desire) encouraged if not invented by Buddhism, and the good form of Japanese chivalry, known as *Buchido*, served only to increase the prestige of the clans, and did nothing to increase the power of the State. Neither in Hindu nor in Buddhist India, did the State fill any considerable place in the life of the people, and it got the respect, its small place deserved. The State was not the great Leviathan in ancient India. It was very small fry indeed.

When from India we turn to China we meet a kind of life altogether new. We leave the land of religious pre-occupation and philosophical speculation far behind us. We come upon a practical people who devote themselves more to material prosperity than to philosophical theory. Their philosophy of life is practical and rational, if it is not frankly materialistic. Their religion in fact is morality. Their politics also is morality. When Chi K'ang Tzu asked Confucius what government was, he said, "to govern is to keep straight". In reply to other enquiries he rings the changes on the same thesis. The art of government consisted in the sovereign doing his duty as a sovereign, the subject, his duty as a subject, the father his duty as a father, and the son, his duty as a son. If the king were good, the people would be good. Personal morality of the king is the secret of good government. For "if the ruler cherishes the principle of self-control, the people will be docile to his commands." If "the ruler is personally upright his subjects will do their duty

* The Sayings of Confucius edited by Giles.

unbidden." Punishment, least of all capital punishment, would be unnecessary if the king were good. According to the Chinese philosopher the two requisities of good government are domestic order and individual self-control. Although the title of son of Heaven is given to the King, it does not mean any apotheosis of the State.

The Chinese State has been one of the least governed States in the history of the world. One of the sayings of Laotzu was "Practise non-interference in order to win {the empire."† Confucius quotes the example of the Chinese King Shun who did nothing, yet governed well, for "religiously self-observant, he sat gravely on the throne and that is all." The Chinese kings themselves did not think highly of their sovereign position. Confucius quotes a Chinese saying "I have no joy in kingly rule, I rejoice only because none can oppose my will." The Chinese State never acquired some of the important attributes of the modern State. All-embracing jurisdiction and coercive government were conspicuous by their absence. The Chinese did not recognise that separation of civil from criminal law which is one of the features of a developed State. The Chinese knew no special law of treason till recent times.* Unity in race, religion, language, civilization and culture have been enough to give China all the political unity it needed. Its geographical situation and its remoteness from the high roads of history gave it a security which few peoples have enjoyed. The cultural wall of separation which, much more than the Chinese wall, kept it from contact with foreign ideas and influences ensured it against disturbances more profound than civil war or conquest. Its vast territory, its splendid family system, the qualities of enormous industry, stoic patience and small scale intelligence have saved China till recent times from those economic shocks and upheavals which have been the fate of less fortunate, if more progressive, peoples. Towards all this unity, integrity and prosperity the State has contributed little. The State has not done so much for China that its people need worship nor respect beyond obeying it.* The political organisation of China was too simple to be exacting. The Chinese State was the Family enlarged. The cult of ancestors still further approximated the Chinese State to a family. The Celestials in heaven were Chinese like the Celestials on earth. The Chinese State was governed on the patriarchal model. The Emperor was the father of his people and the Mandarins were the servants of an extended household. They collected the taxes and administered justice according to Confucius. Legislation there was none. The

† Sayings of Laotzu edited by Giles. * Lieber—Civil Liberty and Self-Government.

whole duty of political man whether for ruler or ruled lay implicit in the books of Confucius. They were the law as well as the prophets. Chinese life was too simple to need many laws and too stationary to need new ones.

The impact of the State upon the individual was very light. The duties of the State, according to Confucius* consisted in providing enough food to eat, in keeping enough soldiers to guard the State and in† securing the confidence of the people. Not to interfere with the life of the subjects is the beau ideal of Chinese political philosophy. As restrictions and prohibitions are multiplied in the empire the people grow poorer and poorer says Laotzu. The greater the number of laws and enactments, the more thieves and robbers there will be. Govern a great nation as you would cook a small fish. *i.e.*, do not overdo—is the sage advice of the same philosopher. As in the Ancient Indian State, tax-gathering was the most important function of Government in the Chinese State. It is about the abuse of the power of taxation that the few political murmurs that we hear are uttered. Mencius, the most considerable philosopher after Confucius, advises the King to abolish unjust taxation. The Chinese philosophers are not oppressed by a sense of the omnipotence of the King. Both Confucius and Mencius think that the power of the King is not supreme, that an unjust tyrant can be overthrown by the people.‡ Dynastic revolutions were frequent in the history of China, although neither the constitution of government nor the condition of the people suffered any change. The State in China, although useful was not thought to be of absolute importance. The family organisation, the morality of Confucius, the industry of the people were enough to carry them through their social life. The Chinese State was too large in extent and too simple in its constitution to mean anything but a vague idea to the people.

It is a far cry in space and time from China to Egypt. Not so much, it would seem, in regard to the political attitude of the two peoples to the State. The ancient Egyptians were a much more philosophical and much less materialistic people than the Chinese. They no doubt laid store by material prosperity. The peasantry of the Nile were as hardworking, as patient and as realistic as that of the Hoangho and Yangetsikiang. But the skies of Egypt seemed to call for more of that philosophic melancholy, that nostalgia of the Infinite, as it has been called, which is the note of the greater peoples of history. The ancient Egyptians were filled with a sense of the transitoriness of this world. They regarded the present life as of little moment. Belief in a future life, says De Morgan§ absorbed the Egyptian to the neglect of

* Sayings of Confucius—Edited by Giles. † Sayings of Laotzu—Edited by Giles.

‡ Janet—*Histoire de la science politique* Vol. I.

§ De Morgan : *Les premières Civilisations*.

the thousand things of life on earth, and the kingdom of the Pharaohs was not an earthly kingdom. They looked upon their houses as hostleries. Their tombs were their eternal homes and formed their typical architecture.† Their interest in public life was limited to cultivating the Nile-inundated lands, paying the taxes and obeying the scribes that were set over them and building the tombs and temples of the King. Contrary to the custom of Chaldaea, the land belonged to the king and not to the people who held the land as tenants on the tenure of tribute and military service.‡ The Egyptians were one of the most passive and servient peoples of history. The bastinado was the typical instrument of Egyptian Government. "A young man" they had a saying§ "has a back to be bruised; he hears better when he is beaten" Popular insurrections, so frequent among despotically governed States, were few and far between in ancient Egypt. The government of the Pharaohs lay lightly upon the Egyptians and the subject populations, not because it did not exploit them, but because it did not penetrate into the private life of the people. The Pharaohs never aimed at the egyptianisation of the peoples whom they conquered. Their life was one dull round of routine and hard work. The rise and fall of the Nile which was the maker of Egypt determined that life. The Nile was to the Egyptians the State. The legacy of the pyramids is symbolic of what the Egyptian Kingship and the Egyptian State meant to the common folk. While the excavations at Pompey reveal the life lived by the people at large, the treasures of Egyptian tombs speak to us only of the palaced lives of Kings. Egyptian history is well summed up in those famous lines of Shelley on Ozymandias, King of Egypt. Not only now but even in the time of Ozymandias'

"Nothing beside remains, round the decay of that colossal wreck
Boundless and bare the low and level lands stretch far away."

To such a people what could the State have been but a distant thing, a Sphinx which surveyed their petty lives in lordly disdain?

Whether in Chaldaea, where the State (except for the Assyrians) left people largely to themselves, or in India, where the State was overclouded by Society, or in China, where the State was absorbed in the Family, or in Egypt, where the people lived for and by a river, the State could not have been anything important or memorable to their peoples. One fact is enough to prove the little hold the State had upon the peoples of oriental antiquity. The States of the ancient East were subjected to a never-ending cycle of conquest and revolution. These people could not have held the State in high esteem, if they let the stranger in at the gates with hardly more than a single struggle. To them one rule was as good as another. And that marks one of the lowest levels to which the reputation of the State may descend.

† Laurent : *Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanité*—Vol. I.

‡ Ibid.

§ Seignobos. *L'Orient*.

THE DIVINE IN MAN.

By JOHN W. GRAHAM.

THE popular forms of religion in all countries are found to fail as a medicine or as a guide to the souls of many whose spiritual perceptions, or whose study of history or of science, have emancipated them from ancient terrors and hopes, and taken away the intellectual background out of which the multitude of gods came forth. Must such sceptics maintain a permanently negative position out in the cold? Religion, that is our consciousness of God, gives unity to life's variety, coherence among discords, confidence in darkness, and in our better moments, it surrounds the clouds of dulness or of storm with a ring of communicated glory, showing a sun behind. We miss something real if all this becomes meaningless. This article is written to show that such need not be anyone's fate. Let us fall back upon experience, and be wholly independent of tradition and authority, building on a foundation of certainty that nothing can take away, so long as we remain sane. Let us leave for the present also, the remarkable religious enlightenments that have come to saints and mystics. They can wait. We must appeal to ordinary experience in order to carry conviction to the ordinary man.

I ask my readers to grant me three experiences.

First:--We are not at our best till we have given ourselves away to some service; having lost ourselves we find a quieter, stronger and happier self. Selfishness causes misery before achievement, disappointment after. Millionaires or Rajahs who arrange their lives as a succession of pleasures and amusements are bored to death, if they do not degenerate into crime or insanity. The man who is making the most of himself is always busy, has little leisure, a heavy correspondence, engagements thick upon him, constantly consulted about affairs not his own. Up to the limits of his ability he is a quiet man. He is living according to his nature, and his personality expands in its proper air. On the other hand a man who always shirks responsibility, who meets every proposal

with the question how it will affect his own safety, or convenience, his leisure or his credit or his money, such a man's personality, by the time he reaches midlife, shrinks like a dried-up kernel in a nut-shell. You can hear it rattle. He is drying up, because he is not fulfilling his nature.

Consecration also brings a wonderful happiness of its own. Everyone knows that, who has gone through it, most of our troubles are egoistic. We are not sufficiently thought of—we are snubbed, left out, forgotten; we miss what we deserve—and we are hurt and miserable. What a great liberation to put all that behind us, and be immune to these pains. Consecration to something not ourselves spills happiness and ease of heart and radiant faces. It also brings charm to commonplace people. How we avoid the boor who talks about himself at quiet length, how delightful to meet people who are at leisure from themselves and able to think of others!

We do not all realise how much this proves. If an animal gains strength, happiness and charm, we say that it is living according to its nature. So it would be reasonable to conclude that consecration is the right attitude of the human spirit. But that is a remarkable result, for much of our experience, particularly our animal tendencies, point to unlimited and unscrupulous selfishness as the way to success. But the spirit of man has gone on to learn a better lesson. It finds that the egoistic struggle is outgrown as the typical activity of his spirit. Civilisation has all the time been controlling it. Its activity is limited in the case of what we call a good man and it turns out to be finally superseded by the consciousness of a wider unity, which we do well to recognise. We are parts of a whole, elements in a great spirit, and all a man's self-centred struggle has been to prepare a fit home for an element of a spiritual cosmos. There must be some divine or universal spirit to receive the consecrated service to which strength, happiness and charm are attached. We cannot be alone in the universe. We are elements, organs, of what we need no longer hesitate to call God.

Let us examine again our experience to try to find what are the laws, the ways, the qualities of the God so found. We need not search in any remote corners. Does not experience shout to us that love is the supremely poignant one of all our experiences, the most potent of all good motives when rightly directed. Is not its opposite, hatred, miserable within, ruinous without. Our happiness may be measured, with general accuracy, by the extent and the intensity with which we love and are loved. Does not this point to the patient and obedient worshipper of things as they are that

love is the law, the way and the quality of God? There is something unique, very near godlikeness in the best kind of love.

What is love? It appears to be an attraction among souls, by which two become one. The analysis of the quality in ch. XIII of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians bears out this summary definition, and I know of no better exposition. In the world of matter, everybody is attracted to every other by the law of gravitation, by which the universe is kept stable. Love is the law of gravitation of souls. It does not always have its way any more than weight always causes motion. But it has always to be remembered and reckoned with. "God is Love", said a christian apostle.

Must we stop at this abstraction, or is there practical commerce between the great soul and the microscopic elements thereof? Yes, says the voice of common humanity, in all ages, there is prayer and a response. Not every one experiences this. The roads to God are at times blocked by too much baggage, or obscured by fog, darkened by thunder-clouds of passion or frozen in exceeding cold. Intellectual difficulties also crop up sporadically. But as a whole men have prayed in all times and places. Rituals of prayer were made to be used. Naturally the desire to beg for favours, to overrule the weather, to avoid bereavements, to win battles or even games, to control nature, has led to many mistaken uses of prayer. I speak here only of spiritual exercises, with spiritual responses. By prayer we gain wisdom, patience, courage, forgiveness, charity. It is a spiritual not a physical force, and it makes a spiritual transport or telegraphic system for the world of souls.

Two illustrations of this relation of man to God occur to me, taken from biology. Analogies between living things and spirit are truer than between dead matter and spirit.

First and simplest :—We are like leaves on a tree which is God. A leaf is a partaker in the communicated life of the tree. If the tree dies, the leaves die. Their individual career is short and full of risks, from grubs or animals, drought or storm. But they are joined to the tree by a twig, down which goes the carbon the leaf has collected from the air, and up which goes the sap to build up the leaf. This is the analogy to prayer. This will bear thinking about.

Or to use a rather more elaborate illustration, our bodies are made of millions of microscopic cells, with a life of its own. They are born by splitting from other cells, they work, and then die away. Most of them are probably little cognisant of much of the body, though some are. The one life of the body is in all of them.

To kill the body is to kill all. How if we are like cells in the body of God?

There are many curious and striking parallels between the cell in the body and the man in society, which is on its spiritual side a manifestation of the spirit of all. The body has its medical service. If you cut your finger the process of healing begins at once. It has its hospitals, the sensitive fluid which gathers round a sprained ankle to keep the wound from damage. These are the financiers who keep the reserves of the body in the form of fat. There is the government in the brain, often torn by conflicting views and even well constituted parties. The nerves are the civil servants, and the education department. The brain has curious messengers which take orders to any part. They are called Hormones, and have not long been discovered. Then the digestive organs are the manufacturing districts. One can play with this idea, discover military organs, and even diseases curiously parallel to the diseases of society. Rebellion is the social parallel to cancer, in which a group of cells set up for themselves with great pain to the body politic. Then society has fevers, of many kinds, political, financial, fashionable, all infectious and all temporary. You may have the rheumatism of social discord, the paralysis of social apathy, the discouragement of social catarrh. So we might extend, not without amusement, but really touching, as I believe, things as they are. Our spirits are cells in the universal spirit of God. We belong to one another; the same life is in us all. The more we recognise human claims the more we recognise our divine affinity and common organism. We find God within ourselves and in other men, and nowhere else. Have we abandoned the personality of God? By no means. What is personality? Materially it is simple enough. Everything inside our skin is ourself and nothing outside. That is the statuesque conception. But spiritually it is not so easily defined. Are our thoughts part of ourselves? Surely they are. When they become words, spoken or written, do they cease to be part of the thinker? Surely not, a man's books if he be a writer, his pictures if he be a painter, his institutions if he be a philanthropist, are spiritually part of him. One can no more limit the scope of a personality than find the end of the ripples made by a ship on a calm lake.

The greatest and commonest extension of personality is that made by parents. Children reproduce the qualities of their ancestors, and extend the one family unit. The unity of the family is so common a spectacle that we are apt not to see the wonderfulness of it. Now we can understand why we speak of our father when we wish to approach God. The relation of fatherhood

or motherhood is the nearest earthly approach to the wider relation to the central personality whose love, care and wisdom reach us through our parents. We have not missed the personality of God in the doctrine here sketched out.

It may seem slight and vague. It needs no temples, priests or rubrics, it is independent of historical criticism. The worshippers of the travelling God need no traditional authority, though they value the treasures of the saints which have been handed down.

But on the side of conduct its demands are high ; they may be too high for some. They certainly are fatal to some popular religions. For they imply human equality, or rather brotherhood and communion with none excluded—none. And some religions have forgotten this. How can we realise the temple of the only God in every man and yet participate in these four.

1. War. It is the central denial of human and divine nature.
2. Race hatred and contempt, akin to the war spirit.
3. Caste. God knows nothing of untouchables nor of the twice born.
4. The inferiority or degradation or limited life for women. If all souls are part of God's soul, sex cannot affect this universal fact.

This is not the place to elaborate these points. How happy the race would be if it could achieve a victory for common humanity over these four leviathan evils.

For I am not blind to the reality of sin, in speaking of man's likeness to God. Man is an animal also. Love and faith had a lovely origin. And the great and tragic conflict between the lower and the higher on the scope of evolution is going on in all of us all the time. We are called to assist in the victory of the divine spirit in the world—through the kindred victories of our own spirits. I should be glad to stop here, having said all I want to say about the indwelling God. But the objection will be in my readers' minds, that I have said nothing of the creator of nature, nothing of the problem of pain, due to the relentless processes of physical laws.

Lives are ruined for innocent people in a wholesale, apparently careless way. The blind, the maimed, the leper, line the streets. The death of babies is too common a tragedy in every Indian village. Influenza slew fourteen millions in India about nine years ago. Hookworm, consumption, cholera, plague—who made these curses of humanity? Famine, drought and flood; India

knows of these. Are they the work of the heavenly father who is revealed in consecration, love and prayer?

I fall back on the little I know from experience. And experience says there is no connection discoverable between love and reckless nature. Nature is outside my religion. And I do not deify natural powers, as primitive religions did.

Shall we rest, then, in dualism? Are there two powers in the Universe? Yes, very likely more than two. We make too hasty a unification. But the mind cannot rest in dualism as a final philosophic doctrine. Let me then leave religion for a while, and see whether I can philosophize myself into any sort of monism, to accept one Absolute.

I can begin by building five bridges between the spiritual and physical.

1. We are ourselves a body and a spirit. Our bodies are made of chemical elements, like the earth. It is not likely that so close a union as soul and body can be under two gods.

2. Our intellects owe their skill to long operation upon nature as raw material. In her school we have learnt to be cunning and accurate, and to make fine distinctions.

3. Our moral character has been built up out of hard experience with natural forces. That is how courage and endurance and patience were learnt. Out of co-operation in the hunting or hunted tribe and out of sex came love.

4. Our sense of beauty in nature is a real link. Of course the beauty is not in nature. It is in ourselves. We have the aesthetic faculty which creates beauty from certain things in nature, inexplicably. Again nature is the raw material.

5. The fifth bridge is a broad causeway, and needs much longer treatment than I can give here. It is given by the fact that the spirit of man does not stand against material physical nature, in a complete and isolated dualism. Between them are all the animals and plants, close each to each with only tiny differences in the evolutionary scheme. The world cannot be divided into two. It might be three or four; and there are no lines of distinction, no places where the cosmos will divide. These five bridges make me convinced that nothing but some form of monism will fit the case. I feel that there must be one—the Absolute.

But I know nothing about him or it. I end up with a confession of ignorance, and with no complete solution to the problem of

pain and the apparent cruelty of nature. Can we be surprised that our analysis fails before the Absolute? We are inside the Universe, and got outside to examine it and report. All this is philosophy.

But for religion all we need is given in the threefold experience with which we began, which leads us to an indweller in whom we live and move and have our being.

CAMBRIDGE.

J. W. GRAHAM.

ORIENTAL.

By STANLEY RICE.

BY common consent the civilised world is divided into East and West. Outside these two main categories lies the greater part of the vast continent of Africa and the many islands that dot the Pacific. The genius of the European races, especially of the Anglo-Saxons, has carried the Western line further into the two Americas, and southward into Australia and to some extent into the more favoured quarters of Africa. But broadly speaking a line drawn through the Ural mountains from the White Sea to the Suez canal separates the East from the West, for the American stock with the exception of the Negroes is drawn from Europe, and Australia may be regarded as an out-post of the West, peopled like the United States with European blood.

This arrangement of the earth which practically resolves itself into the continents of Europe and Asia with additions on both sides, since the whole coast of North Africa is predominantly Asiatic, is of course not scientific, nor is it my purpose to probe the history of mankind so far backwards as to lose myself in the maze of Aryan and Dravidian, of Alpine, Nordic, and Mediterranean. The terms Eastern and Western have taken on a connotation of certain types of civilization and these have as is usual in such cases, been greatly confused in the minds of many, because, when once a broad principle is established men are very apt to accept it without looking too closely into details, to assume in the present case that everything that falls on either side of an imaginary line of their own choosing (and the very distinction of the two continents is artificial) must conform to a particular type and that therefore they are justified in drawing certain inferences. The inexorable laws of Nature contradict them because Nature ignores these man-made lines but the imagined tradition remains and both sides argue from it on false premisses.

Not that everyone looks upon the line as drawn with mathematical accuracy and rigidity. There are degrees of the East to the European; -unable to argue away Turkey, the

Bulgarians, and the Mussalman populations in Russia and round about the Aegean, the European has agreed to call this tract the Near East. Russia herself is acknowledged to be half Asiatic, without distinction of Archangel from Odessa. Arabia, Iraq and perhaps Persia go by the name of the Middle East and the yellow races of China and Japan constitute the Far East. He who would talk of a Western civilization must in effect confine himself to that part of Europe which falls west of a line drawn from the mouth of the Niemen along the eastern marches of Germany. Of Middle and Far West we hear nothing except in America where the terms are purely geographical and have little or nothing to do with ethnography.

Now on what does this distinction rest? The first answer would naturally be colour. But colour alone cannot account for the difference of characteristics which are supposed to separate East from West. Nor is it accurate. Asia is a conglomerate of colour. The white Siberians themselves a reflux from semi-Asiatic Russia, the light brown Aryans, the darker skinned Dravidians, the yellow Japanese and Chinese and the varying hues of Arabia and Persia have only this in common that they are none of them red. The Nordic stock particularly the comparatively unmixed stock of Scandinavia and of Denmark differ to an almost equal extent from the olive Italians and the dark mixed race in Southern Spain, which is often in individual cases darker than the great majority of Northern Indians. Nor does creed help us, for creeds are exclusively Asiatic and though they have naturally taken on the impress of the civilisations with which they have come in contact—in Europe the Greco-Roman, in India the ancient Aryan or Dravidian, in Japan and China the ancient Japanese and Chinese—the stubborn fact remains that no religion has the monopoly of either continent. Siberia is predominantly Christian, Palestine to a certain extent Jewish, while of course it is hardly necessary to point out the existence of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism over huge tracts of Asia. Europe itself is divided into three different kinds of Christianity and in the Eastern part Islam can claim a not insignificant share. If then we reject colour and creed as fundamental to the difference between East and West, we are driven to such trivialities as dress. These superficial differences however could never account for the great differences of national character and once again the attempt to justify the longitudinal division must fail.

If now we abandon this idea and divide the world along the lines of latitude we shall be able to obtain a much clearer vision. The lines of longitude are really based upon nothing more than

convenience. The Meridian of Greenwich is due to the accident that scientific men who came from England chose to adopt it. I cannot see that it would have made any difference if the zero meridian had passed through Berlin or Delhi or Canton. The Equator on the other hand is a truly scientific line based upon climate; on either side of it as you go north or south the climate becomes colder until we reach the equal rigours of the Arctic or Antarctic.

Almost all early civilisations flourished round about or rather South of the 35th degree of latitude. Sameria, Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Northern India and Greece all fall within this zone. Primitive man was nomadic and pastoral, later he took to agriculture, settled down and founded cities. Those who amassed wealth were not only able to take their ease and to hire servants to do their work but they also acquired the leisure to think and to develop the arts and naturally, as history proves, their first thoughts were centred on the mystery of the universe and issued in cosmogonies and philosophical speculation on origins. It was almost inevitable that the evolution should have taken place exclusively within this zone. It was here that Nature was most abundant without being too enervating. Man had as it were but to stretch out his hand and take the fruits of the earth; he needed little for clothes or for warmth. Nature took him to her breast and nourished him. By and by the tide flowed slightly northward and Greece arose. There is much that is Asiatic about Greek art; the early plays - those of Æschylus in the first half of the fifth century B. C. - are conspicuous for the amount of lyrical poetry which they contain and it is usually admitted by competent musicians today that Hindu music is the only key which remains to us of the old Greek music to which the choruses of the plays were sung. It is true Greece developed a pictorial art as well as a sculpture and architecture all her own. We are however not now concerned with artistic developments or differences but rather to point out how civilisation established itself in Southern Europe with the trend northwards. Rome followed Greece; civilisation became sterner and more practical. All that was artistic, all the adornments of life she borrowed from Greece. For herself she kept the conquest of the world, and the art of Government.

All this time Northern Europe lay in barbarism. It is true that as the readers of Tacitus will remember, there was a rude civilisation in Germany and even some primitive attempt at tribal organisation. Tacitus, writing at a time when the luxury of Rome was beginning to sap her stern conceptions, has much to admire in the German simplicity but it is clear that there was

nothing there to compare with the earlier civilisations of Egypt and India nor with the later development of Greece and Rome. Britain was no better. All that remains to her of those early times she owes to the Roman occupation.

Then came a change. The Roman Empire overweighted fell to pieces in the hands of effete rulers. Hired soldiers were brought in from the North who put the Empire up to auction. Gaul broke loose. The Empire of Charlemagne succeeded to that of Augustus and the tide of civilisation again flowed northwards. It is needless in this short sketch to carry history further. All the world knows how the Holy Roman Empire gave way to French ascendancy and how France with a brief interlude of the accidental and factitious domination of Spain in her turn yielded the supremacy to England which during the nineteenth century was unquestionably the leading nation of the world.

Further Nature, it seems, will not permit man to go. To the northern nations of Europe she was not so kind as to those early pioneers of Asia. They had to work hard for their living; they had to overcome the forces of Nature and living as they did in a bracing climate they developed a determination and a power to overcome obstacles which the peoples of the softer South never acquired. To them, because of this, was given the spirit of adventure and the practical gift of invention; to the South, dreaming in her vines and her sunny lands, was given the gift of imagination and artistic beauty. The cradle of European music is Italy; the master pieces of mediæval art come from Italy. The boast of India that she was civilised while naked Britons were wandering in the forests in blue paint has thus no force whatsoever; the boast of Britain that whatever may have been the case in the past, she has far outstripped India is equally empty. Both were the inevitable outcome of the natural conditions. The civilisation of India is ancient because in early times man with his simple needs was not called upon to work hard for a living, or rather discovery and invention being still in the distant future wealth came easily to the one, which had to be wrung from unkindly nature by the other. Necessity became the mother of invention and those who learned in the harder school were imperceptibly moulded thereby into sterner stuff.

But it is clear that climate, however important is not the only factor in the moulding of national character. If we follow the map of Europe from the straits of Gibraltar obliquely to the Ural mountains and across them to the great Siberian plain till we reach the mouth of the Yenisei and the seas of ice we shall find an almost unbroken plain of varying but on the whole of great fertility. We have already seen that beyond a certain limit the forces of Nature become too strong and the intense cold forbids any great

development of civilisation. All central Europe then being one great plain the establishment of great cities has been favoured and the contact of people with one another has been made possible in a measure denied to the Asiatic continent. For, had climate been the single factor concerned, that part of Asia which lies within the same latitudes might have been expected to show the same development. But Asia is the exact antithesis of Europe. Instead of a great fertile plain, she presents a vast series of tumbled mountains rising in Tibet to over 15,000 feet. Where contact becomes more possible in the north it is forbidden by climatic rigour; where the luxuriant south offers her easy gifts as in India and all along the southern coasts roughly to the mouth of the Yang-Tse the heat saps the vigour of man. But no civilisation can be highly developed in a mountainous tract and in Asia it is just in the most favoured climate that the mountains abound. In the west of the continent the mountains give way to some extent to desert and the nomad Arabs are, as much debarred from civilisation by the arid plain as are the Tibetans by their mountain ranges. In either case that contact which is essential to progress is denied to them.

But contact can be established not only by personal intercourse but by interchange of ideas. The invention of printing came naturally from the north where men's wits had been sharpened by the struggle with Nature. But the great advantage which western Europe enjoys over the nations of Asia is the use of a common script. This of course is due to the influence of the Roman Empire. Italian, French and Spanish are all variants of the Latin language. English contains much that is derived from the same source, and all four languages and now very largely German, use the Roman characters. The advantage is inestimable. The ordinary student is spared the drudgery of learning first a new and often complicated alphabet. He begins with grammar and with pronunciation. In Asia there is a vast divergence of these scripts. In India alone the Hindu man cannot even begin to decipher Telugu. To the Telugu man Tamil is a sealed book. There is nothing in common between Urdu and Bengali and to these and a host of others must be added the ideographic characters of China and Japan. Thus while English, French and Germans can exchange ideas without more labour than is required of the modern school boy coached in these languages, it is well nigh impossible for a Bengali to master a Japanese book without a degree of labour that makes the task almost insuperable. He waits for a translation into some common language such as English but this very fact only emphasises the supreme advantage which history has conferred upon western Europe.

And this interchange of ideas has been fostered in Western Europe by the sea. In the early days when men ventured upon the ocean in their craft, they were afraid to go very far out of sight of land. It is true that there were adventurers who, greatly daring sailed the high seas with their lives in their hands. But the majority, of whom exceptional courage was not expected, took the safer course. Now there is no continent so completely broken up by water as is Europe, unless it be the north of Canada where however the conditions are unfavourable to navigation. The continent of Europe provides endless cradles for seamen. The long littoral of the Mediterranean could be searched and the sea itself crossed without fear of being too long out of sight of land. The Baltic was the nursery of the north and the North sea is separated from the great waste of the Atlantic by the barrier of the British Isles. The Black Sea, the sea of Marmora and the Caspian are all nearly land-locked and the English channel held no terrors for the Roman Caesar and the Norman William because England lay to the north. There are few such cradles in Asia. All along the coast from the yellow sea to Hongkong, the Chinese were confronted by the Pacific ocean beyond which lay the unknown. All along the southern coast stretched a long and apparently impassable waste of waters leading nowhere. Only in the Red sea and the Persian gulf were the conditions more favourable. But most of all the islands which stretch from the Asiatic coast to Australia offered shelter to mariners and it was just here that maritime enterprise from the East and the West was at its best.

But some may say these arguments do not apply to the Chinese Empire which stretches from the southern zone well into that which has been described as the most favoured. It is true that China as we know it extends very far north. But it should be remembered that the original China, the true Kingdom, did not include either Mongolia or Manchuria. The sons of Han were essentially the men of the south and of the Middle Kingdom; it was there that Chinese civilisation had its birth and just as the men of the North poured into India through the famous passes, just as the Germanic tribes poured into Italy from the North and established the Empire of the Ostrogoths under Theodoric, so did the hardy warriors pour into China from the stern schools of Manchuria and Mongolia to annex the richer provinces of the South to their own inheritance. We may see the difference in the present prolonged struggle between north and south. It is the south which has imbibed the modern ideas of nationalism, communism and democracy, however crudely these ideas may be expressed both in word or in action. It is the north which has clung to the more conservative notions of feudalism and military

autocracy. Man for man, the North is according to all observers out of all question superior to the South but the slower brain of the North has not been able to compete in intrigue and in the art of winning over opponents by other means than those of arms. The Civilisation of China has permeated the whole country because allegiance to a central government is one of the main factors of nationality and it must bring with it a more intimate intercourse, a closer exchange of ideas and a gradual assimilation of common manners and customs.

The rise of Japan to be the foremost Asiatic power has been considered phenomenal and French writers have gone so far as to explain the defeat of Russia by arguing that the Japanese are in spirit Western while the Russians are Eastern. The victory therefore follows the usual course of an armed contest between East and West. The true explanation, if there is any force in our reasoning, is far simpler. Japan is a northern country; the latitude of Tokio is somewhere about the latitude of Tangier and the North African coast. She is moreover an island and the Yellow Sea has served as a nursery for her sailors. Invaded by over zealous Christian missionaries and alarmed at the injudicious boasts of the Spaniards in particular, she took the drastic step of shutting herself up from all international intercourse for over 200 years, merely allowing the Dutch to trade, but keeping them at arm's length and refusing to permit any interference in politics. In 1853 came Perry and his American ship. The Japanese saw that the game was up. Seclusion could not be maintained for if the door was shut against the white races, they could and would break it open. She accepted the inevitable, looked round her to see the sources of power and adapted herself to the modern conditions. When once the barriers were down, Nature asserted herself. Having all the advantages which England possesses in the west except the script, she marched towards her natural evolution; but owing to the stagnation of two centuries she had to make haste. Whether or not she was wise in her determination to remain secluded, who shall say? This at least is certain that she denied herself the greatest of all privileges, international intercourse and so answering the impulse of Nature, she copied, she assimilated, she adapted until within 50 years she achieved what she might have achieved more slowly in full 250.

The exultation of India over the Japanese victory was therefore based upon false premises. The fight was not between East and West but between one northern nation and another. What the Japanese did, the Manchurians or Koreans might, so far as climate goes, have done; but the forces of Nature are too strong

for the South. I have examined elsewhere the causes of European ascendancy and the reader who wishes to pursue the subject further is referred to that book. It must here suffice to say that the genius of the North as expressed in the northern European nations and America is something different from that of the South. Europe has been accused of materialism ; Asia of spirituality and each has had something hard to say of the other. The truth is that each is obeying the laws of its own nature. The North has learned to be self-reliant, independent, assertive, because of the conditions of her being ; the South is poetic, imaginative, passionate, because it too obeys the natural law. This is particularly apparent in the case of America. Mrs. Trollope's once famous work shows how the stern struggle for life when all the elegancies were wanting and man had no time for anything but the fight with Nature and his fellowman, has led to the evolution of the present American character, assertive, self-reliant, eminently practical, money loving and vulgar. These qualities of the North have gained for it power, wealth, and domination ; it has little desire to emulate the South because it is content with these practical advantages. There is nothing to prevent East competing with West in any field. But if the South wishes to emulate the North then the task before her is stupendous. For she must set herself to overcome all that nature has placed in her way as obstacles, and she must rise superior to the course of evolution which nature has marked out for her.

I have finished. If men would but recognise that there is really no such thing as the Oriental and that what is so often contemptuously referred to as Eastern is but the product of natural forces, there would be more charity abroad. And if the so called Oriental recognised in like manner that the northern nations are what they are by reason of those same natural forces, there would be less envy expressing itself in such epithets as Satanic. Each has something to give to the other ; Nature is one and indivisible.

BARODA.

STANLEY RICE.

RECENT WORK IN INDIAN THOUGHT

(BY INDIAN WRITERS).

Mahamahopadhyaya

Professor S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

INDIA's present in the sphere of philosophical thought is, in several respects, like India's past in that sphere and may, with advantage, be considered in its two aspects - the *irenical* and the *polemical*. In its irenical aspect, the present work in Indian thought is mainly in the direction of enabling *India to speak with her own voice* in such a manner as would appeal to Western or Westernised minds, that seek to understand the spirit of Indian culture, not through any imitative echo of western thought, but through a telling exposition by a cultured Indian through the medium of English--the most influential and widely spoken language of the present world. This work of interpreting and evaluating Indian thought to English-knowing readers has been attempted by several Indian scholars with varying degrees of success; but the most commendable achievement in this kind of work so far has been what Professor S. Radhakrishnan of Madras (now of Calcutta) has shown in his recent contributions concerning Indian Philosophy and Hindu religion. Professor Radhakrishnan's volumes on Indian Philosophy easily surpass similar works about the same subject, in respect of form and matter, in respect of expository brilliance and estimative tact and in respect of textual correlations and technical elucidations. In these admirable volumes, he compresses into a lucid and interesting account, a bewildering mass of details pertaining to the pre-Buddhistic, Buddhistic and post-Buddhistic stages of philosophical thought in India. English-knowing specialists in Sanskrit Sastras are likely to notice that many a technical slip has unfortunately crept into an otherwise admirable work, which greater attention to textual matter would have prevented. But these specialists, if they have sufficient imagination and fairness, can hardly miss the gripping and living interest of Professor Radhakrishnan's volumes, which successfully exhibit the course of Indian philosophical thought as a perennial stream of progressive sweetness, and the

ancient makers and the moulders of this thought, not as so many embalmed corpses, but as living embodiments of philosophical insight and continually suggestive forces of well-regulated reason. In these volumes, Professor Radhakrishnan rightly holds up before himself Vachaspathimisra as the model of true philosophical spirit and with the inspiration which could be derived from such a model proceeds to interpret and evaluate the ancient philosophers of India at their best and to correlate them with the live issues of contemporary thought. Some foreign reviewers of Professor Radhakrishnan's work suggest that he has attempted to read into the crude phases of Indian philosophical systems several developments of modern thought, of which the traditional exponents of those systems were entirely innocent; while some Indian critics have suggested that Professor Radhakrishnan has been striking a false note in places where he speaks of a synthetic unity as underlying the diverse *darsanas* and that he has not correctly represented the attitude of the *darsanas* towards the Veda. To show the unsoundness of such criticisms, one has but to draw attention to Sanskrit works like Madhusudana Saraswati's *Prasthanabheda* and has to secure a dispassionate consideration of the admirable effort in Professor Radhakrishnan's volumes to combine fidelity to original sources with intelligent interpretation and criticism, as also of the learned Professor's remarks about the true significance of the nature of the Vedic sanction behind the *astika* systems of philosophy.

Professor Das Gupta's "History of Indian Philosophy" is another notable contribution to the irenic phase of the present work in Indian thought and lays greater emphasis on the historical aspect of Indian Philosophy than on philosophy proper. This learned Professor of Bengal endeavours in this work to give an account of the evolution of philosophical thought, strictly in accordance with the original sources in Sanskrit and seems to hold the view that there is hardly any need for a constructive exposition of the doctrines of Indian philosophy, for the reason that they appear to him to be essentially the same as those found in European philosophy. It is certainly a laudable endeavour, as all such endeavours are. But some discriminating readers of this work are apt to remember the unpleasant feeling which the unattractive manner of exposition causes in several places and are not likely to be very favourably impressed with the nature of its relation to the Sanskrit sources, since they cannot lose sight of many a noticeable lapse in the statement of Sastraic facts.* Of other Calcutta

* Read, for instance, the statement of the atomic theory of the *Vaiseshikas*, the elucidation of *visesha* as a category and the explanation of the definition of *asamavayikarana* in volume I of his History of Indian Philosophy.

scholars who have been attempting to interpret in English the chief doctrines of Indian *Darsanas*, mention may be made, in particular, of the names of Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya M.A., Professor Kokilesvara Sastri M.A. and Dr. Mahendra Nath Sircar. Following the *Prasthanatraya* literature as interpreted in Sankara's Bhashyas, Professor K. C. Bhattacharya attempts, in his "Studies in Vedantism", to clear up what is "vaguely called the mysticism of Vedanta in a more than ordinarily strenuous spirit of rationalism, without pretending to furnish omniscient explanations". The genuine philosophical spirit exhibited by Professor Bhattacharya and his crisp style of exposition are such as could easily mark out his work as one of outstanding merit among the Calcutta publications seeking to interpret Indian Philosophy in English. Professor Kokilesvara Sastri's desire to expound *advaita* doctrine, with almost exclusive reference to Sankara's works, is certainly commendable and his "Introduction to the Advaita Philosophy" is a work of considerable merit on the textual side, though, in respect of exposition and estimation, its weakness not infrequently comes out in a perceptible manner. Dr. Mahendra Nath Sircar's work "The system of Vedantic thought and culture" - is a contribution that shows a commendably high level of study and elucidative capacity and utilises, though often in a clumsy and injudicious way, much of the valuable material in post-Sankara literature on Advaita. It may not be out of place to refer in this connection to the somewhat amusing attitudinisation which one cannot help noticing in an interesting and useful compilation by Mr. Dakshinarayan Sastri M.A., which was published in Calcutta last month under the name of *Charvaka-shasti*. It would be useful to refer in this paper to the gigantic scheme recently adumbrated by Professor Ranade of Poona, for producing an Encyclopaedic history of Indian philosophy. The two volumes already published in accordance with this scheme are encouraging and give rise to great expectations. One of these volumes happens to be the work of Professor Ranade and gives a comprehensive view of Upanishadic thought and contains a "constructive survey of Upanishadic philosophy", with a view to correlating it to contemporary philosophical thought. The other volume supplements the former and is the joint production of Professors Ranade and Belvalkar. In the latter volume, the Upanishadic thought is analytically studied with reference to its historical antecedents and effects. When all the volumes of this Encyclopaedic history come to be published, it would turn out to be the most glorious monument of the present workers in Indian thought.

The religious side of the irenical phase of the present work in Indian thought claims, among others, three very recent contribu-

tions which compel the young and old Hindus alike to think on proper lines and which earnestly seek to help them in the difficult task of reconstruction and readjustment. Professor Radhakrishnan's Upton lectures on the "Hindu view of life," recently published in Great Britain in a beautiful volume, represent an excellent type of philosophical exposition, as applied to the central principles of Hinduism. Professor D. S. Sarma of the Presidency College, Madras, recently wrote and published two books relating to the Gita viz., "Introduction to the Bhagavad Gita" and "The Gita and spiritual life". They embody the results of the earnest and well-directed efforts of an enlightened Hindu Professor to effectively help himself and those who come into intimate contact with him, in utilising the Gita as a practical gospel of life. In this connection, it would be appropriate to invite attention to the attractive volume recently produced by Professor S. N. Das Gupta of Calcutta, on "Hindu mysticism". This volume incorporates the six lectures which the distinguished Professor delivered in America, as N. W. Harris Foundation lectures for 1926. These lectures contain much interesting matter relating to Hindu mysticism. One is, however, somewhat puzzled over the artificial and novel way in which the author defines the term 'mysticism' and proceeds to speak of *sacrificial mysticism* as one of the forms of Hindu mysticism. By what mysterious process the distinguished author has been able to discover any mystic element in an ill-assorted faggot of *Karma-mimamsa* concepts referred to in the first of these six lectures, one is at a loss to know. Nor does the author give any help in separating the mystic from the non-mystic elements in any of the *astika* systems of thought described in these six lectures in a somewhat diffuse manner.

It remains for us now to say a few words about the polemical phase of the present work in Indian thought. The contributions made from time to time by Professor K. Sundararama Aiyer M.A., of Kumbakonam and Professor R. Nagaraja Sarma M.A., L.T., of the Presidency College, Madras, in this direction, deserve special mention. The venerable Professor of Kumbakonam, in his masterly introduction to the Srirangam edition of the *Vedanta-sara* of Sadananda, pulls to pieces certain questionable generalisations and interpretations which Dr. Thibaut had occasion to set forth in his introduction to the English translation of the *Bhashyas* on the *Brahma-Sutras* by Samkara and Ramanuja. Professor K. Sundararama Aiyer's recent brochure on "the Vedanta and its doctrine of Divine personality" is an able and vigorous exposition of the theistic elements of *advaita* in a setting which is at once polemical and constructive. Mr. R. Nagaraja Sarma is a rising *vaitandika* of Indian Philosophy, and his writings, such as

we find in his recent pamphlet entitled "Romance in Indian Philosophy", are certainly very useful in that they seek to provide an effective type of philosophical catharsis to the present work in Indian thought, with special reference to some of the best works of eminent scholars like Professor S. Radhakrishnan. Professor R. N. Sarma ought to take care to feel his own ground quite safe and ought not to nod in his polemics, as he has done, in his animadversions against Professor S. Radhakrishnan's interpretation of the word '*avyapadesya*' in Gautama's definition of *pratyaksa*. In fact, the most brilliant and attractive contribution to the polemical side of the present work in Indian thought is to be found in the vindication of the Upanishadic approach to reality through a polemical review of contemporary philosophy in Professor S. Radhakrishnan's *best work* called "The Reign of Religion in contemporary philosophy".

The present work in Indian thought may thus be seen to be full of promise for the future and tends to show how there is every possibility of readjustment where necessary, with old values duly conserved wherever desirable, and how the disintegrating influences of the present-day communalistic negativism should be combated by the more thoughtful, reasonable and far-seeing followers of Hinduism.

MADRAS.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

OUR FUTURE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMME.

By Professor H. D. BHATTACHARYYA.

A few months ago the writer of the present article was invited to preside over the deliberations of the Dacca District 'Teachers' Conference—an annual gathering of the teachers of high schools situated within the Dacca district. He accepted the invitation, not because he was intimately associated with any school but because he felt that being an outsider he was perhaps seeing more of the educational game than those actually engaged in the act of instructing school children. When educational ideals, institutions and policies are all in the melting pot and seem to suffer from a chronic malady which justifies frequent consultation of educational commissions and committees, it is no wonder that the teachers should be curious about the opinions and attitudes of all sorts of people (the class to which the writer belongs being among the rest) regarding their own work, and also that every educated person, taking any interest in the educational developments of his own country, should have, to use the words of Plato, some opinion, if not a knowledge, of academic remedies. The following observations are therefore made in the nature of an opinion which the writer has, after some acquaintance with the educational history and policy in India, come to form regarding the malady and the remedy.

The Hartog Committee is touring the country to collect materials for an educational report bearing on the nature of the future franchise. Its primary aim is not academic but political. After a close personal association with the president for over five years at Dacca, the writer confidently expects that the work of that committee will be thorough and conscientious; but he is afraid none the less that, owing to its political orientation, the findings of that committee will not be to benefit the educational bodies directly to any great extent. The Calcutta University

Commission did its work so thoroughly that its report has already become the academic scripture in many a centre of learning and the names of Sir Michael Sadler and Sir Asutosh Mookerjee have frequently been exploited to silence any voice of dissent or criticism. There is no doubt, however, that the report was in the nature of a compromise between rival claims and a concession to existing educational conditions. It was, moreover primarily designed to meet a local need and could be utilised elsewhere only in so far as similar conditions prevailed. The only tangible result in Bengal thus far has been the establishment of the Dacca University (with which the writer has been associated since its very inception) and a consequential starting of a board at Dacca to control the Intermediate and Secondary education within the limits of the Dacca University jurisdiction. But the impetus it gave towards the establishment of residential Universities has travelled beyond the limits of Bengal, and Lucknow, Allahabad, Osmania, and Andhra Universities have come in the wake of Dacca to concentrate higher teaching at definite spots, and those that have still to control mofussil colleges are trying to evolve a better method of instruction with the co-operation of their constituent colleges, or by direct appointment when funds permit. Already the cry for the separation of the Intermediate colleges from the Degree Colleges has travelled far, and it may be expected that if nothing untoward happens the scheme will be universally adopted and the Intermediate Colleges and schools will very soon get dissociated from the Universities and have their policies and destinies controlled by semi-academic bodies acting as the mouthpiece of the community which they are primarily meant to benefit. On the face of it, there seems to be nothing wrong in this evolution of educational arrangement. But it is this aspect of the policy that we shall discuss at some length in the present paper.

The first thing that strikes an educationist of other lands is this Intermediate course. The justification for its continuance has been sought in the low standard of the Matriculation and the consequent imperfect equipment of the students to profit by a degree course direct. So the Intermediate course was designed to serve as a continuation of the school course in another name, only that some new science subjects like Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, etc., and some new arts subjects like Logic, Economics, Psychology, Civics, etc., have from time to time been added, and some new vocational courses like Commerce, Dyeing, Book-keeping, etc., opened to keep pace with local demands or to brighten the admission prospects of students in relation to

higher educational institutions. It was never meant to be a final stage in the educational progress of any student and had always its curricula determined by extraneous needs. That it should suffice for the cultural needs of the community for the majority while serving at the same time to give the necessary introduction to the higher courses like Medicine, Engineering, Science and Arts, was what was never directly aimed at. That is why with advancing years the tendency has been towards increasing specialisation, with the effect that now you can have lots of Intermediates who are totally ignorant of the natural sciences or, in the alternative, of the cultural side of education. The Matriculation has long ceased to have any aim of its own. The market value of its certificate is below that of the German mark or the Austrian kronen during the last war. In Bengal and the Panjab the number of Matriculates has gone up by leaps and bounds, not because the Matriculation means anything financially gainful or academically spectacular but because to one without the Matriculation certificate, all doors of further advance are barred. It is regretfully tantalising to Indian guardians that in many lands the Matriculation should be a sufficient passport to life's vocation and that the University and the professional courses should be meant only for the special few. How many would joyfully greet the advent of that day when for finding an occupation a youth need not go beyond the Matriculation stage unless he is ambitious and intelligent and aspires after leadership and fame! Is it impossible to bring about that contingency by a slight rearrangement of the educational grades and to bring India into line with other parts of the world?

Let us accept the obvious fact that the Matriculation has ceased to be of any substantial value. It is true that in Government offices, where assistants are recruited by competition, Matriculation is still the minimum standard of qualification; but then the presence of a large number of candidates with higher qualifications almost invariably leaves very little chance to the Matriculates. When persons with better educational qualifications are available, it would be doing them an obvious injustice if they are debarred from appearing at these appointment tests; but when they leave the Matriculates in the lurch through their superior ability and thus a large number of imperfectly trained young men are left in the hands of the community, we begin to ask: what are we going to do with them? India is not yet sufficiently developed industrially to absorb these men and to lick them into some passable shape by years of specialised training. So they remain for years social hangers-on till they drift into uneconomic positions or develop into social rebels.

The system of universal matrimony (from which happily the country is disengaging itself in recent years) increases family responsibility without adequate income, and a nation of impoverished weaklings becomes the inevitable consequence of a suicidal social policy which fails to take note of the altered value of money as commodities rise in price with advancing time. The social task is to find adequate outlets for these imperfectly trained men—the educationally depressed classes whose interests have been systematically neglected of late. This can be achieved by a simultaneous improvement in their educational equipment and increasing their distance from the next higher class in the educational world.

To achieve this object we must introduce a new dichotomy into our educational system. *We must abolish the Intermediate course altogether* and raise the Matriculation to the status of a self-contained course sufficient for cultural intercourse and life's vocation in non-technical fields of employment. In order to bring that about, it would be necessary to split up the present Intermediate course into two halves. The first year of that course would go to the High School and the second year would be absorbed by the higher courses of instruction. On this scheme there will be an additional year given to the schools to improve the literary, cultural and technical equipment of its students. The University course for a degree would then consist of three years instead of two, both for Pass and for Honours, followed by a two years' M.A. course. With the elimination of the Intermediate stage and the rise in the Matriculation standard, the vocational courses would be opened without reserve to the matriculates. Thus Medicine, Engineering, Junior Law courses, Junior Teachers' Training courses, etc., would in future draw their recruits from the improved matriculates of the future. Needless to say, the ministerial appointments of the lower grades would go to these and all junior technical appointments requiring a period of apprenticeship would look to them for future filling-up. Incidentally this method would reduce the number of examinations by one. Henceforth there will be a Matriculation examination, followed three years later by a University degree examination. The distance between the graduates and the matriculates would be quite respectable, and the present large number of Intermediates would not spoil the chances of the former in any junior appointments. The number going up for University degrees is still manageable and it is likely that those who now read up to the Intermediate standard from sheer necessity and thus waste their paternal substance would in future

remain satisfied with a Matriculation certificate that gives access to the ordinary avocations of life.

There are no doubt difficulties, some permanent and some transitory. There is, first of all, the difficulty of improving the Matriculation standard uniformly all over the country. Struggling schools that cater for local needs with imperfect equipment will be weeded out in the struggle for existence unless they make arrangements with improved schools to take over their boys from a certain stage onward (and that depends in most cases on the convenience of the scholars and the location of adjacent schools). The introduction of Science courses into the Matriculation will prove an additional complication to most schools that have to spend at present next to nothing on scientific equipment. Even when Geography with its small equipment is a subject that many schools can ill afford to teach as an optional subject, there is no doubt that the addition of Science courses would mean the total disappearance of some of the existing schools. This is a contingency that must be faced, for after all, schools are meant to prepare scholars for life and not for the Intermediate course. There is no reason why some schools should not remain satisfied with the preliminary classes, say up to the sixth or seventh standard (5th or 4th class), while other schools begin from this stage. At present all schools teach from the lowest to the highest grade; in any future scheme we may seriously discuss whether it is not desirable that, where funds do not permit schools should combine to run the higher classes as a joint venture instead of entering into competition with one another with their inefficient staff. Co-operation among schools, analogous to that among Colleges for higher instruction, is still an idea unknown, although in towns, where schools are near one another, such a co-operative method of instruction is eminently feasible. There is no doubt that a much better staff can be engaged where schools pool together their resources for imparting better instruction than they do at present. With the introduction of the extended Matriculation course this would be more or less a necessity, for many schools would have to disappear entirely if they refuse to participate in such joint venture.

The real difficulty is about the rural population. In recent years the policy has been to bring education to the doors of the community so that there might be no excuse for illiteracy or outcry against social indifference. Already in rural areas the schools are too far apart; insistence on a higher standard and addition of a science class will mean the extinction of many of the existing rural schools. It may not, therefore, be improperly

asked whether the present Government institutions in district headquarters (we are talking specially of Bengal) might not be turned into Schools composed of the five upper classes only (even three or four classes, according to the efficiency of the feeder institutions) to which the rural schools might send their scholars (and these might be helped financially to meet the expenses of a city life). Our children have too long been tied to the apron-strings of their mothers and have as a consequence developed that homesickness and that dread of the distant and the unknown from which it is high time to wean them in the interests of a developing national consciousness. Without a spirit of migration neither a community nor a church flourishes; the truants, the emigrants and the missionaries are the growing points of a communal and religious life. There are risks but these must be faced to give the children a schooling in the strenuous struggles of life. There is no doubt that the city atmosphere is more cultured and more liberal than many home atmospheres of villages. With increasing demand of urban instruction the amenities of hostel life will naturally improve in the towns and better methods of control will be evolved.

In Bengal the dissociation of the Intermediate from the Matriculation and the degree courses has landed educationists and administrators in a quandary. Who are going to undertake responsibility for running the Intermediate course? A patchwork was done at Dacca where a Board was set up to run both the Matriculation and the Intermediate. But the Government of Bengal has, it seems, realised already that the Matriculation is enough for a single Board, nay it may be necessary to set up two Boards in the two parts of the Province to run the Matriculation alone. So the Intermediate is being handed over to the University of Calcutta for administration as before, and naturally, therefore, the University needs will dominate the course in future as at present. To set up another costly machinery to run the Intermediate administration is not likely to be countenanced by the public. So by a curious arrangement the task of running two administrations has fallen on the Colleges instead of on the Government. Those who have to do with education alone know what financial difficulty this unnecessary duplication of the teaching and administrative staff means. But what has been the net benefit? Bengal is not in a mood to accept this division of educational institutions into two halves, each of two years' duration. In the city of Calcutta no post-graduate teaching can be imparted except at the University, with the co-operation of such teachers of private colleges as are engaged by the University.

Outside Calcutta no College is likely to command a staff likely to be approved by the University for post-graduate teaching. It has been felt that in two years no affection towards an institution can grow. So the two years of Intermediate College life is a sheer desert in academic affection. That *esprit de corps* and academic loyalty which it is the aim of education to foster, cannot develop when the institution is a transition between the beginning and the end of the educational course. By abolishing such an institution of doubtful utility and enormous encumbrance to teachers and administrators alike, the educational system is not likely to lose anything—rather, the chances are that it will gain in the long run by opening up to improved matriculates a career which at present the swarm of Intermediates now threatens so disastrously. When will the country refuse to worship this academic trinity of Matriculation, Intermediate and Graduation? By interposing no fresh examination between Matriculation and Graduation, not only will young students get that respite which they so sorely need but the question of a Board will be automatically solved, for then there will be a board, representing social interests which will control the Matriculation and there will be the University to control all higher teaching.

From the side of the Universities there will be a great gain. The three years' Honours course has been worked at Dacca now for the last seven years and yet notwithstanding the risk of enraging enthusiastic admirers I must confess that so far as the Arts side is concerned, it has not worked well. Bright students to whom a degree means a career, generally go to the Calcutta University (and this is specially true of Hindu students whose financial facilities at Dacca are admittedly less than those of Mussalmans) to take an Honours Degree in two years and then proceed to the M. A. and Law courses. As they finish their career in exactly the same time and have the advantage of possessing an Honours degree a year earlier, the three years' Honours course at Dacca counts generally upon local recruits who cannot meet the costly expenses of education at Calcutta. We must however make an exception in favour of the Mahommedans for their type is better at Dacca and the reason is that Dacca offers many facilities and amenities to Muslims which they cannot get elsewhere. But apart from pecuniary considerations there are grave academic objections to a three years' Honours course. So long as separate instruction cannot be provided for Honours men and Pass graduates, the first year M.A. work is primarily designed to bring the Pass men up to the level of the Honours men as far as practicable so that in the second year all the students may be taught together and enter for the same final M. A. examination.

The effect has been that the funds at the disposal of the University being limited, separation of Pass and Honours men has not been found possible. The pass men are forced to sit for a very imperfect Preliminary M.A. examination only after six or seven months' training, and brilliant Honours men find one year too short for taking up any research work as a part of their M.A. course. That within six examinations since the inception of the Dacca University, only one student should dare to submit a thesis in lieu of written papers is eloquent testimony to the unsatisfactory character for the Final M.A. course so far as the Arts side is concerned. On the Science side, however, by a more liberal exemption from written tests than on the Arts side, it has been found possible to attract students to the Research course.

A three years' degree course would obviate all this difficulty. Students will take up Pass and Honours course according to their ability and inclination and not on account of the question of the years of instruction. One great advantage of this extended degree course, at least in the Honours subjects, would be the possibility of making a modern European language other than English (say, French or German) compulsory for all Honours candidates. The sooner it is recognised that for higher research work in any subject, acquaintance with German is almost a necessity and that for Literature, Psychology, Oriental Art, Mathematics and some such subjects, a knowledge of French is an obvious advantage, the better for the educational development of the country. The English are conservative not only in their political outlook but also in their educational and scholarly activities. Years must elapse before a classic of some other language is translated into English, with the effect that Indians who sedulously cultivate this single foreign tongue have to depend upon secondhand materials for utilising the discoveries and discussions recorded in non-English languages of Europe. The English boy is a less sufferer, for he generally acquires a knowledge of French in his school, but the Indian youth must be left to his own devices to get that essential knowledge of French or German without which he finds himself hopelessly out of date in most academic and technical matters. True, the English boy has not to learn a vernacular in addition to English as the Indian boy has to do (and in South India the vernaculars are so many) ; but then we propose the beginning of the French or German course at a fairly good age and give three years to learn the essentials of the language to Honours men who are presumably better in intellectual equipment than the rest. At present there is no possibility of getting a working knowledge of these foreign languages except at a great cost or a huge personal effort. The time has come when every University and

every College affiliated up to the Honours standard should be required to provide instruction in these as a compulsory part of the Honours course. As a consideration, the Vernacular paper, if any, may be taken out of the Honours course and retained only in the Pass course.

An Honours man so equipped in languages will not be afraid to go in for a research degree in his special subject at his M.A. The two years at his disposal will be sufficient to give him a taste for original composition and to lay the foundations of an original mode of thought which is so essential for all national regeneration. Merely reproducing the thoughts and opinions of others brings on a slavishness which is dangerous to the intellect and inimical to the will. Once you rid the students of the incubus of frequent examinations and give them some time to look ahead, there is no reason why you should not hope much of the youths of the country. We are personally convinced that had Sir Asutosh been alive he would have disowned, for very good reasons and with the example of Dacca before him, that part of the Calcutta University Commission Report which relates to the three years' Honours course followed by a single year's M.A. As a matter of fact during his life time, in the Post-Graduate Council in Arts a resolution, mainly inspired by Dr. (now Sir) Brajendranath Seal, was adopted recommending the retention of the two years' Honours course. That resolution is now probably lost in the archives of the University but is well worth resuscitation. That Sir Asutosh did nothing to help the inauguration of the new Honours course is itself a proof that he was not enamoured of the plan, for had he been convinced himself it would not have taken him long to bring the Senate over to his own way of thinking and to introduce the much needed reform. One acquainted with the history of the Law and Post-graduate instruction in Bengal will easily understand that no amount of public clamour would have deflected him from his resolve to carry through a desired improvement.

Now a word of caution at the end. We are particularly concerned at the large-scale withdrawal of Muslim children from general High Schools at a time when we are trying to get the depressed and backward classes into them. The segregation of the two main communities of India in this fashion can never augur well for the future of the country. When it is possible for a Mahommedan boy to pass from a High Madrassah into an Islamic Intermediate College and thence to Aligarh University or some communal institution like the Islamia College of Calcutta without getting that intimate knowledge of the life and feelings of his

Hindu neighbours, it is idle to expect that even as an educated man he will ever be able to get rid of communal bias. The time has come to cry halt to this kind of communal instruction as a part of public policy. Not only must all communal institutions maintained at public cost disappear, but even when private charity establishes an institution of this type in the future, it must be definitely laid down as a condition of affiliation that a fixed percentage of students of other denominations must be admitted into every class. We are already sufficiently disunited among ourselves; further encouragement in this direction would mean ruination of all national hopes. Neither by religion nor by race must we aspire to thrive, and no educational institution (and I include within it schools meant for Europeans, Parsis, etc.) must be allowed to keep out as a matter of policy students of other types beyond a certain percentage.

This is enough work for the near future. To strive for an extended and improved Matriculation, opening out into most of life's minor vocations, a three years' Degree course with French or German compulsory for Honours men, the total abolition of the Intermediate examination (and colleges) and the suppression of all exclusive institutions should be the immediate objective of all educationists with the country's good at heart. May another Sir Asutosh arise to carry these measures through!

DACCA.

H. D. BHATTACHARYA.

NEHRU REPORT AND SIMON COMMISSION.

By B. K. MALLIK, B.Litt. (Oxon.)

II.

BUT we do not, for a moment, suggest that Sir John Simon came over to India if only to stage a burlesque on a political piece; nor need we be absurd enough to insinuate that our Pandit Motilal was out only for some relaxation in this tremendous game. Obviously both of them seem to be well past the fantasies even of middle age; and unless meanwhile they had to make a "deal" of their inner faith, they could hardly spend the rest of their life except in building up the edifice of human security. Besides, after all, it did not quite rest with a Simon or a Nehru to decide whether there should or should not be either a Simon Commission or a Nehru Report. As a matter of fact, both were foregone conclusions; and precisely, because there had for sometime, arisen in the Indian horizon, what might be called a political crisis which, if it did not quite upset the British connection with India, at any rate shook it to its very foundation. It was this crisis and nothing else which precipitated both the Commission and the Report; and it was not possible that even the high Gods of politics should prevent them. What, of course, this crisis really meant is another question; and we propose to discuss in the body of these articles both what it precisely indicated or why it arose at all. But would it be at all exaggerating the truth if we said,—by the way,—that the early 20th century with its stupor-like faith in English Liberalism and the late 19th with its still lingering touch of Victorian piety are long past the edge of the Indian sky, and perhaps, sinking on its way to the British Isles? Besides, it must be curious, indeed, for anybody to have to record that even the long-stretching rays of Loydian hopes, so anxiously rushed across to the Indian horizon, in the gorgeous prime of the European War, should have moved away, leaving it to the suspense of a sullen calm. Yet, we should not be supposed, for one moment, to suggest that, what the crisis we have been talking about really meant was, that the Indian mind simply rose, as it were, in revolt at the almost diabolic practice of holding back promises after having lavishly

scattered them as if to serve an immediate need. It was, indeed, a spectacle for the Gods to watch how those promises rose and spread out to the distant East with the waxing severity of the War and gradually fell quietly to return to the British Isles as those dangers steadily waned. Nor could it possibly be a question of exploiting the sudden fall in British prestige and the enormous change in the world situation which so curiously, followed in the wake of the German fall. For, after all, the Hindu and the Mahomedan, have long ceased to be exploiters in politics whatever their leanings might be. As it is, the Indian Mahomedan is a very different person even from his fellow Moslems across the frontier, and the Hindu as is well-known never properly cultivated that practice at all. The point is that neither the Hindu nor the Mahomedan rose in revolt at all; nor ever really designed such a move. If they at all rose, they must have risen, as it were, from a long dream; and the crisis arose, steadily and full-throated precisely because they instantly began to question the strangeness of life which had drifted in, ever since they fell asleep. The fact of the matter is that the moment had arrived when they felt they must don their political mantle which had to be stowed away, for at least a century and a half, under the pressure of some medieval need. It was not possible that they could put up, any longer, with the conditions of life which they had themselves, consciously, or unconsciously chosen to live ever since the Moslem Power broke up and Panipat smashed the Hindus again. In all conscience they had enough of that experiment, however indispensable; and, what they were now truly out for, was nothing, if not the Indian State which had been almost deliberately kept in abeyance ever since they encouraged the British people to run their affairs for them. There is not a Hindu or a Mahomedan in the whole of India, whatever his political creed or spiritual bias, who did not set his heart on the Indian State as the one supreme goal of his political endeavour; and it would be madness to deny that, if anything could allay the perpetual troubles which are characteristically Indian, it must be the Indian State. After all, the Indian issue is very very simple indeed. If is, if anything, merely a question of resuming, on the part of the Hindu and the Mahomedan, the life of political practice after a long sojourn in an exclusively non-political medium. What we must never forget is, that the Indian problem was, by no means, one of acquiring political independence or of even regaining it. There never was a lapse of independence; there was not even a political failure; there was, at the most, only a voluntary abstention, a choice, however stimulated, to go on a long leave, as it were, from political activities under conditions which made a joint experiment

with the secular and spiritual interests both dangerous and futile. What, however, this exactly means or what phase of Indian history it refers to, we can not quite discuss at once. We will have to deal with it at length, but it might well be, that even such an innocent and perfectly legitimate aspiration of the Hindu and Mahomedan might be suspected as something, ungracious, if not wildly freakish. Unfortunately there are still people who see things from an angle, just the reverse of that of the Hindu and the Mahomedan. As a matter of fact, there is still abroad too much of prejudice and even superstition in the 20th Century not to push the Englishman into belief that, after all, the Hindu and the Mahomedan might be only stealing a march on him, under the garb of a patriotic faith. And it is a fact that political prejudice dies hard, especially when it is deeply in alliance with cultural pride; and it does not seem to be, at all, clear if things would right themselves if they are left to the usual currents of practice and thinking. As a matter of fact, if we are at all, to prevent this extremely unfortunate possibility from materialising itself we must expose it in the glare of Indian history. If anything can disabuse the English mind of its long-cherished prejudice, it must be a fresh and an altogether different conception of the origin of the British rule from what has hitherto passed current with him. If we are at all anxious that the Englishman should see things as they are and not as they appeared to a distant and prejudiced vision, we must let in a flood of light on the rise and growth of the British status from a fresh analysis of Indian history. What we must remember is that the Englishman is by the urge of his imperial past, necessarily a conservative in the main; and naturally has to be literally hit hard with the stubbornness of historic facts before he could easily bend his honest mind.

But it would be silly and mean to forget that after all he was not wholly responsible for the one-sided history which had been the main source of his dark prejudice. No doubt it was his own countrymen who wrote that history. But why at all had they to write it? Why did not the Indian write the history of his own country instead of letting the necessarily incomplete vision of a European do that work for him? This is not the moment to be perverse or acrimonious; but one must admit that the Englishman's misconception arose partly because he had to do somebody else's job, hardly agreeable to his temperament. So that what it is necessary that the Indian must undertake to do at once is to rewrite the history of India instead of wasting time in fixing up its blame. And it is all the more necessary that he must do so, as what is of paramount importance for both the Indian and the Englishman, to day is that the deeper currents of that history

must be brought up to the surface if we expect anything really substantial to happen. The time is long gone when a bare chronicle of events with occasional reflections induced by personal tastes might do. What is really necessary now is to go behind the scenes, however detailed, and straight away ask the question "Why did they happen at all"? We have to interpret the records left to us by our forefathers and not accept them on their face value.

We have to ask for instance, "Why did not the Hindus and the Mahomedans form a coalition against the European when he appeared like the dark horse in their midst just when they were struggling to come to some sort of an understanding between them? Why did not they fight together against the European exactly as they fought among themselves especially, as at least some of their intelligent minds pretty early realised that the European did not quite appear as a "spiritual star"? On the other hand how did the Englishman happen to think that he could hold the Hindu and the Mahomedan well under control when as a matter of fact he had only a new strategy or a fresh weapon of warfare at the most? What reasons had he believe that Mutinies would not be the rule of the day, instead of crossing the horizon only once like a bashful blunder? The point is, we have to go behind documents and pronouncements, battles and attempts to stop them, even histories and chronicles worked up in the heat of the moment and find out the deeper conditions which made the Hindu and the Mahomedan suddenly depart from their time-honoured political tradition and delegate the whole question of administration to the charge of a foreign power almost in the same spirit as a Nepalese King or a Japanese Monarch handed over temporal power to their ministers. And we are confident that if we approached the history of India in this spirit, we are sure to discover that it was neither the peculiar efficiency nor the peculiar deficiency of the British people which gave them the chance of establishing the British regime in India; nor was it that the Hindu and the Mahomedan failed to oust him simply because they had a monopoly of human weaknesses. It is absurd to think it was ever at all a question of a sudden military inspiration in the one or a rapid stroke of feebleness in the other. What it precisely was, it is difficult yet to tell; but it was, at least, nothing short of the momentous fact that the modern age in human history was dawning in India; and naturally altogether fresh experiments in social and political practice must have been almost cosmically in view. So that what must have worked and held decisions, as it were, in the palm of their hands were not merely individual or even collective opinions and views but the traditional roots of ages and even logical situation which came down to us from the hoary

past. In plain terms if the British regime for instance opened up in India it was partly because while the 'mackerel' and 'steel' precipitated a sudden commercial enterprise and a navigating impulse in England, a failure was marked simultaneously in India, even after centuries of social affinity to form a really true Indian Society. So that the Englishman, whatever his political creed could easily believe that the British rule was not a matter of "conquest" or "trust" any more than it rested on a "bounty" or a "privilege." No doubt there was a necessity for it, a necessity almost biologically stimulated, but it never could be ridiculous enough to orient itself at the expense of Indian individuality. On the contrary, it was to this individuality that it must have owed, as well for its inception as for the steady nursing it has required ever since it was established. It could not have survived even a day if it had not assured itself of the Hindu and Mahomedan sanction to its main motive from the beginning till to day. One might even be hyperbolic and call it providential, if only one could add that the Providence could not have behaved quite like a tribal God insinuating either a reflection upon the political history of India or a blighting curse on her future. It precipitated an English agency, launching out a fresh experiment in political practice, it must have had sufficient faith in its purity not to confuse it in a personal matrix, and, if only the British authorities had not converted a secular neutrality into an economic and cultural exploitation, it would surely have pleased Providence more and, by no means, less. Indeed, if only the English politician had, somehow, avoided working up Indian history as only a venue for propaganda work, he might have easily seen how his status was no more economic or political than it was spiritual or cultural. The Englishman was never called upon to provide a religion to India, nor even a culture, least of all, a merchandise, the peculiar virtue of which was to kill the indigenous. It was open to him of course to come over and settle down and practise whatever faith or manners as he pleased, exactly as the Persian, the Jew, and the Scythian, among others, had systematically done before him. It was open to him, again, to play the critic and even an advocate to the antagonist of Indian tradition. Nothing could be more salutary to the Indian cause. But his main business in the country was to watch and guard over the economic and political interests for which he held an agency and not to supersede them by personal consideration, much less to interfere, in any way, with the rooted faiths and habits or the social system which they had embodied either with an evangelist's passion or a diplomat's perseverance. It was, indeed, a misfortune for all parties concerned that the English politician never realised what his real status

in India, was, or why the English civil servant, for instance had to sweat in the sweltering heat of the Indian plains. By a strange fatality, he was infected with what they called the superiority complex, pretty early, in his prosperous career; and never really got the chance of revising his views and ideas. By far the most pathetic event in the history of the modern European was that he happened to take himself much too seriously; and many of us know only too well how the drama is still being enacted even as we write this either with 'personal vanity' or a "collective greed". If only the English historian had seen that while the dark age of India—we are supposed to be still in it—was not much too deeply shaded, the corresponding age in Europe which is supposed to be saturated with light was after all dark enough; that if the Hindu and the Mahomedan had not the political opportunity to live out their independent lives, the Englishman was hardly secure enough in the ramshackle economy of the British Empire. So that what we feel bound to repeat again is that it is necessary that one must go back to Indian history and orient a more balanced and accurate account of the origin of the British administration than what has so far prevailed. Obviously Sir John Simon will achieve nothing whatever either this way or that so long as he did not start with the right ideas and it is much too late in the day to crush India Montague-like with the dead-weight of Western culture or to perpetuate the present regime with only alterations on its facade. What he has to realise above all things is that even his own security as an Englishman was in danger just as much as that of the Hindu and the Mahomedan—perhaps he does that and the main problem no longer was how to try and make the British Parliament even more powerful than what it was already but to deal with the British Empire in a way sufficiently intelligent only to set aloose its different parts. The present is the moment for division and discrimination and not by any means for deepening the vagueness of its nebulous disorder. Sooner than one could think, the constituent parts must first be put back in their regional grooves; and if necessary one must carve two empires out of it and then knit them together by a different tie altogether more honourable and eminently productive for the human good. But let us proceed to deal with the history of India if only to substantiate our case.

(To be continued.)

BEHIND THE MASK.

And what is all my singing worth
If everywhere upon the earth
Under an unresponsive sky
The little children starve and die?

While millions labour all day long
How shall I dare to sing a song
Woven of soft melodious words
In praise of waters and of birds?

Nay, selfish poet! let us cease
To sing of life's poetic peace
Which is at best a mask that tries
To hide a world of weeping eyes.

Have you not heard the roaming feet
Of weary women in the street
Who fill the night with tired tread
That children may at dawn be fed?

Have you not seen the death that fills
The eyes of millions in the mills
Whose life is nothing but a bare
And bleeding story of despair?

Come, poet! sing no more of stars
While there behind black prison-bars
Where silence is itself a groan
Men languish silent and alone.

In this dark world of death and pain
Who sings of beauty, sings in vain
In this dark world of groans and cries
Who sings of beauty sings of lies.

For where is beauty, poet, where
For them who breathe the deadly air
Who hear all day the heavy thud
Of iron monsters in their blood?

The wandering cloud, the flowering tree
Soft winds and azure skies shall be
For the first time in beauty wed
When every man receives his bread.

A HOT-WEATHER NIGHT.

(ON THE INDIAN FRONTIER.)

(Copyright.)

Dark, hot and still the night; the stagnant air
Smells of the warm damp grass; and as I lie
Waiting for sleep, I watch the splendid stars
That glitter in the black gulf of the sky
On guard, the old Afridi chowkidars

Are chatting over there,
And hubble-bubbles gobble; the weird howl
Of Jackals, and the far-off bay of dogs
Join chorus with hoarse croaking of bull-frogs,
And "What?" mysteriously asks an owl.

Now all is quiet, save the ceaseless chirr
Of shrill cicadas sizzling in the heat;
Still, dark and hot—O for a cooling breeze!
Drowsy, I watch the glittering fire-flies flit
Among the blacken shadows, which are trees,

Where not a leaf doth stir;
But now and then a bird, as if in pain,
Flutters up there; sometimes a silly dove
Suddenly wakes, and coos aloud his love,
Then stops, and quickly sinks to sleep again.

Hot, still and dark—and slumber will not come.
Hark! in the silence, far and far away,
A thin, lone voice, singing a wailing song,
Hauntingly sad, a strange weird Indian lay
In minor key, with notes drawn out and long,

While throbs a thudding drum.
It thrills with wistful yearning, and it
To be of things forlorn and lone and *triste*;
It calls with all the lure of the East,
Lulls me to sleep, and mingles with my dreams.

RAM MOHAN ROY AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.

By N. C. GANGOOLY.

IN his controversy with the Christian missionaries, particularly with Dr. Marshman of Serampore, Ram Mohan played the double part, first, of interpreting Christianity from his own point of view, and secondly, of defending Hinduism on the lines of its best and noblest thoughts. His avowed object was to set forth the highest truths of all living religions which naturally have some common features of an ethical and spiritual character, so as to admit of a synthesis broad as well as deep. The totality of these features was for him the greatest common measure of all the religions in the world. Evidently he was not a votary of any particular system—a fact which caused much confusion in the later estimates of his religious faith.

In his *Precepts of Jesus*, the reformer had taken the general position which may be best depicted in his own words thus:—

“ By separating from other matters contained in the New Testament the moral precepts found in that book, these will be more likely to produce the desirable effect of improving the hearts and minds of men of different persuasions and degrees of understanding. Moral doctrines tending merely to the maintenance of peace and harmony of mankind at large are beyond the reach of metaphysical perversion and intelligible alike to the learned and the unlearned. . . . This simple code of religion and morality is so admirably calculated to elevate man's ideas to high and liberal notions of one God, who has equally subjected all living creatures, without distinction of caste, rank or wealth, to change, disappointment, pain and death, and has equally admitted all to be partakers of the beautiful mercies which he has lavished over nature, and is also so well fitted to regulate the conduct of the human race in the discharge of their various duties to God, to themselves and to society, that I cannot but hope the best effects from its promulgation in the present form.”¹

It is definitely shown in the above extract that Ram Mohan was not taking a narrow view of Christianity which was to him

¹Prec. of Jesus, p.

the very best expression of moral and social idealism. But he was really trying to steer clear of the theological differences among the Christian sects themselves, futile as they were in regard to man's spiritual advancement and he laid special stress on the moral side of Christ's teaching as the most practical path to progress and culture. Miss Collet has remarked, that "the very last thing Ram Mohan desired or anticipated for his book was theological controversy." In fact his own position was clear and he made it more explicit in his confession that

"This essential characteristic of the Christian religion I was for a long time unable to distinguish as such amidst the various doctrines I found insisted upon in the writings of Christian authors. . . . Among these opinions the most prevalent seems to be that no one is entitled to the appellation Christian who does not believe in the divinity of Christ and of the Holy Ghost as well as in the divine nature of God, the Father of all created beings. . . . Whilst some require from him who claims the title Christian only an adherence to the doctrines of Christ as taught by himself, without insisting on implicit confidence in those of the apostles, as being, except when speaking from inspiration, like other men, liable to mistake and error. . . . That they were so is obvious from several instances of differences of opinion amongst the apostles recorded in the Acts and the Epistles."²

What he actually cared for was the "ideal humanity" of Christ, permeating the Christian faith; and this, according to him, was its "essential characteristic" calculated to secure "the peace and harmony of mankind at large."³ He was very modern in this respect, as it is being proved day after day that the metaphysical part of Christian doctrine has very little to do with the solution of world problems. On the contrary the ethical teachings of Christ, indicating evident and palpable ways of escape from all types of difficulties, have not as yet been courageously adopted or given effect to anywhere on the face of the earth. Ram Mohan looked up to these moral principles as containing potential victory.

Naturally enough Ram Mohan was misunderstood by the Missionaries, but it must be said to their credit that they found out quite early the trend of thought which threatened to destroy their propagandist work. If some are of opinion like Dr. Macdonald of the Presbyterian Mission,⁴ that sympathy might have saved the situation, the very incisiveness of the reformer's criticisms, his range of study and intensity of zeal would prove that he was in a different region and sympathetic handling alone would have

¹ Collet, p. 59.

² Pre. of J., p.

³ Collet, p. 61.

⁴ Ibid p.

produced little impression on him. He was of different metal and his mental constitution was moulded on other lines. Marshman spoke of him as merely "an intelligent heathen" in his note to which Ram Mohan took strong exception in his first *Defence*, declaring that he had given up idolatry and accepted Christ's moral excellence. Besides he was cut to the quick and roused to vigorous action for being called "an injurer of the cause of truth"¹ as it was really the last thing which he would have brooked as a man. That he had the highest and deepest respect for Jesus is undoubtedly true, though not in the shallow sense in which Mr. Parekh has understood it.² Yet this close point of contact was of little use to those who were out for propagating their own type of Christianity. Calvinism of the crudest type was the stock in trade of the apologists, who entered the lists with the heathen giant, who in his turn quoted Matthew to prove in Christ's own words that "he who is not against me is with me." In himself he was decidedly more than a match for the combined forces of orthodox Christianity. The result was therefore parallel to that produced by his attack on the strict Hinduism of the age.

The achievements of missionary proselytization were not perhaps any better than those that are obtained today and probably Ram Mohan was the first man to point this out to the country. He stood for the Christian spirit and not the legal position created by formal conversions. As to the method employed, his criticism was searching and severe. He showed how the missionaries after distributing numberless copies of the complete Bible among Indians with a view to promoting Christianity "could not be altogether ignorant of the cause of their disappointment . . . but that he had seen with regret that they had completely counter-acted their own benevolent efforts."³ He understood very well the inwardness of the situation and his explanation may partly hold good in this age as well. He was not against the missionaries in general, who in his opinion were wrongly given to "addressing instructions as if they were reasoning with persons brought up in a Christian country." This want of touch with the people and their country and their customs was contrary to the spirit of the Christian religion and has been the greatest defect of missionary work from its beginning and the logical result was described by the reformer in the following words:—

"I am not aware that we can find a single respectable
Moossulman or Hindoo, who was not in want of the

¹ Works II, p. 346.

² Parekh's *Rajarshi* R. M. R.

³ First Appeal, p.

common comforts of life, once glorified with the truth of Christianity constantly adhering to it."¹

Notwithstanding the severity and probably the excess of this statement, we was fully conscious that missions and missionary efforts were great assets in the progressive evolution of the Indian nation. His request for those Presbyterian missionaries in the memorial to the Scottish General Assembly, to which he was party and one of the signatories, and his subsequent connection with Alexander Duff bears ample testimony to his practical appreciation of Christian work in this land. In the *First Appeal* he openly expressed his admiration for the ideal which stood behind Christian enterprise.

"From what I have already stated, I hope no one will infer that I feel ill-disposed towards the missionary establishments in this country. This is far from being the case. I pray for their augmentation and that their members may remain in happy enjoyment of life in a climate so generally inimical to European constitutions; for in proportion to the increase of their number, sobriety, moderation, temperance and good behaviour have been diffused among the neighbours as the necessary consequence of their company, conversation and good example."²

The pointed argument of the *First Appeal* disclosed the weakness of the Christian criticism levelled against the *Precepts* as well as the unnecessary narrowness of the Christian publicists. Dr. Marshman tried to nullify the attack and defend himself by means of a rejoinder in the *Friend of India* of May 1820. But it was weak and halting in the presence of Ram Mohan's vigorous exposition. Marshman's disavowal of anything uncharitable and unsympathetic, in the use of the word "heathen" with reference to the writer of the *Precepts of Jesus*, could not do much to bring about the desired reconciliation, for he refused—rightly in this instance—to regard anybody as a Christian, "who did not accept" the Divinity and Atonement of Jesus Christ and the Divine authority of the whole of the Holy Scriptures." It was probably true that the word "heathen" was not applied as a "term of reproach" as was subsequently explained by him, the innate British sense of self-sufficing superiority having caused the mischief, but his limitation of the term "Christian" left the way open for the continuation of the controversy. In reality his was a "singularly negative vision of Christianity"³ and the reason for it lay in the basis of hyper-Calvinistic theology upon which it rested. The orthodox Christian view stressed these points to the utmost.

¹ Ibid.

² First Appeal.

³ Collet, p. 64.

"The leading doctrine of the New Testament may be summed up in the two following positions; that God views all sin as so abominable that the death of Jesus Christ alone can expiate its guilt, and that the human heart is so corrupt that it must be renewed by the Divine Spirit before a man can enter heaven."¹

"In the first number of the Quarterly Series of the *Friend of India* of September, 1820 the worthy Baptist", observes Miss Collet, "sets himself to prove this version of his faith from the sayings of Jesus."² But it ought to be added that Miss Collet herself has said nothing on Ram Mohan's real position in respect of Christian doctrines, while Mr. Parekh has evidently taken great pains to prove him a Christian.³ He was in every sense above the distinctions of caste and creed which are unfortunately often signified by the word "religion" a truly spiritual cosmopolitan of the frontierless Kingdom of God. The very last sentence of the *First Appeal* conclusively shows the directness and comprehensiveness of the reformer's mind in a noble utterance, unknown (rarely found) in the history of religious controversy.

"May God render religion destructive of differences and dislikes between man and man and conducive to the peace and union of mankind."⁴

The *Second Appeal* which came out in 1821, followed by the Third in 1823, was a reply to Dr. Marshman and is full of abstract theological reasoning. The three taken together are like the three great controversial works of Luther just before his break with the Church and the inauguration of the Reformation. Indeed the events that happened in the wake of the publication of the *Appeals* signalised directly Ram Mohan's final breach with the Christian faith and indirectly his doubtful relation to orthodox Hinduism. Not less than Luther in a land of numberless religions, he went forward not only to reform, reconstruct and readjust the ancient faith of his fathers but also to purify the dross in every religion with a sublime conception of the universal in human spiritual experience in general. A careful survey of the controversy reveals that his was not merely an attack but a real synthesis. He defended Christianity from what he considered "the Christian perversion" of it, against its natural implication and the mind of its founder. In respect of scholarship the documents are still of priceless value and it is a wonder that one born and brought up a Hindu could gain such a thorough command in those days of the most abstruse portions of Christian theology. Had the author been any less informed in the subject than the Serampore scholars, defeat would have been unavoidable and inevitable. But the mind of the

¹ Ibid, p. 65. ² Collet, p. 64. ³ Rajarshi R.M.R. ⁴ First Appeal, p. 125.

greatest Indian of the modern age was gifted with extra-ordinary powers which made him an authority on ten languages and the founder of the Science of Comparative Religion in the opinion of Monier Williams, though Dr. Macnicol has hesitated to allow the claim without suggesting any other name in this connection.¹ His exposition was necessarily that of a scientific intellect fully trained in the theologies of many religions—a fact which was a decided advantage to him. He put it clearly in a few simple sentences in the Second Appeal as its subject matter.

“It is my reverence for Christianity and for the author of this religion that has induced me to endeavour to vindicate it from the charge of polytheism, as far as my limited capacity and knowledge extend. It is indeed mortifying to my feelings to find a religion, that from its sublime doctrines and pure morality should be respected before all other systems, reduced almost to a level with Hindu theology merely by human creed and prejudices, and from this cause brought it to a comparison with paganism of ancient Greece.”²

For Ram Mohan, therefore, the difference between Hinduism and Christianity consisted in a few multiples of the number three, and the Trinity contained nothing more than the idea of *Vyuha*³ of the Pancharatra system, which had four of them contained somehow in one Godhead. He stated in the Tytler controversy that “the same omnipotence which makes three one and one three can equally reconcile the unity and plurality of three hundred and thirty millions, both being supported by a sublime mystery which far transcends all human comprehension.”⁴ The argument of miracles did not affect him much for he knew equally, or perhaps more, wonderful ones recorded in Indian Scriptures, if simply wonderfulness went to prove anything, ethical ends being common in both cases. His stock example was of “the sage who drank up the whole ocean and threw it out again.” Christian dogma was similarly of no avail. The passage from one set of dogmas to another would have helped the human soul very little, his own country produced worse dogmas than any other religion in the world. To him Christ’s message itself was divine enough and the divinity of his person lent no additional weight, though he honoured him and all the prophets of the ages, as their own adherents did, by using the honorific titles of “lord”, “master” and “saviour” seriously and sincerely with reference to Christ, Sankara and Chaitanya, much in the same way and spirit as the Mahommedans speak of Rasul-Allah, or the prophet of God. There would be otherwise no meaning in his yielding divine

¹ Macnicol’s R.M., R.

² Second Appeal. p. 293.

³ Ibid. p. 296.

⁴ See Natesan R.M.R., p. 25, Works III.

epithets to all the three, and he was aware that later on he would be interpreted by the votaries of different faiths in their own way as Hindu, Mahommadan, or Christian.¹ This synthetic attitude was the cue which was afterwards taken up and worked out fully by Ram Krishna Paramhansa who worshipped the deity strictly according to the creed and custom of every religion in order to realise God's purpose and revelation at different times and places.

The atonement was to him logically a false argument however much it might have meant for orthodox Christians. It made Christ, in his view, more merciful than God and thus went against the ontological proof of God's existence.² It postulated philosophically the possibility of a being who was greater than God in one quality at least, viz. that of money and this was impossible from the very definition of the Highest Being. The self-evident perfection theory of God's nature stood in the way of the doctrine of Trinity. He was well versed in the history of Christian dogma, and in regard to the pre-Nicene theology recounted that in the "first and purest ages of Christianity, the followers of Christ entertained different opinions on the subject of the distinction between father, son and Holy Ghost." His exegetical methods were those of the Unitarians supported by his unequalled knowledge of Hindu and Moslem theology. The main passion of his life was in reality to maintain the unity of the Godhead in the strictest sense.³

It was the mystic position in religious experience, backed by rationalistic speculation in the field of faith, that placed the reformer on the solid ground of philosophical criticism. Few in the world after him had the advantage of combining Eastern and Western acumen against the back-ground of ancient and modern thought and very few used knowledge so sincerely for the service of God and man. Absolutely free from pre-conceived ideas, his stern logic pressed him forward in the quest of truth, in whatever shape it might lie hidden, and he courageously accepted what satisfied his intellect and his heart.

A singularly striking event took place in the year following, that is at the beginning of 1821. Ram Mohan was engaged in translating the Bible with the Rev. William Yates and the Rev. William Adam, both of the Serampore mission. The Rev. William Adam in a letter to the Baptist Missionary Society, dated the 11th June 1821, said that "the two Bengali translations of Dr. Carey and Mr. Ellerton are declared by Ram Mohan Roy to abound in the most flagrant violations of native idioms, and he accordingly

¹ Chatterjee R.M.R.,

² Second Appeal.

³ Collect, p. 66.

applied to Mr. Yates and myself for our assistance in translating them anew from the original. This we readily have given." A difficulty arose in doing the Fourth Gospel over the rendering the interpretation of the Greek particle "dia", which might mean *through* or *by*. In English "All things were made through him", or "by Him", changed in meaning according to the force of the two prepositions. In this case the word "through" was allowed to stand, and the Translation Committee in its session afterwards discovered that it lent colour to Arianism, which was heresy in the eyes of the orthodox. The translation was wrecked by it naturally "drew the heretic and the Heathen into an intimacy frequent and confidential,"¹ with the result that Mr. Adam finally gave up Christianity and declared himself a thorough-going Unitarian. Throughout the discussions in these days Ram Mohan was seen to sit pen in hand in dignified reticence, looking on, listening, observing all, but saying nothing" as described by Mr. Adam.² His nature was made of the toughest elements and nothing is known ever to have ruffled his mind even under the most trying circumstances.

It is almost certain that the *Second Appeal to the Christian Public* which came out about this time considerably helped Mr. Adam to come to a definite decision. In a letter to N. Bright of May 7, 1821, he described how he resolved to discard his own religion—

"It is several months since I began to entertain some doubts respecting the supreme deity of Jesus Christ, suggested by frequent discussions with Ram Mohan Roy, whom I was trying to bring over to the belief of that doctrine and in which I was joined by Mr. Yates, who also professed to experience difficulties on the subject I do not hesitate to confess that I am unable to remove the weighty objections which present themselves against this doctrine The objections against it compared with the arguments for it appear to me like a mountain compared with a mole-hill."³

The news of this conversion became known a little later and the new convert was nick-named "The second fallen Adam." That an ordained Christian missionary, and an Englishman among Europeans, was thus converted by "an intelligent heathen" attracted great interest both among the Europeans in India and the Indians themselves. A biographer has observed that an unbiassed study and examination of the Scriptures by an open-minded Hindu showed to the missionaries what could be done with the Bible in India. Their animosity, according to Mr. Chatterjee,⁴ was

¹ Ibid. p. 68. ² Collet, p. 68. ³ Ibid, p. 68. ⁴ Chatterjee R.M.R.

consequently sharp as well as deep and their counter-attack on Hinduism now engaged the best part of the reformer's attention and energy.

Bishop Middleton of Calcutta, who saw that Ram Mohan had faith in Christ's teachings, suggested to him all the worldly advantages that would follow from his accepting Christianity and "the grand career which would open to him by a change of faith." In Miss Collet's biography it is recorded as follows—"He would be honoured in life and lamented in death; honoured in England as well as in India; his name would descend to posterity as that of the modern Apostle of India."¹ The Bishop was not wrong, nor was he wide of the mark, for in reality had Ram Mohan become a Christian, the history of that religion would probably have undergone a radical change on the Indian soil at least, and with his many gifts, his erudition, and his prolific productions, he would have ranked with the greatest of the Church Fathers. The incident happened in the Bishop's house, where the reformer had an interview with him. The refined and sensitive Hindu nature was acutely hurt at the suggestion of worldly gain; and on leaving the Church dignitary Ram Mohan entered Adam's house somewhat agitated, took some refreshment, went home and never saw the Bishop again. Mr. Adam remarked that "the sting of the offer was this; he was asked to profess the Christian religion not on the force of evidence, or for the love of truth, or for the satisfaction of conscience, or for the benefit of his fellow-men, but for the sake of the honour and glory and fame it might bring him. This was utterly abhorrent to Ram Mohan's mind. It alienated, repelled and disgusted him."² The life of Miss Collet has something to say from both points of view—the Bishop's and that of Ram Mohan. "The Bishop's meaning was doubtless innocent enough, but the keen truth-loving Hindu seemed to feel it as a modern version of the Tempter's 'all these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me.'"³ This one event proved to those, who expected him to be a Christian in the fulness of time, that their anticipation was wrong and had no foundation in the correct understanding of his religious *views*.⁴

In September 1821, partially as the result of Adam's conversion the Calcutta Unitarian Committee was formed with some European and Indian gentlemen of influence and substance. They were its first members, and the following names are found in its membership—Theodore Dickens, a barrister of the Supreme Court, James Gordon of Mackintosh & Co., William Tate—an attorney, W. B.

¹ Collet, p. 70. ² A Lecture on the Life of R.M.R. pp. 21 ff. ³ Collet, p. 70.

⁴ See Parekh's R.M.R.

Macleod, a surgeon of the East India Company, Norman, an Accountant in the Company's Service, Dwarka Nath Tagore and Prasanna Kumar Tagore of Calcutta, Ram Mohan Roy and Radha Prasad Roy. Adam was naturally the Unitarian Minister and was supported by the reformer who established the Committee and who was also fully conscious of the responsibility in converting him. It is quite in keeping with the innate nobility of Ram Mohan's character, that besides bearing Adam's expenses, he later on made provision in his will for Adam and his family.¹ It is a fine testimony to the friendship that grew up between the two, and the cause which both supported at so much cost and sacrifice. The Unitarians in England and America were as a matter of fact delighted to hear of these new and important accessions to their ranks, and a new enthusiasm for missionary enterprise on Unitarian principles was the result. Regular correspondence between them went on henceforward, though nothing very important came out of it in this period to determine the course of events.

Amidst the engrossing activities to which Ram Mohan was incessantly committed, he was visibly moved at this time by an event, which had nothing to do with India, but which showed how universal was his sympathy and how intense his love of freedom. The people of Naples who were fighting for their liberty were forced back to their former state by the combined influence of the Kings of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sardinia, even after they had succeeded in wresting a suitable constitution from their own King. The large heart of Ram Mohan which conceived and formulated a universal religion for the world felt it keenly and deeply, and he expressed himself to Mr. Buckingham in a letter dated August 11, 1821.

"I am obliged to conclude that I shall not live to see liberty universally restored to the nations of Europe and Asiatic nations, especially those that are European colonies, possessed of a greater degree of the same blessing than what they now enjoy. Under these circumstances I consider the cause of the Neapolitans as my own and their enemies as ours. Enemies to liberty and friends of despotism have never been and never will be ultimately successful."

Miss Collet says that this trait of his character is a mark of the universal spirit that was in him and that raised him above his fellow-men, and quotes the ideal superbly portrayed by Lowell—

"In the gain or loss of one race all the rest have equal claim,
..... wherever wrong is done to the humblest and
weakest 'neath the all-beholding sun, That wrong is also
done to us".²

¹ Adam's Letter of Oct. 14, 1826.

² Collet, p. 74.

GLEANNINGS.

LOAD ON BERTRAND RUSSELL.

A REVIEW OF 'SCEPTICISM' BY BERTRAND RUSSELL.

THAT the truth of men's beliefs is in inverse proportion to the fervour with which they advocate them, that the activity of most individuals is pointless where it is not harmful, and that the activity of States usually and of moralists always is harmful where it is not pointless, these are the main propositions asserted by Mr. Russell in his new book.

Of these the first is the most important, the others being deduced logically from it. It is a fact not usually recognized that the only beliefs for the sake of which people have been prepared to make a nuisance of themselves, are almost certainly untrue. Nobody, so far as I am aware, has been willing to die or to kill in defence of the probably true proposition that two and two make four; but for the highly dubious beliefs that the Holy Ghost is descended from the Father and the Son or alternatively from the Son only, that bread and wine is not bread and wine but body and blood, or that if mysteriously both is and is not body and blood at the same time, people have killed one another in thousands and inflicted appalling tortures on thousands.

When the truth is known it arouses no moral enthusiasm; it is only when it is uncertain that men are moved to proselytizing zeal and supply the place of knowledge by converting other men's conjectures into dogmas. From this need to believe, this demand for certainty which others too must share, most of the evils that afflict mankind spring; such at least, is Mr. Russell's contention. The Scepticism that he advocates as a corrective is mild enough to convert even the most credulous. It is to the effect that "when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain," and "when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert." But the mildness of this receipt is somewhat delusive. It is an example of a figure of speech known to grammarians as *meiosis*. The essence of *meiosis* is understatement; one says less than the truth; one also says less than one means. Mr. Russell's use of *meiosis* is constant and felicitous; it is, indeed, one of the chief weapons of his irony. "In America. . . though it is not illegal to keep a mistress, it is illegal to travel with her from one State to another; a New Yorker may take his mistress to Brooklyn, but not to Jersey City. The difference of moral turpitude between these two actions is not obvious to the plain man." The comment of the last sentence is completely adequate; pages of invective could not make the American regulations about mistresses more supremely ridiculous.

Our habit of believing in propositions for which there is no evidence leads us to adopt false opinions as to what is valuable. In an essay on Eastern and Western ideals of happiness Mr. Russell praises the Chinese for aiming at enjoyment, while we aim at power. Nothing, indeed, in modern civilization is more noteworthy than the disparity between our technical powers and our social wisdom. Our age is equally remarkable for its marvels of invention, and the trivial uses to which it puts them. Men of genius by the dozen, men of talent by the hundred have laboured that wireless might be; they succeeded, and the tittle-tattle of the divorce court and the racing stable is broadcasted to the ends of the earth, while the remoter ether vibrates to the strains of negroid music. It is because of this disparity that the powers which scientists have won for us fail to make us happy.

In the psychology doctrine of Behaviourism, Mr. Russell finds the most adequate expression of the outlook on life of the average Western man. According to Behaviourism there is no mind, there is only body. The only thing the body can do is to move; thinking is merely a series of movements in the larynx. Since the only thing we can do is to move, the more we move the better; hence the only ethic compatible with Behaviourism is that which identifies virtue with the movement of matter. Mr. Russell is unable to accept this ethic; art and contemplation appear to him "as admirable, as altering the position in space of large quantities of matter." On this point he finds that the Chinese agree with him, but that the Americans do not. The Chinese do not love hustle for its own sake. "When they have enough to live on they live on it, instead of trying to augment it by hard work," whereas the future of the Westerner is envisaged as one in which "he will perform all sorts of tasks with extraordinary skill, but be incapable of considering rationally whether the tasks are worth performing."

With regard to Governments, Mr. Russell's position is frankly Anarchistic. Briefly paraphrased his argument is, "It is the business of Governments to interfere; hence all Governments are evil. An inefficient Government is less like a Government than an efficient one. Hence, if we must have Governments, the more inefficient they are, the better; they will interfere less." Here again the Chinese are praised. Until recently their "industry was too inefficient to produce either automobiles or bombs, the State too inefficient to educate its own citizens to kill those of other countries, the police too inefficient to catch either Bolsheviks or bandits."

Bad as Governments are, moralists are worse. It ought to be clear by this time from the negligible effects of moral exhortation upon those exposed to it, that morals cannot be taught. Nevertheless, the pleasure we obtain from blaming our neighbours is too great to be lightly abandoned. Morality is the rationalization of the impulse to blame, and so moralists are not only still with us, but, as Mr. Russell argues in an essay "The Recrudescence of Puritanism," likely to become more so. Mr. Russell cannot speak of the moralist without breaking into epigram. "The infliction of cruelty with a good conscience is a delight to moralists. That is why they invented Hell." "In virtuous people love of power camouflages itself as love of doing good, but this makes very little difference to its social effects. It merely means that we punish our victims for being wicked, instead of for being our enemies." "The (ethical) philosopher first invents a false theory as to the nature of things, and then deduces that wicked actions are those which show that his theory is false"

"Sceptical Essays," it is obvious, is an exceedingly brilliant book, the best non-technical book that Mr. Russell has written since "Principles of Social Reconstruction." It is extremely witty, yet the motive power of Mr. Russell's wit is not the appositeness of verbal connections, but the logical drive of his thought seeking expression. His epigrams result not from forced collocations of ideas, but by looking straight at facts, which for most of us are obscured by prejudice, and drawing the logical deductions. The result is frequently startling, yet it is difficult to see how any other could be reached. As an example of the process of work, I will quote one of Mr. Russell's illustrations of the Behaviourist standpoint which is likely to become famous:—

"When, recently, a famous intellectual married a famous dancer, there were some who expressed doubts as to their congruity. But from a behaviourist standpoint such a doubt was misplaced: she had cultivated the muscles of legs and arms, he the muscles of the larynx, so that both were acrobats, though belonging to different branches of the profession: "

C. E. M. JOAD.

— The Nation and the Athenæum.

MORE LIGHT ON KEATS.

THERE is an unending zest in tracing the inspirations of genius, and it is not often that so rich a source of guidance comes to hand as in the copy of Shakespeare belonging to Keats that has turned up in private hands in the United States. For the pages of this seven-volume edition edited by Dr. Johnson yield not only an abundance of evidence, in Keats's own annotations of the plays that most deeply moved him—among which "The Tempest" and "A Midsummer Night's Dream" stand pre-eminent,—but it shows the flame of his poetic temper playing fiercely upon the patronising and pedagogic comments that Johnson made on Shakespeare's work. One seldom meets in the literary tourneys of the classics such scorn as Keats here spent on annotating Johnson's notes. The complacent remark that Johnson appended to "A Midsummer Night's Dream," "Wild and fantastical though this play is, all the parts in their various modes are well written and give the kind of pleasure which the author designed," rouses him to fury that is not content with scoring out the offence and writing "Fie" to Johnson's signature. He ransacked Shakespeare himself for appropriate abuse. He likens Johnson to "the clamorous owl that hoots at our quaint spirits," and warns him, like the "newts and blind worms," to "come not near our fairy queen." Here, in the unfettered freedom of his study, we can see Keats fanning the flame of that renaissance of wonder in English poetry that was to put the artifice and precision of the eighteenth century in its place as by comparison mere mechanics—the flame that burst out in his condemnation—

Ah, dismal souled !

The winds of heaven blew, the ocean rolled

Its gathering waves. Ye felt it not.

This Shakespeare was one of Keats's dearest possessions when in 1817 he sought peace in the Isle of Wight to begin "Endymion." Dr. Caroline Spurgeon, Professor of English Literature at London University, has had the good fortune to have access to it, and the publication which is promised of the whole of the poet's copious annotations should do much to give us a fresh and deeper intimacy with his spirit.

—"The Manchester Guardian."

LORD MORLEY AND THE WAR.

MEMORANDUM ON RESIGNATION.

THE late Lord Morley of Blackburn resigned, as every one knows, from the Cabinet in August, 1914, on the issue of the War. His "Reminiscences" barely touch on the close of his public career; but he left among his papers a memorandum on the events leading up to his resignation and his reasons for it, and this has now been published by his nephew, Mr. Guy Morley, who contributes a preface. It is entitled a Memorandum on Resignation, August, 1914. (Macmillan, 3s. 6d.)

Lord Morley began to write the Memorandum, as Mr. F. W. Hirst, who contributes the introduction, explains, after his resignation; it is based on his notes on the Cabinet proceedings from July 24 onwards. The Memorandum is a valuable supplement to several works already published of history and biography bearing on the fatal days just preceding the War. Habitual readers of Lord Morley's writings will recognise in it a specimen of his most characteristic and pungent style.

The Memorandum, which begins with the words "On or about July 24—27," records how Lord Grey "made a memorable pronouncement." The time had come whether we were to take an active part with the other two Powers of the Entente

or to stand aside and preserve absolute neutrality. It was an impressive statement; Morley says for its simplicity "so free from the *cassant* and over emphatic tone that is Asquith's voice on such occasions." But the Cabinet "rambled"; "perhaps quite as much my fault as that of anybody else, the discussion was thin and perfunctory." Then and up to the morning of August 3, Morley adds, the question of Belgium "was secondary to the pre-eminent controversy of the Anglo-French Entente." Meanwhile Harcourt was organizing opinion among the Cabinet in favour of neutrality; this was as a countermove to that which was being "openly worked with his best demoniac energy by Winston, with strenuous simplicity by Grey, and *sourdement* by the Lord Chancellor—the Prime Minister seeing and waiting." But there was "no intrigue about it; all was above-board." Beauchamp and others "calculated to a tune of eight or nine men in the Cabinet likely to agree with us." Mr. Lloyd George at this time furthered a good cause by a very remarkable piece of intelligence. . . . He told us that he had been consulting the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England, other men of light and leading in the City, also cotton men, and steel and coal men . . . and they were all *aghast* at the bare idea of our plunging into the European conflict.

AN UNEASY CABINET.

The Cabinet became uneasy about its own cohesion; Mr. Burns after the Cabinet of July 29 pressed Morley by the arm, saying, "Now, mind, we look to you to stand firm." Mr. Burns intimated that a warning to Germany "not to try it on against the French coasts or ships in the Channel was more than he could stand." "Burns is never furtive," Morley adds. That same evening Morley was host to Kitchener, Jellicoe, Winston, Crewe, Haldane, Knollys, Guy. Bryce was shocked at Haldane's war talk. Within ten days, Morley adds, Kitchener was "in my chair in the Cabinet!"

By August 3 Harcourt, it appears, told Morley that he "believed he could count on ten or eleven men against Grey's view that we had both moral obligations of honour and substantial obligations in taking sides with France." What was the difficulty, Morley asks himself, in not making Belgian neutrality a *casus belli*, but in protesting and pushing on by diplomatising? "Why, our supposed entanglement with France and nothing else." Coming to personal movements Morley says:—"Simon and Lloyd George drove me to lunch at Beauchamp's and our talk was on the footing that we were all three for resignation." That afternoon the dissolution of the Ministry was "in full view"; yet as he mused at the club Morley could not be sure that the "fervid tone" of the colleagues he had just left would last.

"I was no standard-bearer. The power of Asquith and Grey, and the natural 'cohesion of office,' prove too hard for an isolated group to resist. The motives of Lloyd George were a riddle. He knew that his 'stock' had sunk dangerously low; peace might be the popular card against the adventurous energy of Winston; war would make mince-meat of the Land Question."

That evening, after the Cabinet at which Burns said he must go, Morley told the Prime Minister that he feared he must go too. But at the Prime Minister's request he slept on it, and next morning wrote the letter of resignation which will be found in Lord Oxford's "Genesis of the War." Mr. Lloyd George "seemed astonished." "But if you go it will put us, who don't go, in a great hole," he said; to which Morley "made the obvious reply to this truly singular remark." That morning the Prime Minister announced that he had received four resignations; but by the evening "Simon had been got over," and Beauchamp. "So," Mr. Burns said to Morley, "you and I are the only two."

On August 4 Morley received a letter from Asquith dated August 3 midnight, begging him in "a most afflicting moment," "to think twice and thrice, and as

many times more as arithmetic can number, before you take a step which impoverishes the Government and leaves me stranded and almost alone." Morley's reply: "Your letter shakes me terribly," appears in Lord Oxford's "Memories and Recollections."

I parted from friends [Morley concludes] without a wound or even a scratch, I could not comprehend them all, and two of them I had no choice but to *judge*.

—The Times Weekly.

EMPRESS'S "BLACK BOXES."

SECRET LETTERS OF KAISER'S MOTHER.

DRAMATIC DISCLOSURES.

IN 1901, soon after King Edward's accession, news reached the British Court, relates Sir Frederick Ponsonby in "Letters of the Empress Frederick," just published by Macmillan, that the Empress Frederick was seriously ill. The King accordingly decided to visit her at Friedrichshof, near Cronberg, and he took with him Sir Frederick, and also Sir Francis Laking, his physician in ordinary. On the third night at Friedrichshof the Empress sent for Sir Frederick. "She looked as if she had just been taken off the rack after undergoing torture." After quarter of an hour of "intense conversation and hurricane of questions" the Empress closed her eyes, and the nurse said that Sir Frederick must go. "A few moments more," the Empress murmured, and the nurse again left the room. After a pause the Empress opened her eyes and said :—

"There is something I want you to do for me. I want you to take charge of letters and take them with you back to England. . . . I will send them to you at one o'clock to-night, and I know I can rely on your discretion. I don't want a soul to know that they have been taken away, and certainly Willie (her son, the ex-Kaiser) must not have them, nor must he ever know you have got them."

That night Sir Frederick dined, as usual, with King Edward, and the German Emperor was among those present. Afterwards he retired to his bedroom, and punctually as the clock chimed one there came a quiet knock at the door, and four men entered carrying two boxes. They put them down and retired. Sir Frederick was alarmed at the size of the boxes. To adopt any method of concealment would be disastrous. So he wrote on the label of one. "Books with care," and on the other. "China with care," with his private address, and determined to make no attempt at concealment.

In the hall when the luggage was carried out on the day of departure, as the two black boxes, were removed, Sir Frederick felt extremely nervous, but no one appeared to notice them, and the Emperor went on talking. They reached the house at Windsor safely. Now, after 27 years, the "black boxes" have been thrown open, and the ex-Kaiser can, if he wishes, share with the rest of the world in a perusal of their contents. For him the letters will make painful reading. When he was a boy of 13 his mother wrote, "He has no strength of character," adding, however, "he is a dear boy," and a hope that he would grow into a useful man. As the years passed mother and son gradually became estranged, and when "Willie" fell under the influence of the Bismarcks, the estrangement developed into a grim domestic drama. A violent scene occurred when the Kaiser, then Crown Prince went to San Remo, where his father was then slowly dying of cancer. On November 15, 1887, the Empress wrote to Queen Victoria :—

You ask how Willie was when he was here ! He was as rude, as disagreeable and as impertinent to me as possible when he arrived, but I pitched into him with, I am afraid, considerable violence, and he became quite nice and gentle and amiable (for him)—at least quite natural, and we got on very well !

On June 15, 1888, the Emperor Frederick died after his short and painful reign. No humiliation was spared the ex-Empress. In vain she appealed to her son and to Bismarck to grant her an interview the day after the Emperor's death ; Bismarck's curt reply was that he was fully occupied with his new master. She bore her humiliation in silence. "William allows his father and me to be insulted and attacked, and sanctions it," she wrote afterwards, and some time after her widowhood she had this to say :—

Bismarck could not have a better tool than William. . . . He wishes his head to be thoroughly turned, his vanity and pride to be still greater than they are already and then he will, of course, dash into anything they may propose. It is sad, indeed, for me as a mother ; but it is not surprising. . . . Of course, it must be our endeavour that the relations of England and Germany should not suffer in spite of Prince Bismarck's wickedness and William's folly.

In 1892 we have the anxious mother telling Queen Victoria :—

"William's one idea is to have a navy which shall be larger and stronger than the British Navy ; but this is really pure madness and folly, and he will see how impossible and needless it is."

In yet another letter she wrote ; "I now watch as from a grave—more than useless and forgotten—the reckless course pursued by my own son. The worst of it is that perhaps we shall have to pay for his ignorance and imprudence."

—The News of the World.

IS POLITICS A "DIRTY GAME" ? GRIEVOUS GROUSE OF HARD-USED MEN.

(BY J. RAMSAY MACDONALD M.P.)

LORD CURZON, in whose biography appears the latest charge that politics is a "dirty game," seemed to mean by that he was a grievously hard-used man.

Certainly the context in which this judgment is embedded does not prove the case. But many others have said the same thing, and when George III, blurted out that "Politics are a trade for a rascal not for a gentleman," he represented for once a fair number of his subjects. The sensitive politician (if there be such) must be aware long ago that he belongs to the tribe of black sheep, and that really respectable people—especially of the services and the professions—who invite him into their company do so with their tongues in their cheeks.

THE BLACK SHEEP.

In order however that their company may occasionally include lions, they have decided that among the black sheep of politicians there are some witty ones who have managed to become brown, and they are called statesmen. In this way, the community of politicians manage to carry their bad name and retain their respectability at the same time.

Far be it from me even to try to whitewash politics for I agree with what Lord Morley once wrote to Lord Minto: Politics are a dubious trade, to be sure. I can name other trades and professions just as dubious and just as spotted with black sheep.

So many callings are nothing more than what we make them and there is really nothing in serving the public, in winning rows, in proving that your views are better than the other persons which the Recording Angel will turn into a barrier when in due time the politician approaches the gate of heaven.

Of course, politics is beset with its own special pitfalls. It is hard, said some one, for a man to keep his eye upon truth who is always in a battle or a triumph.

If a politician shows that he knows that there is more than one side to truth he is accused of shilly-shallying, dubbed a compromised, and what not. He is told that he must live in blinkers or the world will not understand him, nor have confidence in him.

The word "but" is poison to his reputation. Truly his trade is as dangerous to his morality as wording in white lead would be to his body.

Moreover, his life is essentially one of a team, and the truth he follows and expounds is a composite affair with features that are blurred like those interesting photographs that Mr. Stead published in the early issues of the "Review of Reviews," obtained by putting a group of faces of the same type one on the top of the other.

His experience of life also increases the dangers to his soul by his acquiring the practical habit of adopting an amalgamation of other people's truth with his own, because he invariably finds that the man who cannot work with a team and be loyal to it has no greater appreciation of truth than he has himself, and is too often a bit of a humbug in addition.

HUMAN WEAKNESS.

The real danger in spending a life in politics is that the battle is all that is thought about, that party difference in conviction becomes a partisan use of weapons, and that behind the leaders who have to keep up a reputation is a host of unknown agents who have only to keep up majorities. The literature of the secret thoughts of politicians is full of the worldly wisdom of men who have found out the weaknesses of human nature.

As a rule the party agent is employed to find out more and more of it, and party funds are accumulated to exploit the discoveries. Elections are too much like wars for politics to be quite clear of baseness; for when people are in a fever and their judgment at the mercy of emotion, victory can be snatched by the dirtiest of tricks.

Normally people are not simpletons, but at elections they are not normal. The shortness of the election period enables a maximum amount of primitive fear and credulity to be awakened, but not enough of rational judgment to be formed.

It gives a tremendous power to the slanderer on the doorstep and the stunt newspaper so that on the day after, when the decently-minded citizen surveys the missiles on the stricken field and the spent posters on the walls, in disgust he groans: "What a dirty game! "It has been a dog fight, not a judicial assize."

IT DOES NOT PAY.

I keep by me for my delectation, and also for my wonder, an extract from two speeches delivered by the same person, one two days before an election and the other a short time after it. One makes me blush for the terrible iniquities I had done and the injuries I had inflicted on my county; the other makes me blush with the eulogy on how I had guarded the State and magnified its place in the world. Truly, politics may be made a very dirty game.

That, however, is by no means the sole experience of any one who has lived long in politics. He has also stored in his memory chivalrous testimonies, generous admissions, and proofs abundant that dirt does not pay.

In politics all the weak and unlovely qualities of striving human nature are found from time to time floating on the top, and because, in political conflict, there must always be a critic as well as a door, the public are never allowed to forget the failings of the antagonists. It is also easier for the injured man to curse than for the victorious one to bless, and so the bad in the surging mixture of the political life has been most frequently advertised. When man groans he accuses some one else; when he shouts his satisfaction he draws attention only to himself.

But neither the heart-sore Curzons, nor the Disraelis, nor the cynical and false Chesterfields, who from their various hearts have told the world of the dirt on which the politician thrives, can establish what is not true; that he who would serve the public and win popular confidence, must bid honour farewell.

The party which does the "dirty business" may for a time overcome that which, for one cause or another, does not do it, but in the end the simple victory is not the settlement of a skirmish, but the finish of a war.

One victory of reason is worth a dozen of dirt.

—"Sunday Express."

Dr. JOHNSON ON DICKENS.

(BY WIRELESS FROM ELYSIUM, BOSWELL SPEAKING.)

AT the club to-night the conversation turned upon "Ephesian's" recently published novel, in which he assails the character of Mr. Charles Dickens. Reynolds opened the subject by asking Johnson whether he had read the book.

Johnson: Why, yes, Sir, and found it a very ill sort of book—ill-natured, ill-constructed, and ill-written.

Reynolds: I can hardly believe that this writer's presentment of Mr. Dickens as a money-grabbing and immoral hypocrite is a true presentment Sir.

Johnson: Sir, I am convinced that much of it is grossly untrue. But even were it otherwise, this author shows a mean relish in exposing Mr. Dickens that is not to be forgiven him. Sir, his is not the tone of one who breaks a popular idol out of painful duty, but rather of one who has a gusto in doing it. As you read the book, Sir, you can almost hear him licking his lips over those so called exposures of his.

Goldsmith: I do not know why you term them "so-called" exposures, Sir. Have you not read" "Ephesian's" defence of them, on the grounds of their being warranted by Mr. Dickens's own letters and other documentary proofs?

Johnson: Sir, all hinges upon how you construe these things. If you set yourself to put the worst possible construction on everything that a man ever did, said or wrote, you shall not fail to make a very pretty villain of anybody. Had Boswell so used me, Sir, I had assuredly come down to posterity cheek-by-jow! with Caesar Borgia and Jonathan Wild, Sir. I should have been held up to general execration as the completest villain that ever cheated Tyburn. Yet this, Sir, is how "Ephesian" uses Mr. Dickens.

Goldsmith: Nevertheless, Sir, there is a good deal in Mr. Dickens' life to support "Ephesian's" conclusions.

Johnson: If by this, Sir you mean that Mr. Dickens did not always live up to his professions, you have said no more against him than is to be said against any man. Alas, Sir! If everyone that stands up to preach the better way, but sometimes himself lapses from it, is to be accounted hypocritical, where shall an unhypercritical preacher be found? The material issue is not whether the preacher

sometimes fails to square his conduct with his message, but whether he has a living faith in that message. Now, Sir, if any man ever had a living—nay, a burning—faith in his message for humanity, it was the man Dickens.

Goldsmith : This, after all, is only your opinion, Sir. And "Ephesian" has as much right to his as you have to yours.

Johnson : Sir, all men have equal rights to their opinions. But this is not to say that all men's opinions are of equal value.

Goldsmith : I suppose the only opinions to which you will allow value are those which happen to concur with your own, Sir ?

Johnson : Sir, it is not concurrence with mine or anybody else's opinions that matters, but concurrence with reality. Now, Sir, if reality, as evinced by the experiences of life and history, shows anything it shows the emotional impotence of all mere pious affectations. Pecksniff, Sir, shall often enough succeed in hiding his secret infamies from the public, but he shall never succeed in setting that public on fire with his assumed benevolence. Yet the man Dickens, Sir, set all England on fire, not once but many times, with the glow of his fervour for the cause of the illused and oppressed, and with the heat of his indignation against their illusers and oppressors. This is what no hypocrisy ever did nor could do. Only a burning sincerity could do it ; and by the very fact of his doing it, Dickens proves himself to have been actuated by such burning sincerity.

Burke : This, I think, is a very good argument, Sir.

Johnson : Sir, on the point of hypocrisy it is a conclusive argument.

Burke : I could wish, however, that he, who was in many respects so noble a man, had brought a little more of this nobility into his domestic and commercial relations, Sir.

Johnson : Why, yes, Sir. We all wish that. He was, beyond doubt uncongenially mated. Possibly one of his impulsive and irascible temperament should never have found a quite congenial mate in any woman. But, Sir, Kate Hogarth was by nature, very particularly ill-suited to him. Perhaps, if he had married Mary or Georgina, he had made a better choice.

Reynolds : What is your view, Sir, of his romantic love for Mary ?

Johnson : Sir, I confess to seeing nothing very reprehensible in this. A man cannot help his feelings. He can only restrain his conduct in respect of them. And this the man Dickens did. According to "Ephesian," Sir, his tortured heart did, indeed, reveal something of his love for Mary, as she lay in *articulo mortis*. But, Sir, licentiousness itself could scarcely have imputed moral impropriety to his parting embrace of her in that solemn moment.

Reynolds : Yet he should have done better, Sir, out of consideration for his wife, to refrain from insistence on a place being left for him in Mary's grave.

Johnson : Why, yes, Sir. He should undoubtedly have done better to have refrained. In his passionate grief for the dead girl he thought too little of his wife's feelings. But this was the extent of his misconduct, if misconduct it is to be called. There can be no implications of grossness in that "post mortem" devotion.

Goldsmith : Perhaps you will defend his dastardly conduct in pillorying his own father and mother in his novels, Sir.

Johnson : Sir, to my mind, the pillorying of any man in a novel is commonly a somewhat cowardly sort of subterfuge not very easily to be justified. And this indeed is one of the things about "Ephesian's" book to which I take exception. But, Sir, to say that the man Dickens has pilloried his father, in the character of Wilkins Micawber, is a misuse of language. Sir, he has rather canonised him. He

makes us love the improvident, but delightful, Wilkins, as we could never have loved the improvident, but by no means delightful, John.

Goldsmith: And how about his mother, Sir?

Johnson: Sir, I will not entirely defend Mrs. Nickleby, nor, for that matter, Harold Skimpole.

Goldsmith: I am glad you admit some defects in your idol, Sir.

Johnson: Sir, he is no idol of mine. I see in the man Dickens a great and on the whole noble character, which is, however, marred by some ignominious defects. But, Sir, his nobilities far exceed his ignominies. And any writer that sets out to exhibit him, whether in the form of straightforward biography or biographical fiction, should see to it that both aspects of the man are blended in due proportion. Now this, Sir, is precisely what "Ephesian" has not done. He sets out with the preconceived notion that his subject was an odious humbug and interprets all that he ever did, said, or wrote in the worst possible sense in order to justify that preconception. This is not character-painting; it is character-smudging. Never, I believe Sir, was a littler book written by a littler man about a great one. But, Sir, in so doing he has loosed a boomerang. In trying to convince us of Dicken's littleness he has chiefly succeeded in convincing us of his own.

— Truth.

"SPLENDID SONS OF SIN."

FAMOUS MEN WHO FOUGHT THE CURSE OF ISHMAEL.

SINCE Ishmael was cast out into the wilderness with Hagar, those born out of wedlock have been severely handicapped in Life's race; yet in the pages of History's book of fame their names are legion.

"Brought into the world with a disregard for established law, custom, or etiquette," writes Dr. A. S. Rappoport in *Splendid Sons of Sin*, "these sons of sin seem to have disregarded in their turn the ordinary laws of life, to have walked new paths and paved new ways. In almost every instance Nature seems to have showered her gifts upon such children of sin and to have endowed them with courage, intelligence, and even genius."

Greatly struck by this phenomenon, the author seeks some explanation. "History offers us," he says, "many examples, especially in dynastic families, where the legitimate children are miles behind the illegitimate offspring in energy and intelligence. Now, are there any physiological and psychological reasons for the facts I have enumerated? Could they not be adduced as an additional proof that the crossing of races is advantageous for the human species?" Leaving the reader to ponder over this curious problem, he proceeds to illustration.

Illustrious indeed are the names upon the roll (says a *John o'London* reviewer). Themistocles, Ptolemy Soter, Jugurtha King of Numidia, Theodoric King of the Ostrogoths, Heliogabalus Emperor of Rome, Charles Martel, the famous Mayor of the Palace who saved Europe from the Saracens at the battle of Tours, Arnoul Emperor of Germany—all were natural sons. Dynasties have been founded by them—in England by William the Conqueror; in Portugal by John I., in Naples by Frederick I., and in Castile by Henry of Trastámara; whilst pre-Norman England had two such Kings in Edmund the Martyr and Harold Harefoot.

A VERSATILE RULER.

Almost every walk of life is represented. The Church by Edmund Bonner and Stephen Gardiner : Science and the Arts by Boccaccio, Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus (probably the greatest scholar the world has ever known). Cardanus, Richard Savage the poet, and d'Alembert, who was found abandoned as a babe on the steps of a Parisian church. Luckily for the great philosopher and posterity, he was forthwith adopted by a kindly couple who cherished him as their own son. The Duke of Berwick, natural son of James II and Arabella Churchill, won fame as a Marshal of France during his father's exile.

Manfred, King of Sicily, was the natural son of the Emperor Frederick II., who is said to have kept a regular harem, recruiting its inmates from Saracen countries. In courage, ability, and intellectual attainments he far outshone his father's legitimate offspring. Having won the kingdom of Sicily by force of arms, he held it by virtue of his wise and popular rule until killed on the battlefield of Beneventum. An enlightened ruler, he was anxious to educate his subjects, himself studying philosophy and mathematics to that end. He was, moreover, a poet and musician of no mean order; it is said that his delight was to venture out into the city streets at night, singing songs.

Francisco Pizarro, conqueror of Peru, was the offspring of a casual union between a Spanish officer and a peasant girl. His father disclaiming paternity and his mother being poverty-stricken, Pizarro was employed from a tender age as a swine-herd until rosy tales of a distant El Dorado lured him to join an expedition to Darien.

There he entered into a "partnership" with two other adventurers to share the proceeds of their swashbuckling. Not one could sign his name, so the agreement had to be signed on their behalf by strangers. Even when famous as the conqueror of Peru, Pizarro could neither read nor write. There was nothing noble in his nature, nothing noble in his end—he was assassinated by his associates in the house which he occupied as Governor of the new Spanish dominion.

Don Juan of Austria, victor of Lepanto, was the illegitimate son of the Emperor Charles V. and a washer-woman named Barbara Blomberg. Entrusted by the Emperor first to a fiddler and his wife, he was transferred into the keeping of the Court Chamberlain until such time as his half-brother, Philip II. of Spain, decided to recognize him. For the purpose of this formal recognition the King arranged a hunting party. Don Juan, ignorant of his parentage, was confronted with his sovereign in the forest and thenceforth treated as one of the royal family. "I have never caught better game," remarked King Philip as the hunting-party broke up.

Despite the inimity of the Infante Carlos, whose temper was so cruel that he forced his shoemaker to cook and eat a faulty pair of boots, Don Juan rose ever higher in royal favour. His military prowess so impressed the Pope that he was appointed commander of the Holy League force against the Turks. At Lepanto he won a decisive victory; thus for the second time a bastard saved Europe from the Saracen menace.

FAMOUS ISHMAELS.

Appointed Governor of the Netherlands, he had to journey to his post disguised as a Moorish servant. There he saw for the first—and last time his mother, who was leading so profligate a life that he was forced to throw her into prison. She revenged herself by spreading a report that he was not the son of the great Emperor, but the child of her amour with an obscure furrier. Soon afterwards Don Juan died of fever in a hovel which had been a pigeon-house.

Jean, Count Dunois, known as the Bastard of Oriens, was the natural son of Louis Duke of Orleans by Mariette d'Enghien. Having, with Joan of Arc, freed France from the English yoke, he was buried with honour, Louis XI. attending the funeral in person.

Dr. Rappoport might have made his list of famous Ishmaels even more imposing, for Alexander the Great, Homer, the infamous Cæsar Borgia, and Maurice of Saxony all belonged to the class of which he writes.

"INTERPRETATIONS" OF FAMOUS MEN.

WHO IS "LYNX" ?

WHO is "Lynx" ? He (or she) writes under this pseudonym what are described as "interpretations" in an irresistible collection of cartoons by Low ("Lions and Lambs"),

Perhaps some clue to his (or her) identity may be found in these extracts from "interpretations" of well known people :

Mr. Philip Snowden : There is no man in whose hands England would be more safe. There is no man to whose hands England is less likely to trust herself.

Mr. Lloyd George : The maddening thing is that when one is most repelled one still does not find him unlovable.

Mr. Bernard Shaw : He suffers from that lack of taste which accounts for the designs of Irish wall-papers and textiles, and the unique quality of Irish cooking.

Lady Oxford : A worthy human being, fond of her family, and full of impulsive kindness, but without modesty and without diffidence. Brilliant only in the sense that an unshaded electric light is brilliant.

Mr. Winston Churchill : The conception which has upheld Mr. Winston Churchill is that nothing is ever lost, that there is no such thing as defeat, that the word "life" means perpetual triumph. Life melts in his mouth like butter.

Lord Oxford : He struck the new and disillusioned generation as genial, optimistic, and airily irresponsible.

Sir James Barrie : The least human of writers.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald : He would make an excellent Prime Minister for a Conservative Party that was in for a long term of office and had nothing to do but sit tight. . . . He is a misfit.

THIS UNROMANTIC AGE.

(BY LORD THOMPSON.)

WE are living in an unromantic age, but probably the same thing has been said of most ages by their contemporary critics, whose usual habit it is to praise the past. The present seldom bears comparison with the past, and romance grows naturally around tradition ; indeed, to a great extent it is inspired by legends.

It may be that the world stock of romance is giving out through not being replenished, and that succeeding ages, having less and less, compare unfavourably with their predecessors ; so it is just conceivable that some future race of "robots" will regard even this age as romantic.

Romance has suffered so much at the hands of sentimentalists that to the majority of people it is synonymous with "ilosh"; even Carlyle and Froude did not escape the insinuation that they were charlatans.

The effect has been unfortunate from many points of view. A project has only to be called romantic to be condemned, often unjustly, and works of great utility have thereby been delayed. As an example, when first proposed, the building of a bridge across the Thames at Putney was denounced as "a visionary, romantic scheme."

The spirit of romance in enterprise and trade has played so great a part in building up the British Commonwealth because it has not been emotional, but a quickening influence, with just that touch of other-worldliness which appeals to something latent in every human heart and gets the best work out of people. It is a pity to let it go.

Owing to the discredit into which romance has fallen, romantic literature is fast disappearing and being replaced by photographic studies of uninteresting, unpleasant types and ingenious detective stories. Form is subordinated to these themes, a sloppy style being considered a proof of sincerity, while careful writing is discouraged.

Platitudes are another outcome of this fear of what appeals to the imagination or goes beyond the practical and ordinary; they permeate our newspapers and public meetings, few journalists or public speakers dare indulge in flights of fancy, but stick to familiar tags.

And platitudes are dangerous; they save us the trouble of thinking, but are in fact worn out truths. We have sacrificed much to the conviction that truth is matter of fact, a conviction in the category of those described by Nietzsche as being more dangerous to truth than lies.

Perhaps the most romantic period in European history occurred in the first half of the twelfth century. This is how Miss Violet Markham paints the picture of that period in a shortly forthcoming book: "It was a wonderful moment when Europe was alive as it has seldom been before or since; when, thanks to a very practical internationalism, frontiers were no bar to the free passage of men and ideas from country to country; when Eastern works of art were being imported eagerly into the West, and *Ille de France* sculpture was being turned out at Jerusalem; when Henry II laid the foundations of law, and Abelard lit the torch of the new learning; when Suger worked at St. Denis and Eleanor of Aquitaine held court at Acre; when the great abbots ruled at Clunney, and the troubadours went singing along the highways of Europe."

Here seemed to be all the essentials of real romance. There was nothing morbid in the Europe of that day. It had just emerged from the welter of the Dark Age, and the people who set to work to make a new Europe were very much alive, drawing their inspiration from within themselves, free from convention, fostering learning, displaying enthusiasm for enthusiasm, and with it all, how romantic they were—did they not build for the delight of after ages great shrines like Vézelay?

We may complain that in our present age life is too mercenary and complicated, that real romance is shy and secret, shrinks from publicity and propaganda, has no money in it and cannot be "put across"; that we are pre-occupied with many cares, and see and hear so much about the world that our curiosity is sated; and finally, that in these circumstances we should be content to make the best of material things and resign ourselves to spiritual inactivity.

WHAT FOR TODAY.

If that is going to be our attitude in this age of marvels whose scientific and mechanical achievements should appeal to the last imaginative when an individual

with a simple wireless set can catch the countless murmurs out of space, and men have learned to move in three dimensions, when we seem to be on the eve of new and still more startling development—we shall have to admit the utter failure of the human spirit, and will sink eventually to the level of the beasts that perish.

If we succumb to weariness and weakening of the faculties of resistance, as civilization as advanced as ours have succumbed in the past, it will be said of us that we were not only unromantic, but in addition and perhaps for that reason, that we were unworthy of our heritage, and that our age and generation marked the beginning of the definite decline in Western civilization.

— Daily Chronicle.

A LOST ART.

GREAT TALKERS OF THE PAST.

Is conversation a lost and submerged 'period' art?

Having perhaps reached the height of its glory during the Eighteenth Century, it has since seemed to waver and decline, until nowadays, with the exception of a few common or garden flowers of speech it appears to have fallen into complete decay.

The lamp-lit salons of Madame de Stael, Madame Recamier, and Madame Deffand have become a kind of unattainable ideal to modern hostesses, and the glitter of their personalities causes our electrically-lighted drawing-room to look dark by comparison.

The brilliant novel, "Madelaine," by Miss Hope Mirrlees, throws a significant search-light on this point of view. Her heroine, a young country girl patiently and assiduously practises the art of conversation in the unfulfilled hope of obtaining the entree to any of the Paris Salons. What modern girl could, or would, conscientiously struggle to perfect herself in this particular way? She has too many other aims, too many other ambitions, and there are too many burning questions with which her mind must be occupied for her to devote her energies to so sterile a task.

"INARTICULATE ENGLISH."

In previous ages, however, conversation was far more consciously enjoyed and proportionately more cultivated with that object openly avowed. Even among the "inarticulate English" such was the case. The Eighteenth Century elected Dr. Johnson to the highest rank of the immortals very largely because of his qualifications as a conversationalist. He had several English successors; notably Coleridge most eminent of all who could talk all night, keeping everyone enthralled; Charles Lamb, Leigh Hunt, Macaulay and later, Gladstone and Meredith.

But all that belongs to the past—the spacious age of continuity and reflection. To-day, we are supposed to live so fast, to be sucked down by such a whirlpool of activities and changes, that we have no time for coherent speech or thought.

If conversation as an art has really disintegrated, it may be simply because we have realised the fact that the world of to-day is no longer the leisurely and comparatively simple world it was when Mme. de Stael glittered supreme. The salé pleaders salon-leaders were content to be word perfect within the limited radius of their vision—but is not our world too subtle and too manifold to be adequately reflected in ordinary speech?

— Morning Post.

BOOK REVIEWS.

SUTTEE BY EDWARD THOMPSON. GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD., LONDON. Pp. 165. 7/6 net.

THIS book, which is appropriately clothed in a flame-coloured jacket, is described on the title page, in somewhat pompous terms, as a historical and philosophical enquiry into the Hindu rite of widow-burning. There is a Renaissance of Hinduism now as a result of national awakening; and therefore it is to be naturally expected that there will be friends of India who will be interested in showing us the other side of the medal. Miss Mayo overshot the mark by appearing to give an account of Indian civilisation as a whole. Moreover, she committed the indiscretion of going beyond verifiable facts and printed documents. She spoiled her case by too much comment. Mr. Thompson knows better. He would confine himself to a single aspect of this over-praised Hindu civilisation. And in treating it he would not go beyond historical records. He would be severely academic, approaching the subject less as a propagandist than as an anthropologist and a historian. He would make facts speak for themselves. And above all, he would adopt the new Missionary policy of *appearing* fair and just. We shall not be surprised if, in a few years, another friend of India, encouraged by Mr. Thompson's method of approach, presents the world with a learned monograph on infanticide in India. Mr. Thompson triumphantly declares towards the end of his book, "I have tried to make it as impossible for an educated Indian to defend suttee, as it is now impossible for an educated Englishman to defend execution by torture." We may accord to the author the glory of having killed a dead snake. But one wonders which educated Indian seriously defends suttee at the present day. It may be that some of our emotional young men, when they are constantly taunted by foreign missionaries about the defects of our social system, are occasionally forced into a perverse defence of them. Mr. Thompson's book itself affords examples of violent statements which put the Hindu reformer in an embarrassing position, and force the obscurantist into a greater perversity. Take for instance the following:—"The nonsense about the wonderful purity of the Hindu marriage ideal cannot survive examination; still less the sex-obsession of the civilisation and the social system which, in making one sex the unpitied servant to the other, drains and

destroys both". Confronted with criticism of this kind it is no wonder that some of the defenders of Hindu culture go to the opposite extreme, and try to seek the soul of good in things essentially evil. To take such a defence seriously and to make it one of the reasons for shocking the world with a reprint of one of the blood-stained pages in the history of a nation is to lose all sense of proportion.

Mr. Thompson says, "India's primary need to-day is fair judgment—from us to it and from it to us". We agree. But is it fair to regard the practice of suttee by a nation, which has evolved the doctrine of *ahimsa* and in which the family affections are proverbially strong and sweet, as anything different from the orgies of witch-burning, religious massacres, Smithfield fires and tortures of the Inquisition in Christian Europe? It is one of the tragedies of religion everywhere that, by some perversity, grossly inhuman and immoral practices find a safe lodging in it for many years after they have been banished from other departments of life. Men make themselves the victims of a hoary tradition against all dictates of reason, common sense and humanity. Custom becomes a pitiless tyrant, especially in communities which have become stagnant. Even to-day there are prevalent among Hindus a number of harsh customs—the heritage of the Dark Ages—which are observed by most people with tears in their eyes. Such things only show the contemptible weakness of a fallen nation, not its wickedness. Therefore it is absurd to say that suttee would seem to prove "a depravity and arrogance such as no other human offence had brought to light."

The pity of it, however, is, that in the matter of suttee the Hindu religion, as taught in the Vedas, the two great Epics and the early codes of laws, is not at all to blame. The poisonous weed was of a later growth. Though it may be of indigenous origin it was nourished and strengthened by foreign influences. It struck roots in places most exposed to the barbarities of war, and thence ran wild over the country.

Suttee was once universal. It was one of those primitive cruelties like cannibalism and human sacrifice that characterised the childhood of humanity in every land, though, later in some places, it came to be invested with a halo of heroism. In pre-historic times it prevailed in Scandinavia, Greece, Egypt and Scythia. It existed among the Tongans, the Fijians, the Maories and many African and American tribes. "In fact," says Mr. Thompson, "the rite belongs to a barbaric stratum which once overlay the world including India."

But the remarkable fact is that suttee had gone out of use among Aryans before the Vedic period. One of the funeral hymns of the Rig Veda runs thus :—

" Rise up, O woman, to join the world of the living. Thou liest with the man who is dead ; come away, and mayest thou become the wife of this second husband who is to take hold of thy hand."

In the Atharva Veda this verse is preceded by another which runs ;—

" This woman wishing to be in the same world with her husband lies down by thy side, O mortal who art dead, following the ancient practice ; grant her in this world children as well as wealth."

The eminent orientalist, the late Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, after quoting these two verses in one of his addresses, remarks :—

" Thus you will see that the custom which had gone out of use amongst the Vedic Aryans was revived later on about the time when the metrical Smritis were written through the influence of the practice of other races."

Therefore Mr. Thompson is right when he says, " I suppose no scholar of repute would now maintain that suttee was a Vedic rite."

Not only the Vedas but also the Epics, the early Smritis and Puranas are free from suttee. The Ramayana is free from it. In the Mahabharata after the great war the numerous royal ladies, who survived their husbands, did not burn themselves. No doubt there are a few instances of suttee in this vast epic, as in the case of one of the two widows of Pandu. But these seem to be rather later additions. For even the Tantras of a subsequent age forbid the rite. And Manu does not prescribe it. The famous law-giver says on the other hand :—

" At her pleasure let her emaciate her body by living on pure flowers, roots and fruit ; but she must never even mention the name of another man after her husband has died."

" A virtuous wife, who, after the death of her husband, constantly remains chaste, reaches heaven though she have no son, just like those chaste men."

And Medhatithi who wrote a commentary on the code of Manu about the tenth century, while commenting on these verses, denounces strongly the practice of suttee. Mr. Thompson does not mention this fact. Nor does he trace the growth of the rite through our later Smritis and Puranas. In fact his research even with regard to the early periods is very superficial. He does not seem to go to the original sources. His facts are all taken second-hand from writers like Wilson, Dubois, Balfour and Sir Charles Eliot mentioned in his foot-notes. And the reader is disappointed when he comes to the rather bald statement " that the rite came in with the tribes taken into Hinduism and its performance became common."

Every student of Hinduism knows that various tribes, at different levels of culture, have been absorbed into the Hindu fold with all their customs and manners and practices. In later times no serious attempt was made to Aryanise the converts. A nominal acceptance of the authority of the Veda was practically all that was imposed on them. Every tribe, that was thus admitted, retained its individuality, followed its own code of manners, and lived its own compartmental life. This policy of the Hindu leaders had its disadvantages as well as its advantages. We are now concerned only with the former. In course of time the whole civilisation of the land became contaminated with the unassimilated poisons. Savage customs began to jostle with high philosophy, and degrading conceptions of the Deity went hand in hand with the Absolute of the Upanishads. The practice of suttee is a case in point. Here is an inhuman custom of the primitive times, which is not sanctioned by any authoritative Hindu scripture, but is, on the other hand, condemned by many law-givers; and yet it firmly lodged itself in the community and even spread to classes which were once free from it.

It is a remarkable feature of suttee that it was prevalent only among certain classes, and not others. Brahmans, for instance, were exempt from the rite. Even in Bengal and Rajasthan, where many Brahman women burnt themselves, there was a certain measure of immunity for this caste. This fact goes to show that suttee was a thoroughly non-Aryan rite, and that it became a respectable thing only after the Rajputs entered the Hindu fold. The stronghold of the rite was the aristocracy of the ruling classes, especially the Rajputs and the Sikhs. The lower classes seem to have been almost untouched by it. Hence we are forced to conclude that, though suttee was a primitive rite in its origin, it became a point of honour with some Hindu noble families. The woman who mounted the funeral pyre along with her dead husband was almost canonised, and the family, to which she belonged, rose in the estimation of the people. On the other hand a woman of rank who refused to die was looked down upon as an unfaithful wife and a coward, and her desire to live brought down the prestige of the family. In such circumstances women of the warrior class would rather die than face obliquy of this kind. Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy compares suttee to conscription because in both cases a person, whether willing or unwilling, is driven to an act of self-sacrifice for the sake of a doubtful ideal either by the pressure of public opinion or by the fiat of the ruling class. But a nearer parallel would be the custom of *hari kari* that prevailed in Japan till very recently. When a king dies all his faithful courtiers thought it a point of honour to do away with their lives. We remember that a

few years ago, when the Mikado died, the world was shocked to hear that a distinguished general in the Japanese army committed *hari kari*. When such an act was glorified by the nation one could easily imagine the pressure of public opinion or a false notion of prestige and family honour acting on the minds of persons similarly situated. This is an aspect of suttee to which Mr. Thompson does not do sufficient justice.

"For reasons which no one has yet established," says our author, "suttee seems to have increased in many parts of India between 1680 and 1830." We may hazard the guess, however, that it was perhaps due to the unsettled state of the country consequent on the downfall of the Mogul empire, and the absence of security of person and property, especially in the case of unprotected women. Whatever that may be, suttee seems to have reached its zenith, as far as the Bengal Presidency was concerned, in 1818—the very year in which Ram Mohan Roy began to publish his pamphlets. The other parts of the country that were affected were the Punjab, Rajasthan, and, in South India, Madura and Vijayanagar. The main object of Mr. Thompson's book is, of course, to show the appalling extent to which the rite had spread before the British took over the administration of the country, and the glorious part played by the English rulers in putting it down. That is the burden of all the later chapters. The early chapters are only an eye-wash. Like the good Christian that he is, the author wants us to confess our iniquities, turn away from the hideous idol we worshipped, and pay the debt of gratitude where it is due. Well, we are quite willing to do so, even without attempting to scrutinise his statistics. We assure him further that there is no danger of India's forgetting her real benefactors like Lord William Bentinck or of her partially reverting to suttee, as he fears, in the event of the British leaving the country. Happily his fears are unfounded, Mr. Thompson should have a little more faith in humanity, even in Indian humanity. He is unjust and inaccurate when he says:—

"The weakest thing in Hinduism is its ethical record, which is a shocking one. There is no single instance of a cruelty or an injustice which the religion or the people have shaken off from within. Reform has always come by forcible interposition from without, and without that forcible interposition would never have come."

To say this of a people, who, before the loss of their political independence, carried the banner of a high ethical religion over the whole of eastern Asia, and at home fairly humanised their masses, inculcated the doctrine of *ahimsa*, and induced large portions of the population to give up meat-eating and drinking, is to betray one's own prejudice or limitations of mind. We are no defenders

of India's crimes and misdemeanours. We do not forget that there is many a dark page in the history of Hinduism. But we cannot forget, either the unedifying spectacle that Christianity presented in Europe so recently as 1914—18. We know the measure of peace on earth and good-will among men that that religion has so far achieved. Even to-day we have very little assurance, in spite of all the Christian pulpits in the world, that the Belgian atrocities would not be repeated, that defenceless civil population including women and children would not be murdered in their homes by aerial bombs, and that shameless lying propaganda would not be carried on by Christian nations if it served their purpose.

Naturally Mr. Thompson is unable to see the demoralising effects in India of long centuries of political stagnation and subjection. The people have lost all power of independent thinking and all power of initiative. They are content to lead dull and inglorious lives. In our own generation we have seen and are seeing the swift transformations in independent countries like Japan, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. And we are also seeing the long-drawn travail in India. Our princes are still having their zenanās, our pundits are still advocating child marriages, our intelligentsia are still discussing whether social legislation even in the case of a crying evil is advisable, and our masses are all the time looking helplessly on, while the paramount power, which acted with such splendid heroism in the days of Bentinck and Dalhousie, has begun to cultivate an obsequious regard for the feelings of all the obscurantists in the land. The social reformer is suspect, because he is also a political reformer. And it is in this impasse that people of the class of Mr. Thompson give us the pin-prick.

It seems to us that the right mood in which we should contemplate the past crimes and aberrations of humanity in any land is one of profound sadness, and not of self-righteous indignation. We are surprised, therefore, that especially so many of those who call themselves the followers of Christ do not remember, when they write books on the sins of India, what their Master said when he stooped and wrote with his finger on the ground.

"He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her."

D. S. S.

ESSAYS ON THE GITA BY SRI ARABINDO GHOSE.

Although the earliest interpreters of the Bhagavadgita have held that it presents a consistent thought, yet some modern critics have seen in it contradictions and irrelevancies, which have led them to suspect that interpolations must have been made by later generations. However, as the poem now stands, it lends itself to a number of different interpretations. Some aim at inculcating Karma (Works) as the main object of the teaching, some hold that Bhakti (Devotion), some others Sannyasa (Renunciation), others Raja-Yoga (Mental discipline), others still Hatha Yoga (Physical discipline), others again Dharma (Ethical discipline), a few Tantra (Mystic practice) and lastly, some hold Jnana (Knowledge of truth) to be the essential teaching of Gita. Now Sri Arabindo Ghose says that the core of the teaching is to be found in 'The triune way of knowledge, works and devotion. . . . The first step is Karma Yoga, the second is Jnana Yoga the last step is Bhakti Yoga which leads to union with the divine being and oneness with the supreme divine nature.' And the 'supreme divine nature' is thus described by him. "Brahman the one indivisible existence resides as if divided. The unity is the greater truth, the multiplicity is the lesser truth, though both are a truth and neither of them is an illusion." He also speaks of it as being "true truth" and "real reality." But what is "truth" and what is "reality"? Our difficulty in understanding him increases when he says that Brahman is both "mutable" and "immutable" at the same time. And we are not permitted to ask such questions. For he says that his object in expounding the Gita is "not a scholastic or academical scrutiny of its thought, nor to place its philosophy in the history of metaphysical speculation, nor to deal with it in the manner of the analytical dialectician." Then, what does the learned author promise if we should accept his new interpretation and guidance? He assures that "The supreme eternal superconsciousness will be yours. You will dwell for ever in the highest status of the supreme spirit; for, here you will have accomplished the expression of the godhead and your soul even though it has descended into mind and body, will already be living in the vast eternity of the spirit." Further, "The heart spiritualised and lifted beyond the limitations of its lower nature will reveal to you most intimately, the secret of God's immeasurable being, bring into you the whole touch and influx and glory of his divine powers and open to you the mysteries of an eternal rapture."

May we not pause for a moment and ask whether this may not be self-delusion or hallucination or the effect of some

self-hypnotization? But as he tells us that Bhakti, not Jnana implying rational enquiry, is the highest aim of the teaching, he seems to demand implicit acceptance of his words whatever they may mean.

It is one thing to make use of the Gita to teach a great lesson or rather some important lesson that the country, or the world is in need of and another thing to get at the meaning of the author irrespective of all other considerations. An instance of the former, probably the best of its kind, is Sri Bal Gangadhar Tilak's Gita Rahasya. And there is relevancy between his view and Arjuna's resumption of arms to fight. Our learned author too appears to belong to the same category. For, he says that his object is to "extract from the Gita what can help us or the world at large and to put it in the most natural and vital form and expression we can find that will be suitable to the mentality and helpful to the spiritual needs of our present day humanity."

Here may we not enquire, which scripture, for instance, the Bible or the Koran, as interpreted by its modern exponents has a different aim? And the best proof of the truth of any teaching lies in its practical effects as we see them. Sir Arabindo's Bhakti Yoga has been before his countrymen for thousands of years and yet the majority of the people in Bengal have been gradually drawn away into the folds of Mohamedanism and Christianity. Substantial numbers in other parts of India have deserted the "Bhakti Yoga" of the Gita to the faith of the Koran and the Bible. If we are not to test the worth of the Gita's teaching either by the standard of its "philosophy" or by its effects on the hearts of the people, in what other way are we to measure it? Not that we underestimate the value of Bhakti or devotion as such. But our question here is as to how far the "Bhakti" of the Gita is of any special significance to human society.

What fascinates the largest number of men in all countries and at all times is the mystic creed whose first democratic article of faith is contempt for the intellect and whose second is the abandonment of the thought of physical well-being, which two are the causes of all the ills of life. This creed raises in every individual the hope of realising all that one aspires for. And it also gives a teacher the privilege of pleasing the majority of mankind without having to prove the truth of one's statements. It is the shortest and the easiest route to popularity. What distinguishes its modern form from the old world type of it is that in our own times it is clothed in such gorgeous literary garb that it passes the simple layman's powers to get at its true meaning. There may have been Mahatmas of this kind in

countless numbers in India. We do not question the greatness of their internal or personal and private achievements but how have their ecstatic visions helped the poverty stricken and sorrow laden millions who are not mystics? We could appeal to the only court we know, the history of India of the past thousand years. But such intellectual scrutiny is inconsistent with mystic faith.

This is the delusion under which India has been labouring for centuries. Does Sri Arabindo Ghose's new exposition help to free ourselves from this delusion? We have found no answer. Tilak's *Gita-Rahasya* appears to be more practical in this respect, though we do not subscribe to its view. For our part, as for a layman, the question with which the *Gita* starts and the reply with which it ends are quite simple and plain. Bhakti does not appear to be the special or the last point of instruction in as much as Arjuna says *at the very commencement* that he has complete faith in Krishna and that he will do Krishna's bidding. On the other hand, verses 7 and 8 of Chapter II contain the first prayer of Arjuna in which he says that his *mind* is "confused" as to what his duty is and as a consequence he is overcome by grief which makes him seek Sri Krishna's advice. And at the end of the *Gita* in XVIII, 72, Sri Krishna asks him whether his delusion (Moha) and ignorance (Ajnana) are gone. Arjuna in the following verse replies that he is freed from "delusion and ignorance." There is no reference here either to Karma, Bhakti, Sannyasa, Dharma, Dhyana, Yoga or Tantra to indicate that that is the main teaching. What the *Gita* inculcates is what removes ignorance and delusion that is Jnana (Knowledge) as the highest object to be acquired so that delusion and ignorance may be dispelled. And what India really needs is knowledge or Jnana; more Jnana be it philosophical or scientific or to put it in other words, the spirit to pursue truth in all fields. She has to free herself from that mentality which accepts anything as truth without proof.

Though we thus disagree with the learned author of the *Essays on the Gita*, we have no doubt whatever that the book will be exceedingly popular among those who are of an emotional temperament. His poetical interpretation covers two volumes which are full of literary merit and in which the wings of imagination soar to the highest altitudes. The chapters on the Sankhya-Yoga, and the Vedanta as well as his views on "Avatars" and "Sacrifice" have much originality which will repay perusal. We heartily welcome this delightful addition to the World's *Gita* literature.

SIR ASUTOSH MUKHERJEE—A STUDY BY PROBODH CHANDRA SINHA. THE BOOK COMPANY LIMITED, CALCUTTA. PRICE Rs. 4.

The art of biography is as yet undeveloped in this country, and biographies, such as have been written by Indians, with a few exceptions, are mostly in the nature of panegyric pamphlets revealing neither critical judgment nor literary skill. It is, therefore, very pleasing to see Mr. Sinha attempting a serious life study of one of the most remarkable men of our time. We must, however, confess a sense of surprise that so ambitious a work should have been attempted by one who does not, apparently, seem to have had the benefit of personal contact and intimacy with Sir Asutosh. It is certain that the quality of the book would have been heightened by putting in intimate touches, such as conversations and enlivening discussions of men and things. The book is needlessly bulky and could have been written, with advantage, in a third of its present size. In the first 78 pages the author compresses the actual biographical details of Sir Asutosh Mukherjee, from birth to death, and the four hundred and more pages are devoted to an account of the various aspects of Sir Ashutosh's accomplishments and character. We are not sure if this is the best method. Career and character are not to be so distinctly separated. Career is determined by the character which in turn it reveals. The lawyers are, however, likely to grumble that the judicial labours of the greatest Indian Judge should have been treated in a brief chapter that is not particularly illuminating. Extraordinary interest attaches to the correspondence (published as appendix) that passed between Sir Asutosh and Lord Lytton in regard to the vice-Chancellorship of the Calcutta University. In the bold stand that Sir Asutosh took, he has shown not merely that he had an intrepid and tenacious spirit (for which throughout his life there are abundant proofs) but that the University was the greatest devotion of his life. It is no exaggeration to say that the best part of his time and energy was given to the building up of the Calcutta University; and it is but right that Mr. Sinha who has a great admiration for Sir Asutosh should do justice to this side of his life.

S. P.

REVIEWS REVIEWED.

The October number of the *Edinburgh Review* contains an article on '*The Indian Peasant*' by Mr. W. H. Morland, who in the course of an able review of the report of the Lingthlow Commission, indicates that in the absence of real leaders of the people to encourage agricultural development, that work has to be done by the State. The other article of interest to India is the one on '*Lord Curzon*' by Sir John Marriott, admirable both in substance and form. The editor, Mr. Harold Cox contributes a paper on the dangers and evils of safeguarding of industry. Mr. Bruce Lockhard leads the number with a survey of the Austrian Succession States. The economic and political conditions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugo-Slavia are treated with admirable clearness and lucidity. Prince A. Lobanav Rostovsky suggests that Bolshevism has gone back upon its previously declared policy of renouncing Tsarist conquests. This number as usual, contains admirable reviews of recent publications.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (November 1928) has an important article by Mr. Pallis on *The New Turkey*. Principal Major of Ripon Hall, Oxford, writes with authority on *The base for Modernism*. He declares that human nature is in its constitution as definitely religious as it is rational, moral and aesthetic. He insists on the importance of religion in human history.

"The greatest figures in human history are the founders of religions; the most influential movements are religious movements; the most enduring organisations are religious organisations; the most ruthless of wars have been religious wars."

Being a Christian modernist, Mr. Major believes that "the Christian religion marks the highest point in the religious evolution of humanity" though there is "much that is profoundly true and good and beautiful in the teaching and lives of the founders, prophets, and saints, of non-Christian religions. The histories of some of these religions are free from the horrid blots which stain the history of the religion of Christ; nevertheless the

religion of Christ in its ideal form does contain a combination of values and potentialities vouchsafed to none other of the religions of mankind in the same degree." Colonel Fuller has an article on *The Elimination of War*. Dean Hutton writes a review article on Ronaldshay's *Curzon*.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW (November 1928). Mr. Robertson's article on *The Battle for Free Trade* has much interest in view of the general election in Great Britain. The Bishop of Oxford makes some illuminating remarks on the old problems of *The Church and the State*, with special reference to the recent prayer book controversy. The Maharajah of Patiala puts the case of the Indian Princes in a clear way. Bernard Shaw's latest work on Socialism is reviewed at length by that well known economist Mr. F. W. Hirst.

FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW (September)

This number contains 3 articles, one on each of the leading political parties in England. In his contribution "*The Bed Rock of Tory Faith*" Sir Reginald Bank describes the central characteristics and ideas of Toryism as :—

"Respect for continuity and authority; loyalty to national institutions, especially the national crown, the national church and the nationalities within the Empire; a belief in private property of every kind as the best basis of the state; a preference for the practical as opposed to theoretic; the defence of popular interests against those of wealth or caste : "

Mr. Hubert Philips writes on '*Liberalism and Industrial Relations*' and advances the following as the six major proposals of the Liberal policy.

(1) The creation of a Ministry of Industry having attached to it a representative council of industry discharging important advisory functions.

(2) The establishment, throughout the industrial field of representative negotiating bodies in each industry, differing, if need be, among themselves as the circumstances of industry may differ, but discharging under the general guidance of the council of Industry, certain common functions.

(3) The elaboration of special schemes, along more or less well defined lines, for ensuring the maintenance of industrial peace in certain essential public services—this proposal being a practical alternative to that illegalizing of sympathetic strikes with which the Trade Disputes, etc., Act of 1927, is largely concerned.

(4) The elaboration of principles of wage policy, which lend themselves to Statutory application as far as minimum wages are concerned and to a progressive improvement in the technique of corrective wage ascertainment as regards wages other than statutory minima.

(5) The establishment by law of representative works councils in all industrial concerns, such Councils having defined privileges and responsibilities.

(6) The enactment of legislation designed to protect the individual wage earner against some of the worst abuses now arising in the course of his employment, and so conferring upon him, in his capacity as wage earner, a status not incompatible with that which he enjoys as a free citizen in democratic state.

Mr. James Corbett's article on "*What is wrong with the Labour party*" is a very ably written paper. He sees dissensions in the party. Mr. Cook is likely to split the Labour Party and Maxton and Wheatly are also working in a similar direction.

"Apparently they are working for the disruption of the Labour Party as a political force. They are strange bed fellows, called together by a singular Fate but they understand each other perfectly. They are checkmated by MacDonald, Thomess and Snowden, and tug of war between these men is delightfully interesting. I believe the rope will break in the hands of Mr. Cook. The Radical group led by Lloyd George and the Labour School will perhaps coalesce.

Mr. Lewis Einstein (U. S. minister in Czechoslovakia) leads the number with a biographical sketch of Mr. Hoover.

The October number of the London Mercury is up to its normal level of excellence. Dorothy Wellesly's 'Egypt' is the chief poem of the 'Poetry' section, which is an invariable feature of this Magazine. C. E. Montague's story "*The Wisdom of Mrs. Trevenna*" though not among the best efforts of the writer, is a charming short story. In his article on '*What is wrong with the Commercial Theatre*' Mr. A. G. Macdonell deplores the shortage of playwrights of merit, and producers of imagination and grip of the stage craft. Mr. George C. Williamson's reminiscence of Edmund Gosse as a boy would be read with interest. The usual features, Surveys of recent plays, architecture, fine arts, the movies, poetry, fiction, literary criticism add much to the liveliness of the reading matter. There is a good review of Lord Oxford's 'Memories and reflections' by Mr. Clennell Wilkinson.

THE ENGLISH REVIEW, (November.) The interest attaching to this number is considerably heightened by the full publication of Mr. Bernard Shaw's impressions of the League of Nations, which

had already appeared in the daily press in the form of brief extracts. The Rt. Hon. Lord Hugh Cecil writes an article "*Mr. Chapman and divorce*" with all the apostolic fervour that one generally associates with him. He is perturbed at the suggestion of Mr. Chapman that indissoluble marriages cause great hardship. He relies upon the Lord's teaching that marriage is sacred, and marriage after divorce is adultery. The following passage shows how he stands in relation to this increasingly important social problem."

Those who on religious grounds are opposed to divorce are so because they believe that dissolution of marriage even if it be thought desirable is in fact impossible. Marriage they believe can never be broken as a reality in the sight of God. It is therefore idle to enter upon the question whether people would be happier or less happy if their marriages could be more easily dissolved because in truth and reality no marriage can be dissolved and it is foolish to speculate about what cannot be done. . . . Not Parliament, nor bishops, nor popes, nor councils of the church nor any other authority turn into marriage what is by God's plan of creation adultery."

Major C. M. Enniquetz deplures in the course of his article the relation of Burma to India, that though very rich, Burma is still very backward, and thinks that the main complaint of Burma is that her revenues are automatically absorbed by India. The writer recommends separation of Burma from India, with whom he is confident, she has no ties, religious or racial.

THE BOOKMAN (November). Mr. Alfred Noyes's contribution in the last number of this Journal seems to have attracted a large volume of hostile criticism. The symposium of opinions invited by the Editor on Mr. Noyes's candid and challenging criticism afford very interesting reading. The Rt. Hon. Augustine Birrel leads the symposium and states, "If Mr. Noyes likes to bash out his brains at the foot of Bunyan's pedestal he does it at his own risk, and deserves some credit for his courage." Bishop Welldon, Rev. R. J. Campbell, The very Rev. W. H. Hutton, Dean of Winchester, Rev. Dinsdale, and others are no less derisive of Mr. Noyes's attempt. It is instructive however to read in Mr. Noyes's rejoinder his own crisp summary of the controversy.

1. It is admitted by Bunyan's best exponent in the symposium that his God is almost a God of hate.

2. It is admitted that he had an undeveloped mind and his biographers offer conclusive evidence (from which I have quoted here) that it was warped by congenital defects.

3. His story of *Pilgrim's Progress* does not come into the great aesthetic category to which *Paradise Lost* belongs (This again is admitted.) Its characters are false to their names and its ideas (upon which the conduct of the story depends) will not bear examination.

4. Bunyan's work is of immense interest as a human document, a pathetic revelation of the man himself almost as complete in its own sphere as the diary of Pepys in a very different sphere. It will live for that reason: not because it ranks with the masterpieces of art which, through their art and its symbolic values transcend their age.

Wilfred Gibson reviews "Winter words"—the last poems of Thomas Hardy and confesses in spite of the poet's assertion, the collection is gloomy. George Saintsbury writes on '*Restoration Drama*.' The Journal, as usual contains its other interesting features.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE PROBLEM OF LABOUR IN INDIA.

PROFESSOR T. K. Duraiswami Aiyar's very interesting article on "The Problem of Investment in India" in "The New Era" of November suggests the question whether in the present state of the country a similar effort should not be made to pool the labour force of the land, in other words, whether there is no scope for an enlarged employment bureau, which will not only find posts for candidates but will try to devise means to provide new outlets for the energies of the children of the soil, educated and un-educated. The acuteness of the unemployment problem is felt by most middle-class families in India and we need not here expatiate upon the hardship and the agony of the young man who after a more or less successful career at the school or the university is called upon to face life with a degree, diploma or certificate which he finds has almost no value in the labour market because of what in other directions the economist would term 'over production'. Indianisation of services, their communalisation and other such cheap recipes do not go to the root of the problem; at best they afford temporary relief to certain aggrieved communities—we may say individuals, perhaps; but unless the total "production" of the country increases as fast as the population, the share of the national income that on an average falls to the lot of an individual must inevitably tend to decrease. These are mere economic platitudes no doubt, but their bearing on the problem in hand is so often lost sight of that their renunciation may be pardoned in this connection. From the point of view of the "educated" young men, literally begging for posts in our towns, the country seems to have no more use for the bulk of them than for the stray dogs that wander along the streets. The 'uneducated' labourer finds it equally hard to get employment in towns, or in villages either, except in the busy agricultural seasons. From the point of view of the country as a whole, economists, financiers and statesmen deplore the paucity of industrial development and attribute it among other things to the ingrained indolence and conservatism of the people, their lack of education and enterprise, the dearth of capital etc., etc. Natural resources, the "land" of the Economist, we have in abundance. With regard to Capital, the Professor's able analysis in the article referred to above, shows that the chief difficulty is not the lack of capital so much as the absence of an agency to bring together the available capital and the demand therefor. Can we not say that the same is true of labour also? On the one hand we have able-bodied and intelligent workers quite willing to do an honest day's work for a reasonable living wage; on the other hand we have the country crying as it were to heaven to be developed to its utmost capacity; and yet there are no enterprising agencies to organise this labour force and to get the most out of it, to the benefit of every one concerned.

Our councils and conferences, official and non-official deal with almost every aspect of human life except this, the most fundamental of our problems. What can

conferences do, it might be asked when the State is apathetic? The State will retort that this is primarily a matter for private enterprise. The private capitalist will give you a thousand convincing reasons for his inability to do anything in view of the present circumstances. We are thus left where we started, each party shoving the responsibility on to some one else. But is it fair? Is it just? Progress and advance in human affairs are never attained without active co-operation; this truth is realised for example in the political sphere where the record of the last fifty years shows what might be achieved through concerted action. In India, the home of co-operation, where the joint family, the village and caste systems were built up on the "live and let live" policy as against the "devil take the hindmost" policy of relentless competition, it ought not to be impossible to organise the nation into co-operative labour groups to the great benefit of the country. If private enterprise is not sufficient—as apparently it is not—to cope with the difficulty of the problem, there is no reason why trusts and syndicates should not come into being for starting new industries and reviving old and dying ones. The orthodox economist of the West will scoff at the idea of any direct association between philanthropy and big business but in a land where the digging of tanks and the boring of wells was until recently a favourite form of public benefaction, there is no reason why a public spirited citizen should not finance an industrial enterprise or an agricultural experiment in the interests of the country without any expectation of a return in the same way in which he now endows a Hospital or a University.

If the tanks and wells of the country had been left to be excavated by private enterprise on purely commercial lines, where would the agriculturists of the Deccan and the Carnatic have been? It is up to Indian Economists and thinkers, therefore, to urge that the justly celebrated charitable instincts of the nation be diverted into the channels of industrial and agricultural enterprise, in order to bring together the enormous resources of the country, in land and labour, to enable India to take her place among the nations of the world.

C. B.

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By Professor A. R. Wadia, B.A., (Cantab)
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IN THE SANDHILLS.

Into a gentle wildness and confusion,
Of here and there, of one and everyone,
Of windy sand-hills by an unkempt sea,
Came two with two in search of symmetry,
Found symmetry of two in sea and sand,
In left foot, right foot, left hand and right hand.

The beast with two backs is a single beast,
Yet by his love of singleness increased
By two and two and two and two again
Until instead of sandhills is a plain
Disposed in two and two, by two and two,
And the sea parts in horror at the view.
Rather an antique Three, beard, beard and bird,
Or three old spinning women, spinning hard,
Than two-four-eight-sixteenish single same
Re-registration of the duple name.

OXFORD :

ROBERT GRAVES.

APPROACH TO METAPHYSICS.*

By PROFESSOR S. N. DAS GUPTA.

IT may not be considered very wrong to think that a search after Reality may in some sense be regarded as the fundamental task of metaphysics. There may be many who think that the attempts of metaphysics during the last two or three thousand years in this direction have been a series of failures; judging from that, the presumption is that there is not much to hope from metaphysics, and that therefore it is now high time that we should leave it off. This I think is in one sense a misconception. To answer by way of comparison, we could say that because the moral endeavours of the whole humanity after perfection have been a record of failures, we should not think of giving up our moral endeavours. I have no mind to enter into any detailed examination as to how far the failures of metaphysics have been greater than that of morality, for, I think it to be more or less useless. The failures of the moral endeavours of my past life may stare me in the face, but still so long as I have the moral instinct in me, I should be continuing the moral struggle. Hunger cannot be satisfied with the knowledge that food is not available. There is in us a thirst after Reality which justifies those intellectual attempts of ours which go by the name of metaphysics.

Whether these intellectual efforts are required ultimately to point to some kind of solid experience as the ultimate result or whether the efforts themselves are sufficient to satisfy the craving of the mind in this direction, is a matter in which the Western and Indian minds are not in thorough agreement. I do not say that there is any history of open and positive disagreement and quarrel over this matter between them, but, it seems from the history of philosophy of the two countries, that European minds were always generally satisfied with the theoretical and rational enquiry, whereas, the Indian minds though they enforced strictest

* This paper is the first chapter of a work in preparation "Philosophy and Experience." The term "experience" used in this paper needs the elaboration of the later chapters.

rational enquiry, always demanded some real experience which could verify the net results of the intellectual enquiry. With the Indian thinkers mere theoretical accuracy of thought leading logically to a certain conclusion, was not considered to be sufficient. It is curious that there were certain metaphysical results which they considered as being strictly verifiable in experience, and in which all the conflicting systems of thought, which were in hopeless quarrel over the epistemological, ontological and logical parts of the theoretical enquiry, were mostly practically in agreement.

I hold no brief for India, but I pause to think about the scope of metaphysics. There is always a way of conventionally putting a limit somewhere. But with this I am not satisfied. Of course you can always have your definition and you can always say that thus further and no further should we go. But with me the ground and justification of all metaphysical enquiry lies in the innate craving of the mind to get at the Reality. And I ask myself whether this enquiry should merely be limited to certain theoretical deductions and constructions or whether it is incipiently an attitude of the mind to reach an experience which it was only imperfectly trying to grasp by the processes of logical thought. Does the notion of Reality mean merely a notion, or a consistent system of ideas giving satisfaction to the logical propensity of the mind just as a piece of poetry may in some external sense be regarded as a system of thoughts or imageries satisfying our æsthetic temperament? Or does the notion of Reality involve the suggestion that behind the search after the theoretical consistency of a construction of the nature of Reality, there is a deeper and more or less unanalysable tendency of the mind to come to a truth which will not only be logically unassailable, but should also be felt as an experience which will leave in it the final justification of its search after Reality? Is a philosopher merely a caterer to the taste of the logical propensity of the intellect as a confectioner is to the palate? Is our notion of Reality, a system of ideas which will explain a certain class of facts and relations in which we as men are widely interested? Certainly in this sense metaphysics cannot be verifiable and is not therefore verifiable. Must it not

then be an intellectual myth or fancy which is therefore different with different individuals? We read Shelley, Browning and Keats and enjoy, so do we read Kant, Hegel and Lotze. But there is this difference that there is no pretention on the part of the former for any exclusive privilege. Each philosopher on the contrary claims that his system is the only valid theory to the exclusion of those of others. What this claim for validity means is however again uncertain and vague; it generally takes two forms, namely, that one system is logically more consistent than the others and that it satisfies the demands of our nature better than the others. The precise meaning, however, of the latter claim is not so easily intelligible and many philosophers have often taken advantage of this vagueness (often unconsciously) and have uncritically given it some sort of a convenient interpretation and have tried to convince others in the same way. The fact that this satisfaction of the demands of our nature is offered as a criterion for the validity of any system or as a claim for its acceptance, again leads us to think that apart from the craving of the intellect for a logical consistency, there is some other craving which requires to be satisfied in our enquiry after metaphysics.

It seems to me that most branches of human enquiry, science, philosophy, æsthetics etc., require some sort of satisfaction obtainable by direct experience which it wants to supplement by intellectual consistency or vice versa. When one deals with æsthetics, he understands that whatever may be the consistency of the canons of criticism, their ultimate test must lie with the satisfaction of our æsthetic sense; when one deals with physics, he understands that all its laws must stand the test of sense-experience. But in philosophy, we cannot point to any special kind of experience whose satisfaction we want; the sort of satisfied experience that we want seems to me to be something like a focussed point where all our demands have somehow met. If I may apply an image, I should say that our different sorts of cravings as men, were being projected forth in our own inner space like rays of light and that if they were not obstructed in the way by their individual satisfactions, they would all converge together at a spot, further than which, there is nothing

more. It seems to me as if this projected point of focus is incipiently felt as the goal to which all the satisfactions of our individual tendencies point to. Each experience gives us a touch of it only in the sense that it points to a region ever beyond to a distant glimpse of a vanishing point beyond the series. But this is a digression, and we cannot anticipate the results of any metaphysical enquiry until it has been actually demonstrated. What I want to do in this paper is simply to discuss the method that ought to be adopted for the building up of any metaphysical hypothesis that can justify itself to us.

The subject matter of metaphysics is much wider than that of any other investigation, and it is said that it seeks to harmonise them all. But I do not know what we mean by this word. Harmony is a word which has an intelligible sense in music, because there it corresponds to a particular kind of experience. In music the different notes are heard and their commingling in a certain manner producing the harmony is also a matter of direct experience. When this harmony is felt, our musical craving is satisfied and we do not expect anything more. The relations between the different tones before the harmony has formed were not one of logical inconsistency, but a defect in their æsthetic expression which made us expect that the proper place of the tones would be served if they could make themselves the means for the production of that experience which our musical sense was wanting for its satisfaction. The dissatisfaction produced by a single note is due to the fact that it gives the suggestion of a kind of experience which our æsthetic sense was longing to have, but at the same time fails to produce it. I do not say that the combining of the tones gives this sense by the process of addition, but I think that the experience of harmony is an experience totally of a different kind,—just as water is different from Hydrogen and Oxygen of which it is composed. The musical tones were all individually real in the sense that they were experienced, and in this sense they had as much reality as the harmony; but the reality of the harmony is higher in quite another sense, namely in the sense that it represents the ultimate satisfaction of the craving of the æsthetic sense. The experience of the harmony

thus in a sense transcends the experience of the separate notes, but it is all the same felt to be the ultimate meaning of them all—in the sense that they were somehow implying or suggesting it imperfectly.

It is precisely in this experience of an implied imperfect satisfaction of the tones and the realised perfect satisfaction of the harmony that the higher reality of the latter is felt. If this finds any corroboration with the logical definition or deduction of harmony as the reality of music by any thinker, we should surely welcome it as an additional proof; but our experience of the harmony must demonstrate to us its reality. It cannot be accepted simply by dictation. So if our enquiry after the ultimate Reality in metaphysics should seek to find a Reality which would harmonise all our experiences, this could only be done on the basis of the test of a corresponding experience. Words would not be of much avail. I should require that such discovery of reason should also be testified by experience. When the notes commingle together and form the harmony, we can seldom detect their exact process but when the harmony is produced, it is felt to be the Reality which the notes were implying. Similarly even if the exact processes through which our individual experiences commingle together may not be detected at every stage, the final stage must be a matter of direct experience and there ought to be found sufficient links in the intermediate stages to justify the fact that the inner notion of ultimate Reality realised, was the thing to which our other experiences were pointing.

I must make it clear, that I am not appealing to any kind of mysticism or emotionalism, though I think these emotions and mystic experiences should always be considered as relevant considerations for any one who proposed to investigate all our experiences. I am only arguing that no theory of epistemology or of metaphysics formed from outside could ever have the right to dictate to us. Logic is the language with which we interpret our diverse experiences in volition to one another. It can work upon facts and give us the clue to many new relations of facts, but it does not create new facts, nor does it stand a guarantee for the validity of the result,

if the validity of the facts supplied to it cannot be certified beforehand. Whatever Spinoza's opinion may have been, metaphysics, I think, is not geometry. You cannot take a maxim or a principle either as an axiom or as a postulate and then sitting upon it, continue to spin and spin until you have got a web big enough for covering all experiences with an Absolute along with them. I do not deny that even in this procedure there may be found some results with which one could be in agreement, but I think that to depend only on such a process without any reference to experience, is hopelessly wrong in metaphysics. It is done nowhere. Even in geometry, when you start from certain principles and arrive at certain results, these are verified in experience though their validity may be claimed apart from those verifications. Geometry starts with certain axioms and postulates regarding the nature of space relations and from them by a process of logical reasoning, proves other space properties. This result is valid as a logical deduction, but this is verifiable too by actual experience in accordance with our other experiences of time-relations and space-relations. But if the deductions of geometry could not be verified otherwise, and if it would not have directly taken part in other experiences with which we are interested, they might still have remained valid for thought, but no one would have thought to relate these logical constructions with other parts of our experience. Physics makes abstractions from experience, but at each step these abstractions are verified in experience.

A metaphysician surely misses his vocation if he considers himself to be Moses, the law-giver. He cannot claim to dictate to us what Reality is; but his business is to seek and find what people imply when they speak of Reality. He should seek to find out by an analysis of experience, as well as by the synthetic implications of experience, the validity of the range and scope of our craving after finding the Reality. He should examine the place of our metaphysical tendencies in our other groups of tendencies and the results of our diverse mental experiences.

Our logical faculty is the faculty with which we can leave off the details of any presentation in thought which are unessential for any particular purpose and link ourselves to other identical

or similar traits with which we are interested at the moment. This is at once its advantage and defect. Without this faculty we should have been lost in the fleeting presentations and could not have pursued a definite line on the ground of any identity of relations. But its defect is that if we should trust ourselves merely to it, we might be brought to places which we had no inclinations to visit. When using abstract logical thought as vehicle of journey for finding out Reality in experience, we are always to get down at stations at convenient intervals and assure ourselves with the experience of the place that we are proceeding along the right route.

Logic with me means the process by which our thought may be led to get beyond the immediate experience of the present, either as sensuous percepts or as felt wholes, which are only realised as a continuum, but not analysed into constituent parts. No thought can be satisfied with what is merely immediately given, either through the senses or directly to the mind. The logical faculty of thought (if I may be allowed such an expression) always seeks to break up the immediacy of anything that is given into differences, and then guided by any particular kind of interest to pick up any of these and unite them with other entities, similarly broken up and abstracted from other unities. When our experiences remain as mere immediacies, or felt wholes of the moment, they remain shut up within themselves; conceived as such, these are isolated facts which can seldom be connected up with one another. Each felt whole stands alone by itself. But the activity of the mind could not be content with such immediacies, for the essence of activity consists in the passage from one to the other and we notice two kinds of such movements in our mind, the one, automatic and random, and the other, necessary and connected. The first is represented by all that is given through the senses and through automatic suggestions and associations, and the other, by the logical process through voluntary, yet necessary connecting of the elements of abstraction in a definite order.

Both these are essential for thought. The presentations of our thought come to us quite uncontrolled by us, but the activity of the mind is not satisfied by this involuntary

movement, for, it wants consciously to unite those presentations in some way or other, and as this is found impossible, it detaches or abstracts certain features from the concrete felt wholes in diverse experiences, tacitly treats them as actually existing entities and unites them in a new unity. We may start with a certain abstracted feature and continue the process of establishing its relations with other abstracted features. But however we might do it in one single line, or multiply it in diverse lines, we cannot get at the truth of our experience. The automatic inrush of new experiences is the materials over which the logical activity of analysis and synthesis works. What is the exact nature of the relation between any two logical abstractions taken at random is more than we can say. It was Hegel's belief that they were so connected with one another that you could start from any logical abstraction and if you had sufficient patience to continue the process of analysis and synthesis, you could arrive at any other abstraction. They were to him but moments or links in a self-contained evolving cycle of the dialectic process. But however good may be some aspects of the general results of his philosophy, all his attempts in this direction failed, and even if he had been successful in showing such an universal self-developing inter-connection between the categories, the question as regards the complete wholes of experience would have been left quite untouched. Hegel would probably have dismissed them as unimportant, but that would not improve matters.

However less we might know about it, there is probably an unconscious or subconscious bond which holds together the different isolated felt wholes forming a totality of inter-connected experience. The unity which the free play of our logical faculty gave us, was of quite a different type; it was the conscious establishment of new unities, on the basis of the materials supplied by automatic presentative experience appearing either directly or through memory. Without the presentation wholes, there cannot be any realisation of the logical activity and without the latter, the former sinks below the threshold of thought. The inner demand of our nature craves to be satisfied in both ways. It seeks to arrive at new relations between the abstracted features with which discursive thought deals and it also wants to have the

experience of the concrete presentative wholes. These two worlds, namely, that of logical thought, and that of a logical concrete experience, are neither completely different, nor merely parallel, but are more like two sets of curves which are continually intersecting and separating; and they are so inter-woven that in adult life, the mind in its continual passage from one to the other, hardly notices the two as distinct and the passage from concrete experience to logical thought by analysis, and from logical thought to experience by synthesis, is felt to be so sure, so necessary and so orderly that the mind runs on through them, seldom suspecting that in its progress, it is always in touch with two different kinds of worlds. There is probably somewhere a knot which ties the two fabrics together in a universal and unalterable order. But what is the nature of this knot, is yet to be discovered. People who set out to discover the reason of this bond of unity have often ended in making an easy solution by dropping either of these altogether and resting contented with the one. Thus there have been mystics and philosophers who regarded all logical thought as untrue appearance, unwarranted construction and illusion and based their ultimate enquiry into the nature of reality upon the logical immediate experience of such a concentrated nature as could completely get rid of the logical movement or upon an intuitive grasp of the truth by pure sympathy alone. There also have been philosophers who considered logic as the only truth and regarded the method of the logical movement of thought as representing the method of movement of the Reality itself. The march of logic is as a rule linear and these philosophers attempted to show that all experiences were evolving in a circular chain the method of which was in essence the same as was involved in Logic. The success that they attained in this cannot certainly be regarded as indisputable. And when they had to face the problem of explaining the concrete wholes of experience they generally tried to avoid it as unimportant.

The main point which I want to emphasise is this: that the process of thought in logical abstraction and that of enjoying the experience of concrete wholes being complementary to each other, no attempt at finding out the nature of Reality could be justified which made an abstract principle,

the sole criterion of Reality. In such specific notions of ours as the space-time notion, where the one unified notion is so ultimate and so unique that it is hardly affected, complicated by other experiences, the logical deductions have the greatest chance of holding good, independent of verifications from experience, for all our mathematical judgments are hypothetical in the sense that provided there is this space-time notion, these deductions from it must hold good. But this cannot hold with reference to our enquiry after Reality, for it involves as its data the whole of our experience. As I have hinted above, our logical chain of reasoning holds good our experiences within certain limits. We cannot put ourselves in a logical train of reasoning and proceed on and on without reference to experience and ultimately come to a point where we could be sure that there must be a Reality or an experience within which all other experiences have been enmeshed. When logical abstractions are made from the concrete wholes of experience, the extent to which these abstractions may stand as representatives of the concrete wholes from which they have been taken is always limited; and therefore there is always the chance that any unverified logical train should land us in a place where we had no intention to proceed. Cases are by no means rare where philosophers were driven to a conclusion by a logical course of reasoning and having come there tried to convince themselves that, that was exactly where they had intended to come.

The enquiry after Reality is an enquiry which proceeds from the totality of our being; it is not a mere pastime of intellectual exercise; it is therefore necessary that any result that is attained in this course must be such that it should not only be made somehow logically consistent, but should be felt in the experience as a whole in which we are really interested. The business of a metaphysician should be to interpret experience and not to hold forth a logical principle and then stifle all those experiences that would refuse to obey it. Our notion of Reality is not a mere logical principle, a rule or a maxim, but if it indicates anything, it indicates an imperfectly felt Reality which carries with it the actual suggestions of its perfecter form. So the search after Reality that metaphysics

ought to adopt should always follow the indications to Reality that may be actually found in our experience and not imposed upon them from outside by excessive logical subtlety. And theory unfounded and untestified by experience in metaphysics may more or less be regarded as mythologies of metaphysics which may no doubt be attended with its own peculiar pleasure due to a robust intellectual exercise or a fine flight of fancy.

If I am asked to give an example of a metaphysical system where logic overdoes its part, I may just try to give an example after the manner of certain philosophers.

"Anything which requires something else for understanding it is self-contradictory and therefore appearance."

"I can call something self-contradictory and unreal only because I know the real."

"The Reality is that which is self-contained."

"Such a Reality must exist" and "It is of the nature of an experience in which all other experiences are welded up into the whole." The abstract logical principle which shows itself in all the above ramifications of thought is that, what is self-contained is Reality. By the very hypothesis the Reality is to contain all. So the next attempt consists in declaring that it does contain all. There are many confusions and inconsistencies of such a system, but to these I do not refer, for I am not engaged now to attempt any serious criticism of it. But what I want to point out is this, that no one has the right to ask me for any definition of Reality without previously testing it in the light of our experience. Another important point about it is that even if there was such a Reality as a super-experience in which all other experiences melted down, I do not think that I should be least interested about it unless I find it indicated in my experience. So long as it is a mere matter of logical deduction from a doubtful proposition, I do not see how it can satisfy either our earnest and sincere enquiry after truth or our search after Reality. In our search after truth or Reality, we try to satisfy the inherent demands of our nature in those directions. If there was any super-experience in which all our experiences melted down, without the whole affair being in any way felt or indicated in experience, it would have little interest for us. It could surely have a great

value as a philosophical hypothesis, if such a hypothesis is in any way explained, at least a fairly large amount of our experience is involved in that tendency of our mind which demands satisfaction from metaphysics.

I do not want to bring in the discussion, whether any particular person's Absolute does so or not. But if that philosopher does not try to demonstrate that it does, apparently he does not think it necessary to do it. Once you assume unconsciously that all you are required in metaphysics is to start with an abstract principle and apply its litmus-paper test to all things, in order to determine if there is any such absolute acid which will dissolve all things, and accept uncritically that this test is the right one, you may find such kinds of Absolutism pretty satisfactory. Any piece of well-sustained subtle argument affords us a certain amount of intellectual satisfaction, but it will, I think, be wrong to think that a metaphysician's duty is finished if he can dazzle or outwit us by subtle arguments. We do not want a cosmology from a true metaphysician of our times. We want our metaphysician to take into consideration at least all the important cravings manifested in experience such as logical, æsthetic, moral, religious etc., and tell us what ultimate fact or facts of Reality may be assumed on their direct evidence. I admit that this will indeed be a difficult task, but I feel that even if our progress be slow, it will at least have a stronger and more hopeful basis.

I cannot help thinking that the philosophy which aims at giving us some sort of a cosmology without largely depending on experience, will on the whole resemble mythology only with this difference that it would use subtle logic on many unessential parts of the scheme. With a Jupiter or a God of the old testament, with his wrath and kindness, we could certainly explain many things in quite a smooth way. There are, so far as it appears to me, systems of philosophy which resemble these mythical explanations. Or at least the task of building systems of metaphysics becomes in the hands of clever thinkers something like intellectual pastimes. There was a time when any one who occupied a chair of philosophy in Germany prepared a system of metaphysics which people were asked to believe.

But at this stage, I believe, I ought to modify some of the statements I have made, or else I may be misunderstood. I beg to point out that I do not wish to maintain that no philosophers ever attended to experience in framing their constructive scheme of philosophy. This would indeed be impossible, for they could never apply any logical principles, maxims or criterions without having before them some field of experience, in which they could discover them. It is also true that they had to apply to some extent these principles on experience in order to test their validity. But with most of them, the tendency had been to refer to experience, only so far as could yield them an abstract principle, and when this is once got, they forthwith proceeded to construct their work without further reference to experience. When they were challenged with experiences, which did not tally with their abstract principles, they tried to explain away the experiences, or twist them in such a way as to suit their principles. The satisfaction that these systems give, is limited to the extent to which their abstract principles are certified by experience. In this sense, I should think, that most systems contain some partial truth. It does not matter much, if we cannot agree with any system of philosophy, in its details, or even, so far as its general results are concerned, for it is enough, if after critically sifting their doctrines, we can find something true in their explanations into experience. We can fruitfully utilise the labours of the philosophers of the past, if we stick to these. At this point, I think, it is well to remember that the results of the labours of the philosophers of India of the past will be specially valuable, for, they partly on account of their insular geographical position, and partly on account of distinctive national peculiarities and climatic conditions, interested themselves in some important aspects of experience which did not attract much attention in Europe. A careful study and appreciation of these is bound to stimulate us into new channels of thought.

The general results of this paper consist in this that, I consider that the justification of all enquiry into the nature of Reality is based upon a natural craving of the advanced human mind in this direction. Our enquiry in this direction can only

satisfactorily proceed, if we search our experiences and try to find out from their direct evidences, implications and suggestions, if we can discover any notion of reality which will satisfy the craving after Reality, manifested in a general manner in all our experiences. Any undue importance given to deductions and constructions from abstract principles are likely to be futile. A carefully conducted logical reasoning with a view to discovering what is given or implied through the wide field of our experience with regard to the notion of reality can only help us out of the difficulty. The labours of past workers can be of help to us mainly so far as they have penetrated into the evidence and implications of experience. No deductions from a hastily formulated abstract principle can hope to be successful, for, the search after Reality being essentially a tendency of the mind, the object of search has to be achieved in the field in which the mind moves, namely, the experiences. A neglect of these considerations has led some philosophers (Bosanquet—*Essentials of Logic*, P. 106.) to think that philosophy can tell us no new facts and can make no discoveries and that all it can tell us, is the significant relation of what we already know. Many questions may be raised here as to the nature of the experiences, or their relations with logical thought and self, but these questions can only be discussed in the chapters that would follow.

CALCUTTA.

S. N. DAS GUPTA.

KABIR.

THE APOSTLE OF PEACE IN INDIA.

By PROFESSOR A. R. WADIA, B.A., (Cantab) Bar-at-Law.

*Ram nam tun bhaj le pyarc, kaheku magruri karta hai,
Kachi matika bungla tera, pav palke dhulta hai.*

.
*Kahat Kabira, sun bhai sadhu, manki mala japta hai.
Jo bhav bhajanse dhyani dharat hai, unku Saheb milta hai.*

One fine morning these sweet words of a famous song of Kabir were heard by me, as sung by a beggar woman from Kathiawar. Its deep devotion, its delicate irony, its sterling sincerity made me realise as never before the enormous potential power of Kabir as the true Prophet of Modern India, the India of the Hindus and the Muslims. Mysticism has always been the birth right of India. Its insistence on the oneness of the universe has been both an example and an inspiration to the rest of the world. The highest religion tends to merge itself into mysticism, and in every corner of the mystic world the same ideas, the same symbolism, the same self-forgetfulness, the same gush of enthusiasm have marked the utterances of the greatest mystics. From the Upanishadic *tat tvam asi* to the days of Sankara, who has stamped the major portion of Indian thought with the idea: *Brahmasatya, jaganmithya, jivo brahmavo napar*, and right down till our own times, when the voice of Modern India in the Gitanjali of Tagore once more reminded the world that the soul of India is yet beating true to her original message, there has been a remarkable continuity of mystic tradition. It was this alluring ideal that was echoed in the Sufism of Jalalud-Din-Rumi:

"I died from the mineral and became a plant ;
 I died from the plant, and reappeared in an animal ;
 I died from the animal and became a man ;
 Wherefore then should I fear ? When did one grow less by dying ?
 Next time I shall die from the man
 That I may grow the wings of angels.
 From the angel too I must seek advance.
 All things shall perish, save His face.
 Once more shall I wing my way above the angels ;
 I shall become that which entereth not the imagination.
 Then let me become naught, naught ; for the harp-string
 Crieth unto me : ' Verily unto Him do we return ' ".

Europe found the mystic cry in Eckhart and Thomas à Kempis, in St. Francis of Assissi and St. Theresa. And even to-day sunk in materialism as the West is supposed to be, Emerson could write :

"There is no great and no small,
 To the Soul that maketh all ;
 And where it cometh all things are,
 And it cometh everywhere."

And so too Browning in his *Saul* :

" God is seen God
 In the star, in the stone, in the flesh, in the soul and the clod."

One might expect that with such unanimity the mystics by now would have succeeded in conquering the world and making mankind ashamed of the thousand and one differences which divide them from one another. But there is a cussedness in the human mind, which passes all understanding, and it is this cussedness which is perhaps rampant most of all in India. We revel in mystic utterances, we pay lip homage to the divine pervasion in the universe : in every nook and corner of it. But in practice there is not a single principle of division human ingenuity can think of, which has not been hallowed and venerated as of celestial origin. In this caste-ridden land it is the mystics who have held aloft in the darkest days the torch of Divine Oneness and replenished the flickering lamp of India's spirituality. The fact that Chaitanya the Bengali saint did not hesitate to wash the clothes of the untouchables, and his love

for the low caste Haridas Thakur are eternal witnesses of this spirituality. An outcaste like Chokemela could rebuke a haughty Brahmin: "If God finds no temple in thy mind, though thou mayest be close to His shrine, thou yet art far apart."

In the distinguished line of the great saints and mystics India has given birth to there is none greater than Kabir the Prince of Mystics. There are various distinguishing features in the career of Kabir. Both Hindus and Muslims have vied with one another in claiming him as their own. But he belonged to neither. It is irrelevant whether he was born a Hindu of a Brahmin widow or in a Muslim Julaiyya family of weavers. He scorned to be labelled. When he first met Loi, whom tradition rightly or wrongly regards as his wife, he was asked who he was, and he answered "Kabir." "What is your caste?" "Kabir." "What is your order?" "Kabir." "What is your name?" "Kabir." When Loi expressed her surprise at these answers, he said: "All others have name and caste, but Kabir has none." The Quoran mentions Kabir as one of the titles of God, and for the mortal Kabir all was God. Brought up as a Mahomedan he did not fail to imbibe the democratic teaching of Islam. But born in the heart of Benares, a city of the Hindus par excellence, he did not fail to imbibe the love for Rama. His heart went forth to the Hindus as much as to the Muslims, and when he found that his thirst for the lore of the Hindus was left unquenched, as no Hindu *guru* would accept him as a *chela*, he did not rest, till he could persuade Ramanand of his spiritual fitness, and Ramanand had the courage to brave public obloquy and receive a pupil, who was to all appearances a born Muslim. In course of time the pupil did not hesitate to play the role of a teacher to his own *guru*. Kabir's discipleship was but a means to have access to Hindus, for among them there has been an age-long tradition that *gurubin gyana nahi, gyanabin moksha nahi*: there is no knowledge without a *guru*, and there is no salvation without knowledge. He was through and through God-intoxicated, but his love for God found vent in love for men, even like Gautama Buddha and Christ. Mystics are generally weighed down by a consciousness of the woes of the world. But Kabir had a sense of cheerfulness about him, which was allied to a sense

of delicate humour and irony, of which the song quoted from at the beginning of this paper is a splendid example. He had the Socratic sense of robustness both in his love for and faith in God, as well as in the homeliness of his parables and in the naive humour with which he could see through and expose humbugs. It is remarkable how in the fifteenth century, when he flourished, he could envisage the great problem of India staring in her face: the unity of Hindus and Muslims. He could see how children of one God and one land could yet raise barriers that kept apart their hearts. With the key of the mystics he sought to break down those barriers, and has left behind words of gold, which serve as a continuous reservoir of inspiration to those who could rise above differences of birth and shake off the chains of a hollow ritualism, which makes mimicry of religion and shrouds the spirit of God behind cheap formulae and cheaper modes of salvation.

Kabir's philosophy of life began and ended with unstinted love for God. Even at that early period of Moslem domination he saw the enormous waste of energy involved in religious bigotry. He felt that both Hindus and Moslems had gone wrong, both had failed to find God. In *Shabda* 30 he sings how Allah, Rama, Karim, Keshava, Hari, Hazrat are all but different names. Just as there is but the selfsame gold in different ornaments, so too is the worship of God, whether you call it *Namaz* or *Puja*. Hindu and Turk alike live on the same earth. The former reads the Vedas, the latter Khutbas. One is called a Pundit, the other a Maulvi, but both are pots of the same clay. One sacrifices a goat and the other a cow, but neither has found Rama or Allah. What can Kabir do but bewail that in mere argument they waste their life, while all the time truth stares them in the face?

Similarly in *Shabda* 4 he gently rails at pirs and pundits alike. They worship brass and stone and are lost in pilgrimages from one place to another. They wear beads and caste marks, but they know not the nature of their soul. The Hindu cries out: Rama is my beloved; the Turk says: Rahman is mine. But neither knows that Rama is but Rahman. That is why in *Shabda* 10 he says: say Rama, say Khuda, it is all one.

He knows no distinctions of race or faith. He prides himself on his impartiality :

Hum kachu pakshpat nahi rakhi, Sub jivan ke hitki bhakhi."

(I know no partiality ; whatever I do is for the love of all).

One day Kabir put a *tilaka* on his forehead and began crying out : Narayana, Narayana. The orthodox Hindus resented this presumption on the part of a Muslim weaver. *Kabir Kasauti* gives the reply which their conventional orthodoxy invoked :

" My tongue is Vishnu, my eyes are Narayana. In my heart there dwells Govinda. But when you die, what reply will you make to Ishwara ?

As a weaver I am weaving clothes, and you put on the sacred thread. You read Gita and Gayatri, but Govind is always in my heart.

I am but a sheep, but you Brahmins are ever the shepherds of sheep like me. So it is your duty to save us, and if you do not, how are you our shepherds ?

You are Brahmins, and I am but a poor weaver. But still learn this from me that while you are after worldly goods my heart and mind are ever devoted to Hari."

It was because of this supreme devotion and passion of his life that he rose above the mere external forms of ordinary conventional religion. At times he could be as ruthless in matters "religious" as Mark Twain or Mr. Bernard Shaw. If mere ablutions can make a man holy, says Kabir, frogs should rank among the holiest creatures. If the water of the Ganges can purify men, how is it, he asks, that the fish in the Ganges have as unpleasant an odour as fish anywhere else ?

Early in his own life, when he had to be circumcised according to the Muslim tradition, he rebelled against the tyranny of such a custom.

" If God has made you a Muslim, why have you been born uncircumcised ?

He retorts : If by circumcision one becomes a true Muslim, what about our women ? A wife is said to be half our body, and if she remains uncircumcised, half of ourselves are still Hindus. If one can become a Brahmin by putting on a sacred thread, what about women, who have no sacred thread ? So women are but Shudras, then why do you, O Pundits, eat the food prepared by them ?"

Once a Pundit Hardeo by name came to a well, where Kamali,

the reputed daughter of Kabir, was drawing water. He asked her to give him a drink of water. She obliged him, but when on inquiry he came to know that she was a Jullaiya he was wroth with her as the cause of his having lost caste. She took her to Kabir, whose reply to the Pundit is worth the meditation of every true religious person :

" Punditji, pray tell me which water you are free to drink and which not. In this well are fishes, frogs, dead birds and decayed vegetation.

Death has claimed crores of men as its own, and every minute you may be walking on the clay of some corpse. Of this very corpse are vessels made, from which you drink water. Do you not feel disgust at this ?

We get milk through the substance of flesh and bone. You drink this milk. Are you free from pollution ?

The fly that fattens on the dirtiest things sits also on your own food. Why do you not prevent this ?

So Punditji, cast off such superstitions and surrender yourself only to Ram."

The upshot of this was that the Punditji took Kamali as his wife !

On another occasion Kabir heard several pious Hindus discussing the wonderful purifying powers of the Ganges water. From a distance he quietly heard them talk, and when one of them wanted water he went to the river and offered the Hindu a drink in his own cup. The Hindu was offended, but Kabir calmly replied : " If the Ganges water is unable to purify my cup, how can it wash off my sins ?".

He was not afraid to teach a practical lesson to his own *guru* Ramanand, when the latter wanted to perform the *Shraddha* ceremony of his dead guru. He sent his disciples for various things, and Kabir was sent for milk. He went to where the bones of dead cows lay, and when asked the reason for this, he coolly replied : " I thought the milk of dead cows best suited to dead *gurus*." It was also under Kabir's influence that Ramanand admitted as his disciples persons of all the varied castes, including even the untouchables like Rui Das a *chamar*, Sadna a butcher, Dhanna a Jat, and Ganga a prostitute. Kabir in this acted up to his faith that a holy man cannot be defiled by the touch of even unholy men.

Kabir's love of God made him realise his own nothingness. He felt himself to be but "*Ram's kutta*" or a dog of Ram; not merely a slave of Ram, but a slave of his slaves. But his love for God made him a lover of all the creatures of God. He is a Pundit, says Kabir, who knows *Prem* (love). His charity often outran his slender resources, but his faith never faltered. When his father contributed his mite towards the purchase of a cow to be sacrificed on the Id day, he left his father's house in disgust. And when he was once cooking his food, he noticed that the fuel was full of ants and could not but grieve that one meal meant the destruction of so many lives.

It was perhaps but a part of his lifelong crusade against mere formalism that after spending practically all his life in Benares he chose to spend his last days at Maghar of all places on earth. Was it his intention to belie the popular idea that one who dies at Maghar is reborn an ass? All over India a Hindu yearns to breathe his last on the sacred bank of the Ganges and to have his ashes thrown into its sacred waters. And there was Kabir who as the hand of death was knocking at his door was turning his back on the most sacred of cities. Some jeered at him, many deplored his decision, all wondered at such infatuity. His friends sought to dissuade him, but he had his reply ready :

One who dies at Maghar becomes an ass. Can you believe this, O people simple of understanding? Verily have ye lost all faith in Rama. What is Kashi (Benares), what the waste land of Maghar, if but Rama dwells in my heart? If I leave my corpse in Kashi, how does it affect Rama?

Who can gainsay the fact that in death as in life Kabir lived true to his convictions?

It is most unfortunate that in recent years it has become the fad of some Hindus to declare that all the ills of India began with the Mahomedan conquest. That it brought religious antagonism cannot be denied, but people are apt to forget that the conquest itself was a result of Hindu degeneracy. With a dominant priesthood steeped in ritualism with an unending emphasis on the form rather than the spirit of religion; with the political rivalries and dissensions of petty kingdoms the conquest of India by a virile foreign power could have been easily anticipated. That

the Mahomedan conquest shook Hinduism to its foundations cannot be gainsaid, but it must be counted a tragic misfortune of India that the Hindus did not react to the democratic inspiration of Mahomedanism nor achieved a resuscitation of Hinduism on a genuinely Vedantic foundation, purged of the social distinctions, which have always been thwarting the urge of Hindu unity. Apart from this it would be fatuous to deny the permanent enrichment of India in varied directions through Muslim influence. The political genius of the great Moghul Akbar set an example of statesmanship and tolerance, which was far above anything to be found in contemporary Europe. The peerless Tansen showed the heights to which music could rise in India, and which fair-minded man can possibly deny the contribution of Muslim genius to the evolution of music among the sweetest to be found on the face of the earth? Once again, in the domain of architecture India would be infinitely poorer without those exquisite beautiful structures that are dotted all over India in the form of mosques and monuments, among the most beautiful in the world. That marble dream, the Taj at Agra, stands an eternal monument not merely of kingly love, but of the Muslim genius that could create poetry out of stones. The art of government and the realm of beauty apart, even in the sphere religious—the most ancient and glorious inheritance of Aryan India—the Muslim conquest directly and indirectly gave an impetus to a spiritual fervour, of which the saintly Kabir was the most striking embodiment. He saw the mimicry of circumcisions and endless ablutions, of endless rites and endless pilgrimages, the mimicry which was masquerading as religion and was entombing the living spirit of man's yearning for God. It was the misfortune of India that Kabir in the fifteenth century was far in advance of his age, and to-day in the twentieth century he remains as far in advance as ever before. For he was one of those immortals like Christ and Buddha, whose mortal relics are more keenly venerated than their sublime teaching. To-day we grope for light, we pant for political liberty, but find all our efforts nullified by our religious feuds, and all this because we do not understand the A B C of spirituality. Kabir sounded the full depths of spirituality, and he was eager to pass on his own light to the India

of his day and of the future, but his message has fallen on barren soil, rendered all the more barren by the lapse of time. We are still wrangling about music before mosques and the slaughter of cows. Kabir like Socrates had the divine gift of laughter, and he could not resist the temptation to laugh at men, who would travel miles and miles to see God, when all the time God is within them :

*Kasturi Kundal base, mrug dhunde ban mahi ;
Aise ghat ghat Ram hai, pur dunya dekhe nahi.*

(There is musk in the stomach of the deer and yet it imagines that the fragrance comes from without and hunts and hunts for it all in the forest. So too God is within us, but we mortals pass Him by.)

*Dekho sabme Ram hai, ekahi ras bharpur ;
Jaise ukhte sab bana, chini sakkar gur.*

(There is Ram in everything, everything is full of his sap, just as in everything sweet there is sugar cane.)

In *Shabda* 97 he says : "What is the use of ablutions and cleansings of the teeth ? And what avail prostrations in the mosque ? With deceit in heart are offered prayers. What then avails a journey to Mecca ? Hindus fast on twenty four Ekadashis (i.e. 24 times in a year). The Muslims fast on thirty days. But pray enlighten me, who passed over eleven months and made only one month His own ? Hari is made to dwell in the East, Allah in the West. But seek Him in your heart. You will find Him there, both Karim and Rama. If God is only in the mosque, to whom does the country outside belong ? Rama is supposed to be in the pilgrim places and in His images. But they have found Him in neither yet. Who said that the Vedas and the Book (Koran) are false ? They are so to those who do not think. Within all bodies there is but One and no second. Man or woman, they are but Thy form. Kabir is but a child of Allah Rama and He is his guru and pir alike."

As a genuine devotee of God he could brook no intermediary, whether a priest or a ceremony. "Gorakh could not retain his breath for all his boasted devices ; and in spite of all ceremonies they never knew Par-Brahma." It is impossible to describe the

Being on high, just as a dumb person who tastes a sweet thing, says Kabir, finds it impossible to explain it.

The purity of Kabir's life was not lost on his contemporaries, nor was the beauty of his songs. He even succeeded in inspiring Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion, the greatest attempt ever made to bridge the gulf between Hinduism and Mahomedanism. Great mystics like Dharamdas looked up to him as their *guru*. But it is questionable whether they had really mastered the teaching of the Master. Or else how are we to account for the unseemly wrangle over his corpse between his Hindu and his Mahomedan devotees? It is poetically beautiful to read the legend that his corpse turned into flowers, half of which was burned by Hindus at Benares and the other half was buried at Maghar. Even to-day there are two monuments of Kabir's remains: one in the charge of Mahomedans and the other in the charge of Hindus. *Sic transit gloria mundi*. And they stand as the permanent memorials of Kabir's glorious failure. If those very persons, who had venerated him in life and had day after day heard his denunciation of pilgrimages and ceremonies, if even they claimed him as a Hindu or as a Mahomedan, what wonder if the succeeding generations have sung his *gazals*, even like the begger woman from Kathiawar, as songs of beauty to be admired, not as songs of truth to be lived. Verily is it easier to worship bones than to realise that like musk in the deer's abdomen God resides within us. Kabir that sought to lead men direct to God came to be worshipped by the Kabir Panth! Such is the irony of life! If he could have succeeded, we would not be witnessing the lacerated India of to-day: a joke for the sceptic, an economic tragedy, a religious comedy of warring children, who delight to revile one another in the name of the God they have no spirituality to understand. They fail to see the profound meaning of Kabir's utterance to Sikander Lodi: "Mean I am and with the mean I would be numbered," or that other great utterance of his: "Those only are Pirs, who realise the pains of others; those who cannot are Kafirs". His was nothing but the religion of service.

India to-day suffers from hysterics: hysterics in politics, hysterics in religion. Words are expected to make up for the

consuming fire that mark great patriots or the great *bhaktas* of God. Children of India fail to recognise their kinship, because they still envisage Rama as a tribal God, who is expected to be partial to Hindus and ruthless to non-Hindus; and Allah as a tribal God, who protects the circumcised followers of the Prophet of Arabia and has nothing but blood and iron for the rest of the world. They who say with Kabir that Ram and Allah are but different names of the same universal Father, and that Ram does not need costly pilgrimages nor is Allah disturbed by the music before mosques, are apt to be looked upon as heretics, who have deviated from the beaten tracks of ready-made spirituality. India claims to be the mother of spirituality. She has given birth to two great religions. Burma and Ceylon, China and Japan look up to her as the sacred land that gave the Buddha to the world. But to-day she has deified Buddha and exiled Him from her soil. She bore Kabir and there are the two mausoleums in standing contradiction to every word of his exalted teaching. Verily we can but echo those immortal words of the Master:

Kasturi kundal base, mrug dhunde bun mahi;

Aise ghat ghat Ram hai, per dunya dekhe nahi".

Will the day ever come when a deeper religious insight will bring a clearer political vision, which in its turn will usher in a new era of economic prosperity? Will the day ever come when the Hindu and the Muslim in the Temple and in the Mosque sing and live the words of the Master:

Ram nam tun bhajle pyare

.

Kahat Kabira, sun bhai sadhu,—manki mala japta hai,

Jo bhav bhajanse dhyani dharat hai, unku Saheb milta hai."

THE NEW ERA IN CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.

THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE AND THE NON-CHRISTIAN SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE JERUSALEM CONFERENCE.

By DR. GEORGE HOWELLS.

THE Jerusalem Conference as Dr. Mott points out, "was not a legislative body, and its pronouncements and recommendations have no binding authority on the Churches. They possess only such weight as may be given them by the experience, truth and insight which they embody". I take it that this in itself is the sign of the developments finding expression in the Christian movement of our time. The day of external authority and credal enactments in the realm of the spirit is passing away. While Christians of today may not and cannot turn to these Jerusalem findings with the same outwardly submissive deference as Christians of old turned to the decisions of the great Councils of the early centuries of Christianity, yet outside the Church of Rome, their real authority in the great republic of Protestant, non-Roman and Evangelical religious thought may be no less great, when we remember that they represent the spiritual insight, experience and corporate thinking of some 250 trusted leaders of the Christian forces of some fifty countries, and that they give to us the thought and vision not only of the older Churches of Europe, but equally of the younger Churches of Asia, Africa and Latin America. What should be of great significance to us on the field is this, that these men and women who met on the Mount of Olives, while representative of widely different backgrounds and schools of thought, never ignored serious difficulties and conflicting views, but meeting as they did in a spirit of devout prayer and loyalty to a common Lord, they were able in dependence

on the leading of the Divine Spirit to create an atmosphere in which differences were transcended, and it became possible for them to 'receive a fresh mandate from the ever-creative God.'

I cannot in this brief paper attempt a general review of Christianity and the non-Christian systems. I only write to point out what in my judgment constitute some of the more important questions we have to bear in mind in considering the Christian message in its relation to the non-Christian systems, from the standpoint of the findings of the Jerusalem Conference.

(1) We have to recognise that increasingly it is coming to be realised in Christian circles, that there is justification for the term "A Parliament of Religions", and that we must approach non-Christian systems in the humble spirit of fellow learners, rather than with the one desire to refute and overthrow. 'On our part' says the Report "we would repudiate any symptoms of a religious imperialism that would desire to impose beliefs and practices on others in order to manage their souls in their supposed interests. We obey a God who respects our wills and we desire to respect those of others". I confess that was not the spirit in which I began my missionary life in India thirty three years ago, notwithstanding any elementary studies I had taken in Comparative Religion. That Hinduism or Islam had anything to teach me as a Christian I never for a moment seriously assumed. I viewed Christianity in the light of an absolute Monarch, having every imperial right to impose its thought on all and sundry, in such a way as inevitably involved the destruction of all opposing or competitive systems. I have now come to think of Christianity as a constitutional President of a great Parliament or Congress of Religions all having something valuable to contribute to the upbuilding of the great Temple of Divine Truth. Christ to me is the Supreme fulfiller rather than the destroyer, not merely of the Jewish faith, but of all forms of religious life and truth bearing witness to the working of the Divine Spirit in human hearts and lives through the ages.

(2) From the standpoint of the Jerusalem Conference, it needs to be noted that ambassadors of Christ need to be more concerned with bearing with them the Christian life than even bearing the Christian message. The first volume of the

Jerusalem report is entitled "The Christian Life and Message in relation to non-Christian systems". This emphasis on life is surely rightly placed. Yet one criticism that has been urged against the Jerusalem Conference attitude is that it concerns itself unduly with the practical concerns of everyday life in its industrial, social, national and intellectual aspects. 'The Church's duty, it is urged, is to confine itself to one thing, the preaching of the Gospel, and to leave to others the decision as to how the message is to be applied. I am convinced that this criticism is a mischievous one. It reminds one of a story of the Earl of Chesterfield who had been listening to a sermon of the great eighteenth century preacher, George Whitefield. The sermon had been a rather searching one in regard to certain moral and social issues that had a bearing on the lives of the hearers. The Earl, whose personal reputation was none too good, left the meeting in disgust with the indignant remark "This is intolerable. Things have come to a pretty pass, when religion is allowed to interfere with a man's private life". Increasingly the world is coming to identify the Christian message with the Christian life, Christianity with Christ. There is no sphere of activity, private or public, in which Christianity is without its responsibilities. The Era of exploitation, social, economic or political in the name or with the sanction of Christianity is, thank God, passing away, and the mind that was in Christ Jesus, the Spirit of our living Lord, is asserting itself in the judgments we pass on all the practical issues of our time—personal, commercial, industrial, national or what not. A certain type of businessman or politician still occasionally shews signs of fierce resentment when some bishop or other Christian leader, greatly daring, gives public expression to the Christian view of things in relation, say, to native rights in some distant colony, claims of workers in some industrial struggles to an economic wage, the liquor problem in India or West Africa, the occupation of the Rhine land, or any other vital problem of our time, keenly affecting the interests, legitimate or illegitimate, of masters or men, rulers or ruled, classes or masses, of Western or Eastern lands. Let the cobbler, it is said, stick to his last, and let the Christian preacher limit himself to preaching his Gospel, and not seek to meddle with complicated economic

and political problems which should be left to the settlement of professional business men, trade union leaders or politicians. Our reply is that the world is our field, and our supreme concern is to carry the spirit and message of our Master into all human relationships. The Gospel to us means no mere acceptance of certain religious truths or theological plans of salvation to save us from the flames of the lower world. It means the bringing of fullness of life and opportunity to all that are heavy laden with life's burden's of sin or suffering, and our work as Ambassadors of Christ is incomplete until His Spirit of love, purity and brotherhood is dominant in all human concerns. It falls to us primarily, whether we are Indian or European representatives of the Christian faith, to be exemplifications of Christ, living embodiments of our Master in all our dealings with the peoples and systems of non-Christian lands. In my long period of residence in this country I have heard many criticisms and also many appreciations of the life and influence of Christian missionaries or Indian Christian workers. Criticisms have been some times very severe indeed calling seriously in question our claim to be called Christians, especially when certain actions, personal or administrative, have appeared to our critics to be utterly inconsistent with the spirit and example of the Christ of the New Testament. When we have power over others, it is said—and this is not simply a racial issue, for, the criticism is often of wide application referring to the European and Indian alike—we are guilty of acting towards those beneath us in a way we deeply resent if those in authority over us shew any tendency to treat us in a similar manner. The bare fact is that the Christian message is so much sounding brass or tinkling cymbal to the people of non-Christian lands unless it comes from the very heart of the Christian life. While criticisms have been many, it is only fair to say that appreciations also have been abundant, whether of European or Indian representatives of our faith, but the appreciations of a Christ-like life have been far more frequent than of any message taught. We are reminded of the vision that came to that great journalist of volcanic energy and enthusiasm, W. T. Stead when in prison "Be a Christ and no mere Christian". There may be some danger of misunderstanding in this way of putting things, and most of

us will be humbly content with the simple designation Christian, provided its use has a solid basis of justification. But the vision that came to Mr. Stead has a lesson for us that we cannot ignore. Unless we are able to say to ourselves and convey to others the impression in all sincerity and humility with St. Paul, "I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me", any talk, so far as we are concerned, of the relation of our Christianity and its message to the non-Christian systems has no meaning. I wonder what proportion of the representatives of Christian Church or Mission, in this land, can successfully endure the application of this test, not in our judgment, but in the estimation of the men, women and children among whom we daily live and move and have our being, and above all in the judgment of the Master who at last will say to his faithful ones "In as much as ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." By all means, let us use every atom of strength we possess in seeking to present skilfully and faithfully, as workmen that need not be ashamed, the great message entrusted to us, though in the last resort we may be very poor tools indeed. But if we have sought in all our service with some measure of success, and in our humble way, to be living embodiments of our Master, we shall have contributed something substantial to the solution of the grave problem of the relation of Christianity to the non-Christian systems. I remember a good many years ago coming in contact from time to time with an old missionary who had lost hope. I never met him without hearing from his lips a succession of gibes and cynical remarks about every body and every thing. Of course we all have our dark moments, and some of us may be subject to temporary attacks of despair when we hiss out in our haste an unparliamentary though Biblical expression "All men, or all women, or both are liars." But sanity and the light of hope soon return, and we realise that God's world is worth living in and worth working for. A Christian worker who lives day in, day out, in an atmosphere of bitterness and cynicism, is poles asunder from Him of whom it was said "A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench," and such a person exercises nothing but a mischievous influence in our efforts to solve the problem we are now considering.

(3) To approach more closely the subject of our discussion, Christian thinkers of today are in increasing numbers gladly and ungrudgingly recognising the spiritual values in other systems, and the following passage in the Jerusalem report is particularly significant in that direction: "We recognise as part of the one Truth that sense of the Majesty of God and the consequent reverence in worship, which are conspicuous in Islam; the deep sympathy for the world's sorrow and unselfish search for the way of escape, which are at the heart of Buddhism, the desire for contact with ultimate reality conceived as spiritual, which is prominent in Hinduism; the belief in a moral order of the Universe and consequent insistence on moral conduct, which are inculcated by Confucianism; the disinterested pursuit of truth and of human welfare which are often found in those who stand for secular civilisation but do not accept Christ as their Lord and Saviour." The discussion on this aspect of the problem at the Jerusalem Conference was clearly one of living interest, and revealed various standpoints, though the ultimate findings received unanimous support. One member remarked "We must not allow loyalty to Christ to blind us to what the Father has revealed to other peoples," but another contended that the only way to approach Christ was through faith which is willing to sacrifice even the spiritual values of non-Christian religions. "We fear," he urged "that the central task of missions is in danger of being lost to view by paralleling real or imaginary spiritual values, attractive though this method is for the professor of comparative religion." This is a rather hard saying for some of us who confess to some tendencies in the direction so earnestly deprecated. But if there are values there can be no question of sacrificing them, for as believers in the God of Truth, we must frankly and ungrudgingly recognise marks of His handiwork wherever found, and acknowledge the light which the *Logos Spermatikos* has given to all the great peoples of the ages. I cannot accept at its face value the view expressed by one member that to him who has found everlasting life in Christ, none of the non-Christian systems can give any new religious values. I have frankly to admit that my Christianity has been enriched by my study of non-Christian life and literature, as for instance some

of the Upanishads, Psalms of Hindu saints, the earnest sacrificial life of Buddha, or contact with certain non-Christian men of today with their signal devotion to truth and duty. Christian Truth itself would be all the poorer, if the spiritual value of non-Christian systems are to be sacrificed and thrown to the dust-heap. Such a position would lead us to accepting the standpoint of that great and courageous but in some respects thoroughly wrong headed heretic of the second century, Marcion, who because he was repelled by the vindictive and 'jealous' God depicted in many of the chapters of the Old Testament, came to the conclusion that the God who was the Father of Christ could not possibly be the God of the Jews, and so he rejected a conception, fundamental to the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the religious progress of Israel, was under the hand of God, the earthly basis of Christianity. As in the Roman Empire and in Judaea nineteen hundred years ago, so in all missionary lands today Christianity never begins its work *in vacuo*, in a void, but builds on the foundations already laid for it, believing that God has laid those foundations as surely as He superintends the superstructure. On this issue I find myself in hearty agreement with the following, taken from Canon Quick's statement in the Conference "We must be able to see Christ coming from Nazareth as well as from Bethlehem. Nazareth stands for all the unexpected places out of which Christ comes. Having Christ and knowing Christ, we must be still learners of Him among the peoples to whom we go with the message. It is only to him who hath, will it be given. A man finds a new thing in Christianity only because he also recognises it has something for which he has already been seeking. The Christian Gospel must always be presented in relation to non-Christian thought. Christ used the Jewish conception of the Kingdom of God in the proclamation of His message, St. Paul used some of the language of the Hellenic religions in his teaching to the Gentiles. The early fathers brought the wealth of Plato, the schoolmen brought Aristotle and in its ages of creative thought. Christianity has built on the non-Christian things that it has found. What we need is the Pentecostal gift of tongues to make all men hear each in his own language, the wonderful words of God. Thus shall

we attain to a clear vision of the uniqueness which proves itself by its universality."

While the Conference gave ungrudging recognition to the religious values in non-Christian systems, it sought to dissociate itself from anything in the nature of any kind of syncretism that could be regarded as illogically electric, or flagrantly compromising in character. Good old Richard Baxter is very hard in one passage on what he terms a carnal syncretism which attempts the reconciliation of Christ and Belial. Judging from the tone of the discussion it would appear that many members of the Conference agreed with this attitude to syncretism "with its lifeless mosaic of unrelated truths." To quote Dr. Speer "The values of the old religions need conversion. They too must be washed in the blood of the Lamb, pass through the agony of the cross, and rise again in the resurrection." I think however the same thing might be said of many of the spiritual values of the Christian faith and organisation of our own day. I am far from being in agreement with one statement quoted in the Jerusalem proceedings, but not, I am thankful to say, receiving any support in the findings. "These religions are going to be smashed any how. It does not seem to me to be really worth while to attempt to save from the wreck what seems to be good and valuable in the older non-Christian civilisations." But to many a saintly convert from the non-Christian systems Christ has meant not so much the overthrowal and reversal as the fulfilment and completion of the spiritual heritage of their fathers. While none of us can give any countenance to that syncretistic type of mind which compromises vital truth in the interests of a semblance of unity, and that considers all religious and theological differences trifling and uncalled for, capable of being easily settled by a little shrewd management, yet I confess to a great deal of sympathy, with the syncretistic temper as understood by Plutarch, who interpreted the term as meaning "to combine against a common enemy after the manner of the cities of Crete." In his essay on Brotherly Love, he makes the observation that "although the Cretans were frequently at faction and feud with one another, they became reconciled and united whenever a foreign foe attacked them." This they called syncretism. Genuine syncre-

tism therefore, as understood by Plutarch, who seems to have coined the word, or at any rate to have made it current, is merely the instinct of self-defence which sinks private differences before a threatening peril on the outside. It presupposes a common basis of loyalty that is fundamental and that ultimately dominates all other relationships. Every normal family knows something of what this means. Of course I speak in this matter from hearsay, but it has been reported to me that most husbands and wives occasionally get high words together (except those impossible beings who compete for the Dunmow flitch) that reminds me of the good man who saw an Irishman and his wife engaged in what appeared to be a fierce fight. He gallantly went to the rescue, and began to thrash the husband for treating his wife so. But forthwith the wife turned on the well-meaning outsider and shouted "If any one is to beat my man Pat, that privilege is to be mine. Clear out and let Pat and me settle our differences alone." That is the instinct of self-defence and mutual combination—syncretism—in the presence of a common danger. I take it that the Jerusalem Conference itself is an exemplification of the syncretistic attitude of mind in the Church of today on the part of non-Roman Christianity, evangelical and catholic, Eastern and Western. In this connection the Conference further recognised that a factor to be taken into account of far greater importance even than the rivalry of competing religious systems, is the supreme issue of the religious view of life versus the secularistic and naturalistic attitude now spreading across the world, and threatening to engulf all religions in a common ruin. Principal Mackenzie of Bombay went so far as to say "I would rather have a man who bows down before a daub of red paint or a stone than an educated man who has nothing but materialism and is satisfied with it." Compared with abandonment to the materialistic view of life so common among all civilisations, there is in the last resort a unity of spiritual experience consisting in a sense of intimate personal fellowship with the Divine, linking together all forms of religious faith, and the significance of this we dare not ignore. As to the contribution that Christianity has to make to the spiritual emancipation of mankind, I may quote the words of Mr. Chenchiah "Above goodness and greatness and

religious power, above the ideals of the human heart and power of human effort, there is a new creative energy which Christ has brought, which is to be the vehicle of a new earth and a new heaven. This power Hinduism wants. Not till we uncover this power will Christ attract the saints and sinners of Hinduism. The Hindu does not want a way of life, but *life*, not preaching about Christ, but Christ. If you have Christ, pass Him on. If you have the Holy Spirit give it." Here is the fountain head of all true Christian missionary zeal, not the communal zeal of statistical proselytisers, but that of men inspired by the philanthropy of God. The experience of the ages, and the testimony of one's own mind and heart leads to the conviction that there is no ideal so much worth working for, living for, and if need be dying for, as the creation of a Christlike world. To conclude in words from the Jerusalem message "we hold that through all that happens, in light and in darkness, God is working, ruling and overruling. Jesus Christ, in His life and through His death and resurrection, has disclosed to us the Father, the Supreme Reality, as Almighty Love, reconciling the world to Himself by the cross, suffering with men in their struggle against sin and evil, bearing with them and for them, the burden of sin, forgiving them as they, with forgiveness in their own hearts, turn to Him in repentance and faith, and creating humanity anew for an ever-growing and ever-enlarging everlasting life. We believe that in Christ the shackles of moral evil and guilt are broken from human personality, and that men are made free, and that such personal freedom lies at the basis of the freeing of society from cramping custom and blighting social practices and political bondage, so that in Christ, men and societies and nations may stand up free and complete We find in Christ and especially in His cross and resurrection, an inexhaustible source of power that makes us hope where there is no hope. We believe that through it men and societies and nations that have lost their moral nerve to live will be quickened into life We do not go to the nations called non-Christian, because they are the worst of the world, and they alone are in need—we go, because they are a part of the world, and share with us in the same human need. Christ is our motive and Christ is

our end. We must give nothing less and we can give nothing more."

Here is a message which in its substance is applicable to all humanity. Christian missionaries from the west frankly recognise that they have been in danger of presenting this message in a western garb, and indeed it would be a superhuman feat if they showed themselves to be above such limitations. Christ himself however speaks with no foreign accent to all the suffering, struggling sons of men. We are no doubt rightly accused of giving to the people of India translations of the Bible that have many imperfections from the standpoint of the best vernacular style; and perhaps most of our presentations of theological and Christian truth contain much that fails to appeal to the Indian mind. All that we can plead in the way of excuse is, that all our efforts as foreign representatives of the Christian faith should be regarded as partaking of a pioneering character, and so possessing strong claims to lenient judgment. May we not also ask our critics, whether Hindu or Christian, to attempt something more in the way of constructive effort? Some of the ablest literary men of the West have used their best gifts in putting into western form some of the noblest products of Indian religious literature. Surely we may look with hope in the coming years, to some of the most gifted of India's sons, whether Hindu, Mohammedan or Christian, to vernacularising what is by common consent one of the most precious of the world's literary treasures—the Bible—and to interpreting for their countrymen in terms of Indian thought and outlook, the mind and personality of one whom all recognise as a great world Teacher, the prophet of Nazareth and whom so many of us adore as God incarnate, and the World's Saviour.

SERAMPORE, BENGAL.

GEORGE HOWELLS.

THE VICISSITUDES OF THE STATE.

II

WHAT THE GREEKS AND THE ROMANS DID FOR THE STATE.

By M. RUTHNASWAMY, M.A., (Cantab). Barrister-at-Law.

FROM the low position in which the peoples of the ancient East had kept the State, it was rescued by the Greeks. Coming from those other peoples to the Greeks we seem in the domain of political thought to be passing from the darkness of night through the grey dawn into flooded sunlight. Political thought which was vague and incidental and imbedded in layers of Dharma as in Manu, or of chronicles of Kings as in the Mahabharatha, or of morality as in Confucius, begins to have a life of its own in the Greek world. The Greeks made political thought autonomous. They inaugurated the age of political discussion. Before the invention of the printing press and the era of pamphlets this political discussion could have been only on a small scale. But the root of the matter was in the Greeks. Long before the treatises of Plato and Aristotle appeared, the affairs of government had been a matter for popular discussion. It is true that the speeches reported in Herodotus and Thucydides and Plato were not in fact delivered. But although ideal they were not unreal. Greek politicians and philosophers there were who might have made those speeches.

It was not merely the genius of the people but the size of the Greek State that made them so political. The City State was too small to tolerate the rule of a single hereditary despot. The "divinity that doth hedge a king" would wither in a city-state, even if it could be planted there. Even the absolute sway

of the Spartan Ephors came to them through popular election, and popular election and government by discussion go together. In the Agora, in the groves of Academe, in the popular assembly, political argument was bandied about. While in the Indian bazaar people talk of the Atman, the Brahman and the Paramatman and "great argument may be heard about it and about," in the Greek Agora citizens talked about the last election to the Archonate, or the latest utterance of a Cleon or of the superiority of an aristocracy to a democracy. What Pericles said of the Athenians that they regarded a man who took no interest in public affairs not as a harmless but as a useless character could be said of most Greek peoples with varying degrees of accuracy. The origin of the State, the end of Government, the basis of obedience were the bones of contention between Sophist and Socrates, between a Plato and an Aristotle. A Socrates could any day be found bringing the political bloods of his time down a peg or two asking them to define their terms. All this intense political discussion was possible because the State was to them something real and persistent and ever present. Even if they did not all share in all the functions of government as in a democracy like Athens, they had some share in government even to the extent of electing their rulers as in Sparta.

The Greek peoples were never quiescent. Their political activity was incessant and intense. It may be that the sum-total of all this activity was not an increase in happiness or prosperity and political evolution in most Greek cities worked in cycles. But no one can accuse the Greek of political passivity. Politics, especially political thought, was the greatest contribution of the Greeks to the progress of mankind. The Greeks were the political people *par excellence*. The seven wise men of Greece were all statesmen. Literature, the arts and education existed for the beauty and glory of the State. In Greece, Art and the State reached their highest point of eminence together. The Greeks tried almost all possible forms of government and attempted to solve almost all political problems,—albeit on a miniature scale.

In this atmosphere and environment of political thought and practice the State which before among other peoples had been

treated with indifference or with contempt or with hatred came into its own. At first it was made respectable and legitimised so to speak and then it came to be loved. The best political thought of Greece looked upon the State as something natural satisfying the instinct of men and not as something artificial imposed upon him to curb and bridle. It was meant for the self-expression and not the repression of man. Plato's *Dialogues* and Aristotle's *Politics* mark the climax of the Greek respect for the State. According to these philosophers who only gathered up the thoughts that had been circulating among Greek communities and gave them philosophical form and consistency, the State was not merely a very important incident in the life of man but it was the whole life of man. Aristotle's famous paradox that the State comes before man is not an account of the historical precedence of the State but his way of declaring the supreme authority and competence of the State. To him and to the Greeks the State was not merely the campus where social life exercised itself, it was social life itself. The State was Society among the Greeks. The distinction between Society and the State is familiar to us since Christianity introduced it, but it did not exist for the Greeks. The State was not only Society, it was the Family, the School and the Club. Not that the State was organised on the same lines as the Family or any other lesser social institution. Aristotle takes care to point out that although the State grew out of the family it was not an overgrown family. It was governed by other ideas and machinery than those by which more or less voluntary associations like the family or the school or the club are governed. Its coercive authority, its universal competence, its claim to complete loyalty and obedience distinguished it from those other associations. But what is meant by saying that to the Greeks the State was the family, the School, and Society is that the State was not merely the most important social institution, it was to them the only social institution and the life lived by us in the Family or the School or the Society was as a matter of fact lived by the Greeks in the State. All these other unions of men were branches of the State. The Greeks knew only one social science, and that was Politics.

Men had to be born in families, but once born their up-

bringing was the concern of the State. It is true that in Athens education was to a greater extent the private concern of the parents than at Sparta. But Athens as Pericles pointed out in his funeral speech, was distinguished from other great cities by its toleration of individual freedom and initiative. States like Sparta and Crete which were more typical of the Greek way of life looked upon the State, as the teacher and guide of the people. Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle could preach exposure of infants who might grow useless for the purposes of the State. Not only the education of the young but the civilization and culture of the citizens was the direct concern of the State. The mad king Ludwig of Bavaria created a sensation by having an opera house of his own. But music and the other fine arts were under the jurisdiction of and in the employ of the State in Greece. Private patrons of art were few in Greek States. Gymnastics including wrestling, according to Aristotle, were the concern of the State. Religion and morality belonged to the province of the State. The Greek State was also, to make use of modern language, the Church of the Greeks. It was their be-all and end-all. It was their highest good.

The State did not exist for the individual but the individual existed for the State. Not that the individual was a slave of the State or an automator. The individual had rights but not against the State, for he did not stand opposed to the State as he does according to modern individualistic philosophy. The rights of the individual in Greek political philosophy were the rights of the State. Such a modern notion as the interference of the State with the individual was foreign to the Greek mind. The State simply guided and conducted the individual to progress and prosperity. The individual lived and died for the State because in realising the ends of the State he was realising his own highest end. The Greek citizen made the supreme sacrifice not for his country or his nation but for his city which was the State. The State had never before been revered as it was among the Greeks. It has not been worshipped as much ever since—not even among the Prussians among whom it was feared rather than loved. And it is doubtful if the State will ever be again to any other people what it was to the Greeks.

It is the fashion of modern political criticism to speak of Roman political thought as if it were derived from and dependent upon the Greek. But although there is much in common between the Greek and Roman idea of the State, the Roman both in theory and practice carried the State two or three steps farther on the road to development. We shall be able to draw up a true estimate of the contribution of the Romans to the idea and form of the State if, instead of going to the political theorists, we turned to Roman history and Roman Law, the two great gifts of ancient Rome to mankind. Through this history and through this Law it was that the Romans contributed to the development of the State. In history they very soon burst the bonds of the City State. Although the city in which they also had begun their political life continued to be throughout the history of Rome down to its downfall the unit of their administration, the Romans showed the world how it was possible to form a free and at the same time a great State. The Greeks had lived under the conviction that for a State to be civilized and cultured it was necessary to be small. Their few experiments at empire and federation had been sorry failures, for they achieved through them neither liberty nor law and order. The Romans it is true lost their liberty when they had created the largest State known to history. But it must be remembered that from about 487 to 70 B. C. for about four hundred years they had shown how it was possible to combine *imperium* with *libertas*. For the rest, there are other things that make a State respected than democratic liberty. The Greeks had shown what a sweet aroma liberty gave to a State. The Romans endowed the State with majesty and grandeur. They formed a State that embraced within its jurisdiction peoples of many countries and different races and brought primitive and semi-savage tribes under the influence of political discipline teaching them the great virtues of obedience to law and government and cementing them together into a solidarity that would endure, that administered equal law and educated them into much greater progress and prosperity than they had known before they came under the influence of Rome.

The great political achievement of the Romans was to show

that the construction of large sized States based upon freedom and law was possible. They showed that the State was a civilizing and culture-giving influence not only for the limited population of a State but for all those that lay on its fringe. They taught the world how political unity and integration could be achieved on a large scale. The disinherited nations of the earth found shelter under its roof and an existence which they might have lost in the struggle for it. The Roman State grew like the mustard tree of the Gospel and all the nations of the earth came and lived under its shade. They found that the State could be the instrument of civilization not only of a people but of humanity. Rome, as Ihering* points out, gave the world three unities at different epochs—the unity of the State, the unity of law and the unity of religion. Respect for the State was definitely and considerably increased by the Romans. It became a majestic and awful thing. Horace dared to say:—

Alme Sol, curru nitido diem qui
promis et celas aliusque et idem
nasceris, possis nihil urbe Roma visere maius.

They crowned it with the laurels of a hundred victories. They hitched a hundred peoples to its triumphal car. They made it a Colossus that dominated three continents.

The Romans made the State not only majestic but useful to its makers. They made it the defender of the private rights of the individual and in this the Roman view marked progress definite and memorable beyond the Greeks. Ihering! has shown how in the beginnings of Rome it was the personality and force of the individual that was the foundation of Roman law. The Roman State was founded and formed by the vigour and initiative of individuals, the sword and the lance of individuals. Roman Law rose out of private justice. The history of ancient Rome is the history of personality. And this domination of the rights and personality of individuals persists throughout Roman history in spite of later increase in the prestige and power of the State. The personality of the individual was raised through and by

* Geist des römischen rechts, Vol. 1.

† do. do. do. S. 10.

means of the State. In Roman history constitutional struggles centre round the law of property, the law of marriage, the relations that make and alter private rights. Individual freedom had much greater play in the Roman State at any rate in the period of the Republic than in the Greek State. Law and government were the creation of individuals. The Romans, Ihering points out, realised much earlier than the Greeks the distinction between *Fas* and *Jus*. As he graphically puts it, with *Fas* they faced the East and with *Jus* the West and thus stand forth in the middle way of history. While *Fas* was the divine, immutable, stabler rule of Religion, *Jus* was the changeable, progressive, adaptable law made by men. They buttressed the State with a Law which has been considered to be written reason itself. That Law guaranteed the rights of the individuals as well as the power of the State. Although among the Romans as among the Greeks the individual lived for and died for the State, the rights of the individual and of individual personality were kept intact at Rome. The *patria potestas* of the pater familias over wife, children and slaves, was allowed free play subject only to the censorship and public opinion. The imperium of the individual magistrate was absolute while it lasted. The Roman idea of *Jus naturae* and *Jus gentium* made them the political superiors of the Greeks. The Roman attitude to slaves and slavery, allowing for emancipation and conversion of slaves into free citizens, bound them with the future and the progress of humanity. Their conception of a *Jus gentium* marked them out as the leaders and makers of the world. Through the idea of *Jus naturae* and *Jus gentium* the Romans made their State the presiding genius of the civilization and culture of the world and not merely of a race or of a nation as the Greeks or Jews did. It was no mean achievement to have done away with the Greek squeamishness about barbarians and to have conceived of a law of nature and a law of nations.

If the Greeks made the State a thing of beauty the Romans made it a thing to respect and obey. They set it up on high for men to fall down and worship. The cult of the State was the national religion of Rome. They raised the State and loyalty and obedience to the State above all doubt or question. Other

institutions may abide the Roman's question, the State may not. The State was their own. The modern antagonism between the State and the Individual was unknown to the Romans. They made the State the one thing necessary to men and nations. The Roman reverence for the State passed the limits of political needs when in the days of the Empire *quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem* and the Roman emperor was considered to be *legibus solutus*. Reverence for the State could no further go, and the service rendered by the Romans has stood the State in good stead, for it has more than once, since then lived on the traditions of loyalty and obedience which they had banked up for it.

The State reached the pinnacle of its fame under the Romans. And from that pinnacle it fell. It was not enough for the State to have become great and glorious and all-embracing. Every human institution lasts according to the service that it renders to man. No record of past service however long and meritorious can save an institution from decay. It must justify itself from year to year. It cannot live on the strength of the past. The Roman State great and noble as it grew to be, fell upon evil days which were largely of its own making. Its organisation in the days of the Empire was unequal to its size and the number and variety of its population. Concentration of power which was perhaps necessary to rescue the republic from the rocks on which it had wrecked itself was detrimental to the existence of a State of the size of the Roman Empire. Decentralisation and local self-government were the conditions on which the Roman Empire could have endured. Restrictions of liberty may be necessary for the saving of the life of a State on the brink of destruction. But no State can live and wax strong on a denial of freedom. Equal justice keeps a large empire together. But a time came when the judgment of St. Augustine—*remota justitia quid regna nisi magna latrocinia*—could be applied with truth to the Roman Empire. The Roman poet had said:—

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.

Parceri subjectis et debellare superbos

This ideal was perhaps realised in the times when Virgil sang that ideal of imperial rule. But a time came when the Roman

Government remembered only "parcere superbis" et "debellare subjectos." A time came when membership of a Municipality, that palladium of Roman liberty, was avoided like the plague and men betook themselves to the nearest forest on the approach of a Roman Magistrate from the capital. Rome fell from its high estate, and with it tottered the State to the depths.

The Roman State fell from internal decay as well as by external attacks. The barbarians were able to conquer not on account of their strength but on account of the weakness of the Colossus about whose legs they had crawled for years. With the Roman State there fell not only an institution but an Idea. And that idea was the idea of the large imperial State, what is called in modern jargon the world State, transcending many countries and many peoples in its sway. It fell so completely and so decisively that never again has an attempt been made consciously and of set purpose to realise the same ideal. The Holy Roman Empire was a revival only in name, and the Byzantine empire was that part of the Roman Empire which took a longer time to die. But the essential idea of the Roman Empire was cut off by the root when it disappeared from the homelands.

MADRAS.

M. RUTHNASWAMY.

PROGRESS OR DECADENCE ?*

By HARRY F. WARD.

WHEN this symposium was first announced I said to the editors that the title had established a world record by begging three questions in five words—first that there was anything which could properly be called civilization; second that these United States had a title to the term America; third that there were any gains in the life of this country since the war. To this I added my grave doubts about a procedure which looks for something people want to find instead of going to see what is there. For good measure I threw in my very strong objection to any undertaking which seemed either designed or likely to fortify our comfortable, middle-class religionists in the false security which emanates from the idea of automatic progress that left them so unprepared and helpless when the World War hit them. That shelter must be ruthlessly destroyed before such people will set to work to make the future. So that I should now be asked to review the whole situation is some evidence of the temper in which this venture is being conducted.

Clearly these reviewers of our contemporary life in this country have reported to us some advances; but they give the impression of having had heavy going, especially at vital points. The best they can do for us is to recount some surface improvements without setting them against the underlying situation or in the crucial matters of war, race, industry, and religion to express faith that principles are being accepted, situations faced, attitudes changed. Just what is the worth of technical improvements in education and government in the face of the extent to which business enterprise, consciously and unconsciously, manages to

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control them and determine their objectives? The challenge of the Goose Step and of Teapot Dome with all its ramifications is yet to be faced by the people of this nation. Will the few who have accepted the ethics of Jesus in the matter of race relationships avail any more as the black people join the issue on economic and cultural equality than did those of the same sort in the slavery fight? What is the possibility of peacefully democratizing economic procedure and socializing industry by way of gigantic trusts whose predatory claws have been trimmed and who have found some humanitarian feeling, when these dividend collecting organizations increase a luxury leisure class and diminish accordingly the means of development for the working section of the population? If religion must either function as a saviour in the practical affairs of mankind or be sloughed off with other useless encumbrances, where are the signs that an ethical religion is actually developing among us? Where was it when the humanitarian conscience of Europe was shocked by the callousness with which we tortured to death two Italian workers?

It is indisputable that cultural equality and economic equality are interdependent. The former can only be realized as the latter is approximated. Hence the significance of the recent concentration of income and ownership in this nation. It means a stratified class culture. It means that the United States is beginning to repeat that particular aspect of European life of which it has been stridently critical, and is losing that equalitarian tone which was distinctive of its democracy. It cannot be denied that to an increasing section of the workers on the soil and in the city, the door to the cultural life for their children is shut and barred. Those who survive the influence upon their tastes and standards of the press and the radio, if they are also physically strong enough to withstand the fatigue of monotonous, high-speed labor, may some of them still earn their way through college. But more of them will go as beneficiaries of endowments. Likewise those who prefer less stereotyped education will avail themselves of libraries, museums and lectures by the grace of charity. It is the same with religion. That, too, is dispensed as alms, not only to the unfortunate and inefficient but also to those who are where they are, as against the prosperous, simply

because they or their parents came too late to share in the initial exploitation of the unparalleled natural resources of this continent. The control of these resources, and of the trade and investment they made possible, by the successful, under the original American doctrine of freedom of opportunity, is the stern economic fact which determines the future of that doctrine.

To know how far it has been abandoned, it is necessary to estimate that intangible thing—public opinion. But there can be little doubt about the public temper since the war. The official hypothesis of the country, almost unanimously repeated by the press, is that the more money we let the successful moneymakers acquire the better we will all be off. That is, the more inequality we have in economic control the more equality in all things else. Apparently this paradoxical dogma has been accepted with acquiescence by most of the people. At least they are supposed to be owning. But if all of this should turn out to be something more than the illusions of a fool's paradise what does it mean in essence? If the greater part of the population of this free man's country is from now on to get more goods and culture only by grace of the captains of industry and finance, exactly as the underlying citizens of Germany got some of these things before the war by grace of Bismarck and the Kaiser as God-appointed trustees of the new Teutonic capitalism, is not this clearly the reversal of the distinctive American process?

That the situation has this ominous possibility is made clearer when we look at the state of freedom. There definite facts speak louder than in the matter of equality of cultural opportunity. The similarity in external appearance, the ease with which income and occupational differences are crossed in conversation, which so impress Europeans habituated to a world of status inherited from feudalism, carries with it no corresponding equality in control of government or of the means of livelihood. A discriminating visitor from across the sea recently remarked that our social attitudes were more, our institutions less, democratic than those of his country. It is increasingly difficult for the ordinary run of citizen to make himself effective in the machinery of politics. The net result of the company union schemes that have propagated themselves so abundantly since the war is to strengthen

the control of industry by a paternalistic, financial oligarchy and so to make more difficult and costly a real sharing of power.

If there be doubt about this, there is certainly no question concerning what has been happening to those who seek to change our political and economic institutions in the direction of the original American ideals of freedom and equality. For them there are blacklists, injunctions, the fists, clubs and horses' hoofs of the police. If these prove insufficient, then there are frame-ups, long jail sentences, and in extremity, the electric chair.

Since the war most of our states have passed laws which can be, and in some cases are, administered so as to prevent any advocacy of basic change in our political or economic institutions. These laws and this use of them have now been twice upheld by the Supreme Court, with a small, dissenting minority. Since the war it has become the habitual practice of local officials in a number of industrial centers arbitrarily to forbid the exercise of the historic rights of free speech and then further brutally to break up peaceful assemblage for public protest against this and other administrative abuses. Again, the courts, instead of rebuking such unconstitutional tyranny, have given jail sentences to the defenders of our traditional freedom. It is true that a recent decision in New Jersey has put a stop to the use of the law regarding unlawful assembly to prevent peaceful protest against wrongs and emphatically affirms the necessity of the most liberal interpretation of the historic civil liberties. But in other industrial states the opposite practice and law continue. The denial of free speech is therefore now entrenched in legal precedent. The continuance of the use of coercion by the democratic state to prevent certain types of discussion of the distribution of economic power means that coercion will be used in the effort to secure and prevent that distribution.

To avert that contingency already it is necessary to reverse two Supreme Court decisions and the decisions of several courts of last resort in several states. Most of the force of government and most of the power of law is now most of the time behind property rights, regardless of the results to freedom or social progress. This means that the weight of the American government is thrown a good deal of the time against the struggle

of the masses for freedom and equality, to which purpose the government was once dedicated. If this tendency is not reversed it means that the democratic state has lost its function. It was to make possible social change without recourse to force and violence. Insofar as it is now preventing discussion of change it is now making inevitable the use of force and violence to secure change. Indeed in many instances of current record it is itself the first to use the force and violence which it was supposed to make unnecessary. Thus does capitalistic society add to its distribution of bread and circuses in place of the rights of a free citizenship the use of another Pretorian Guard in the vain attempt to maintain power which has outlived its usefulness.

If this trend cannot be reversed before it gets too late, if education and religion can do no more to prevent this country from drifting into the class war than they did to keep it from being pulled into the World War, then the meaning of recent improvements in either our comforts or our institutions will be to make the next advance in human life more costly than it would have been without them, because they increase both the destructiveness and the bitterness of the conflict. They mean more things to defend or to capture. Russia and China can pass into a co-operative economic order by way of civil warfare with less cost than Germany, Great Britain or the United States. Yet at present with us the economic world, with the state behind it, is definitely turning toward that catastrophe. The Sacco-Vanzetti tragedy cracked for a moment the crust of our sodden, guzzling complacency and showed those who have eyes to see the molten lava beneath. Education and religion are theoretically against the conflict method as a means to progress. What they are worth is now to be proved. Is there any evidence in the last decade that they have checked a trend which goes clearly against their basic purpose and which if it continues will nullify any other gains they may have made?

The inexorable fate of a class culture is to contribute to more of the people whatever gains it has wrought out in its course only through the conquest of power by the rising class. The only way it can avoid this fate is by becoming a universal culture, that is, by ceasing to be. If we want to know whether what we have

here is merely another class culture which in time must go the way of its predecessors of the old world, we shall once more have to get the viewpoint of those who see us from without. It is at the point of our impact upon other peoples that the nature of our way of life is revealed. Civilization in an inter-communicating, interdependent world is henceforth universal and the measure of the culture of any particular people is those elements in their life which the other peoples recognize to have common worth.

A class culture is inevitably nationalistic and imperialistic. It asserts the same privileges against other nations abroad that it holds against other classes at home. It is either patronizing or aggressive, condescending or cruel, supercilious or blatant. In short, it is typically one hundred per cent American; it is America First; it is the supremacy of the White Nordic Protestant, or of the intelligent who have tested the intelligence of the others and signed the certificate of their own. But a manner of living that is entitled to-day to the name civilization must be part and parcel of the whole life and struggle of mankind. It must both draw from and pour into the common pool of resources for the development of the common life of man. It must be not only willing but anxious to universalize its gains, to share its experience and resources with all other peoples and in like manner to receive from them. Because we now live and move on the world stage we can no longer measure one sectional life against another under the term civilizations. They are but cultures, still predominantly local perhaps, but not exclusively so. Therefore the life of any people must now be measured by what it contributes to the rest of the life of man. No way of life that draws tribute from others, that waxes strong at the cost of making others weak, can henceforth be regarded as civilized, no matter what the state of its machinery, art, literature or religion. Imperialism is as barbarous now that the sun of world brotherhood is rising as was the plundering of the Goths when the sun of imperial Rome was setting.

What then is the significance of the fact that by the smaller nations to the south of us we are increasingly regarded as a menace? To an ever growing number of their people we are a great, predatory power, encroaching upon their freedom with our

control and shaping their destiny in ways alien to their desire. This empire of trade and investment that desires no more territory yet must have its tribute. The demand for profit and interest is as inexorable as the requisition of the Roman tax-gatherer. We seek and get advantage, not the mutual pooling of effort and sharing of increment resulting therefrom. Benevolent we may be as long as our paternalism is not resisted, but we still regard the resources of this continent, both natural and human, as our occasion for profit; and if our praiseworthy intentions are resisted, we can and do kill the rebels as relentlessly as Rome or Britain. On this basis what relations can develop between the peoples of this continent that are worthy of the name civilization? How can a world of mutual effort and sharing be built on investment for profit? The basic facts of economic exploitation and economic inequality will have the same effect in international relations that they have produced in this country in the contacts between the races. Desire it as we may, a warless, fraternal world remains as unrealized as the freedom and citizenship of the Negro so long as one people continues to use another for its economic advantage without an equivalent return. On that basis, all we can have is a class, a national, a racial culture with all the passion and strife that they breed.

There is another test which our own wisdom as well as that of the East is beginning to put to our manner of life. The chief characteristic of that manner of living in the past which has in common usage been called civilization, whether it was in China, Greece or Medieval Europe, is unity. Life was within the compass of a scheme; it had unity. Its relationships were ordered; there was a universal sense of status and obligation. But this is exactly what is lacking in the Western world, and most of all in these United States. And over its absence we even exult. The transition from the obligation of status to freedom of contract is hailed as a great step forward. Is not the road to the top always open for the most able? Let every one look out for himself and the common weal will automatically be taken care of! Let individual selfishness go its own way, within the limits of the criminal law, and social harmony will come without thought or effort, especially if we put the most potent curses on every

proposal to improve life by ordered effort. The actual outcome of course is mostly chaos and conflict. We have not yet begun to make our civilization. We live in a disordered world, in a time and place too full of antagonisms.

The essence of harmony in those days and scenes where men achieved some unity of life was in the conjunction between the cultural and the economic aspects of living. In Greece the aristocracy of the intellect and the labor of the slaves were interwoven; in China the family determined both ethics and economics; in the high days of Medieval Europe feudalism gave everybody his place and duty in the common life for which they all lived. Today there is not only no plan, system or order over vast areas of our economic life save the control set up by organized greed, but our cultural life and our economic activities are proceeding by contrary principles. Democracy is the slogan of our culture, autocracy the dominant principle in our industrialism which comes increasingly within the grip of a financial oligarchy. The ethics of our professed religion is to love our neighbor as ourselves; the law of business enterprise is to make a profit out of him. Our political philosophy is rooted in freedom and equality, our industrial practice tends irresistibly toward monopoly and concentration of power. It is this basic conflict between our culture and our economic activities that tears our life asunder and leaves it broken and disordered. And this disorder again is at odds with the machine, which demands a technique of coordination. The condition of civilization for a machine age is social planning and social control. This will bring not only order where there is now chaos but spiritual unity where there is now warfare and anarchy. And since the power machine both makes possible and requires a world civilization this planning and control must be on a world scale.

Here is our test. If our economic philosophy and arrangements make for class culture and conflict they make also for nationalism and imperialism. In that case any gains which may be registered in a paper program against war, in the spread of education or the socialization of religion are deficient in reality and will not show permanence. If these gains are to endure and continue, the economic forces must be brought into harmony

with them, which means they have to be transformed from planless, divisive activities into ordered, integrating pursuits.

What evidence is there that in the last decade or two the people of the United States have addressed themselves to this basic problem of modern life? Everywhere, from child labor to electric power, the scant forces that seek the civilization which the machine makes possible are holding the trenches against the continuous assaults of greed and ignorance. Never was the philosophy of profit-seeking as the way to the Promised Land so vocal or so dominant in our public life. Never was our government so controlled by successful business enterprise nor our press so given over to moneymaking. When were the people so indifferent to their freedom? The days since the World War are, like those that followed our civil strife, the dark days of our record. In them we have been moving away from our early ideals and away from those by which alone a free and ordered, a just and fraternal world can be fashioned. A sophisticated, imperialist United States is more dangerous to the rest of mankind than one that was ignorant and isolated. It is too early yet to know whether these recent tendencies represent the real drift of the American current or are only a side eddy. If they continue there is history enough to read their meaning—they spell decadence once again. If this country is to contribute anything more toward progress it is necessary for it to apply its bent for invention to the discovering and developing of the forms of economic organization which will enable its original principles to be realized throughout its population and its genuine friendliness toward other nations to become a practical reality.

NEW YORK.

HARRY F. WARD.

GLEANINGS.

TOLSTOY AND IBSEN.

A RECENT writer in the *Mercure de France*, protesting against a critical bracketing together of these two names as literary anarchists, has declared that whereas Tolstoy was truly anarchistic in spirit, Ibsen was the exact opposite. Tolstoy, he says, seemed to believe in and certainly preached consistently that the natural goodness of man is distorted and cramped by bad institutions, whereas Ibsen never attacked institutions, but in every revelation that he made of a particular tragedy he showed that the fault lay in the deficiencies of the human individuals concerned. Ibsen's attitude is, pursued the writer, most clearly shown in the remark which he puts into the mouth of old Ekdal in *The Wild Duck*, when, speaking of the wild duck's plunge into the depths of the swamp when wounded mortally, he says: "Only a very clever dog can ever dive deep down and bring the wounded wild duck safely up to the surface again."

In none of Ibsen's plays is there ever to be found, says our French critic, *un chien assez habile*—a dog who is clever enough—and if Ibsen can be described as a pessimist, it is on that account only. Obviously from such a point of view it is Tolstoy who is the real pessimist, because he starts by assuming that the raw human material is good, but that somehow through the badness of civilisation it is corrupted. Why and how civilisation should have gone wrong he does not satisfactorily explain, whereas in Ibsen's plays, it is clear that human civilisation is imperfect because individual man is imperfect, and that every society is defective since it reflects the shortcomings and vices of the individuals who compose it. There is more hope in this attitude because better human beings may be born, and then society will improve, whereas what is to be done if man's goodness can always be brought to nought by unknown and uncontrolled influences? But with these remarks in my mind during the recent performances at the Arts Theatre Club of Tolstoy's *The Power of Darkness* and *The Fruits of Enlightenment*, and of Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkman*, it was interesting to discover the abstract categorical nature of the French writer's criticism. The two Tolstoy plays seemed much more human, and in a sense real than the Ibsen play, and of the two artists Ibsen seemed the more theoretical and dogmatic. It is true that Tolstoy has a belief in the cleansing and reconstructive power of confession and repentance which appears somewhat arbitrary to us. At the end of *The Power of Darkness* he makes Akim say:

(*with rapture*) Speak, my son! Tell everything—you'll feel better! Confess to God, don't fear men! God—God! It is He!
And then after Nikita has confessed:
(*rapturously*) God will forgive you, my own son!

(*embraces him*) You have had no mercy on yourself, He will show mercy on you! God—God! It is he.

Nikita and Akim are no doubt true to Russian character as Tolstoy knew it, and they have a certain universality which makes a strong appeal to us Westerners even to-day when the symbols and metaphors used by Tolstoy tend to darken rather than illumine his meaning; but, nevertheless, there is a gulf between the Western and the Russian, or Tolstoyan, attitude which time is widening. The tougher fibre of the Westerner is shown in the difficulty we have in indulging in the luxury, the consolation and the dogmatism of confession and repentance. For confession and repentance involve the perception and the belief in the necessity of sin, and in the free-will of a sinner who must both sin and repent. Tolstoy does not ask the natural question which we ask: Why did Nikita sin if it were bad for him to sin? He accepts "sin" as a part of God's plan. He does not re-inquire into the nature either of "sin" or of "God." These are the unquestioned postulates with which he begins, and he thinks he understands exactly what they mean. But, unfortunately, for us it is not so simple. These "postulates" are no longer postulates but assumptions, as relative in their truth as we have found the once invulnerable axioms of Euclid to be. We cannot accept any description of "God," of His "plan" or of "sin" which theology or science can offer us. Science, indeed, to-day admits its inability to supply a definition, a hypothesis or a description which covers all the known facts; but Tolstoy, who was a thorough Easterner in his impatience with the slow delving laborious methods of the West, was content to accept a given ideal of God and of a good man because his reforming zeal, his passionate nature, needed a principle of belief on which we could act. He took his religious ideals from the New Testament, and based his indictment of the ills of society upon the obvious discrepancy between the way of living prescribed by Jesus and that practised by modern society.

The thinkers of this generation are inclined to suspect a certain inadequacy in the ideals of the New Testament not on *a priori*, but upon purely experimental grounds. An hypothesis which does not "work," a description which does not cover all the known facts is suspect, no matter whose authority it rests upon, and although we cannot say that the ideals of the New Testament are false, we are now inclined to believe that they are incomplete—just as Newton's geometric conceptions of the universe have proved to be, not false, but incomplete.

I personally find that I do not share Akim's rapture over the repentance of his son; nor do I understand the meaning of, "God will forgive you, my own son." But this in no way detracts from the revelation of human nature which Tolstoy gives us in this fine play. Nikita is an imperfect man by his own standards, not by any theoretic ideal. He *suffers*, that is the indictment of his way of life by himself. And Tolstoy's genius is shown by the reality he gives to Nikita. In so creating a real character who lives and suffers Tolstoy has done the artist's work of revelation, and this cannot be diminished by any theological interpretation which is given to Nikita's conduct. It remains a mystery why

Nikita lived and suffered as he did, and we are all the wiser when we discern that no satisfactory explanation of this mystery exists.

But with Ibsen it is not so easy to separate the artist from the thinker. Tolstoy remained an artist by the sheer vitality of his human genius which purged his best creations of all rationalising and falsifying attitudes. Ibsen, with a more sceptical intelligence, did not often attain the unity of creation, but had to make his characters participate in the judgment which the more intellectual are always, in real life, making upon their own conduct. Whereas Tolstoy's characters judged their actions conventionally and therefore seem to belong more naturally to their own society, Ibsen's characters are, like Ibsen himself, rebels and adventurers in thought. But they do not turn out to be more complete, more fully developed men and women than Tolstoy's characters—as they should if they were truly more complete men and women of higher intellectual development—for we find ourselves more sceptical of John Gabriel Borkman of *Ella* than we are of Nikita and Aniyusha.

I believe wholly in Nikita and Aniyusha and they remain, what all real human beings remain after the most exhaustive analysis, unexplained mysteries. But I know too much about John Gabriel Borkman and *Ella*. They are too completely explained to be quite real, and when *Ella* says to Borkman, "You have committed the one unpardonable crime, you have killed the love-life in me," I am not convinced—not even when it is as beautifully said as Mrs. Patrick Campbell said it, at the Arts Theatre Club, this week. Ibsen is so much "cleverer" and more "modern" than Tolstoy that he is too sensible to be an anarchist or to pin his faith to any creed or dogma, but, like all the moderns, he cannot live without explanations, and they must be new ones. By sheer intensity of will and feeling he gives life to his characters, but by the devilish need to understand completely what is happening to them he creates a plot which is too artificial and self-contained, and in that plot his characters, like intellectual, hot-house-bred products, sometimes wither and die when put upon the stage in front of a living audience.

But what a pleasure it is to see in the theatre such plays as Tolstoy's *The Power of Darkness* and *The Fruits of Enlightenment* and Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkman*! The Arts Theatre Club is to be congratulated on these productions. If I prefer the natural anarchy of that fine tragedy *The Power of Darkness* and that brilliant and amusing comedy *The Fruits of Enlightenment* to the too narrowly ordered logic of *John Gabriel Borkman*, I am not blind to the psychological insight and imaginative power of the latter play. What a pity it is that we have to depend upon centenary celebrations to get a chance to see such plays performed in London?

J. B. W.

—The New Statesman.

OBSCENITY AND THE CENSOR

BY HAVELOCK ELLIS

'TO THE PURE' is the title of a book—with the sub-title 'A Study of Obscenity and the Censor'—just published in New York by the Viking Press. At the outset

let me say that it is a title which, however useful as a label, *contains implications we do not all accept.* By this we mean no disrespect to St. Paul, for when he uttered the famous dictum, "To the pure all things are pure," he was not discussing literature or pictures or the kinema, but a matter to which they are hardly analogous. There are many things in books and art generally which the pure may be justified in not feeling to be pure, although there can never be any agreement as to which things these are. That indeed is one of the solid and permanent arguments against a censorship of "obscenity."

Fortunately it is only as a label that the authors of this book have chosen their title. They are two American lawyers, Morris Ernst and William Seagle, and between them they represent an active interest in both law and literature. Their collaboration has proved singularly fortunate. They are not only able to speak with authority of legal conditions in England and America—for the book is as much concerned with England as America—but they are extremely well informed in literature, and with a sufficiently adequate critical and æsthetic equipment for estimating literary values. The book is at once a competent history of the Anglo-Saxon censorship from the Victorian period until to-day, and at the same time a cogent and yet singularly temperate argument for freedom from censorship. It is not the first book which has taken this standpoint. There is, for instance, also from America, the substantial and powerful work of Theodore Schroeder, published some twenty years ago, on 'Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law.' But that book was hardly written for the general reader and it remains less well known than it deserves to be. 'To the Pure. . . ' is undoubtedly by far the best popular book—the best written as well as the most persuasive—that has yet appeared on this subject. And since it is a subject that concerns us here to-day at least as much as it concerns Americans, the sooner it is published here the better.

I have referred to the tone of the book as temperate. We have too often seen the slapdash hand exercising itself in this field. The foolish and extravagant rhetoric of those who fulminate against "obscenity" has been matched by the random and reckless smartness, sometimes scarcely less foolish, of those who took the other side. It was fully time to approach the question in a sane and serious spirit, which is not less so for allowing the play of wit and humour. Thus it is notable that these authors do not, as was not so long ago the fashion, howl over the supposed misdeeds of "Puritanism." They know that real Puritanism was on the side of liberty, and that it was the greatest of the Puritans who in the 'Areopagitica' put forth the noblest denunciation of censorship that was ever uttered. It might be added that even in more recent days the most genuinely Puritanic of prominent publicists, W. T. Stead, was prepared to raise his voice for those haled before the courts for "obscenity," and was in fact himself once among them.

It is, indeed, well known that the Bible takes a high place among "obscene" books. There appears to be no definition of obscenity which will not condemn the Bible. Moreover, on the practical side, it is also known that the young find their chief source of information concerning sex—birth, masturbation, birth-control, rape,

and perversion—from the Bible. This was, for instance, shown not long ago through a careful enquiry by a distinguished authority in social hygiene, Dr. Katharine Davis, among over a thousand unmarried women, and college graduates. The same women were also asked what they found most "sexually stimulating" (in the police courts it would be phrased "lewd, filthy, and disgusting"). The largest number replied "Man." The problem thus becomes of tragic consequence, for we see that if "obscenity" is to be suppressed it can only be done by the extinction of one-half of the human race. And as men, if asked the same question, would in an equal majority of cases undoubtedly answer: "Woman"—why, there goes the other half.

The authors of this book are not joking but they are concerned to show that the final refutation of the criminal obscenity laws lies in their futility. They are throughout dealing with the actual facts of life and of law in our own day; they marshal these facts with learning and with care (in spite of a few curious misprints); and their conclusions are logical, sober, and irresistible. They claim to have shown the necessity for *revaluation of obscenity*. That is very far from meaning a justification of the things that most reasonable people find ugly and unpleasant. But it means a different attitude towards their suppression in practice. We know the results of the attitude which has prevailed in the past. We have all been the victims of it. A premium is put on things that are dirty and worthless. It is law alone which makes pornography both attractive and profitable. A simple-minded Home Secretary arises and declares that he feels it to be his duty to protect the young from the awful dangers that threaten them in books, postcards, and kinemas. Needless to say, the young of to-day are not in a mood to be preserved from these dangers, which can always be reached sooner or later, with a little trouble and money. And no doubt such things often give rise to some gloating, though in the absence of the alluring taboo they would call forth only indifference or dislike. The motive for producing them would then soon disappear. At the present time, thanks to the premium put on them, the production of obscene postcards and similar things is so large that even the number of those seized by the police soon mounts up to millions. All of us, it is probable, have once been stirred to gain access to such things simply because they were forbidden. For my own part, I remember how, long ago, in a quiet street of Seville, a furtive and shabby individual drew me aside and produced from beneath his long cloak a little book with coloured illustrations which curiosity induced me to spend several pesetas in buying. I found it pathetically crude and unpleasant, and quickly destroyed it; my curiosity was once and for all satisfied. Such things are, of course, far away from art or science, which redeem all they touch if it happens to need "redemption."

"The real obscenity lies in taboo"; that is the great truth on which Messrs. Ernst and Seagle have seized and sought to drive home in a world which is suffering from the ignorance of it. As they rightly point out, it is impossible to estimate the social damage which has thus been done. It is these taboos which have delayed until to-day the effort to combat venereal diseases and the discussion of the population question. The names of the evils were too "obscene" to mention and there-

fore the evils themselves were allowed to flourish unchecked, or else left to specialists and officials to discuss in technical terms. In another field the difficult problems raised by psycho-analysis have been dragged from the calm field of science to be perverted and distorted by the fascination or the repulsion of the taboo against obscenity. Even in the sphere of history and biography the taboo against obscenity has stood in the way of an accurate knowledge of personalities and events; while now that the taboo is losing its force there is naturally a movement to the other extreme, with a tendency to distortion in the opposite direction, and we magnify the importance of the facts that before we were not allowed to see. For it is not one of the least evils of taboos that even the inevitable reaction they lead to is evil.

It seems so simple, so innocent, so entirely praiseworthy, to put down indecent literature by laws against "obscenity." We are, none of us, in favour of what seems to us indecent. It is impossible we should be, for the word means, if we search into it, simply what is unfit. Yet the simpler and more fundamental the conception of decency is seen to be the more it eludes any prescription of positive law. It is determined by the nature of the individual himself, by the feelings of his social group, and very notably by fashion. Most of us are old enough to know that less than twenty years ago the whole young womanhood of to-day would have been held guilty of indecency in dress and liable to be conducted to the nearest police station. In literature fashion is even more uncertain and elusive than in life, for the good reason that it is not produced by mass action. Messrs. Ernst and Seagle constantly bring forward examples of such fluctuations of opinion regarding books condemned by law, as well as examples of books legally condemned as obscene in England and free in America or legally condemned in America and free in England. "The obscenity of to-day will be the propriety of to-morrow."

Law is made ridiculous when it is thus prostituted to the fashion of the hour. It is made immoral when it is thus perverted to the supposed protection of children. It used to be "women and children" who were assumed to be in need of such protection from the dangers of "obscenity." It is now only children, for women have rightfully insisted that in this matter they are henceforth to be put on the level of men and not of children. The problem of the child remains, and one of the wisest chapters in this book is that on 'Pornography and the Child.' It ought to be clear that we are not entitled to protect children by laws which also extend to adults and thus tend (sometimes with too much success) to convert adults into children. It is for the parents and teachers to protect the children. Yet it is admitted that there is "a twilight zone of disputed control between parents and government." In the realm of economics it is rightly held that the forces against the child should be restrained by laws against long hours of work and similar hardships. But to protect the child against "obscenity" by legislation is not only more difficult but less necessary. Pornography has no meaning and no attraction for the healthy child who casually comes in contact with it; the reaction is one of indifference, if not of disgust. To-day if any harm is caused it is less likely to come from pornography than from the crudely exaggerated films of vice and disease, presented by virtuous propagandists of social hygiene, which are apt to cause a painful shock to the virginal

mind, just as the tender skin of the infant is injured by the hot bath of a temperature wholesomely stimulating to the adult. There are many uncensored things in life far more injurious to the young than obscenity. "A minor's pornography law" is here suggested, but tentatively, with much doubt; "we have faith that education, through school and home, will prove the enduring solution." Parents and teachers alone can be trusted to guide the child safely through these risks without injury to the freedom of adults. To-day this is being recognized by parents and teachers alike, even if not yet always in ways that are according to knowledge.

"The modern counterpart of modern witchcraft"—it is so that in the Preface the authors of this book describe the superstition of "obscenity." It is, indeed, an analogy which might well be worked out in greater detail. The witch-finders of the seventeenth century are a close counterpart of the obscenity-finders of to-day. The lurid halo around the witch made her a really injurious influence, just as the glamour we now cast around obscenity imparts to it an influence it would not otherwise possess. Witchcraft, like obscenity, was not altogether the product of the witch-finder's imagination. But so far as it was real it could not be touched by the ducking-stool or the law court. It melted away under the influence of a more reasonably humane and civilized attitude.

It was precisely at the 'time when the development of science and civilization was leading to the proper estimate of witchcraft that ferocity in the persecution of witches reached its height. We may say the same to-day about obscenity. The old sex taboos are dissolving. We are beginning to face openly the facts of sex, with a degree of intelligence and frankness which even a quarter of a century ago was impossible. That new honesty and sincerity itself stirs up the persecutorial fanaticism of the descendants of the witch-finders. Yet until the crime of "obscenity" goes the way of the crime of witchcraft, it is idle to talk of civilization.—*The Saturday Review*.

DR. WATSON SPEAKS OUT.

By A. A. MILNE.

THE Suggestion of the Editor of THE NATION that I should myself review in his paper the collected adventures of my friend Mr. Sherlock Holmes,* which, it will be remembered, I was the first to lay before the public, comes at an opportune moment; for though I am a man of even temperament (save when the weather adversely affects my old wound) I am not one that can sit down under injustice, and in the matter of this book I feel that a grave wrong has been done to me. In order to explain just what this is I must take the public into my confidence in a way that only became necessary in the March of this year, when, as will be remembered, Inspector Lestrade fell off the pier at Southend while the tide was unfortunately out, and suffered a dislocation of the cervical vertebra which has delayed, if not actually restricted, the memoirs which he had proposed to publish.

*"Sherlock Holmes : Short Stories." By Arthur Conan Doyle (Murray. 7s. 6d.)

In those memoirs, as I understand from his widow, he would have done me the justice which a mistaken sense of loyalty to my friend Mr. Holmes has hitherto prevented me doing to myself.

In the course of my different narrative I have had occasion to refer from time to time to a medical practice which I had purchased at Paddington. The real truth about this practice has not yet come to light for the various small deceptions in regard to it which I played upon my friend Holmes (always an easy man to deceive) have undoubtedly led both him and the public to suppose it other than it actually was. The truth which I am now at liberty to reveal is that the practice when I bought it consisted almost entirely of a Mrs. Withers, and that the surprising death of Mrs. Withers during my prolonged absence at Paisley in connection with the Syncopated Bacon Frauds left me with no means of subsistence other than an inadequate wound pension. In this predicament it was natural that I should look about for some other source of income.

I had always been fond of writing, and my descriptions of the Afghan Campaign as sent home in weekly letters to my Aunt Hester at Leamington, and by her submitted to the LEAMINGTON COURIER, had received considerable editorial commendation, although, owing to the exigencies of space and an unexpected local interest in some trouble at the gas-works, they had been denied actual publication. In the hope that my pen had not lost its cunning, I now decided to write out in narrative form some of the adventures in which my friend Holmes and I had participated, and submit them to one of the more popular monthly magazines. Of the instantaneous success of my venture into literature I need not now speak, for it is public knowledge. But the means by which this success was achieved has remained obscure until today, when, in the regrettable absence of Inspector Lestrade, it has at last fallen to me to reveal it.

One of the most useful arts by which a writer may achieve his effects is the Art of Contrast. I remember that in my letters home during the Afghan Campaign (in which I received my wound) I often employed this art with telling effect: contrasting, for instance, the sublimities of the mountain scenery, by which we were surrounded on all sides, with the occasional inadequacies of the sanitary arrangements; and so forth. So, now, in my stories, I decided to heighten the effect by contrasting as sharply as possible the characters of Holmes and myself. Holmes is in many ways the most remarkable man I have met, but he was human. *Humanum est errare*, as my old Anatomy Lecturer used to say. Holmes was human enough to make mistakes, and human enough to resent their being found out. It became my habit, therefore, both in my personal relations with him, and in the narratives which I was putting before the public, to cover up, as far as possible, the very natural errors into which he fell, and to heighten the public appreciation of his amazing talent by contrasting it whenever possible with an assumed obtuseness of my own. It amuses me now to think how little he suspected this, just as it fills me with pride to think how greatly he, and through him the country, profited by it. For Holmes was an artist, and, above all, an artist must believe continuously in his own powers.

Let me refer my readers to the story known as the Disappearance of lady Frances Carfax." In this story, it will be remembered, I record how Holmes deduced from the appearance of my boots, that I had just come back from a Turkish bath. It was a matter of habit with me by this time to admiringly admit the correctness of all his inductions, and to ask for the explanations which he was longing to give. The explanation in this case was that my boots were tied with an elaborate bow, such as only a bootmaker or a bath attendant would use; undoubtedly a keen piece of observation and an intelligent deduction. But he went on to say, "It is unlikely that it is the bootmaker, since your boots are nearly new. Well, what remains? The bath." Why, because one has a newish pair of boots, one should not buy a pair of slippers (as in fact I had been doing, having received a substantial cheque that morning from the Editor), why one should not even buy a second pair of boots, I do not know; but it was without difficulty, almost without conscious thought, that I replied, "Holmes, you are wonderful." It was on this same occasion that he deduced from the splashes on my left sleeve that I had sat on the left side of my hansom (which was true), and that therefore I must have had a companion (which was not true); for, like most men, I prefer to lean against the side of a cab rather than sit upright in the middle. But to have told Holmes so would have destroyed his confidence in himself, and to have told the public so would undoubtedly have detracted from the financial value of the stories. "Holmes," I said, again, "you are marvellous," and he never suspected otherwise.

Undoubtedly his arrogance grew under my flattery, and sometimes this arrogance was hard to bear. It will be remembered that, in our inquiry into the curious experience of "The Retired Colourman," it fell to me to undertake the preliminary investigations. I was giving Holmes some account of these, and describing with the minute particularity on which he insisted the state of a certain wall, "mottled with lichens and topped with moss," as I put it, when he broke in rudely, "Cut out the poetry, Watson. I note that it was a high brick wall." Now it so happened that in an earlier inquiry into the extraordinary mystery of "The Decentralized Tomato"—one of the cases which I have not recorded, as being only notable for the reason that Holmes was searching New castle for a tall left-handed man with a red beard and long finger-nails at the very moment when Lestrade was arresting the actual murderess at Brighton—in the course of that inquiry Holmes himself had said to me, speaking of the high brick wall behind the tomato-house, "Tut-tut, Watson, the lichen. Does it suggest nothing to you?" And when I had made some such obvious answer as that the wall seemed to have been there a long time, he went on muttering to himself, "Fool! The lichen! Why wasn't I told about the lichen?" It will be seen, then, that my deliberate policy of humouring Holmes was not without its undeserved humiliations.

My readers may ask why I should be taking the public into my confidence now when I have put up with these humiliations in silence for so long. The answer lies in this final collection of all the stories into one volume. If my readers

will turn to the last section of the volume, entitled "The Case-Book of Sherlock Holmes," they will read there two stories, inferior stories if I may say so without prejudice, written by Holmes himself. As a writer who has taken himself seriously, even from those early Afghan days, I do not object to belittling myself if by so doing I can increase the artistic value of my narrative. But I can reasonably protest when another belittles me. Moreover, these two stories were inserted into "The Case-Book" without my permission, and by collusion, I must suppose, between Holmes and the publishers. I protested strongly at the time of the book's separate publication; I protest again strongly now. I have written both to the Incorporated Society of Authors and to the British Medical Council. I have also called the attention of Messrs. Murray to a demonstrably false statement in one of the stories, which says with all the circumstance of apparent truth, "It was in January, 1903. . . . The good Watson had at that time deserted me for a wife." I married, as my readers know, in 1887, and my poor wife died in the early nineties. For reasons into which I need not go now I did not marry again. Already, as the result of this false publication, I have had an inquiry from the Income Tax Commissioners as to my second wife's independent means, and a circular addressed to Mrs. Watson calling attention to an alleged infallible method, obtained from an unregistered and unqualified Indian sepoy, for removing superfluous hair. Is it any wonder that I am indignant?

I therefore solemnly call upon the publishers to withdraw the volume from circulation, even though I myself shall be the first to suffer financially by it. Fortunately I have enough now for my simple needs. With the proceeds of previous sales I have purchased another small practice (an elderly gentleman of arthritic tendencies called Ferguson), and with this and my wound pension (a relic of the Afghan Campaign) I am content. But if that content is to be disturbed by the continued circulation of false statements, then let me warn all concerned that I shall not take it lying down. *There are other revelations which I could make.* . . . — The Nation & Athenæum.

THE WINNING ENTRIES.

As a result of the competition initiated by the Saturday Review for invention of characteristic phrase or epigram which might (but does not) occur in the works of each of the following—the winning entries are:

CHESTERTON: The trouble about refinement is its essential vulgarity.

BARRIE: Men, when they take wives, forget that they are marrying, not one woman, but all women.

WELLS: And eventually women like Belinda will seem as remote and unproductive as the ichthyosaurus.

ALDOUS HUXLEY: Modern civilization advanced only when it was discovered that the body was more important than the soul.

ARLEN: He found his illusions profitable—so he kept them.

MILNE: He was a little weak with the pull, but his slice was magnificent.

INGE : I sometimes think that lost causes are the only ones worth supporting.

STRACHEY : The materialists were too busy building their castles to notice that they were building them upon sand.

G. A. NEWALL.

CHESTERTON : There are only two alternatives open when a man disagrees with you—to convince him or to bash him.

BARRIE : Tammas peered through the glass, darkly.

WELLS : Mr. Jones had brushed-up hair and spoke curate's English.

ALDOUS HUXLEY : We stood apart. The body had suffered a sea-change, coprological in its obscenity.

ARLEN : No man is really a woman-hater. It depends on her pass-book.

MILNE : An artist is known by the way he eats asparagus.

INGE : Advertisement apart, there is no necessity for martyrdom.

STRACHEY : He had written a volume of verse—if the title-page is to be trusted.

W. R. DUNSTAN

—*The Saturday Review*.

FUTURE OF LEISURE.

VULGARITY OF NEW RICH.

(BY THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, D.D.)

Mr. C. E. M. Joad, one of the most vigorous of the younger philosophers in his "Diogenes or the future of Leisure" once again rivets attention on the subject of leisure. Diogenes as we all know, was the champion demonstrator of the Simple Life. By living in a tub he escaped having to pay house-rent and rates (if there were any rates in those happier times.) By eschewing all the amenities of civilised life he lived in his own satisfaction on nothing a year, and could tell Alexander the Great that he wanted nothing from the master of the world except that Alexander should cease to stand between him and the sun. Diogenes, then, is a great authority on one way of spending leisure, the way which does not appeal to American apostles of "Consumptionism" nor to the German Socialist who complained that their "accused absence of wants" prevented the masses from being as discontented as he wished to see them.

Some moralists have thought that the human race is so incapable of idling to any good purpose that the less leisure they have the better. Dr. Johnson said that a man is seldom so harmlessly occupied as when he is making money. Mr. Bernard Shaw has suggested that the best definition of hell is a perpetual holiday. Dr. Watts observed that Satan finds mischief still for idle hands to do. Schopenhauer, the pessimist finds that as pleasures increase the capacity for enjoying them dimi-

nish while those who are not at work suffer from perpetual boredom. I forget who it was who said that life would be tolerable if it were not for its amusements.

A FEROCIOUS SATIRIST

Mr. Joad has wrapped himself in the mantle of Juvenal; he shows himself a ferocious satirist. The world, he says is being Americanised; and look how the Americans live. There is a street in New York where four thousand families spend fifty-six million pounds a year. The ladies squander a large fraction of this sum on personal decoration; three million pounds are assigned to illegal alcoholic drinks. But this is not all. "When the satisfaction derived from the brute expenditure of wealth begins to pall, the American rich take to the practice of religion or of immorality." America is the happy hunting ground of every species of religious imposture. "Religion" is one refuge from boredom: the others are drink, drugs, culture, and above all, sexual promiscuity. That the method is not always successful may be inferred from such notices in the Press as "Suicide epidemic among students," one of whom put his head in a gas-stove because he was "tired of the girls and did not know what to do with himself". All this is astonishingly like Juvenal's pictures of the idle rich in his day. If the Communists ever get their innings, it will be due to the performances of these gentry, many of whom unfortunately help to set the pace in Europe; for America exports expensive duchesses as well as cheap moro-cars.

HOG HORNS AND BUNGALITIS

But Mr. Joad is equally severe upon the Englishman's use of his leisure hours. His own favourite haunts in the peaceful country have been invaded and desecrated by the ubiquitous charabanc. The new rich with their tasteless mansions and their "insistent hog horns", the middle class, who are responsible for the epidemic of "bungalitis" which is making the South Coast and the prettiest part of the countryside impossible, and the holiday-making working-man, with his litter of paper bags and bottles, are equally an offence to him. He almost wishes to exterminate his brotherman.

"Life," he says in his haste, "is a disease in the constitution of the earth, a product of rotting matter, preying like a fungoid growth on the planet upon whose surface it crawls." In the same mood of irritation he quotes from a Martian historian of the far future a whole page which was first discovered not by himself but by the prophetic eye of your present contributor. It describes the temporary ascendancy and ultimate disappearance, by mutual extermination of the noxious species which once defaced the surface of the planet between Mars and Venus, "whose destruction has always been acclaimed by our theologians as affording one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the providential government of the universe."

Such rejoinders are justifiable in view of the complacent assurance with which some writers assume that the earth was made solely for the delectation of that brutal bully "homosapiens." But probably neither Mr. Joad nor I wish them to be taken too seriously. I share his exasperation at some manifestations of human imbecility, like that of the woman who sat for 24 hours outside a theatre and

explained that "I just love waiting in a queue," or the habit of playing music at meals, which "spoils three good things, music, eating and talking." But has there really been no improvement in our ways of spending our leisure, however much room we may find for further advance? I think there has, and consequently I am less annoyed with my fellowman than he seems to be.

Reformers are too impatient. They should compare the present with the real past, as well as with the ideal future. How did people spend their leisure a hundred or two hundred years ago?

THOSE GOOD OLD DAYS.

Thackeray, who knew the eighteenth century very well said that a fine gentleman under Queen Anne and the first Georges would be as impossible, from his gross habits, in a modern drawing room as savage. Many old family portraits reveal too plainly how their originals spent their time in Gargantuan banquets with masses of heavy butcher's meat "dull but deep potations" every day, and violent exercise in the fields, necessary to carry off effects of gluttony—this was the life of the oligarchy who then ruled the country. Cruel sports, such as cock-fighting and bear-baiting, were still popular. Gambling at cards was even more rampant than it is now; and duelling was a frequent episode in a gentleman's career.

Or take a rather later period—the Regency as described in the Creevey Papers and the life of the poorer classes as described in Dickens. And remember that Creevey's England was at that time engaged in a great war, followed by many years of distress. Almost universal drunkenness was only one of the vices which make it impossible to regard the England of our great-grandparents as a highly civilised country. The brutality of the Northern countries is exposed by such books as "Withering Heights." Leisure was more scanty in those days but it was worse spent than it is now.

THE CHARABANC.

I have nothing to say for the vulgar new rich except that they know better. But it seems to me that the masses amuse themselves in a much more civilised manner than their fathers and grandfathers ever did. The charabanc is a great nuisance, but, after all, a long country drive is a form of pleasure which nobody need be ashamed of, and which we certainly ought not to grudge to the town worker.

The right use of leisure is no doubt a harder problem than the right use of our working hours. The soul is dyed with the colour of its leisure thoughts. As a man thinketh in his heart so is he. Those who show by the use of their leisure that their one object is never to be alone with themselves confess thereby that their lives are a failure. But I am afraid that some book lovers, the people who, according to Mr. Joad, understand best how to use their leisure, are open to this charge. Some reading is only a kind of intellectual dram-drinking, a means of escaping from thought.

It is a scandal that anyone should be bored in this interesting world. The remedy no doubt, as Mr. Joad, the philosopher, tells us, is that we should

contemplate the absolute values of the Good, the True and the Beautiful—religion, knowledge, and art. To descend into the concrete, what we need is higher ideals and a better education. Education has already done something to civilise the English people, and may do much more. If in the future we are to work for shorter hours, the need of education is imperative. My honoured friend the late Lord Haldane always put this first in his demands for the future.

CULTIVATE A HOBBY.

But I should attach great importance to another piece of advice. Everyone ought to cultivate a hobby. I do not mean collecting walking sticks or postage stamps, but some subject outside the work by which we earn our living, in which we can take a keen interest for its own sake. It is essential that the interest should be disinterested, if the bull may be pardoned. Every impersonal interest has a universal quality about it. It makes a life as a whole worth more to us and open avenues which enlarge our minds. If we can believe that it is of value to society generally so much the better. But almost any respectable hobby will save us from the dismal futility which drives so many people to spend the period of their earthly probation in killing time and running away from themselves.—The "Evening Standard."

THE TYRANNY OF FEELINGS.

NEEDLESS WORRY.

THE majority of people attach too much importance to their feelings. If they feel depressed, for example, they foresee calamity not only to their own houses, but to the nation and even the civilization to which they happen to belong. If they are cheerful the future glows with promise. Exactly the same facile acceptance of what our emotions choose to offer us is usual when illness threatens or arrives. The majority of men meet a cold in the head with gloomy forebodings of bronchitis with pneumonia to follow.

Their depressed emotions suggest to them that their "luck is out." They have, so to speak, lost the toss with life. Anything unpleasant may happen. The ancients called this condition melancholia, which being translated means, "black bile." Men whose bile had turned black, it was thought, tended to take a "jaundiced" view of life. Treatment, consequently, was directed not to the disordered emotions but to the disordered liver.

To-day we tend, rather, to reverse that process. There are plenty of people always ready to suggest that, say, a liver attack is the final consequence of some mental upheaval which took place in the cradle or the nursery. Consequently, treatment of the mind and of the emotions is given for the alleviation of physical as well as of mental distresses.

MIND AND MATTER.

This tendency, this way of thinking, has permeated all minds. It is the fashion now to talk about the great influence which the mind wields over the body, and to belittle the influence which the body wields over the mind. This new fashion, though its adherents pretend that it "strips reality bare" is, in fact, a subtle form of self glorification.

We all like to believe that our great and throbbing emotions are able to make this mortal flesh their poor slave. The idea that our exquisite melancholy is occasioned only by a bilious attack is far less attractive.

No doubt the mind does influence the body greatly; only a very dull person would deny that. But the probability is, nevertheless, that the body influences the mind much more and much more frequently. It is merely foolish to worry about one's feelings if one has had a late night or has become the victim of a cold in the head or sees yellow spots before one's eyes. Each one of these small physical disturbances is capable of opening the gates of the nether regions.

It is well to keep this fact firmly in mind, for it is a fact which, when recognized, saves one from many a gloomy day and from many a foolish word or even deed. Let the wise repeat, when dark emotions assail them; "I am ill. I am out of sorts. Nothing which I feel to-day has any kind of significance. I will wait till to-morrow or the next day before I allow myself to fret."

NEEDLESS WORRY.

An attitude of that sort would save quite half of all the needless worry with which our world is vexed, and it would, without doubt, facilitate the business of the world and make its home-life happier.

For the mischief is that the bilious man or woman demands that he or she shall be treated as a normal, non-bilious man or woman. The whole, healthy world must put on jaundiced spectacles to keep bilious folk in countenance.

From that simple fact outbursts of temper innumerable proceed every day; on that fact those domestic martyrdoms which inflict such wretchedness on all except the martyr are founded. Let it be added that it takes a brave doctor to tell a patient who has surrendered himself to his feelings that it is only his liver which is out of order.

Those who do not feel ill enough to call in a doctor ought to apply such remedies to themselves, when their feelings grow troublesome, as they would apply if they knew that their digestive organs were sluggish.

One can sometimes "walk off" a fit of the blues just as effectively as one can sometimes "walk off" a cold or a bilious attack.—The "Times."

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE GRACE OF GOD AND A WORLD RELIGION. BY THOMAS PHILLIPS (The Carey Press, London, 3s. 6d.)

THIS little book is an interesting and thought-exciting contribution to the literature which has been growing since the great war on the failure of all the religions of the world to prevent social strife, racial hatred and war, and on the need of a religion which will make these impossible. The various chapters are devoted to a comparative study of all the great religions in their important phases. After the study of the history of all the religions professed by large portions of mankind, which it must be admitted, has been done with fairness and sympathy, the author comes to the conclusion that all the religions except Christianity have missed a particular element in the notion of the Godhead which he describes by the word "Grace."

"Undoubtedly the most High God is all these things—omnipotent and righteous, holy and true is He, a God of order and of law, but none of these attributes is the highest we know. Beyond power, we see goodness, beyond goodness we see love, beyond love we see grace—God's whole nature giving itself to make the world sweet and wholesome. Grace is the last, best word we can give to God, and it includes every other excellency that was attributed to him. . . . Further such a conception links God to the universal needs of the world. The Incarnation is God coming to man. Grace is God sharing his life with the life of the race."

According to the author "such a conception of God not only enables us to practice the principles we know, but lifts our whole morality into a higher level."

Mr. Phillips concedes that there has been some endeavour by all the non-Christian religions towards the discovery of the Grace of God, but argues that none of the Incarnations conceived by other religions come up to the perfection and completeness of the Incarnation in Jesus Christ.

"The purpose of this glancing survey has been to show that in every religion there is a two sided relationship. In all of them man has been groping after God. That is universally admitted. But what is ignored, if not derived, is that in all of them God has been seeking after man."

The latter part of the book deals with how Christianity found what other religions missed. Particular emphasis is laid on the teaching of Christ claiming the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of Man.

"All races of men are like children in one of the many rooms of the Father's house, but like children in the dark, aware of a Presence, but misapprehending and misnaming him, supposing Him to be a Fate to crush, an enemy to hurt, or a ghost to terrify. But Jesus comes and switches on the light and they discover the Presence to have been their Father God all the time." "Jesus came to give to every faith the one revelation it needed to classify and complete its conception of God."

It is unnecessary to follow the author through the scholarly discussions about the alleged misconceptions, of other religions such as Hinduism and Islam, and the religion of China. It is sufficient by brief references to indicate the line of the argument. With reference to Buddhism he says:

"It is surprising to find a teacher with no place for God in his teaching, recognised by his followers no more than an enlightened path finder, and lapsing into an incomprehensible Nirvana at last, worshipped as an incarnation of God.By the time his religion has reached China, and the Hinayana has developed into the Mahayana doctrine, he himself is an incarnation, and out of a religion where the doctrine was impossible, and in a land where it was deemed unnecessary, the tendency finds clear and full expression. Neither philosophy nor nationality can suppress the craving for an Incarnation." Buddhism, an emancipation without prayer, and an enlightenment without God, has in China and Japan become the religion of Grace."

As regards Hinduism the discussion is summed up in the following passages:—

"It is not from Brahma the silent and the inaccessible that Hindu religion springs, but from Vishnu and Siva, the Gods who dwell among men in avatars and incarnations; not from the Upanishads, but from the two great epics of Krishna and Rama, not from Sankara as much as from Ramanuja, a theologian of the twelfth century who brought God into touch with His world once more and proved himself a Christian Theist without having ever heard of Christianity."

"Ramanuja was the morning star of the greatest religious revival that India has ever known. His teaching germinated, until years and generations afterwards it blossomed and fructified in the preaching of Ramananda."

Mr. Phillips makes particular mention of the Bhagavadgita, wherein God is described as appearing in human form "to help a man at his tasks, and to guard him against error, and to

win his devotion, and allegiance to himself" and proving himself "a God of humanity, and a God of Grace."

On a similar study of the doctrine of Islam, the author suggests that though the idea of an Incarnation was heresy, there gradually arises a belief—especially among the Shias "that it was only the presence of God himself, as man, that could rest the world in order." So Allah was supposed to have revealed himself in Ali, the son-in-law and nephew of the Prophet, and though he was put to death, he was succeeded by nine Imams "who where also murdered in turn by their orthodox persecutors."

Not even direct violation of the teaching of the Prophet, not even the fate of certain death, could prevent Islam from crying out for an Incarnation."

It is claimed that while all other religions set out in a wistful search for the great Some One, and arrived at the conclusion that "there is little hope of finding Him except as He finds us," "Christianity begins, where all other religions end, *viz.*—with the discovery of Grace."

"Christianity is the story of God finding man. The other religions are man's search for God. Christianity is God's search for man." "It is not man coming to God to be saved, but God coming to man to save him."

The author further attempts to show (1) that the Grace of Jesus is founded on reality (2) that it is ethical and (3) that it is universal in its range.

The result of the whole argument may be given in the author's own words:

"If the contention of this book is to be justified, we must know that the Grace of God has the power to capture these vagrant desires, to train and develop them, and further to purify every magic spell and transfigure every selfish want."

The effect of Grace on prayer, leading to the intercession of man in God's work are dealt with elaborately.

"Grace gives us a God who hears before we call and prays to man before man prays to Him. * * Grace consecrates and satisfies all the legitimate desires of the human soul and lifts up prayer from being a random experiment to be a moral discipline and spiritual Communion."

For the purpose of this review, what has been said above

may be deemed sufficient to indicate the author's standpoint, his conclusion, and the process by which it has been reached. The discussions reveal scholarship, grasp and a genuine historic sense which is admirable in an author holding deep convictions as to the finality and completeness of Christianity and its implications. A study of religions other than our own should be directed to the discovery of common human aspirations and standards of thinking and conduct. There is no doubt that this aim has persistently been kept in view.

There are however a few points in which the reader will find the book of little help or of right guidance. What the world now needs is not a religion of intellectual or doctrinaire perfection, but one which will serve as a fresh stimulus to man not only in establishing his relations to the Supreme Being—which is a matter of individual concern, but in loving his fellowmen in a way in which he has not loved them before, with an interest released from purely selfish considerations, and a desire to benefit at the expense of others. All religions in their ethical aspect have striven to place this ideal before the man of the world, but with little success. Christianity can show no brighter record in this respect. Else, the most advanced Christian nation would not have fought the greatest war of history.

Secondly, the reader may well ask: what is exactly the point of God seeking man rather than man seeking God? There is enough of valuable material in the book which makes it clear that for ages until the birth of Christianity two thousand years ago, the process has been, man seeking God. Why should God have thought of reversing the process, after having seen man pass through all his errors and doubts, trials and tribulations, and come to meet him half way? Did he not thereby put a stop to man's further intellectual pursuits in the seeking after truth and his self-help in the sphere of spiritual aspiration?

Again, there is something unnatural and contrary to human history to suppose that religion, which after all is a human institution for the good of mankind—and has constantly been marching along lines of progress, endeavouring to throw aside whatever was faulty and assimilate whatever was true—

became perfect at a particular space of time, barring further attempts at regeneration and advancement. The religion taught by Christ will not suffer by its being regarded as a great, very great step, forward, but not the final word for all time. Viewed in this light Christianity has deservedly a high place among the religions of men, but everything depends upon the extent to which it shapes, controls, and purifies men's thought and actions towards their fellowmen.

J. W. S.

SELECTED ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. By Viscount Lord Haldane (Murray 6s.)

The selection is Lord Haldane's own and makes up, as he says in the preface, "an expression of faith in knowledge, in higher education, and in a Special phase of the unwritten constitution of the British Empire." The majority of these addresses were prepared for university audiences. Though the expression and the setting is academic, their purpose is practical. How can a man, asks Lord Haldane, best realise the opportunities of life? To this question he had a comprehensive and wistful answer. The individual is not self-sufficing. He finds full scope in a social setting that existed before him and that is going to exist after him. Each one must, therefore, realise the specific sphere of his activities and the place he can fill, with advantage, in Social Economy. Lord Haldane devotes considerable attention to the social setting whose permanent importance is so emphatically laid down. He states the Greek view, that the State is the highest form of social organization and therefore his ethics are inseparable from his politics. The State must assist the development of the fullest possibilities of the individual. The State must have a purpose and that purpose should be moral.

The problem, of course, is how to keep this purpose in view amidst distractions of various kinds. Lord Haldane points to the Universities. They must, says he, stimulate and organise thought and train a body of men filled with lofty standards of public conduct. The development of a number of Universities in the

cities of England was very congenial to him and on his installation as Chancellor of Bristol, he delivered his views on the place of Universities in civic as well as in national life. He expects them to combat a tendency which he noticed in Labour to lower the standards in the name of equality.

Lord Haldane considers the Great University teacher as a social figure of the utmost significance. This is not surprising in one who had a mystical reverence for and faith in knowledge. But what strikes one as curious is that Lord Haldane should have thought that in the English speaking world the lawyer held a position, not inferior to a Professor. The reason for Haldane's view is explained by the hoary tradition of the English law. The Judges in England do not administer a code. The law of the realm is unwritten. The Judges evolve law out of cases presented for adjudication by thinking in terms of society. To them therefore falls the duty of setting the standard that should govern the relations of men. This was the central theme of the notable address which, as Lord Chancellor, he delivered to the American Bar Association in Montreal. Though he calls that standard of conduct by the German name, *Sittlichkeit*, he tries to show that it is nothing else than the expression of the General Will of Rousseau.

Lord Haldane thinks a good deal of the Privy council. In his seventh essay, on the Privy council, he insists, that it should uphold the one and the same standard throughout the Empire.

He wished for a day when the standard *Sittlichkeit* will govern the affairs of the states and the individuals of the entire world; and it is a great thing that Lord Haldane was full of hope.

P. C.

WINTER WORDS. BY THOMAS HARDY (Macmillan 7s. 6d. net.)

THIS last collection of Hardy's poems have the advantage of the author's introduction, wherein the poet complains that even reviewers of the better sort have branded his efforts as gloomy and pessimistic, a verdict which he characterizes as odd. Perhaps he would have relished the words flippant and farcical. In a short poem, called "Not known," his irritation appears.

"They know the wilings of the world,
The latest flippancy;
They know each jest at hazard hurled,
But know not me.

"They know a phasm they name as me,
In whom I should not find
A single self held quality
Of body or mind."

We do not see how the critics deserve the blame. The very title suggests the grey and gloomy landscape and it is all gloomy in Hardy's world. The wry smile on life's ironies is still there.

Love is for disillusionment. Light comes for the commission of crime. Bastards are born and disposed of in stealth. Romance is rooted out. Life is hastening to death. What else is all this if not gloomy? The Carpenter is preparing the coffins. Look at this poem wherein the poet addresses the Dawn and asks why it has come and what it is doing.

The Dawn replies:—

"I show a light for killing the man
Who lives not far
From you.
And for bringing to birth the lady's
child
Nigh domiciled.
And for earthing
a corpse or two,
And for several other
odd jobs round
here
That time today must do.

Surely this is not very cheering. It is very much in accord with the low light of a wintry sky. The technique is very characteristic. The Staccato metres and all kinds of rhyme-schemes that jerk and creek are here to be seen in abundance. There is a juvenile fascination in Hardy for ingenious verse construction. He has not survived the temptation to invent and baffle.

Despite the gloomy atmosphere and the strange diction

and the highly individualized technique, there is great beauty. There is a passionate understanding of Nature in all her moods ; there is a wise pity for the erring mankind, marching in the vale of tears from one tragedy to another; and there is a haunting sense of the capricious cosmic spirit that makes sport of man.

C. P.

EMPIRE GOVERNMENT. BY MANFRED NATHAN. (ALLEN AND UNWIN 10 *sh.*)

THE important resolutions of the Imperial Conference, 1926 have not chilled the imperial consciousness which, since the war, is daily growing among the nations of the British commonwealth. The archaic notion of 'imperial possessions' has given place to a wider realization of mutual kinship and responsibility. The Empire, like all other English institutions, distrusts definition and yet the position needs examination and statement. Mr. Nathan's book is very opportune. It is a text book on the Empire Government and unlike text books, affords interesting reading. Mr. Nathan has presented a brief account of the history of the Empire, from the very earliest beginnings to the present time. The value of this side of the book is purely historical. But the most useful portion of the work is the differentiation of the conditions and relationship of the constituent parts of the Empire. There is also a full description of the political and judicial institutions obtaining in the Empire. Mr. Nathan evidently has no axe to grind. His interest is merely descriptive and he does not attempt to plead. He merely expounds and elucidates. The book has profited much by Mr. Nathan's knowledge of the Judicial practices of the different parts of the Empire and of the history of the Empire generally.

C. R.

TELUGU LITERATURE BY P. CHENCHIAH AND RAJAH
M. BHUJANGA RAO. The Heritage of India series.

HAD this book been written in Telugu, it would have supplied a long felt want. For all the large output in Telugu literature that one meets with today, there is not a serious attempt to work out a continuous and systematic history of the literature. The

late Mr. Veeresalingam's work, "The Lives of the poets" conceived on the truly Johnsonian model, is more biographical in form and scope than critical or historical. The authors, who are both scholars of repute, would have placed the 'Telugu world under special debt of gratitude, had they had done this work in their own language. But it must be remembered that their intention is not so much to enrich the Telugu literature, as to present the non-Telugu people with a readable account of the history and the nature of Telugu literature. In doing so, they have achieved commendable success. In addition to sound scholarship they have the advantage of a pleasing and bright style. The historical and religious background presented in Chapter II is highly valuable, as it explains much that follows.

The authors do not favour the view, cherished by some, that Telugu literature did not originate with Nanniah, and that there should have been, prior to him, a large volume of literature, probably Jain in authorship which was completely destroyed during the wave of the Brahminical reaction; and they adduce some weighty considerations in support of their contention (p. 37-38). But the internal evidence of the *Mahabharata* itself, and (as suggested by the learned writer of the Foreword) the verse attributed to Errapragada, wherein he suggests that his illustrious predecessors Nanniah and Tikkana undertook the work of writing the *Mahabharata* to correct certain "erroneous" views, show that there must have been, by no means inconsiderable volume of literature. One asks the question: What were those "erroneous" views? Presumably Jain or Buddhist notions which were anathema to Brahminism: and what became of those views and the literature which embodied them?

Speaking about the Prabandha period (1509 to 1618 A.D.) the authors say that in this period "imitation was exchanged for self-expression. . . . Released from the leading stings of Sanskrit, the Telugu language celebrated its coming of age by inaugurating literature of freedom" (p. 70). We are afraid this is saying far too much about the Prabandhams, which are utterly lacking in originality, and sincerity of poetic sentiment and whose style is marred by excessively ornate and, sometimes even

grotesque descriptions. The authors have taken it for granted that *Amuktamalyada* is the work of Krishnadevaraya. Recent scholarship has cast serious doubts on this long accepted tradition and inclines to attribute the work to Allasani Peddana.

The summary of modern renaissance in Telugu literature is full and adequate, though the work of certain writers had necessarily to be omitted, having regard to the size and the scope of undertaking.

The authors strike a true note when they say that the "Telugu poets are not creators but artists" (p. 121). Those that love Telugu literature cannot do better than ponder over the very wise remarks contained in the final chapter of this nice little volume.

V. V. S.

REVIEWS REVIEWED.

THE QUARTERLY REVIEW (October, 1928).

Mr. Mayo's opening article on *The Public School Spirit* has some interesting remarks on the nature of education.

"Before the War most people would have agreed that Germany was the most educated country in the world, and in scientific development, in the critical faculty, in history and in knowledge generally, it seemed to be the leader of the world. And I take it that the average German would have put knowledge and the unstinted application after it in the forefront of the qualities which gave such undoubted strength to his national life; it is the same complete scientific organisation from the age of three to the age of nineteen that the Labour Party strives after. Yet by the end of 1914 we, and the world at large, had realised that in spite of their knowing so much the Germans had learnt so little; they did not understand the simplest law as regards honour and chivalry, at any rate understand it as hitherto understood by all civilised countries. To preserve that old understanding is why the nations fought on and on at such a calamitous cost; they never hesitated in their conviction that to lose the world was better than to lose the soul.

The real fact seems to be there are two types of education, which like Euclid's tangents to a circle just meet but do not cut. The one finds its expression mainly in the old Public Schools—unique institutions that have no exact parallel in any other country—where the boys learn to be independent and to bear responsibility, to think of their side, their school rather than of self; the other, the strenuous striving after knowledge, is more at home in the newer type of school; and there arises from a survey of history, especially of the last twenty years, this undoubted fact that progress in knowledge, in intellect, in science which is not accompanied by a corresponding progress in moral perception and in character, in heart and in soul, is bound sooner or later to end in disaster both for individuals and for entire nations. As a proof of this statement consider only the years 1914-18."

Mr. Algernon Cecil concludes a discriminating appreciation of the Earl of Balfour with these words.

"We can at least feel morally certain that of all the living men of our time and country there will be no other that Posterity will more greatly desire to have known and spoken with. For none, as Mrs. Dugdale's excellent selection from his speeches makes plain, has shown his contemporaries more suggestively—both by precept and practice—how rich in interest life can be made in all its range from the golf-course to the senate-house; none has taught them more subtly how all true politics depend upon a serene assimilation and acceptance of real knowledge; none—to pass to deeper issues—has analysed for them more closely the rainbow endings of the mind, nor, perhaps, has any lately raised a bridge to heaven of

more prismatic hues. So gracious a philosophy, framed in the eager zest of early manhood, seems calculated still to serve the searching vision of maturer age as we approach the fast failing rampart of the world, and all the hidden promise of strange sound and unseen colour and of greater things than these can ever be, beckons us towards "the last curiosity."

Other articles of interest relate to *The Greek Tragedy*, *Divorce Law Reforms* and *The Slum Problem*.

THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW (December, 1928.)

Sir John Marriott contributes an intimate and affectionate obituary notice of W. L. Courtney who was the editor of the *Fortnightly* from 1894 until his death. The Rt. Hon'ble W. Joyson-Hicks writes with enthusiasm on *John Bunyan* and the article concludes with these words:

"Now that Bunyan has taken his place in the ranks of English writers, he has become the centre of quite a considerable literature, to which, amongst others, Southey, Froude, Macaulay, Bernard Shaw and Augustine Birrell have contributed. In time, no doubt, the literary critics, theologians and psycho-analysts will have dissolved Bunyan, his mental and spiritual composition, in the acid of their craft, and the resultant solutions will be labelled with a string of formulae well-nigh unintelligible to the lay mind. But the average man will still continue to read *Pilgrim's Progress* undisturbed by these experiments. Its appeal will not be lessened by suggestions that Bunyan derived his ideas from some earlier writer, or that his theology is now out of line with modern thought. The book is read, and will continue to be read, because it presents in the gallery of human types portrayed a conspectus of human nature. Human nature does not change much in three centuries, and in every large community there will still be found Mr. Worldly Wiseman, Mr. Timorous, Mr. Talkative, Mr. Ignorance and all the others—no more alive than the figures which move across the pages of *Pilgrim's Progress*. But it is not only the types that are familiar. Looking back over the years, especially in the latter days of life, there must be few who will not find that the hazards that beset the path of their own pilgrimage are much the same as those that Christian met with. Most people have fallen into the Slough of Despond, and not all have had the strength to win through to the bank; most have encountered Appolyon in the Valley of Humiliation, and not all have triumphed; most have been faced with the ascent of Hill Difficulty, and not all have climbed to see the downward slope from the summit. At the end of the journey lies the River of Death: if each one, inspired and heartened by Hopeful's example, can face the great adventure of the crossing with the same tranquility and fortitude, then Bunyan will not have lived in vain."

Mr. Disher writes an interesting article on "*Classics into Films*" and argues:

"But whether delicately done or clumsily done, this business of altering the

world's store of stories to suit the picture-maker's purpose is serious enough to arouse alarm. Yesterday's despair was that the reader of elementary education was so swamped with cheap publications that he grew up in ignorance of the bookshelves' classics. To-day's despair is deeper by far. The generation that is growing up will not merely be ignorant : it will have a very fantastic idea that what famous authors write is very much like what Hollywood's authors write—only not so good."

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER (December, 1928).

Mr. A. Yusuf Ali pleads for a new and fresh outlook towards *The problem of Education in India* and says :

"I have indicated that in primary education much of the money is wasted on pupils who never become literate or who lapse into illiteracy after they leave school. In secondary education there are not enough pupils, considering the numbers in primary education, and there are not enough facilities for giving self-contained education such as will fit the best part of the nation to become good men and women, good citizens, and efficient workers in our very loose economic system. By far the largest proportion of those who seek University education, so called, seek it for clerkships and petty posts, and would earn a more lucrative and certain livelihood, as well as be more self respecting units of society, if they were absorbed in a reasonable scheme of secondary education combined with vocational and technical training in the numerous openings which modern life makes available. Such a reorganization of secondary education, will also afford a solution to the question of numbers in colleges and universities. A halt should be called to the further multiplication of universities and colleges until resources are available for well-trained teachers, well-equipped laboratories and libraries and instruments of research and well-educated students who can profit by the opportunities opened to them. To multiply numbers without these conditions is to ask for the depression of standards. On the other hand, more money should be spent in order to make elementary, secondary, and university education real links in the building up of a harmonious nation."

Sir Charles Petric leads off the number with his article on *The Problem of British Foreign Policy* and says :

"A survey of the international situation at the present time thus shows that neither in Europe nor out of it, is there any path for great Britain to pursue that is not beset with innumerable difficulties. In these circumstances is salvation to be found either in a close understanding with France or with the United States ?

It is quite obvious from the facts already stated that Anglo-French alliance would be the signal for Italy and Germany to sink their differences and form another bloc in opposition to London and Paris, and so the stage would be set for a repetition of that series of 'incidents' which led up to the outbreak of the great War. Great Britain would have lost the opportunity of intervening decisively at a critical moment, and she would be committed in advance. Nor is it

easy to see what British interest would be served by the adoption of such a policy. The antagonism of Germany and Italy would be a serious matter, while France could do little to protect the overseas possessions of Great Britain in case of attack. In effect, those who advocate Anglo-French alliance are thinking not in terms of peace but of war, and of the late war at that. Such a policy ignores the renaissance of Italy under Signor Mussolini and presupposes that Germany is preparing a war of revenge. The supporters of this view not only fail to realise that what they urge would precipitate the very catastrophe that they fear, but they forget that the provisions of the Locorno Pact give France a British guarantee against German aggression, and it is difficult to see what more is required unless Sir Austen Chamberlain is to become the subordinate of M. Briand. Great Britain has nothing to gain and much to lose by the conclusion of an alliance with France and that should be sufficient reason against the pursuit of any such policy.

At the same time it is not easy to see why the country should be required to jump out of the French frying pan into the American fire. To become too closely associated with the United States would mean to earn the dislike of every nation in Europe, to share in the North American unpopularity south of Rio Grande, and to increase the suspicions of Japan, already aroused by the rupture of the alliance and the construction of the Singapore Base. Nor is there any prospect of obtaining a return for all these sacrifices, for the United States has no need of British Navy in her own waters, and she is quite powerless elsewhere.

Mr. John H. Humphreys in his article on *Parliaments and Stable Government* writes:

"In the long run, Parliaments rather than dictatorships offer the best hopes of stable Government. As between different types of Parliamentary Government there is the greatest promise of stability where the electoral law admits of the free organization of opinion and of its just representation; and by stability is meant not mere absence of change, but a condition of regular and ordered progress. This condition will, however, not be realized unless the political parties which believe in Parliamentary Government remember that they are first of all Parliamentary parties and, that they must accept as their first responsibility, after a general election, the formation of a Government that is willing to give effect to the main body of opinion, as revealed in the election."

Other articles of interest are '*Capital punishment*' by Sir Reginald Craddock and "*The gentleman ideal*" by Mr. F. M. Eachran.

THE ROUND TABLE (December) 1928.

In the course of an article "*The Return of the Simon Commission to India*" an attempt is made to show that in India opinion as regards the Simon Commission is not divided into two diametrically opposed camps i.e., those that boycott the Royal Commission and those that co-operate with it and "that it is quite possible for example, that except on communal questions all, or practically all,

the cooperating groups would agree whole-heartedly with the views and aspirations of many of the "boycott" leaders, and that the ultimate goal and even the methods which they would adopt to reach are common to many who find themselves in rival camps." The election by the provincial councils except that of the central provinces, of committees to collaborate with the Simon Enquiry is pointed out to be a bad shake to the non-co-operation position. The note concludes in a tone of optimism.

"Boycott in the real sense of the word has disappeared, although it is true that non-co-operation on the part of most of the leading All-India Politicians remains. Nevertheless, the cooperation of eight out of the nine provincial legislative councils gives the Commission not only ample justification for proceeding with its work, but also moral support of incalculable value."

THE NEHRU REPORT is described thus.

"The Nehru-Sapru report is, after the Commission, the most important thing in Indian Politics today and it derives its importance partly from the amount of opposition which it has encountered. It is unnecessary either to exaggerate or minimize its significance. As we have seen and shall see again later on, it is far from being the demand of a United India. It is, in fact, the maximum amount of agreement which can at present be reached between certain sections of opinion which are themselves by no means fully representative of India. The safest thing to say perhaps, is that it represents what all, except the most extreme section of the progressive Indian opinion, accepts as the goal to be attained in a not too distant future but in the meantime important communities and interests, and first and foremost the Mahomedan community, are not prepared to accept some of its fundamental provisions without substantial modifications."

A very well-written note on "*Italy in 1928*" concludes thus.

"The truth is that the fascist oligarchy does not feel secure. It knows that button hole badges, Roman Salutes, flag wagging, band music, and the homage paid to the Duce by thousands of people in the streets of Rome on anniversaries do not count much. The bulk of the Italians at heart, are not fascists. They cannot speak their minds—they can only express their feelings by murmurs—but the myth is gone. The adoption of the Napoleonic year did not give Italy an Empire, nor have all the official and economic "battles" won prosperity for her people. The devices and exponents of fascism are discredited. Nevertheless organized opposition is inconceivable. Therein lies the real danger of the situation."

The article on "*The Next President of the United States*" is of great topical interest while those interested in imperial problems will find "*A Plea for an Independent foreign policy*" and "*Reparations and war debts*" repay perusal. As usual the recent happenings in the several parts of the Empire are reviewed in the characteristic Round-Table spirit,

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW (December 1928)

Sir Charles Hobhouse's article "*Independence and Peace*" is a strong plea in favour of the liberal policy and takes the Baldwin administration to task for neglecting the question of disarmament and for its attitude towards the Kellogg Pact.

Mr. S.K. Ratcliffe in his article on "*The triumph of Herbert Hoover*" asserts that the recent presidential Election in the U.S.A. is the most momentous event for Britain and the British Empire since the war. He says:

"The change from President Coolidge to President Hoover will mark a transition of incalculable import for Britain and the British system. The republican administrations since the fall of Woodrow Wilson have stood for a negative policy in the affairs of the old world, if we except the two conferences on Naval Disarmament and the recent, and sudden, adventure of the Kellogg Peace Pact. President Coolidge's speech on the Armistice day was, it may be thought, sufficiently positive, in as much as it contained a hard declaration upon war debts and a reassertion of the later Coolidge doctrine as to the necessity of a great Navy for the assurance of peace. Mr. Hoover cannot have welcomed that speech, for its delivery, in November, 1928 tends to create an international atmosphere, less than sympathetic for an incoming President of the United States. In his policy towards Europe Mr. Hoover will be governed by a resolve to aid in the speediest clearing away of all that remains of the wreckage of war. He will be for a final solution of Reparations, a free Rhineland, a continent moving at last into the normal conditions of self healing. It is in the still unchartered sphere of world commercial rivalry that we shall meet President Hoover, and he will be a formidable new influence. He is a very decided American, and is rightly described as an economic Imperialist, the first American statesman of a new order. . . . It may therefore be said, without a tinge of exaggeration that from March, 1929 the pivotal figure of our western civilization will be Herbert Clark Hoover."

Theophilus in the article entitled "*Burma's position in the Indian Empire*" pleads for the separation of Burma from India.

Other Articles of interest, however, are, "*The Problem of Italian overpopulation*" by Professor Gaetano Salvemini and "*Nature in art*" by Mr. Lawrence Collier.

THE ENGLISH REVIEW (December 1928)

The Rev. Dr. Geikie Cobb contributes an article on "*Lord Hugh Cecil and Divorce*". He says:

"When a marriage entered into hastily has suffered a shipwreck hopelessly a place should be left for a fresh trial; and it may be added that experience shows, that most often the second marriage after divorce is higher and happier than the first. Nor need any timid person fear that frivolity will ever rule in the making of a new marriage. The history of the experiments in legislation for marriage in Scotland and the Scandinavian countries, to name no others, gives the lie to all pessimistic prophecies for fetters for other people, and lack courage to trust to the future, to the spirit of God working for the Kingdom, and to the essential goodness of human nature. A petrified marriage is no marriage, and when the marriage favoured by catholic obscurantism is set out in its naked hardness, it reveals itself as not alive with the freedom of the spirit, but ossified by the hardness of men's hearts."

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
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FEBRUARY, 1929.

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THE HINDU STANDPOINT.*

By Professor S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

It is a very rare privilege to be called upon to address an international gathering of this kind, where representatives and leaders from the ends of the earth have met together to consider and concert measures to bring about the rule of God among men. The mechanical union which has been effected by the achievements of modern science is being slowly transformed into a moral unity as well. This international gathering, I think, is a great step towards the achievement of that cultural and spiritual unity.

We, in this country, who are not Christians, have the greatest sympathy and support for the endeavours of the Student Christian Movement. I do not think it is necessary for me to say it. You are meeting in this important city at the invitation of the enlightened Hindu Ruler of this State, who embodies in himself the characteristics of deep piety and spiritual calm as well as toleration and gentleness, traits associated with religious life in this ancient land.

I have been asked to speak about the Indian situation from the Hindu stand-point. It is a vast subject and the time allowed is only thirty minutes. It will not be possible for me to do anything more than just scratch a part of the surface. I dare say many of you are familiar with the discipline and the doctrine associated with the Hindu religion. I beseech you not to be hasty in your judgment. A religion that has lived for over forty centuries will undoubtedly have in it much that is unworthy and indefensible. The degrading practices which have crept into the Hindu faith are a source of sadness and grief to the educated Hindu as they are a matter of joy and exultation to the unkind critic. I hope you will not judge Hinduism from the scenes at Kalighat. I remember a distinguished Christian missionary, who, after witnessing a bloody scene at Kalighat, came out with the indignant cry 'damn Hinduism.' I may assure

* Based on a shorthand report of the address given at the World Christian Student Federation Mysore.

you that serious attempts are being made to prune the religion of its unworthy elements. The fact that many millions of thoughtful and pious souls find springs of spiritual strength and comfort in the Hindu faith indicates that these degrading practices are not all.

Every period in the history of the world is a transition time and the present is especially so. Hinduism, like every other religion, is passing through a process of change. This country at the present moment is faced with a combination of different movements that Europe in different parts and in different periods of her recent history had to encounter. We have our political struggles, our industrial revolutions, and our social changes. Our religion itself is getting modified by the impact of modern science and criticism. If the changes which the Indian civilization is undergoing are not superficial but deep-rooted, you may be sure that its religion which is the "inside of a civilization" is also undergoing a silent and subtle but real and effective transformation. In the few minutes I have, I propose to refer to one or two aspects of the Hindu faith which may be regarded as the determining motives of this period of reconstruction. What is it that constitutes religion for the Hindu? From the beginning of our history there has been a great emphasis laid on religion as experience, as an attitude of mind. It is not an intellectual proposition to which we pay lip allegiance but a life which incorporates the truth. The greatest religious geniuses of the country are not pedants or *pandits*, not mere philosophers or dialecticians but saints, prophet souls, *rishis* who embody in themselves the spiritual vision. The aim of all religion is realization of the truth. It is intuition of reality (Brahmanubhava), insight into truth (Brahmadarsana), contact with the Supreme (Brahmasamsparsa), direct apprehension of reality (Brahmasaksatkara).

If religion is experience, what is it that we experience? What is the nature of Reality? It has been pointed out very frequently that the character of a religion is to be judged by the conception of God which it adopts. The nature of God or ultimate Reality is the determining feature, so far as the evaluation of religions is concerned. In the latest number of the *Hibbert Journal*, a

learned Christian missionary observes that the Hindu religion is a polytheism. I have no doubt that he will be able to cite texts in support of his view. But it is possible for one to note the facts and yet miss the truth. The seers of Hindu religion assert that the reality we experience cannot be fully expressed in terms of logic and language. It defies all description. The seer is as certain of the objective reality he apprehends as he is of the inadequacy of thought to express it. He adopts an attitude of reticence regarding the question of the nature of the Supreme. When, however, attempts are made to give expression to the ineffable reality, negative characteristics are employed. The real is the wholly other, the utterly transcendent, the mysterious being which awakens in us, to use Rudolf Otto's words, a sense of awe and wonder, dread and desire. It not only fascinates us but produces a sense of creaturely abasement in us. Whatever is true of empirical being is denied of the real. It is not in space or time; it is free from causal necessity. But on this account, it is not to be confused with nonbeing. Samkara points out the great temptation towards this confusion. In his commentary on the *Chandogya Upanisad* he writes—*Digdesagunaphalabhedasunyam hi paramarthasad advayam brahma, mandabuddhinam, asad iva pratibhati*. It is being in a more satisfying sense than empirical being. While the negative characteristics indicate the transcendent character of the real, there is a sense in which the real is also immanent. The very fact that we are able to apprehend the real means there is something in us capable of apprehending it. There is something in the deepest part of our nature which responds to the call of the highest Reality. Look at what Dr. Otto says: "Above and beyond our rational being lies hidden the ultimate and highest part of our nature which can find no satisfaction in the mere allaying of the needs of our sensuous, psychical or intellectual impulses and cravings. The mystics called it the basis or ground of the soul" (*The Idea of the Holy*, page 36) "In us too, all that we call person and personal, indeed all that we can know or name in ourselves at all is but one element in the whole. Beneath it lies even in us, that wholly other whose profundity impenetrable to any concept can yet be grasped in the luminous self-feeling

by one who has experience of the deeper life" (Ibid). While the real is utterly transcendent to the empirical individual, it is immanent in the ultimate part of our nature. God's revelation and man's contemplation are two aspects of one and the same experience. The Beyond is the Within. Brahman is Atman. It is reality, spirit and freedom of delight, *sat, cit, and ananda*.

The Hindu thinkers are not content with postulating a God who is not related to humanity, who is merely the beyond, so far as the empirical world is concerned. From the beginnings of Hindu history attempts are made to bring God closer to the needs of man. We regard the ultimate Reality as the Highest Person, as the supreme Personality, as the Father of us all ready to respond to the needs of humanity. So, the Vaishnava thinkers and the Saiva Siddhantins make of Him, knowledge that will enlighten the ignorant, strength for the weak, patience for the guilty, mercy for the sufferer, comfort for the comfortless.* We have thus accounts of the ultimate Reality as both Absolute and God, Brahman and Isvara. Only, those who accept the view of the Supreme as personality admit that the unsearchableness of God cannot be measured by our feeble conceptions. They confess that there is an overplus of reality beyond the personal being.

It is wrong to assume that the Supreme is either the Absolute or God. It is both the Absolute and God. The impersonal and the personal conceptions are not to be regarded as rival claimants to an exclusive truth, they are aspects of an all inclusive truth, fragments of a single comprehensive pattern. The Absolute exists in itself as well as in relation to us.

A religion that is based on the central truth of a comprehensive universal spirit cannot support an inflexible dogmatism. It is bound to promote an attitude of toleration, not as a matter of policy or expediency but as a principle of philosophy and religion. Hinduism does not say that truth does not matter. It warns us that each of us should be modest enough to realise that we may perhaps be mistaken in our views and what others

*Jnanam ajnanam, sakti asaktanam, ksama saparadhanam, kripa duhkhinam, vatsalyam sa dosanam, silam mandanam, arjavam kutilanam, sauhardam dusta-hrdayanam, mardavam vislesabhirunam, saulabhyam drastumasavatam,

hold with equal sincerity is not a matter for ridicule. Besides, God is not small and partial or remote and ineffable. He is not the God of Israel or the Father of the Christians, but the crown and fulfilment of you and me, all men and all women, of life and death, of joy and sorrow. If we leave aside the credal doctrines and technical formulations and realise that no outward form can wholly contain the inward reality, we shall discover the truth of St. Paul's great saying. "As many as are led by the spirit of God, these are the sons of God." In the great crises of life our differences look petty and unworthy. All of us have the same urge towards something of permanent worth, the same sense of awe and fascination before the mystery that lies beyond and within the cosmos, the same passion for love and joy, peace and fortitude. If we judge the saving power of truth from its empirical effects, we see how every form of worship and belief has a strange power which enables us to escape from our littleness and become radiant with a happiness that is not of this world, that transforms unhappy dens into beautiful homes and converts men and women of easy morals into suffering servants of God. Truth even though slight and partial saves us from great calamity. All truth is God's truth. Anyone who is acquainted with the story of Hinduism will bear witness to the fact that from the time of Nachiketas and Buddha down to Ramakrishna and Gandhi the faith has produced saints who are a challenge to the world. An appreciation of the beautiful results produced by the different religions will promote charity and understanding. Trying to impose one's opinions on others is neither so exciting nor so fruitful as joining hands in an adventure after a result much larger than we know. Truth will prevail and does not require our propaganda. The function of a religious teacher is only to assist the soul's natural movement towards light. The longing for an ideal life may be hidden deep, overlaid, distorted, misunderstood, illexpressed but it is there and is never wholly lacking. It is man's birth right which he cannot barter away or squander. We have to reckon with it and build on its basis. It does not matter what conception of God we adopt so long as we keep up a perpetual search after truth. A man's religion is something integral to

his nature. It is like a limb which grows from him, grows on him and grows out of him and it must be there all the time. Any religious reform has to proceed on the basis of the acceptance of this fact. The significance of the great prayer of *gayatri* is nothing else than an insistence on the spirit of acceptance and adventure in the matter of religious life. We pray to God as eternal truth to enlighten us, to enable us to grasp the truth of things better and better. There is no finality in this process of understanding, not at any rate on earth. Religious life lives only so long as it is cultivated.

The great wrong or that which we can call the sin of idolatry, is to acquiesce in anything less than the highest open to us. Religion is not so much faith in the highest as faith in the highest one can reach. Whatever be the level of our understanding, we must exert to transcend it. We must perpetually strive to lift up our eyes to the highest conception of God possible for us and our generation. The greatest gift of life is the dream of a higher life. Self-complacency is a major vice.

I may here refer to a very familiar criticism that the Hindu conception of God is pantheistic. I do not know whether this charge is to be taken as a criticism or a compliment. I am sure that all intelligent men to whatever religious denominations they may belong have finished with a God who acts spasmodically on the world from without, interfering with it only when it goes wrong, breaking his own laws by miracles and special providence, a God who is used by us to fill up the gaps in our knowledge. We are obliged to look upon the vast creative process as the expression of God's spiritual energy. Behind the terror and the tragedy as well as the wonder and the joy of the world there is a love that is wise and austere, patient and suffering. Any other view reveals a blindness to the scale and proportion of reality. If pantheism means that there is nothing in the world which is not inspired or permitted by God, then the Hindu faith is pantheistic. It does not recognise a place like hell. If hell is a reality and is a place where God is not, then it means that God is not omnipresent. If anywhere God is necessary, it is in hell that He is most

needed. God is in hell though He is lonely there. But the Hindu faith is not pantheistic in the sense of regarding all aspects of the universe as equally divine. Elias Hicks said "A blade of grass is as much incarnation of God as Jesus the Christ". While such a proposition is admitted as revealing the transcendental truth of things, that one being, one life is the essence of it all, yet the Hindu faith evaluates the manifestations of God as higher and lower. The Upanishads declare that matter is a lower expression of God than life, life is a lower one than mind, mind than intelligence, intelligence than the delight of God. Even Samkara who is generally credited with a crude pantheism admits that in the empirical universe we have differences of rank and worth. He says "*ekasyapi kutasthasya cittataratamyat jnanaisvaryanam abhivyaktih parena parena bhuyasi bhavati.*"

On this view it follows that the distinction between good and evil is not an absolute one. All conflict is between higher and lower, superior and inferior. Even the worst forms of evil are not utterly undivine. Many of us believe that all white is snow white and all black is lamp black. But in the actual world it is all grey or brown, more whitish or less whitish but not completely white or completely black. When we are confronted by what the world regards as evil it is not necessary to get upset. The best way to deal with our opponent is to believe in him. If we understand his history and background, his heredity and temperament we can realise why he happens to possess an opinion he holds or do a thing he does. The one prayer which is more necessary than any other is that of one of Galsworthy's characters "Oh God, give me the power to understand". Cardinal Mercier's confession that we are all criminals but for the absence of sufficient temptation, is well worth remembering. The Hindu scriptures insist on preserving an attitude of equanimity or serenity which the tragedies of the world do not disturb. In a spirit of understanding justice which is much larger than an attitude of patronising pity or condescending charity we have to accept the sinner and love him in his weakness and help him to get out of it by sympathetic assistance. If there is anything which may be regarded as intrinsically evil it is a spirit of self-satis-

faction. It is mere acceptance without the supplement of adventure. Adventurous life is the only one worthy of a human being. A striving sinner is in a sense better than a satisfied sage. The one sin for which there is no forgiveness is the sin against the spirit in us. It is to know the highest and yet turn away from it. It is to know the light and yet revel in darkness. What we call evil is clinging to an earlier stage of development when the bulk of humanity has advanced to a higher. Evil in this sense is the survival of habits and tendencies belonging to a lower stage.

On this view it follows that so long as there are unredeemed individuals the work of the cosmos is not finished. Those who have attained to a harmony within themselves are said to be saved though no one can be really saved until the whole world is saved. The presence of error and imperfection, is a challenge to those better placed. When the question is asked as to why sages like Apantaratamas, Narada, Bhṛigu etc., are working for the world while liberated, the answer is given that they will have to fulfill their functions in the economy of the world until the cosmic process terminates, which will be only when sarva-mukti or redemption of all arises. The Hindu has faith in corporate liberation or salvation in togetherness.

I have raised many questions and have not touched on many central phases of the Hindu faith. I hope in the hours which will be prescribed by the Chairman you will offer me several suggestions and I shall be glad to meet them to the best of my ability. Some of the ideas which I have set forth seem to possess a larger bearing and value. To the closer intermingling of races and religions which is taking place, the Hindu mind has some contributions to make. I believe the unity for which we are striving is a unity of spirit and not of creed or dogma. It does not mean that we shall all speak the same tongue or profess the same creed. We shall accept a universal spirit as the animating urge of the cosmic process, and permit each individual and group to realise its highest possibilities. The faith of the future is bound up with co-operation not identification, with accommodation to fellow-men, not rigid regimentation of all, with toleration, not absolutism.

CALCUTTA.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

THE VICISSITUDES OF THE STATE.

III.

THE MEDIAEVAL ECLIPSE

By M. RUTHNASWAMY, M.A., (Cantab) Barrister-at-Law.

IT was not only the idea of the large imperial State but the very idea of the State that perished with the ruins of the Roman Empire. In the so-called Dark ages the State itself seems to have disappeared. It was nowhere to be found. The fall and disappearance of the Roman Empire created a void which came to be filled not by another State but by another institution. Christianity had brought into existence an organisation which was to rival and displace the State. Representative Romans like Tacitus and Pliny had called Christianity an *exitiabilis superstitio* which promoted hatred of the human race *i.e.*, the Roman Empire, and refused worship to the emperor and the other gods of the State. They had been shrewd enough to see that in two or three of the fundamental utterances of its Founder it had claimed allegiance to one half and that the better half of man. Adopting some of the institutional features of the Roman State, for which purpose it would seem Christianity went to Rome, Christianity took unto itself an organisation which stood it in good stead in the storm and stress that in common with the Roman State it had to face. This adopted organisation served not only the Church but the successors and beneficiaries of the Roman State. It was the Roman Bishops, not the Roman Magistrates, that faced the barbarian and broke the terror of his invasions. The bishops not only saved but governed the Roman populations. They administered law and organised order. They kept the pass of political life. They were the political executors of the Roman Empire.

Inheriting its burden, they did its duty. The State had fled from the scene of its disasters. Other institutions reigned in its stead. No one seemed even to regret the passing of the State. It could not have fallen lower than that. In earlier times the State had been treated with indifference, with contempt or with hatred. But in the case of the peoples of the ancient world outside Rome there had been no falling off in esteem—they had known no better. But the poignancy of the situation after the fall of the Roman Empire was that the State had seen better days when it had strode the world like a Colossus. But now there was none so poor as to do it reverence—nay even to think of it as a memory. The State had fallen so low that men forgot that the State had been.

During the long-drawn agony of the period rightly called the Dark Ages that lasted from about 400 to 900 A.D. when the State was under a cloud, it was no wonder that men spoke harshly of it when they did not ignore it. At a time when the State had turned tail and fled and had abdicated its functions, is it strange that men spoke contemptuously of it? St. Augustine had only echoed the sentiments of the common people of the Roman world when he asked them to turn their back upon the secular State and pin their faith on the city of God which was the Church. Modern men have lifted their eyebrows in surprise at the scornful things uttered by mediaeval Churchmen against the State. Gregory VII, like St. Augustine before him, attributed the origin of the State to sin and proclaimed the inferiority of the State to the Church, although it must be remembered that these Churchmen, apart and away from controversy, enunciate the view that the State is a natural and normal institution.* Even such late mediaevalists as Gerson and Dante would call the State a *dominium peccati occasione introductum*; and a "*remedium contra infirmitatem peccati*." But we must remember that the State as the mediaeval Popes and saints knew it was not much to look at. The greatest State they had heard of had proved false to the people and had failed to perform the most elementary duties.

* See for Augustine his letter to Marcellinus where he calls the State "*multitudo hominum in quoddam vinculum redacta concordia*." Epistles of Augustine.

For Gregory see Letters quoted in Carlyle—*Mediaeval Political Theory* Vol. III.

The peddling attempts made by barbarians like the Ostrogoths or the Merovingians or the Visigoths to found strong and stable States on the ruins of the Roman Empire could not but rouse the pity of men who had learnt the Roman trick of organisation and could teach the barbarian chiefs to govern if only they would learn. It was not the Chilperics and the Charles the Fats of the early middle ages that could have raised the State from the low esteem into which it had fallen. It was not the kings and emperors struggling against a powerful feudal nobility that could have wrung respect from the Popes who were used to exact a more complete obedience and enjoin a stricter discipline upon their subjects than was ever dreamt of by their rivals. What a picture of orderly and efficient government the Church must have presented with its well-articulated heirarchical organisation, its magistral canon law, its splendid administrative discipline to eyes wearied with the confusion and squalor of secular government? Contrast the picture of that with the picture of the divided and broken-up authority, the jungle of the *Leges Barbarorum*, the fitful obedience, the state of nature of the feudal State, and one can understand, if one may not approve of, the cavalier treatment of the State in theory and practice by the Church. How can we blame Gregory VII for asserting the supremacy of the Church over the State when he saw the State represented by Feudalism that wanted to bring the Church also within its stranglehold?

The mediaeval State was no doubt in some measure a free State. The middle age was an age of liberties and immunities. The Church, the feudal nobility, the Corporations were all liberties and immunities. The middle ages were the golden age of Corporations. The mediaeval State was a Liberty Hall. But for that very reason perhaps it was not a State to be respected. The strong Kings of France and the powerful Emperors of Germany no doubt inspired a Gregory VII or an Innocent III with hatred. But that was because these kings and emperors aimed at undermining the authority of the one institution that was keeping Europe above water. If the Popes wanted to keep the State down and disposed of it in the famous simile of the two swords or in the analogy of the Sun and the Moon who can blame them? Certainly not the admirers of the Kings who knew not how to

save Europe from the anarchy of feudalism or how to build well-obeyed States. It is true the State in the middle ages was forced to go to Canossa more than once. But can the mediaeval Church and, Churchmen be blamed for it?

It was only when from the 12th century onwards strong Kings appeared on the stage of European history, organising strong and well-obeyed governments, unifying law and dominating feudalism that the State began to raise its head and began to be respected. It was as the secular State became strong under the aegis of a Louis the Saint or a Frederick Barbarosa or a Henry II that the attitude of the mediaeval theorists began to improve. William the Conqueror had shown European Kings how it was possible to build up a strong centralised administration and crush feudalism. No one can exaggerate the service rendered to the State by Louis IX who proved how it was possible to be a saint and ruler of men, and who consecrated the State by his saintliness and strengthened it by his rule. The Holy Roman Empire, if it did not give Germany a strong government at least helped to advance the civilization and culture of Central Europe. The fires of civilization and culture which had been tended in the city-states of Italy that had kept undimmed the Greek traditions burnt bright in the 13th and 14th centuries. All these causes and forces working at or about the same time succeeded in rehabilitating the State. We may detect a new note in the political thought of the 13th and 14th centuries. It was not merely in the party pamphlets of an Occam or a Marsilio of Padua that we may find this change of attitude. In the architectonic treatise of St. Thomas Aquinas a place is found for a study of the State. And the Aristotelian tradition of the State as a necessary, natural and therefore, divine institution is recovered and restated for the middle ages. Not sin but God-given instincts are the origin of the State, according to Aquinas. St. Thomas would follow St. Paul in deriving the power of the State as all powers from God but recognizes that "*dominium et praclatitia introducta sunt ex jure divino.*" The independence of the State in thought and action is vindicated. The State has come to its own once more. Mediaeval theology which had once covered it with

contumely now blesses it. Politics is admitted into the comity of sciences. The State and the Church are reconciled not only in Aquinas but in Dante. It looked as if they would march hand in hand for the progress of civilization and humanity. But the fair prospect thus illuminated by the names of two of the greatest men of the Middle Ages became clouded as soon as it appeared to allure the imagination and hopes of man.

It was one of the tragedies of the last period of the middle ages that the union and the expansion of the State and the Church as adumbrated by an Aquinas or a Dante did not last long and in fact was converted into suspicion and hatred. One cause of this unfortunate turn of events was that the essential condition of equality between State and Church as the only possible bond of union between the two high and contracting powers did not exist. The State which had begun to be respected by the Church in the 13th century immediately set about paying off old scores and decided to lord it over the Church in the fourteenth. The Shame of Avignon was not a personal affront to Boniface VIII but a blow directed against the prestige of the Papacy. When Nogaret put Boniface VIII into prison the Law of Rome triumphed over the Church of Rome. The centralised State put the independent Church out of action. The supremacy of the Church was countered by the supremacy of the State. And it is one of the ironies of history that the absolute theories of authority of Roman law which had been pressed by Roman Theologians and Popes into the service of the Church and taught in the famous schools of law like Bologna served in the hands of the Frederics and the Philips of Europe to pull down the authority of that very Church. Long before Henry VIII Parliaments had passed Statutes of Praemunire and Provisions which certainly interfered with the undoubted rights of the Church in regard to its own government and which would not have been tolerated by a Gregory VII or an Innocent III. The Emperor Sigismund's intrigues in the 15th century in favour of conciliar government were not altogether governed by principle but was animated by the hope of reducing the powers of the old enemy of the Empire. The Church itself drifted into decay. The spirit of recovery seemed to have gone from her. She was no more the

proud protector of Europe. The failure of the Crusades marked the decay of Papal power. The Crusades marked not only the fall of the Church but the rise of the State for they contributed to the extinction of the feudal nobility which indeed had organised and manned them with no help from the Kings. The Babylonian captivity and the Greek schism had diminished the prestige of the Papacy. The Church was withdrawing from the stage of European history upon which it had played no mean part. The State emerged from the eclipse caused by the Church coming between it and the world.

MADRAS.

M. RUTHNASWAMY.

THE INDIAN STATES AND OUR NATIONAL SOLIDARITY.

By PROFESSOR K. T. SHAH.

THE problem of the Indian States in the national polity of India is attracting, quite naturally, a considerable and growing attention from the thinkers and publicists of India. The attention and concern are, however, of recent origin, at least in their present intensity; for in the very recent past, the leaders and spokesmen of Indian public opinion used to avoid, as of set purpose and definite policy, any concern with the Indian States, their problems, or possibilities in an Indian national polity. Even the National Congress had definitely excluded the problems relating to the peoples or governments of the Indian States from its purview. The reasons for this change of attitude are not far to seek. It may be that the more superficial and fleeting influences, such as the growing frequency with which distinguished British Indian lawyers and statesmen are being consulted or employed in the Indian States, may have been the immediate cause of particular individuals of national eminence and authority getting to be interested in the concerns of the Indian States, viewed in the framework of the Indian nation as a whole. Their interest and solicitude inevitably came to be reflected in a growing trend of opinion in British India towards a better understanding of the case for the States. But deeper than this is the growing consciousness, on either side of the border-line between British India and the Indian States, of the fundamental unity of the Indian peoples, irrespective of the accidents of history and politics. Our differences are seeming and superficial, though varied and numerous; our unity—integrity—is fundamental, and therefore lies concealed at bottom. A few of the Princes, or some of their advisers, may have felt, at times, an irritation against the treatment the Princes

as a body receive in the Indian press; and, in the moment of irritation, they or some of them—may have considered the possibility of marking their difference from the rest of India by something more concrete and definite than the mere weight of Treaties, or the force of precedent and convention. But, the moment of irritation once passed, the more far-sighted among the Princes seem to have realised it as clearly as the Indian statesmen that they cannot permanently exclude themselves or their States from the concerns of India as a whole, whether by their own act and choice, or by outside influences. Hence the growth of the phenomenon, which has set the best brains in India thinking of the possible ways and means for reconciling and harmonising the seeming divergence between the interests of British India and the Indian States. For, without an agreement manifesting the underlying unity, there will be no solution of our seeming difficulties and divergence of interests.

The nature of the problem that confronts the nation-builder in India to-day in this regard is commonly misconceived, to the immense injury of the issues at stake. Because the Princes are inclined, with rare exceptions, to represent themselves as embodying the entire States they rule over, it has become customary to consider the problem as if it lay in nationalising the Treaty rights and obligations of the States these Princes claim to embody and represent. Even such a shrewd jurist as Sir Sivaswamy Iyer seems, in his *Indian Constitutional Problems*, to be labouring under this misapprehension, or at least confusion of ideas. He is, indeed, quite clear and categorical in the statement and belief: "None of us would venture to say that the day of the Indian States is past"; and thereby effectively administers the *coup de grace* to the frightful bogey conjured up by interested outsiders before the Indian Princes, as to the intentions of Nationalist India in their behalf. But Sir Sivaswamy Iyer and people of his school of thought need to have a broader outlook,—a more truly liberal conception of the problem of the Indian States,—than seems evident from the work already mentioned. Even if we concede the Princes, *qua* Princes, to constitute one ingredient of the problem, there are other constituents equally important, which cannot be ignored. The Government of India, representing

the whole of British India, and embodying the national idea, is an element in the problem, just as much as the States, as states, and as distinguished from the Ruling Prince of each state. The collective viewpoint of these two is further complicated by the peoples each of them is supposed to represent. An artificial growth of later days seems to have created the belief in some places of a divergence of interests, not only between the Government of India and of the States, but also between the people of British India and their fellows in the Indian States. For a successful, satisfactory, generally acceptable solution of the problem of the Indian States, it is indispensable to consider the position of all these several elements or ingredients, to reconcile, wherever necessary, their divergent or conflicting interests; and to fashion from these a compact, consistent whole, that embodies the full strength of each constituent, and the weakness of none.

In the attainment of this consummation, the first difficulty seems to be created by the Treaties, Sanads, and other engagements subsisting between the several governments, and the body of case-law that has grown up around these Treaties, and from their interpretation, from time to time. The Treaties are, of course, not uniform as between the several States; and their interpretation is still less uniform. The only uniformity, if it can be called by that name, is that induced by the sameness of the judge in each case of dispute, who is also a party to each such dispute, or at least a very intimately interested entity. One thing, however, about these Treaties and engagements may be safely declared to be uniform; and that is, that they all have been concluded between the several Indian States and the Government of India, however that Government may have been constituted from time to time, and by whomsoever it may have been represented. In individual cases, and at times, particular States have been governed by minors, or women, or Regent ministers on behalf of minor or dispossessed Princes; in one or two cases, a Treaty has actually been concluded between the representative of the British Government and those of the *people* of the particular State. But these Regents, or popular representatives, were also negotiating on behalf of the government of the State concerned, whether the one actually in existence,

or an alternative in contemplation. In so far as these Treaties have been confirmed and respected as those concluded directly between the Ruling Prince and the Government of India, it is safe to hold that all Treaties, and engagements in the nature of treaties, are as between the Indian Government and the Indian States. The suggestion, therefore, made in certain quarters, and voicing an apprehension of certain Princes as regards the menace to themselves from the progress of political awakening in British India, that these Treaties be regarded as having been made between the King-Emperor of India, the nominal Sovereign of the British Empire, and the Indian Princes, may be dismissed as utterly irrelevant and unspeakably mischievous. The mere fact that the head of the Indian Government, the Governor-General, is also called the Viceroy of the King-Emperor and that the Treaties are made and diplomatic intercourse conducted between the Viceroy and the Indian Princes, is no reason to hold that in the event of the Indian constitution being so radically modified as to make the people of India a self-governing nation, in name as well as in fact, the Indian Princes would not consider themselves bound by the Treaties they have concluded with the present British Government of India. The *raison d'être* of such an apprehension, and of the consequent attitude of suspicion and distrust on the part of some of the Princes is to be found in the suggestion, astutely placed before the Princes, that the leaders of self-government in India would constitutionally and temperamentally be incapable of respecting the rights and dignities of such an absurd anachronism as the Indian Princedom. But, as Sir Sivaswamy Iyer has well observed :—

“Whatever encroachments on their rights and privileges there may have been in the past, have been made, *not by the people of British India, or any government responsible to them*, but by the irresponsible and burcaucratic government of India.” (Italics ours)

Without any undue flight of fancy, one might trace the handiwork of that body which also insidiously inspires and quietly circulates libels and misunderstandings of the type here instanced. Apart from this secret, almost unspoken, misapprehension, there seems to be no reason why the spokesmen or advocates and

advisers of the Indian Princes should raise this phantom for bewildering those concerning themselves, in all good faith, with the solution of a most complex and difficult problem. The same eminent authority has also disposed of the legal or constitutional point involved in this suggestion, of holding the existing Treaties and engagements to be between the Indian Princes and the present British Government of India; and no other, in a way that cannot be bettered:--

"The theory of a *vinculum juris* between the Indian States or Princes and British Sovereign, otherwise than in his capacity of Sovereign of British India, has no basis in constitutional law. It is, of course, quite possible to distinguish between the Viceroy as representative of the British Crown and of the Imperial Government, and the Governor-General as the executive head of the Government of British India. . . . Such a distinction is not unknown to constitutional law; but as regards the question with whom the Indian Princes have entered into treaties, it is not correct to say that the treaties were entered into with the Crown, irrespective of the sovereignty of British India"

On the political or practical side of the question, it is equally unwise,—not to say impossible,—for the Princes of India to consider themselves as a caste, or an order, or an estate of the realm, apart from the rest of the people of India. Not only are the people of India economically and socially one, woven together into an indissoluble union by centuries of community of life and interests; the Princes cannot transport themselves, their states and peoples, their interests and concerns, bodily outside India, however much they, or some of them, might be dreading the contagion of the onrushing tide of democracy—social as well as political—spreading far and wide in the immemorial East. A purse-proud plutocrat of Bombay, who habitually speaks of the Nationalist publicists, poorer than himself as beggars, has such an intense class consciousness that it once led him to declare that, in the event of the socialist tendencies of the day materialising in the staple industry of Bombay or against its monied magnates, through the medium of taxation, he would take himself and his belongings to his native place of Surat. He was assured, however, that when the socialist in India becomes strong enough to attack the great capitalist

stronghold of Bombay, he may be sure the minor forts like Surat would have long since surrendered at discretion. The same rejoinder may be made to the Princes who seek to bluff nationalist or democratic India by threats of keeping themselves entirely aloof from Indian political developments. It simply cannot be done. The Princes, moreover, must be under no delusion as to the attitude of the leading British publicists and statesmen as regards their claims and pretensions. Lord Reading's classic letter to the Nizam ought to act as a standing warning to the Princes for all time to come, at least as long as the irresponsible and bureaucratic British Government of to-day endures in India. If the British people are impatient of the interference,—very restricted, as it is,—of their own hereditary aristocracy in their own local problems; if they are ceasing rapidly to look upon the survivals of this aristocracy with anything like respect, how can they logically and reasonably support the invidious and obsolete contentions of the Indian prototypes of the same aristocratic principle? True, in politics we do not always find impeccable consistency! True, likewise, that the gold of the Princes may have succeeded in inducing in certain influential quarters of the English political world a degree of corruption which may have its own undesirable reaction on the public life of Britain herself; but which for the moment operates with impunity for the benefit of the corrupters. But that is no reason to forget the basic facts and ideas affecting this particular problem: that the political education of the Western people is fundamentally against the aristocratic or hereditary principle in the actual concerns of government; that, though in regard to India, there may seem to be, for a while, a relaxation of the prevailing tendency, in the long run the force of training and tradition will reassert itself and undo all the achievements of corruption and bribery; that even in the process of such corruption, the Princes must beware the nemesis of a Labour regime in Britain, and particularly the demands for the Labour Party funds. We have known, indeed, the Labour party denying its principles before now, when it came to a question of Indian administration or government; and we may witness the same phenomenon once again in favour of the Princes. But it is impossible to believe that the unnatural

alliance will be or can be eternally maintained. The Princes of India stand to gain much more from a proper understanding with the peoples of India than any party or politician in Britain, who are more likely to take their money, and yet spoil their case than the present.

The *sine qua non*, however, of a satisfactory understanding, between the Indian Princes and the leaders of the nationalist sentiment in India, is the necessity for the Princes always to remember that they are where they are, because they represent considerable numbers of human beings. The Princes, if they mean to attain to a satisfactory solution, must sink their own personal aspect of the question into the only acceptable aspect of an understanding between two peoples through their respective representatives. There must be made a distinction between the claims of the Princes personally, and of their States as states, representing thousands or even millions of human beings. The demand of Sir M. Viswesvaraya, as President of the States' Peoples' Conference, for a speedy introduction of the principle of responsibility in the State Governments is by no means an isolated or illconsidered suggestion. The unhesitating support of the Indian States' people would be had to any understanding and solution that may be arrived at, if only the rulers of these States would remember that they are living now in the twentieth century, when the days of absolute personal rule are no more and that their greatest strength and safety lies in an alliance first with their own people and next with the people of British India.

The principle of responsible government may, indeed, be not quite easy to give effect to in every State Government. With the exception of at most a score of the leading states, the population as well as the resources of by far the large majority of States would make the working of responsible government through representative institutions impracticable not to say burdensome. That, however, is no reason to question the efficacy as well as the necessity of this step. What cannot be accomplished in each individual State, working by itself, may yet be accomplished in a confederation or combination of States, established specifically for certain reasons and purposes of administrative convenience and governmental expediency. The principle of regroup-

ing the peoples and the territories of India, with a better eye to cultural affinity among the members of a given geographical or political division than has been the case in the provinces and States now existing in this country needs to be studied far more carefully, and given effect to as much in the States as in the British provinces. The process may take radically different shapes in either of these two main divisions. While many of the existing provinces might be considered too anomalous and incongruous to be maintained as they are; and while they may consequently need to be split up into smaller but more homogeneous units in the case of the States, on the contrary, we may have to arrive at some working combinations for a definite purpose, that may somewhat vaguely be expressed by the term "Provincial Autonomy". Such combinations among the smaller States may also help to solve another difficulty of the present position, which seems to have needlessly baffled such profound student of the problem as Sir Sivaswamy Iyer. The varieties of the size and importance of the several States, as they exist to-day, make it at first sight impossible to bring them together into any common institution of a national importance, like a Chamber of Princes. It depends, indeed, a great deal on the constitution and the functions of such a body, as to whether or not we can assimilate the existing Indian Principalities in such a scheme; as also upon the division of functions between the central and the local governing units. But one difficulty, at least, of this problem, in this particular behalf would be removed, could we but possibly induce the majority of the smaller Indian States, such as those that make up the peninsula of Kathiawar or the States of Central India and Rajputna, to make working combinations among themselves, or even with the neighbouring British Indian territories. The British provinces regrouped, as suggested above would also be more comparable with the adjoining States, or a majority of them, than is the case to-day. And the comparability would be very much enhanced if the smaller States, say those with a population below one hundred thousand souls, combine among themselves to form a federal unit of a prescribed standard. The latter needs also to be seriously considered, and carefully defined. Except in the case of a few large, cosmopolitan

cities, a standard unit for proper federating of, say, 1,000,000 souls, would be not at all impracticable, provinces and States with more than this strength of population being accorded representation in the national federal institutions *pro rata*.

This is only a suggestion, which, however, demands careful consideration if it is at all to do any good. It will help to remedy many incidental difficulties, of which the man-in-the-street has hardly any conception to-day. For instance, many an important State has its own tributories, or feudatories, or cadets; not a few of whom have received some sort of a direct guarantee from the Indian Government while the States are eager to definitise their relations with the Government of India, they are more than lukewarm as regards the similar claims put forth against these principal States by their own feudatories, tributories, cadets etc., not to speak of the growing consciousness of their civic rights among the the States' people as well. In many States ruled by an intelligent despot, the tendency is only too clearly visible to emulate Richelieu and Mazarin in another country and in a distant century, so as to enervate and undermine the great feudatories with a view to their eventual absorption in the State. This policy may have its justification from the point of view of the principal Prince concerned in such cases. Nor is it utterly without its significance to the general question of the national solidarity of the Indian people. For my own part, I cannot persuade myself that there is any room to-day in India for the Princes to form by themselves a distinct caste, or order, or estate of the realm, with separate personal privileges and immunities. Much less is such a concession possible for the minor Princes and smaller feudatories. All that we can concede to-day with any hope of some permanence, is the recognition of the several States, or their standard combinations, as equal partners in the national life and government; and, as such, their proportionate representation in all our federal or national institutions. In these, the smaller Princes and feudatories may find a place and a voice not utterly out of proportion to their real importance; and for that reason alone, if for nothing else, the suggestion made above needs to be examined, simultaneously as regards the States and the British Indian provinces,

The only question, which, thus, remains to be considered, is the design of such federal, national, institutions, and such a scheme of general federalism, as would ensure to each constituent part of the federation its due place and importance. The distinctive feature of a federation is the distribution of sovereignty, or at least the functions of government, between the central federal authority and its constituents; but this must depend in a great measure on the force of tradition as well as on the degree of intensity urging a people towards federation. We would be doing no violence to the accepted facts of the Indian situation to-day, if we premise that the future development of India must be, will have to be, on the lines of federalism. Assuming this, we must leave it to the experts specially appointed for the purpose to chalk out a definite scheme of division of functions between the federal and local bodies, which would do full justice to the need for federation, and yet ensure a free play to the growing consciousness for local autonomy. This is not the place in which even an outline of such a division could be attempted, even if the writer felt himself competent to undertake the task. This much, however, may be safely ventured: no division would now be satisfactory, which simply ignores the very existence of the Indian States. It is not impossible to assimilate the States in a federal polity for India, if the condition already postulated is fulfilled, *viz.*, that the States are to be considered and provided for *as States*, and not as Princes in their individual capacity as rulers.

Assuming, next, that a satisfactory division of functions is achieved, the problem only remains as far as the design has to be provided of the federal institutions particularly concerned with giving effect to the principle of federalism. In the purely local concerns, each federated unit would, as a matter of course, be left undisturbed by the central federal authority. Much of the irritation felt to-day by the rulers of the Indian States at the constant interference by pin-pricks of the British Government of India in what they regard as their purely local concerns would by this means be automatically avoided. There would in fact be no need for such interference. What interference there will be, will take place on well-established lines, in full publicity, eliminating almost altogether that vicious factor of personal equation which nowadays

causes a great deal of ill-feeling between the rulers of Indian States and their self-made mentors. The central federal government would, by law be similarly assigned an exclusive sphere of purely national concerns, in which it will be guaranteed the unquestioned co-operation of the constituent units, since any action or policy in respect of these national concerns will, of course, be determined upon by common consent, often with stated majority. Another source of misunderstanding, this time on the part of the central government, will thus be automatically removed. A margin of common ground will no doubt remain in the best planned federal constitutions; and, given our traditions as well as requirements, that margin threatens to be very considerable in India, --far more so, I venture to opine, than most people have any notion of. But even on this common ground, the dealings will obtain a measure of smoothness and simplicity, merely by the fact of there being constitutional provision or precedent, and because of the attendant publicity. Other federations, notably the German Reich, have had similar problems of their own; and have succeeded in solving them by analogous methods. The German Council of State, metamorphosis of the old Bundesrath, is not quite a Second Chamber of the national Legislature. Its legislative powers are limited to sage advise and portentous warnings. But, being composed of the representatives of the constituent governments in the Reich, it speaks with unique authority on all those matters which concern the members of the Reich severally. It can hold up legislation, and even propose laws, which must be placed before the Reichstag by the Reich ministers, even if the latter themselves are not in sympathy with the proposals of the Federal Council. If a similar body were established in India; and if its members were recruited from the governors and chief ministers of the several states and provinces, two each; if, moreover, representatives of certain special interests, or even communities, common to British India and the States, were also added to this body, and its authority enhanced by the presence in it of the principal federal Ministers, without prejudice to the latter's place in the chief federal legislative body,—the utility and serviceability of such a body would become extreme. I have tried to outline, very briefly, such a body in a

recent work on the *Federal Finance in India*, which also considers in some detail the vexed question of the economic relations between the components of the federation and the central authority. Considerations of space compel me to refrain from a repetition of that outline in this place. But a glance at the suggestions made there would suffice to show that the ideal Nationalist India seems to have in view is not likely to be defeated for want of practicability in the suggestions made for the solution of difficulties already evident.

BOMBAY.

K. T. SHAH.

LITERARY JUDGMENTS.

By S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI.

THE content of literary judgments is subjective, says Mr. Joad;* it relates not to the work judged of, but to the tastes appealed to or the feelings aroused. Since tastes and feelings are notoriously personal and variable, judgments based on these cannot claim objective validity. That is the conclusion to which Mr. Joad's dialectic leads him, though he seems unwilling to accept it as final. For my part I do not accept either the conclusion or the dialectic; for in spite of its apparent clarity, it is obscure in parts, and it is certainly not as invulnerable as it looks.

It would be well to bear in mind to start with that all judgments, literary and otherwise, are necessarily based on subjective re-actions to the objective. The judgment of sourness expresses the mode in which our sense of taste is affected by goose-berries; the judgment that certain lines of rail are parallel reflects in the same manner our mode of perceiving them. In the latter case, however, there is this difference; the lines which at one point appear parallel, seems to converge further on; yet we judge that the lines themselves are parallel. The judgment that they seem to converge at a distance is subjective, according to Mr. Joad, while the other judgment that they are parallel is objective. There is no doubt that both of these relate to the lines as they appear, not to them as they are in themselves, independently of all experience. The difference between the two is in that convergence at a distance is a limited experience; it varies with the individual's position in time and place; the meeting-point seems to shift, as the observer moves along and if one could go higher up, the meeting-point would seem to be very much further off. In other words, the

* "The Invalidity of Literary Judgments" by C. E. M. Joad, *The New Era*. Vol. I, Part 2, p. 97.

experience that the lines are parallel is more stable, more objective, more universal and hence we conclude that the judgment relating thereto is valid, unlike that about their convergence at a distance. Both arise out of experience and both reflect experience. But where judgment can legitimately claim to be valid, the experience reflected is less limited in extent; it is not barely that of a particular person at a given time or place; it is such as can be shared in by others of similar constitution, relatively irrespective of time and place.

Now, this kind of objectivity may well pertain to judgments about taste. The sourness of a particular lot of goose-berries may be known only to those who eat them, but the judgment of sourness would be common at least to all those who ate them. If the generality say they are sweet, we take it there is something wrong with the sense of taste of him who found them sour. The illustration from taste is, perhaps, slightly deceptive, because of the variability of that sensation in different individuals and even in the same individual. But colour is in the same position for argumentative purposes. "This cloth is red" is a judgment of the same kind as "These goose-berries are sour;" yet do we not claim objectivity for the former? Do we not say that he who does not agree with us is colour-blind? And have we any other means of knowing who is colour-blind, he or we, except by the consensus of opinion? There does not thus seem to be any difference in principle between a judgment as to colour or taste and one as to the parallelism or otherwise of railway lines. The apparently greater objectivity of the latter is due possibly to a survival of the traditional prejudice about primary qualities.

Giving up the attempt to distinguish between two types of judgment, if we turn to the facts, what do we find? Literary judgments are variable, far more variable than judgments about facts like railway lines. The source of the variability will be apparent on a little reflection. Qualities like shape, size, position, colour or taste are relatively simple and the facts *judged as possessing these* qualities are also relatively simple. Hence, their appeal to the human intellect is likely to be uniform. But an individual does not make the same kind of uniform appeal. He is a unity of manifold elements and impulses, a compound of

strength and weakness, and what of him appeals or does not appeal will vary greatly with the education and temperament of the judging public. A man may be praised for his handsome personality, admired for his intellectual subtlety, pitied for his moral lapses, abhorred for his Machiavellian politics, worshipped for his martyrdom, albeit in an unwelcome cause. If all these phases could be judged about dispassionately at the same time, if they could be given their proper place in a scheme of subordination and super-ordination, and if the emotions of the judging individual could be trained not to run away with him, then the resultant judgment would be objectively valid. But not all these conditions can be or are satisfied. We try to approximate to the impartial spectator, but rarely get within even measurable distance of that attitude. The result is that our judgments are partial. And if our judgments to-day err on the side of moral Puritanism, the tide sets in the contrary direction the next day, and we have the exaltation of the intellectual giant despite his lax morals. And yet we do not despair of our judgments about personalities; we continue to make them, and in so far as we are conscious of an ideal, we strive to make them as impartial, as little one sided and as universal as possible.

The difficulty in judgments, literary and artistic, is the same as in the case of those about individuals. A work of art is not a simple fact like the parallel rails or the sour goose-berry, but an expression of individuality. It has as many facets as the phases of the author's personality. The style may be flowing or turgid, the sense may be plain or involved, and the ideas may be dreamy or drab. Though ordinarily we would discard the turgid and the involved and the drab, we can conceive of circumstances when these fail to affect us adversely and we judge them good; but it must be remembered that in so far as we judge, we take them to be good only because of some sufficient reason, as, for instance, that they are a much-needed antidote to the squeamishness that is a sign of greater moral depravity than loose talk or manners. We judge in the light of an ideal; and that ideal, though perhaps broadened and deepened, with the march of ages, does not itself change. Our ideas of what does or does not contribute to that ideal are bound to change, for the ideal is all-comprehensive,

while human vision as such is, after all, limited. Thus, at one time, the sanctity of the marriage tie was considered indispensable for morality; now, companionate marriage is advocated for the very same reason. An 'obscene' play was once considered very bad for the morals; but now, it is seen (if Judge Lindsey is to be believed) that the newer, later generation is unaffected by the spectacle of a bedroom on the stage, while the more strictly brought-up generation registers all the emotional re-action. One more proof that cloistered morality is no morality! But does this prove that all moral judgments are invalid? No. No more does it follow that all literary judgments are invalid. Popularity varies from age to age, because of differences of temperament and experience which lead us to vary our judgments as to the suitable means of attaining the ideal.

It is, of course, true that books are true only in so far as they affect us. But this is so in the case of all objects judged about; we cannot judge of them unless they enter into experience actually or potentially. It is the railway lines *that are seen or can be seen* which are judged to be parallel. If they are buried in a desert island, I cannot judge either that they exist or that they are parallel. They are in no better case than the hypothetical single copy of Shakespeare buried on Robinson Crusoe's island. But it may be said that if I were told of the existence of railway lines on that island, I would judge them to be parallel. So would I judge about Shakespeare's works too, if told of them, that they must be worth looking at, that they are possible sources of deep satisfaction or the reverse. The judgment in this case is indefinite, because the literary fact has more individuality than railway lines. I can at best say very little more of the rails than that they are parallel, made of steel, etc., while of Shakespeare, there will be very much more to say, good or bad. The complexity of the material is at the root of the indefiniteness of the judgment about Shakespeare. It must also be remembered that I could not judge those railway lines to be parallel except in the light of the prior experience of such parallelism. If I had any such prior experience of Shakespeare, my judgment about his works too would be far more definite; I might rank myself among his admirers and set out to recover the solitary copy; or I might count myself with

Shaw and Tolstoy and leave Shakespeare to his merited oblivion. But, in any case, the railway lines enjoy no superiority over Shakespeare's works, except in respect of their spurious simplicity.

The quality and quantity of satisfaction derived from a work are without a doubt tests of its worth; but the difficulty pointed out by Mr. Joad is real enough. Garvice satisfies many more readers than Shakespeare. And even among those who prefer Shakespeare, the argument about the quality of their satisfaction seems to be circular. The best literature is that which appeals to the best class of reader, and the best class of reader is judged by the literature which appeals to him. But is the difficulty so very great? Taking it that Shakespeare and Garvice appeal to different classes of readers, it seems difficult to judge of the worth of the literature or of the readers. But do not both appeal to the same reader very often? In confessing to such a taste, I have no ambition to be ranked a freak. When I feel too tired to work or even to *seek* relaxation, I find that relaxation comes to me with a novel of the Garvice type. There is a pre-destined harmony in his novels beginning with an incognito, leading through marriage and separation to a final reconciliation. One does not think of subtlety of characterisation, dramatic deftness, deviations from history; one does not stop to moralise, however involuntarily, on the width and depth of Shakespeare's vision; one does not feel borne down by the heaviness of the incense burnt through the centuries; nor does one feel called upon to acquiesce in or rebut traditional mis-conceptions. Garvice is for those occasions (and undoubtedly there are many) when we like to live merely in the present, unencumbered by the past, and unfretful for the future. He is, in other words, for the idle moment. And yet does the existence of the idler or of idle moments prove the non-existence or invalidity of work? Do we not rather go back to work with an added zest after a period of (sometimes enforced) idleness?

The existence of grades of satisfaction would be far more clear in the case of authors whose work is not so greatly contrasted. Take, for instance, the novels of crime and mystery. The characters in almost all of these are types rather than personalities—the criminal, the clever, but not clever enough police officer, the amateur detective, the detective's Boswell

(or should we say Watson?) and occasionally a girl whom Boswell (Watson) marries. They all appeal practically to the same mood or the same class of audience. And yet to take two popular authors, Austin Freeman and Edgar Wallace, the former will always rank higher, for, he traffics less in the fortuitous, there is more of science in the detection he works up, and the story carries us beyond the bare moment. Would any such gradation be possible in the absence of an objective standard? And if there is a standard, could we say that our literary judgments are invalid?

To sum up: it would appear that literary judgments differ from other judgments in respect of the complexity of their materials, not in respect of their objectivity. All judgments aim at objectivity and universality; but the more complex the material, the larger the number of facets of the norm, in the light of which the judgment is made. A failure to comprehend all these facets together and in due proportion leads to a failure of objectivity; but this is a defect of degree, not of kind, and applies to all our judgments of worth and of things which are worth while. The simplicity of other judgments is spurious and relatively valueless. Our judgments, literary and artistic, in their very failure are more valuable, because of their vision of the norm, except in the light of which they could not be made at all.

MADRAS.

S. S. SURYANARAYANAN.

ANCIENT TAMIL CULTURE.

I.

By P. T. SRINIVASA AYYANGAR.

THE ancient Tamils developed a culture of their own, unassisted by any other peoples of the world. This culture is embodied in their ancient poetry. Old Tamil poetry, called 'the poetry of the sages' is characterised by the fact that it is totally indigenous; neither in its prosody, nor in its diction, nor again in its subject-matter or poetic imagery, does it show the slightest trace of the influence of Sanskrit. In the form of the poetry, as in the literary conventions that rule it, it is unique. The poems which form the earliest strata of Tamil literature, along with those of a little later age, when Brahmanas began to compose Tamil poetry and hence allusions to Aryan legends, superstitions and religious beliefs began to affect the Tamil Muse, were gathered into anthologies, more than a millennium ago; but we can, by considering the internal evidence of the poems, separate the earliest stratum from the succeeding one. When we do so, we realize that there was a Pre-Aryan stage of Tamil poetry, as there was a Pre-Aryan stage of Tamil culture.

This culture was due to geographical, and not to historical, causes; that is, it was the result of the action of the milieu on the Tamil people and not of their intercourse with foreigners. Early Tamil literary convention has enshrined the fact that the Tamil country was divided into five natural regions—the hilly, the desert, the wooded, the riverine and the littoral. As in the case of all literary conventions (like those enunciated by Aristotle), those of early Tamil poetry were not deliberately devised by critics, but were deduced by them from the unconscious practice of poets, and the practice of poets was the result of the working of their poetic genius guided by the influence of the environment in which they lived and worked. Thus the incidents sung by the

ancient poets, the aspects of nature referred to, the poetic imagery used, and above all the heroes of the poems, were all correlated to the natural region dealt with. The same name was given to the natural region as well as to the class of poetry suited to it. Long, very long before bards arose in South India, men had slowly to migrate from region to region and in each region had developed a culture appropriate to the physical characteristics of that region.

That the cultures, and even the anthropological characteristics, of different races are due to the physical environments in which they lived, has recently become a fundamental notion of Ethnology. So the people of Europe have been divided into three races, each culturally and physiologically correlated to three different areas of characterisation *viz.*, the Mediterranean race of sailors and traders, the Alpine race of mountaineers and the Nordic race of fair-haired giants. The ancient Tamils recognized not three but five cultural classes the hunters of the highlands, the nomad marauders of the sandy region, the pastoral tribes of the forest region, the ploughmen of the lower river-valleys and the sailors and fishermen of the sea coast. These five tribes developed customs peculiar to each, and as life moved much more slowly in ancient times than in the modern age of the aeroplane and television, these people retained their special forms of culture long enough for them to become perpetuated in the literary conventions that were evolved with the evolution of Tamil poetry.

The subject-matter of ancient Tamil poetry, like that of all the literary art-forms of the world, was love and war. Love is of two kinds, the spontaneous outburst of uncontrollable passion which is born when a man and a woman meet for the first time especially in the midst of romantic surroundings and their hearts blend with each other unbidden, and the slow-growing but steadier flame of married love which begins when the wedding takes place and develops little by little as the husband and wife live together and learn to appreciate each other's good qualities. Man first learnt prenuptial love in the first hunter stage of life which grew in the hill country. There he led a life of easy pleasure, his chief work being the hunting of game, either for protecting himself from his animal foes or for supplementing his store of

fruit and nut food. And what is more natural than the birth of love that seeks immediate consummation when the sturdy hunter meets a buxom maiden suddenly, his heart being elated with the joy of the chase and predisposed to the tender passion by his romantic environment. Is it any wonder that when poetry arose among the Tamils, it became a literary convention that poems on the birth of love should have the hunterman alone as their hero, the hunter-woman as their heroine, the hilly region as the scene and the trees and flowers and birds and beasts of the mountains as the associated natural objects? From Tamil poems of this class it is easy to reconstruct the kind of life led by the inhabitants of the highlands in far-off days. The following may serve as a specimen. "The bees swarm in the honey-comb which has beautiful eyes and which hangs from the large boughs of the black-trunked *Vengai* tree whose flowers are full-blown so that the bees may eat their honey. Thence the sweet honey drips and collects in the pits on stones. The hunter-youths scrape and eat the honey. The small-headed and strong young marmosets eat what remains of the honey (after the hunter-youths have eaten it). Oh lord of such a mountain-region, you forget the anxiety which this girl who loves you feels when you, with sweet-smelling sandal-paste daubed on your breast, and the spear held in the hand as your only help, come to this village at midnight, walking along difficult footpaths infested with snakes. Is it proper for you to come alone?" Another aspect of the life of the hillmen is illustrated in the following ode sung by the foster-sister of a girl in love. "You girl that wearest bangles! Answer my question. We gather the flowers that grow near the hill-tank; we string them together; and we make garlands also of the superb lily, decorate the hill-god Murugan with them and worship him. Let him help us; for your mother mistakes your love-sickness for obsession (by Murugan) and may he let her know by a visible sign or by means of a vision in a dream that he has not obsessed you but that your sickness is caused by love for the chief of the hill which shines like the blue gem. If Murugan who wears the green garland about which bees are droning does so, will it harm him?"

* Murugan is the ever-youthful god of the Tamil mountaineers, and patron of pre-nuptial love, later identified with Subrahmanya, the younger son of Siva.

Parents all the world over interfere with the course of true love and impatient damsels have to elope with their lovers in pursuit of happiness. In South India they crossed the desert tracts which adjoin the hilly tracts to prevent pursuit. Hence the poems dealing with elopement were invariably associated with the waterless tracts, described life-conditions in the desert and were called poems of the desert class. The following is a sample:—"She has forgotten her attendants who are wearing the full-blown flowers of the wild jasmine and the clusters of the Nocchi blossoms and have fair forelaps. She no more applies unguents to her thick hair which was combed and made into many plaits by me. She has been charmed by the false words of a stranger and deserted this rich mansion, decorated with beautiful pictures. She has gone with her tinkling bracelets and shining anklets to the wild country which lies north of the village belonging to Vanan, where from the top of the black mango tree the white-headed kite woos his mate. There her lover who desires her can alone braid her hair, which is thick like the black sand of the forest stream and now probably hangs down." From this ode composed about two thousand years ago we learn that the houses of the rich were decorated with painting and that girls were decked with ornaments and used unguents for their hair and their persons. Often the lover has to part with his sweetheart so that he might go to distant countries to earn wealth. This parting of the lovers belongs also to the desert class of poems and is correlated to the life in the desert. Thus a maiden mourns for the lover who was about to go away from her. "The spreading fire has consumed the forest; the trees have become charred and no more give comfort to people, there being no shade there. To such a desert is my lover going. I have learnt this from his actions; for he is cleaning the rust off the bright head of his spear; he has his buckler in his hand; he is wearing the jewel with the peacock feathers; he is kinder to me than usual. Hence the time is come for me when my eyes, which are decorated with collyrium and whose beauty deserves to be reproduced in a painting, will be blinded with tears, which will flow so copiously that I can swim in them."

The return of the hero to his mistress after his travels is associated with the wooded region, where pastoral life requires the

frequent separation of the lovers and their pleasant reunion after the toils of a cowherd's life. Thus the lover addresses his heart on his return from distant tracts to his village:—“(When I left this place) I said to my mistress ‘I will come back on the very day that sees the end of my labours’, and her heart was filled with sorrow. To quench that sorrow I am returning to her. Now in the evening hour the village street is filled with the sweet smell of the waving garlands, made of the tender leaves of the palmyra plucked by the strong hands of the shepherd who tends the sheep with heads that move up and down, and of the Mullai flowers which grow on the Kalli plant whose head is like the king-fisher which frequents the dry, desert land. Has the lizard that lives on the wall of my house given my mistress prognostications of my arrival?”. All these poems bear evidence of the keen observation of nature and nature's ways on the part of ancient Tamil poets. The following excels most of them in this respect. It likewise deals with the return of the lover. “The mate of the sparrow which lives in the thatched roof of the house made love to a bird living in a distant place and returned after a time. Its hen discovered the infidelity of its mate and standing at its nest, along with its many young ones swarming like the flowers of the mimosa, would not let its mate enter the nest. The poor cock-sparrow stood out trembling in the rain. Then the hen taking pity on its mate invited him to the nest in the evening. On such an evening the victorious hero drove his chariot into the village, his horse decorated with garlands and treading on the crops. Then the pallor on the face of the heroine disappeared”.

The littoral tract was the abode of fisherfolk, who were frequently absent for short periods from their homes on account of their boating expeditions. Hence poems dealing with the separation of lovers for a short period were allotted to the class of sea-side songs, which contain a faithful description of the scenery of the coastal region. “The black Alexandrian laurel grows near the vast sea; by its side grows the screw-pine whose bright petals appear as fair as the beams of the sun which from the sky drives away the darkness. My lover is the lord of the harbour surrounded by such screw-pines. His horses have

their necks adorned with rows of gems which resound night and day when is blowing always the wind that raises the soft sand. These horses are white like moonlight; and when they tread on the hills of sand, my heart beats fast. As my lord is come now to marry me, the horses may take rest for some time." The following ode gives expression to a fine fancy. "O lord of the harbour, where the sea gives birth to the right-whorled shell that sounds as sweet as the songs of the bards, I went along with my companions and planted a seed of the Alexandrian laurel in the white sand, and then forgot all about it. It struck root and sprouted. Then I poured on it milk mixed with ghi instead of water and tended it with joy. One day my mother said, "the laurel that you are tending is more beautiful than you and is your younger sister. Hence I feel shame to play with you in front of this tree. Go, therefore, to the shade of another tree."

In the riverine tracts civilization took longer strides than in the rest. The institution of marriage before love became prevalent and, since the hearts of men are inconstant, they turned to hetairæ, women who were trained to sing and dance and steal the love of husbands of loyal wives. Life in the agricultural region was sufficiently idle in certain seasons to tempt men to seek illicit joys. So poems of the ploughland class are devoted to the mourning of deserted wives and the joys of reconciliation when the husbands return to the path of duty. "O lord of the place where the Kanji tree grows in gardens! Near rice-fields on which the rice is heaped, and the shrimp after drinking the water washed out of wine-bowls suddenly straightens itself like a bow whose taut string has slipped from it. There the long cane, which grows near tanks and is covered with sharp thorns like a saw, binds the broad leaves of the water-lily and when the north wind blows upon it rises and falls like the bellows blown by the blacksmith near his forge. They say that you have taken to a young hetaira from among the crowd of bright-bangled women". Here is another poem on the same subject:—"The red ants make a nest of the leaves of the jack tree which grows near the rice-fields and lay their eggs therein; the crane goes to those nests which crowd near other for sucking them; the ants and their eggs that then drop on the

fields look like the half-husked paddy scattered about. The lord of such fields desiring hetairæ no more approaches our house. Even when he does come, the black heroine does not forget her anger and welcomes him not. And I, (the companion of the heroine) suffer so much from the enmity between husband and wife that I desire to die to escape this trouble."

These samples of ancient love poetry which show no signs of foreign influence, and are in metre and diction entirely indigenous prove what a relative high stage of civilization the Tamils attained to by themselves in far off ages.

MADRAS.

P. T. SRINIVASA AYYANGAR.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

By S. SATYAMURTHI.

INDEPENDENCE is a positive conception although negative in form. The Sanskrit equivalent '*Svathantra*' correctly expresses the idea. It can be applied to individuals as to nations. In the case of the latter it means, that the community of people recognising itself as a nation, has the unrestricted right to live its own life, subject only to its own self imposed limitations on the exercise of that right, whether in external or in internal matters. It is irrelevant to argue that no man or nation can be wholly independent of other men or nations. That is conceded. But the point is that the right to be so independent must exist. The non-exercise of that right is purely voluntary. That it may be impossible to exercise that right, under any conceivable conditions does not affect the existence of that right or the recognition of the same by others.

Independence is the natural state of man. All government is a concession to human weakness. People have to be governed by external authority, as they cannot govern themselves. The primary functions for which government exists are to guarantee external peace and internal order for nations, or peoples. If men composing nations gave up earth-hunger and accepted really the gospel of "peace on earth and good will to all men", then there will be no wars either aggressive or defensive, and hence no need for a government to exist and to guarantee the security of a nation from external attack. Similarly if men were perfect enough to follow the "sermon on the Mount" there will be no need for the police or the magistracy. It cannot be denied that the ideal of all mankind is to secure good will among all nations.

and make men righteous and self-controlled. Nor can it be denied that in spite of failures man has raised himself, if slowly, from the level of the bushman and the savage. Hence it is not beyond the bounds of possibility to conceive of a state of human society in this world, when there will be no need for any government guaranteeing either external or internal security. In that state there will be no need for government as such for these primary functions. The other functions of government are purely social or economic and may be discharged by other corporations or societies. So government in its best known capacity will cease to exist, as it ought to. I therefore claim that anarchy or the absence of any outside government save the government of man by himself, should be the ideal of political philosophers with vision and courage. But it has to be admitted that, human nature being what it is, such an ideal is not likely to be reached in the near future. Hence our ideal should be to secure that government for any people, which governs least, is least alien, and is least irresponsible to the public opinion of the people whom it governs. The pioneers of democracy may have bungled. But, throughout their bungling, they have been guided by correct feeling on the nature of the government which, under present circumstances, is most suitable to humanity. Responsible government based on representative institutions is about the nearest approach to government of man by himself, if external authority has got to subsist in any form or to any degree, for the government of nations. Undoubtedly it is the best form of government evolved so far in this direction.

Government is also an art, if people are to govern others. Democracy does not mean inefficiency. Even under the most perfect democracy, the best men in the full sense of that phrase, should govern. Birth and class are to-day rightly discredited. The approval of man by his fellowmen is about-as good a test as we can get to-day. The system of elections, provided the suffrage is wide enough if not universal, guarantees generally the best men coming to the top. But democracy also ensures that such men cannot perpetuate themselves in authority, unless they are eternally vigilant. The moment they lose the confidence of their fellowmen they will lapse into obscurity.

Hence it seems to me that in the transition state, if I may so call it, between autocratic and alien government and no government, a self-governing democracy is about the nearest approach to the ideals under modern conditions, as it is impossible to have real democracy, in the sense of each citizen directly taking part in the government of the nation. Therefore representative institutions have to exist.

So far as the government of one nation by another is concerned it has no justification, either in theory or in history. That it has no justification in theory must be clear from what has been stated above. No nation is good enough to govern another nation. Every nation is good enough to govern itself. Alien government is an intolerable form of tyranny, to those who have faith in the destiny of humanity. Hence whatever one's views may be with regard to the necessity of any government at all, there can be no doubt that alien government is an ugly anachronism.

Hence I claim as a mere matter of political philosophy that complete national independence is the only rational goal for any people, as for the people of India.

There are only two states possible for a nation. Either it must govern itself or another nation must govern it. Ultimate authority cannot vest in two nations. Under Dominion Status, the ultimate authority will vest only in great Britain. India cannot acquiesce in that.

The people of India can have no interests, in the transfer of power from one bureaucracy to another. Ultimate authority vesting in Great Britain, she will be the king-maker, even in democratic Dominion India. The ninety-eight per cent of the people in this country who have not, will come by their own, only when the government of India will have to depend entirely on their support. Last but not least the demand for Dominion Status, if put forward by the people of India, will mean their acquiescence, for the first time, in the British occupation of India. The independence ideal alone will create the true Swaraj mentality which, despite all obstacles will crave for and achieve true self-expression in the form of complete national independence.

ENCHANTED GROUND.

Princess! to sit on the grass at thy feet,
Bathing my soul in the light of thine eyes,
Hearing the lilt of thy lips richly sweet,
Under the smile of the tenderest skies:
Pleasant, delightful, enchanted that ground,
Where chastest perfume of champaks is blown,
From thy soft breath, that like incence around,
Wraps my fond senses, my heart young and lone;
Then the vain world and its hate I forget,
All its illusion, its bartering gain;
Keep me, Beloved, for ever all thine,
Warm me with warmth of thy bosom so white,
Parted from thee I must languish and pine,
Freezing in sleet and in snow of the night:
Chitra! to sit on the grass at thy feet,
Bathing my soul in the light of thine eyes,
Listening to lilts from thy lips richly sweet,
Is my life's wish, and my hope's Paradise!

JUBBULPORE.

CYRIL MODAK.

LOVE

(FROM THE VAISHNAVA POET CHANDIDAS)

E'er shall I live, o dear shall I live, in the land
of love and with love make my cot.

Love alone shall be my neighbour sweet and the
rest all strangers.

Love shall I make the door of my hut and love
my thatch overhead.

In love I'll live and lose myself for days that are
and are to be.

Love shall be my pallet lowly and love my
watch at night.

On love I'll rest my weary head with love as
mate by my side.

In the fount of love I'll lave myself and dye
mine eyes with love;

And above my lips will gently glisten, like a tiny
pendant pearl, the love of my heart.

Thus love shall be my only function, the virtue
of my soul:—my work and worship—death—salvation—
my birth as well as goal.

LAHORE.

HRISHIKESH BHATTACHARYYA.

GLEANINGS.

THE REAL GLADSTONE.

BY THE RT. HON. T. P. O'CONNOR, M.P.

REALLY, I had thought it quite unnecessary to vindicate Gladstone in the public mind from the very prejudiced biography of Disraeli by Mr. Buckle. I have found, however, that I was wrong, and that "After Thirty Years," by Viscount Gladstone (Macmillan, 21s.) --this admirable, well-written, judicious biography by Gladstone's son-- was necessary for the vindication of Gladstone and for the light it threw on the last, and, in some respects, the sad years of his long and useful life.

The most striking chapters are those which describe Gladstone in his home and among his family. Gladstone never was really quite so happy as when he was by his own fireside. The great house at Hawarden, which I once had the pleasure of visiting, was more or less accommodated in all its arrangements to his work and to his rest. His workroom was known as the Temple of Peace; there, as a rule, he was left alone for several hours every day; there he wrote, there, above all, he read. He was surrounded by a fine library of ten thousand volumes; next door to it was a small turret-shaped room in which he had collected his correspondence. It was all in the most perfect order, with an endorsement on each letter of its writer, its contents, and its date. I asked Mr Gladstone who had done this remarkable piece of collecting. "I did it all every word --with my own hand," was his astounding reply.

Another new point which Lord Gladstone's book brings out is his relations with his family. The public generally had an idea that he was austere, perhaps even irritable, and on occasions rather severe; that around him there was the same idolatrous atmosphere which made him apart from everybody, even his own children. As a fact, he was absolutely at home with his children; except when he was working he always had them about; never rebuked them severely, I don't think ever punished them. When they had done something wrong like telling a white lie, or one of their boyish or girlish tricks, his rebuke was rather like a study in philosophy, and was given in a light-hearted tone. This man, with all his gigantic responsibilities and tremendous work and hatred of an idle hour, could become the joyful playmate of his children.

He did not take any part in the household arrangements; these he left entirely to his devoted wife. I am afraid that distinguished and delightful creature was not

the best of house-keepers; she was a bit absent-minded. I know my own experience of Hawarden Castle was rather disquieting, especially as to the internal arrangements of the house. I had to speak at Chester the night before I went to Hawarden, and in those days I rarely went to bed before two or three in the morning; I took no breakfast beyond a piece of toast and a cup of tea. I took it for granted I should have a quarter or half an hour's delay at Chester on my journey to Hawarden, during which I could take my long wanted breakfast; but I had to rush across another platform and jump into the train at once. I was taken in a carriage to Hawarden Castle; there was nobody to receive me: I was too shy to ask for food; and while I was still starving I was invited to take a walk with Mr. Gladstone—and a walk over the grounds of Hawarden with its alternation of hills and valleys was no easy task to a man who had already fasted nearly twenty-four hours.

No detail can be superfluous which gives these inner glimpses of Gladstone the father, and Gladstone at home. That, however, is not evidently the main purpose of Lord Gladstone's book. It would probably never have been written if it had not been for Mr. Buckle's biography of Lord Beaconsfield; and perhaps also if it had not been for the publication by him, not very long ago, of the letters of Queen Victoria at the time when her relations with Gladstone were at their worst. I think both these books are a triumphant vindication of the man whom they set forth to belittle and an equally triumphant vindication of the view that Beaconsfield acted the part of an obsequious courtier, and in that way used his influence to the prejudice of Gladstone and of Gladstone's policy, and was rather an example of the influence which a dexterous courtier exercised over a very self-confident Queen.

After 1874 there was scarcely a political act of Gladstone which did not find one of its chief obstacles in the feelings of the Queen towards him. In her early days, and while she was still under the tutelage of Lord Melbourne, she was a very strong Whig-Liberal, and she did not make any attempt to conceal her dissatisfaction when Melbourne was defeated by Peel—whom she acknowledges she never particularly cared for. She almost trumped up a case against Peel about the ridiculous question whether he or she should appoint her ladies-in-waiting—one of the most grotesque episodes in modern English history. But she remained as she was at the time of her accession in 1837; she had no sympathy with, and no realization of, the new England that was being created before her eyes, and all its developments in democratic feeling were disapproved and obstructed by her.

On the other hand, Gladstone, beginning as a pretty narrow and bitter Tory, gradually realized the new conditions which were emerging into existence. 'Though he was never an extremist he became by his democratic sentiment and his unequalled power of oratory, the leader and the figure-head of these new movements. On all the subjects in which Gladstone had advanced from the narrow gospel of his youth she stood still while he advanced more rapidly. She never had any understanding of the Irish claim, and her own policy throughout was the broken and disastrous policy of Coercion. She would not even entertain the idea of Home Rule. She had no great sympathy with the extension of the Franchise; and finally,

when Gladstone aroused the people of England to the horrible atrocities of Turkish rule over the Christians in Turkey, she took up the same execrable attitude as Disraeli, of denying or of condoning those bloody massacres which made the repute of the Turks as rulers of Christian peoples stink in the nostrils of all the world.

As to Disraeli's method in dealing with the Queen, I doubt if there is a single sane or decent being to-day that must not have felt sometimes positively disgusted. He grovelled in his adulation, wrote to the Queen letters of abject flattery, and in this way was able to keep her on his side even up to the last hour when the revolt of the nation dismissed him from office and made the Premiership of Gladstone inevitable.

The climax of the story came when Gladstone finally resigned and when he went to inform the Queen of his decision. Gladstone was then eighty-six. He had resigned against the will of his colleagues because he would not give way to that new form of megalomania which came with the great programme of naval expenditure. Old, wearied, but still firm in his hostility to the militarism he had always opposed, he was certainly an object of deep sympathy and even of compassion. He was taking farewell of a monarch whom he had laboriously served for sixty-three years. What occurred has been quoted already many times; it forms, I think, one of the most poignant and pathetic stories in history of the unjust treatment which this great man received from this obstinate and hostile lady; the words in which Gladstone describes the interview is an immortal document; I make no excuse for quoting it again:

"While it is on my mind I place on record here, awaiting some more formal method, my strong desire that after my decease my family shall be most careful to keep in the background all information respecting the personal relations of the Queen and myself during these later years down to 1894, when they died a kind of natural death. Relations rather sad in themselves, though absolutely unattended with the smallest ruffle on their surface. It was the kind and generous farewell from Ponsonby which had to fill for me the place of a farewell from my Sovereign."

— *T. P's Weekly*.

LORD LYTTON ON "MOTHER INDIA"

The wisest comment upon the book was made by Mr. Gandhi when he said "It is a book which it is not safe for any Englishman or American to read, but it should be read by every Indian." In the hands of the former it is dangerous, for it is calculated to give such readers a bad opinion of Indians and a good opinion of themselves. It is necessary for Indians to read it because the social evils which it reveals require either to be justified or remedied, and this can be done by Indians alone. Unfortunately it is among English and Americans that the book has had its widest circulation; and in India, though it has been vigorously abused by the Press, it has received no serious consideration. The

immediate effect of the book, therefore, has been to increase racial animosity which is regrettable".

Many of my friends who have read "Mother India" and been shocked by its revelations have asked me what they are to think of the book. "Is it true?" they say. 'Is it fair? Is it really a balanced presentation of Indian conditions?' Many of my Indian friends, too, have asked me "What are we to do about this horrible book? How are we to counteract its pernicious influence?". I would like to try and answer these questions in the present article.

First then, to its English readers I would say—the book is not, and does not purport to be, a critical survey of Indian civilisation, nor is it a fair study of Indian character. It is a cry of horror from a visitor who was genuinely shocked by certain customs and characteristics which she discovered in the country in the course of a single cold weather tour, and of the existence of which she was previously ignorant. So keenly did Miss Mayo feel the pathos of those who are the victims of these customs, that she felt impelled to champ on their cause before the whole world. "Mother India" is not so much an attack upon any class of Indians as a piece of knight-errantry on behalf of the Indian mothers, the widows, the child wives, the Devadasis, the outcastes, and the animals, whose sufferings stirred the sympathy of the authoress to the point of indignation. In describing these sufferings Miss Mayo is frankly a propagandist, and her descriptions do not avoid this exaggeration and over-emphasis which are common to all propagandists. Her deliberate intention is to shock her readers, and with this object her pictures are highly coloured. Some of her facts may be inaccurate, some of her facts may be in the nature of generalisations based upon insufficient evidence, some of her anecdotes may be stale—as, for instance, that of the Prince of an Indian State who expressed the opinion that three months after the British left India there would not be a rupee or a virgin left in Bengal (Chapter XXIII). But when every possible criticism on the book has been made, the fact remains that the principal social evils which it condemns do exist in India and are well known to all those who have lived in the country, and have never before been so pitilessly exposed. Let me set them out "seriatim".

First, there are the conditions in which almost every Hindu child is brought into the world. These have been described with gruesome detail in the book. These conditions are due not to ignorance but to religious traditions. The act of child-birth being in the eyes of the Hindu an unclean act, nothing must come in contact with it which is not already defiled. In the hospitals, of course expectant Indian mothers receive as much expert attention, care and comfort as they would receive anywhere in the world, but in few highcaste Hindu homes would a doctor or nurse be admitted to assist a mother in child-birth, nor comfortable and hygienic conditions be provided for her. To this cause more than any other may be attributed the high rate to infant mortality in India, and there will be no remedy until the women are educated to a different standard and demand the best instead of the worst in the hour of their trial.

Next there is the custom of child marriage and its disastrous consequences to the race. Statesmen and philanthropists have commented on this evil custom for years—Monsieur Clemenceau was its latest critic—but these criticisms have been quite unavailing. The welfare of the race has not weighed a feather in the scale against tradition and habit; Miss Mayo has not merely commented upon the custom, she has drawn a vivid picture of the child wife which has stirred a wave of passionate sympathy throughout the world, and created a storm of protest which may perhaps lead to its modification.

The pitiful condition of the child widow and the child prostitute in the Temples is similarly forced upon our notice. We are not allowed to avert our gaze from these things and pass by on the other side of the road. We are compelled to penetrate behind the purdah in the home of the Hindu and to enter the sacred precincts of the temples where he worships, and there again we are shown the picture of a suffering child. Readers of the book who have never been to India may think that the people to whom these customs belong must be a hard and cruel race, indifferent to the sufferings of children. But this is not so. The Hindu is tender, kind and intensely sensitive where he considers love is due. His love is beautiful and wonderful. Nowhere in the world do children receive more affection and indulgence than in India and family ties are stronger there than in any other country. The Hindu joint family custom places upon the head of a family an obligation to maintain everyone of his relations which is scrupulously fulfilled in all classes. Even animal life is more respected than in the West. The Hindu does not take life for pleasure. But as an Englishman allows his natural love of animals to be subordinated to his love of sport, so the Hindu forgets his natural sympathy with children where they become the victims of customs which are rooted in his religion. There are in India both individuals and organisations which deplore these customs and are trying to get them modified. Miss Mayo's book should give a stimulus to their efforts.

To the questions put to me by my Indian friends, I would reply:—

What Miss Mayo thinks about their country or their customs is of little importance; nor does it matter much what she may make others think. What matters is not what Europe or America thinks or says about India, but what India is and does. What do Indians themselves think about the things which Miss Mayo has described? If they really believed that everything she has said about their customs was simply untrue and that the evils which she says so shocked her were but the creations of her own morbid imagination, they would be wise to ignore the book altogether for such fiction would ultimately do more harm to the author than to the country which she had libelled. If however, they are true, there are two courses open to Indians. Either they must justify the customs which appear shocking to the peoples of the West, or they must seek to change them. The pamphlets and books which purport to be answers to "Mother India" all fail in their object. They are either filled with abuse of Miss Mayo and of British and Americans generally, or they attempt to

place the responsibility for conditions in India upon other shoulders. There is one sentence in "Mother India" which is entirely sound, and Indians would do well to take it to heart. "The only power that can hasten the pace of Indian development towards freedom, beyond the pace it is travelling to-day, is the power of the men of India, wasting no more time in talk, recriminations and shifting of blame, but facing and attacking, with the best resolution they can muster, the task that await them in their own bodies and souls."

That is the simple truth. Indian civilisation is far too old and far too great to be affected by the opinion of any writer. Praise and flattery can make it no less. But the physical welfare of the Indian people required that ancient customs should be modified in accordance with modern scientific knowledge. The opinions of others, whether they be favourable or unfavourable, can do nothing to save or destroy a single life. But customs which produce physical degeneracy or menace health must lead ultimately to race suicide, and no argument about them will prevent their inevitable consequences. Thoughtful Indians have already realised this and are beginning themselves to apply the necessary remedies. They know that political institutions and forms of Government alone cannot save them from the consequences of habits which produce disease, and they are beginning to address themselves in earnest to the problem of public health. The Province with which I was officially connected for five years made little progress during my term of office in the sphere of politics. But great advances were made, in spite of the handicap of post-war financial stringency, in the campaign against disease. The development of the School of Tropical Medical Schools, the growth of co-operative Health Societies, research into the treatment of leprosy, kala-azar, malaria, and hookworm, the public health activities of Union Boards and District Boards, the organisation of infant welfare centres—these were some of the evidences of the progress to which I allude. These activities are little known outside the area of their influence, but in that area they are already bearing valuable fruit. The best answer to "Mother India" would be a book containing such activities throughout India. It would be a laborious task to collect and classify such information, but the labour would be well spent, and if the progress during recent years in other provinces has been as great as it has been in Bengal, the information thus obtained would astonish and gratify the well-wishers of India as much as Miss Mayo's book has distressed them.

—*The Review of the Churches.*

DOSTOYEVSKY'S MARRIAGE

THERE can rarely have been a marriage in which so much anguish and so much happiness was combined as the marriage of Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Anna Grigoryevna. Dostoyevsky was already a famous man, forty-six years old, with many disastrous experiences behind him. Anna was a charming and high-

spirited girl, who now met for the first time the full shock of poverty and the need to adapt herself to a man of incalculable temperament.

It even seems at times that Dostoyevsky was using every effort to drive her to desperation. He put Anna's love for him to the most unreasonable tests. He gave full rein to his irritability and anger. If ever they had scraped together a little money he proceeded, as if driven by a fury, to gamble it all away; and then to ask that his wife should sell even her clothes to provide him with more. Poor Anna had to suffer a thousand humiliations from friends and relatives, from landladies and servants, from tradesmen and pawnbrokers. It would have been a severe trial to her even if she had only to deal with Dostoyevsky's functional maladies; for in itself it must have been distressing for her to look after him in his epilepsy, and to bear the brunt of those black moods in which the attacks left him. When we add to these Dostoyevsky's almost deliberate attempts to see how far he could presume on her love, her courage proved itself almost infinite.

Of course, there was something to make all her troubles worth enduring. With all Dostoyevsky's irritability he was also capable of a supreme tenderness and humanity. What most of all distinguished him from Tolstoy was that he did not keep his wife at a distance; there was no aloofness or cold insistence on keeping up his own moral dignity. His sympathy had radiant and surprising beauty. Moreover, Anna loved him and her love enabled her to bear his tempers, and the enormity of his claims, with equanimity. In her diary she wrote:—

"I simply cannot be cross with him; sometimes I show a severe face to him, but I have only to look at him for all my wrath to melt away."

Their quarrels began almost as they were married; and they were very fierce quarrels, too. Fortunately their love taught them how to quarrel. Sometimes at the height of their disagreements they would suddenly come to themselves and burst out laughing together at the exhibition they had been making. And, still more important, they were both of them unreasonable; they scarcely ever quarrelled over anything but trivialities. A typical scene, for example, occurred barely two months after the wedding:—

"My darling Fyodor bemoaned the fact that I was still dressed all in winter clothes (I had my white fur hat on) and that my gloves were not smart. I was very hurt, and told him, if he thought me so badly dressed we had better not go about together; after which I turned round, quick sharp, and went off in the opposite direction. . . . I felt very upset, and thought it horrid of Fyodor to say things like that. It rained all the time, and the Germans looked astonished to see a young woman like me with no umbrella, and taking no notice of the weather, rushing about the streets. At last I calmed down and realized that Fyodor never really meant to hurt me by what he said, and that I had no reason to get so excited. The thought of our quarrel tormented me, and I was filled with all kinds of horrible thoughts, so that my one idea was to get back to the hotel as soon as ever I could, in the hope of finding Fyodor

already there and being able to make it up with him. Imagine my dismay when they told me he had come back, waited in our room for a few moments, and then gone away again. What I went through! 'He doesn't love me any more,' I thought. 'He has realized how heartless and capricious I am, and has thrown himself into the Spree in his misery!'"

The missing husband came back an hour or two later, in the most excellent of moods. When Anna told him what she had been fearing, "he laughed like anything, and said he would have been a poor specimen indeed to have gone and thrown himself into such a miserable little river as the Spree."

The Diary of Mme. Dostoyevsky, now printed for the first time, gives a very poignant, full and remarkable picture of six months of their first year of married life. There could have been few girls who have passed through such drama and vicissitude in so short a time. She possessed a woman's eye for clear small detail; and her resilience and charm shine through every page. It is astonishing to be reminded how much strength can be given by love. Anna Grigoryevna accomplished the seemingly impossible. By her own generosity and by Dostoyevsky's unparalleled insight and tenderness, a marriage which should have issued in ruin by all the rules of common sense achieved a signal and genuine success.

ALAN PORTER.—*The Spectator*

MAN MADE MORALITY. ,

HOW WOMEN HAVE CHANGED THE CODE OF CONDUCT.

"Yes, indeed, people one never would have met when I was young."

I caught the phrase as I came into the room, and looked at the speaker (writes a middle-aged woman in the "Daily Chronicle"). She was, like me, not more than middle-aged. She had a pleasant face and attractive manner.

In a few moments our hostess brought the conversation back to where it had broken off when I entered.

"You were speaking of the toleration with which people who have been involved in scandals are received in society," she said. "Do go on. I quite agree that there has been a great change in that respect."

A REVOLUTION.

"It is a revolution, my dear," said the first speaker. "And I cannot understand what has caused it. Why are we so slack about morality when our fathers and mothers were so particular? I'm sure you remember the time as well as I do (though we were both young, of course) when a divorced woman found almost all doors closed to her. As a rule, such people went abroad to live."

"Yes," I said, as she paused and looked round as if for support. "I saw a play the other day, called 'The Best People,' by Somerset Maugham. In that there is a peer who ran away with a friend's wife many years ago. The woman tells how everyone cut her, and how she and her peer had to take refuge in Italy, where they lived uncomfortably, and always in fear that someone might behave insultingly to her."

"That was perfectly true--of that period. There was a hard-and-fast line then between what society considered right and what it called wrong. Now it seems to me there is no such line."

Well, I thought about this, and I decided to consult a philosopher of my acquaintance. In a long life he has seen many sides of life and many parts of the world. He smiled when I told him what my errand was.

"Why," he said, "you and your friends must be curiously unobservant. This change you talk of has been going on for a long time. The cause of it is that women no longer accept man made morality, as they once did. They have thought about things for themselves and they have substituted for the standards which men set up a new set of their own."

"That seems to surprise you," he went on. "You haven't been keeping your views up to date. This process of substitution began half a century ago. It is rather less than fifty years since a play called 'A Doll's House' was produced in London (after it had made history in Scandinavia).

A PLAY THAT MADE HISTORY

"In that play a woman came up against men's morality in the matter of a cheque she had forged to save her dying father. Her husband was furious with her so long as he thought the 'crime' would be found out and would reflect shame on him. When that danger passed he was ready to forgive her. But she refused to be forgiven. She left home and slammed the door, and the noise of that door slamming awakened women in all countries to thoughts which had not entered their heads before."

"Then in Germany another dramatist, Sudermann, wrote plays encouraging the idea that women had the right to a point of view of their own, and soon there were any number of books and dramas being published and produced on the same lines. There were angry protests, of course chiefly from men, who said, 'This sort of thing will undermine the foundation of society.'

"Well, those men were right. They are laughed at now, but they did see what was happening. The foundations of the society they knew have been blown up."

"Men had based society upon their right to possess their wives. They therefore made it as unpleasant as possible for any wife who declined to regard herself as a 'possession' of her husband. Husbands made the rules, and if wives broke them they were turned out."

"Gradually that view of marriage gave way. Women were encouraged by Ibsen and Sudermann and other writers, chiefly men writers, to look closely into

the arrangements which had prevailed up to that time. They came to the conclusion that it was a one-sided bargain which women were expected to make when they married.

"They were to be fixed down for life. They were at the mercy of their husbands in many ways—in some ways which to them were very important. They could not make a change if they found that their first choice of a husband was a failure—unless they were prepared to go and live in the wilds. Yet all the time men were at liberty to roam from their lawful spouses as often as they pleased.

WOMAN'S REVOLT

"Women came to the conclusion that this was unfair. They revolted against man-made morality. They declined to be treated as 'possessions.' They declared that they had a right to change partners if they wanted to, and as often as they pleased. They claimed the right also to determine the size of their families, and even whether there should be a family at all.

"Thus there came into existence a New Morality—women's morality, not men's. You think probably that this is degeneration. Don't be too cocksure about that. You don't like it because it is different from what you were brought up to. But just look at the women of to-day, taking them all round, and ask yourself if they are, in essence, inferior to the women at 25, 30, 40 years ago.

"Different, yes. They are the product of different ideas, different ideals, different standards of right and wrong—in a word, of a new morality. It will take time to see how this new morality works. Centuries, perhaps. But there is no need, as far as I can see, to despair of it."

—*The Daily Chronicle.*

EPIGRAMS AND EPITAPHS.

MR. A. H. WATSON'S ADDRESS AT THE ROTARY CLUB.

Many first class minds had been applied to the problem of defining in an epigram, said the speaker, but so far they had failed to evolve a comprehensive definition. If they turned to the dictionaries they found that "an epigram is a verse or short poem ending in some ingenious or witty turn," but that definition failed to cover all the epigrams that were prose. The man who wrote that "the Bible story begins with a man and a woman in a garden and ends with revelations" achieved an almost perfect epigram.

The epitaph and epigram were often combined. An excellent example was one attributed, perhaps wrongly, to Mr. Gladstone. It was written on Robert Lowe, afterwards Lord Sherbrooke, when he was assailing those who had been his friends and colleagues, and it ran:—

Here lie the bones of Robert Lowe,
A faithless friend, a bitter foe.
Who shall pronounce, now he is dead,
Whither his restless soul hath fled!
If to the realms of peace and love
Concord no longer reigns above;
If it hath found a lower level,
All must compassionate the devil.

Shelley did not escape the epigrammatist. On the publication of the greatest of his poems, the "Prometheus Unbound," Theodore Hood wrote:

"Shelley styles his new poem
"Prometheus Unbound,"
And 'tis likely to remain so while time circles round;
For surely an age would be spent in the finding
A reader so weak as to pay for the binding."

Perfect of quite another kind of epigram was Sir John Harrington's famous couplet:—

"Treason doth never prosper. What's the reason?
If it doth prosper, none dare call it treason."

The epigram had been called the hornet of poetry because it so often carried a sting in its tail. It might, however, be a noble compliment, as in the case of Dryden's unsurpassed lines on Homer, Virgil and Milton:—

Three Poets, in three distant ages born,
Greece, Italy and England did adorn.
The first in loftiness of thought surpassed;
The next in majesty: in both, the last,
The force of nature could no further go,
To make a third, she joined the former two."

There was no station of life which placed a man above the web of the epigrammatist, observed the speaker, and quoted Walker Savage Landor's lines on the four Georges as an example :—

" George the First was reckoned vile,
 Viler George the Second ;
 And what mortal ever heard
 Any good of George the Third
 When from earth the Fourth descended
 God be praised, the Georges ended."

The Church has been treated with as little respect as the throne. A brief dialogue between a Bishop and his friend runs :—

" ' I have lost my portmanteau,'
 ' I pity your grief,'
 ' It contained all my sermons,'
 ' I pity the thief.' "

Another epigram of the same kind was written by a clergyman whose rectory had been burgled :—

" ' They came and priggd my stockings,
 My linen and my store ;
 But they couldn't prig my sermons,
 For they were priggd before."

Some epigrammatists were extremely ungallant to women, as for example the distich :—

" While Adam slept, from him his Eve arose ;
 Strange ! his first sleep should be his last repose."

The literature of epitaph, continued the speaker, was of prodigious extent. It had been swollen by contributions from the wisest and the stupidest, the most tender and the most malevolent of mankind. Epitaph making had been regarded by some writers as one of the most difficult of the arts. For grandeur combined with brevity there was no epitaph which surpassed that of Sir Christopher Wren in St. Paul's Cathedral. It consisted of only four words :—

" *Si monumentum quæris circumspecte,*"

the English translation of which was " If you seek his monument look around."

During the discussion that followed Mr. Watson's address, other notable epigrams and epitaphs were quoted by Rotarians, one of the best being a humorous one, told by Rotarian Corn :

" Here lies John Barker
 A billiard marker
 Who has gone for a long rest."

THE RHYME OF INSPECTOR X.

INSPECTOR X he sits at his desk and furrows line his brow ;
He has locked his prisoners up for the night and what is he doing now ?
He is seated in front of a pile of books with pencils big and blue,
And what he has read has gone to his head, as print is apt to do.

*Inspector X he is reading things that make his cropped hair curl ;
And Inspector Y is out in the Park in search of a naughty girl.
It's all for the sake of you and me, though we mayn't be worth our salt,
But if we go to the fires below it won't be Jix's fault.*

Inspector X he sits at his desk, and the light is burning low ;
He is hundreds up on the public now with only ten to go ;
For see he has taken a mighty oath to keep our morals clean,
And as day recedes the books he reads grow more and more obscene.

Miss Radclyffe Hall has gone to the wall, and Mr. Huxley too ;
And Mr. Moore has been dubbed impure, and Mrs. Woolf won't do ;
And Wells has gone, and Bennett has gone, and likewise Bernard Shaw,
For they all of them vex Inspector X whose word is above the law.

Shakespeare has gone, and Milton's gone, and the Prayer Books old and new ;
And Æschylus and Euripides and Homer and Virgil too ;
And works of fiction have fallen fast a shelf-load at a time,
For Inspector X has vetoed Sex and he doesn't approve of Crime.

He has finished his task, and what, you ask, is left for you and me ?
Crockford is left, and Bradshaw's left, and also the A B C ;
And Euclid's left, and Einstein's left, and Mendel's work on peas ;
Inspector X has cleared the decks of everything but these.

Inspector X has cleared the decks and his face is drawn and hard
As the hollow light of another day breaks over Scotland Yard.
All honour then to the worthy men who labour without stint
In a world whose tone has been overthrown - to keep it safe for print.

*Inspector X is censoring books and Inspector Y's in the Park ;
Inspector Z at the Picture House is peering into the dark.
It's all for the sake of you and me, though we mayn't be worth our salt ;
But if we go to the fires below it won't be Jix's fault.*

HUBERT PHILLIPS.

-- *The Nation & Athenæum.*

THE WIFE OF A GENIUS.

ONE of the most ungrateful careers in the world is that of wife to a celebrity. Posterity examines closely the letters or diaries of his family and associates in an eager hope of detecting the impulses and reactions which activated, or at least influenced, his genius. His wife, being so near to him, comes in for the shrewdest glances and every kind of theory is advanced, favourable or unfavourable to her. We forget that, whatever great men may seem to us, to their wives they were principally husbands. It is unfair to expect otherwise, and unfairer to feel, on reading a wife's diary that, if she wept or made a scene, she was an enemy to literature. The truth is, of course, that a close scrutiny of the most admirable life and the most blissful marriage detects much that is regrettable or absurd. A genius does not live a more noble everyday existence than a fool, and the measure of his importance is not to be found in his wife's housekeeping accounts.

It is because we are compelled to love and admire the great Tolstoy that we are anxious to hear more, and yet more, about him, whether as a man or as a writer. Reading in its entirety this new and intimate book, extracts from which the *Spectator* has published recently, we do not lose the feeling that both of the Tolstoyes were probably extremely difficult to live with: but the further insight it gives into their characters can well endear them to us further, and increase, not diminish, our respect. I believe, indeed, that even Mr. Lytton Strachey and M. Maurois greatly increased and in no way minimized the general reader's affectionate interest in *their* shrewdly painted subjects.

Nothing could be stranger or prettier than Countess Tolstoy's account of her short courtship. She undoubtedly married the writer: and found reckoning with the man something of a problem. Nothing could be sadder than the tragedy that befell the bride. Tolstoy made her read his diaries. A fortnight after the marriage she writes: "The whole of my husband's past is so dreadful that I don't think I will ever be able to accept it. . . . He likes to torture me and to see me weep because he has no faith in me." And thirty years later she had still been unable to assimilate that "past": "Marriage cannot be happy after the husband's debauchery. It is a constant wonder to me that we have kept it up so long."

Introspection of a not very helpful kind became a habit with her. Several times each year she suffered premonitions of death. Then she had child after child: one ailed: another was naughty. She is almost always "bored" because, as she says, she "has no imagination," cannot find enjoyment in activity of any kind. She is probably jealous of Tolstoy's talents, and certainly jealous of his amazing interest in "the People." She fears he cares no more for her than for the poor, dirty disciples who come in and out. She tries desperately to be better, and her efforts generally end in tears and gloom and self-deprecation and secret hopes that Tolstoy will be pleased with her and "love" her. What

had really happened was what so often happens to women in marriage: she was trying to fit her old, girlish ideas of "ideal love" on to the man about whom they had crystallized. Naturally enough she never succeeded. As a result, she suffered from injured vanity and compensated herself by feeling moral superiority and quite a degree of martyrdom.

It is easy to feel impatient with her. But she wrote her diary only when she was depressed: when, in fact, she felt she failed the very remarkable man she knew Count Tolstoy to be.

She gives, bit by bit, a lively and fascinating picture of the Tolstoy family. Her notes on his work are invaluable, especially her description of his accidental encounters with the pilgrims from whose simple faith and glowing words he saw what he called "the light" of true Christainity. Even through the more intimate portions of her diary it is possible to detect much of the origin of the work of Tolstoy's old age, *Resurrection*. And since it was during the early years of marriage that he wrote that work of absolute genius, *War and Peace*, for all Countess Tolstoy's tears and means, the reader will close the book remembering less the fact that "he *hardly* ever hurts my feelings" than that he wrote of her as "the one being who has given me the greatest happiness in life and who alone loves me . . . There is a good man within me who sometimes falls asleep. Love him, Sonya, and don't blame him."

—*The Spectator*.

HARDY'S EARLY YEARS.

Hardy was for some time unwilling that his life should be written at all, and only the accident, it seems, of a spurious Life published as authoritative decided him to agree to the writing of this book. His widow, in compiling it, has made use of contemporary notes, diaries, letters, and details given by Hardy in conversation. The book is just what it should be—a detached statement of his early life, amplified with his own comment. There is no attempt at an appraisal of his work, none of that display of "greatness" one has come to associate with such books. The facts are left to speak for themselves.

These fifty years were perhaps the most important in his career, for between 1867 and 1891 all the novels were written except *Jude the Obscure*; and it is certainly for these more than for his poems, even *The Dynasts*, that he will be remembered. During those years he made a habit of noting down impressions and observations—apparently because he thought it a necessary part of the novelist's task, and not because he felt any inclination to do it—discontinuing the habit when he finally gave up prose for verse. They are valuable as much for the light they throw on his character as on his working methods. Hardy disliked writing about himself; he left no autobiography or self-portrait in his books. He was careful at first to mask his identity and the places he was writing about; even afterwards, when he was known, he had a distaste for crushes and dinner-parties, and was dismayed by

Miss Thackeray's surprised exclamation, "Certainly; a novelist must necessarily like society!"

His first novel (*The Poor Man and the Lady*, never published and since destroyed) was written at the age of twenty-seven, six years after he came to London. Before that, as apprentice to a provincial architect, he had written verses which he sent unsuccessfully to magazines. One has a glimpse of him then reading Homer or Virgil for hours before breakfast, working all day in the office and playing the violin at night with his father and uncle at some local gathering. In London he met editors and publishers; Meredith, who was then reader for Macmillan's, saw the manuscript of *The Poor Man and the Lady*, a sweeping satire on modern society, and while praising parts of it, advised the author not to "nail his colours to the mast" in a first book. His suggestion that Hardy should write a story with more "plot" resulted in *Desperate Remedies*, which was published, though not by Macmillan's, and furiously attacked in the *Spectator*. On the whole, though, it seems to have been well received, and *Under the Greenwood Tree*, published in the next year, brought him offers from Tinsley and Leslie Stephen to write serials. Most of his later novels were serialised, and he met from magazine readers the sort of opposition which culminated in the attacks on *Tess* and *Jude the Obscure*—an extra-ordinary rain of abuse, as incredible now as the old Press attacks on Ibsen. Hardy, it seems, was genuinely astonished by each new show of prudery, and in the end so detested the reputation foisted on him by these attacks that he gave up writing novels altogether. Leslie Stephen, writing to him about a passage in *Far From the Madding Crowd*, which needed alteration for the pages of *Cornhill*, apologised for an "excessive prudery of which I am ashamed"; in the serial version of *Tess* which appeared in the *Graphic* the scene of the baptism was cut out altogether, and Angel Clare was made to carry the dairymaids over the stream in a wheelbarrow!

The impression remains from reading this book that the novels were hardly more than an episode in Hardy's life. He began and ended by writing poetry. At one period, when he had finished a couple of novels and had decided to give up writing for architecture, he still hoped to go on writing verse "as a hobby." The idea of *The Dynasts* was present in his mind for many years; one finds such notes as this (as early as 1875):

Mem.: A Ballad of the Hundred Days. Then another of Moscow. Others of earlier campaigns—forming altogether an Illiad of Europe from 1789 to 1815. And:—

Consider a grand drama, based on the wars with Napoleon, or some one campaign (but not as Shakespeare's historical dramas). It might be called "Napoleon," or "Josephine," or by some other person's name.

While he was studying architecture in the country before coming to London, he read only poetry, including the Latin and Greek, and praised *Marmion* as "the most Homeric poem in the English language," regretting that afterwards Scott should have turned to prose. It seems possible that, if he had not—fortunately for English literature—been unsuccessful with his early poems, Hardy might never have written novels at all.

The book ends with the completion of *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* in 1891. Mrs. Hardy makes almost no comment on the effect it was to have on the public. Indeed, her book all through is astonishingly free from comment. It is a piece of work to which the reviewer can genuinely apply that cant word of criticism, "restrained,"

—*The Spectator*.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. By Mr. M. Ruthnaswamy, M.A., (Cantab) Barrister-at-Law.

THE University of Madras is to be congratulated on having secured for the first lecturer under the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri foundation a person of the attainments, outlook, insight and judgment of Mr. Ruthnaswamy. He has handled a rather difficult subject with such consummate skill and ability that a very favourable impression is produced on the mind of the reader. Much need not be said on the importance of the subject matter of the lecture. We in India now are witnessing a noble experiment *viz.*, the application of the principles of democracy, in however halting a manner, to an ancient and heterogeneous community. It is a matter for good fortune that those who have to do the thinking on this particular problem and its ramifications have for their help the contribution of Mr. Ruthnaswamy on the political theory of the Government of India. Though he is modest enough to characterize his lecture as a journeyman's work, those who listened to it were, as I daresay, those who read it will be, impressed with the thought provoking character of the achievement. Mr. Ruthnaswamy has tried to reveal to us the nature of the theory that informed the development of the Government of India since 1858. He has tried to enquire on what philosophy of rule the Government of India has been conducted. We have already remarked that the task is a difficult and delicate one; for, the Government of India is a pragmatic concern and did not develop as a result of any conscious application of a definite and consistent philosophy of Government. But, still, as the lecturer points out even Englishmen who pride themselves on not being a logical people are philosophers without knowing it. Let us examine the philosophy as it has been laid bare by the lecturer.

For his sources of political thought relating to the Govern-

ment of India he has relied on the correspondence of the Secretary of State and the Government of India, the contributions of retired Anglo-Indian administrators and the writings of talented correspondents of the great English newspapers like Sir V. Chirol. The legislative enactments of the Central and Provincial Governments constitute another important source in connection with any enquiry with the theory underlying the Government of India. A survey and examination of the enactments will reveal to us the character of the philosophy that might be said to have informed the development of the Government of India.

Mr. Ruthnaswamy discerns two strands of political thought in the fabric of the Government of India, one strand consisting of what he significantly refers to as feudal paternalism, political materialism and egalitarian justice and the other consisting of liberty and national self-government. By drawing on the utterances and writings of the Viceroys and Secretaries of State he points out that the aim and object of the English rulers of India till about 1916 was to improve the country materially, or, as he puts it, the development of the estate of India and not the building up of the state in India. He further urges that a definite break with such a traditional attitude is marked by the advent of Lord Chelmsford as the Viceroy of India who realised very clearly that India should be endowed with responsible self-government. In tracing the evolution of the policy regulating the Government of India since 1858 we cannot but be struck by the fact that in the minds of the British rulers of India the idea of preparing the country for national self-government was for a long time conspicuous by its absence. This to our mind could not have been helped. By 1858 the British rulers found themselves charged with the governance of a vast population scattered over a big country and divided by language, customs and religion. In those circumstances it was hardly possible for practical administrators to think of anything but promoting the material and administrative progress of the country. The low standard of life of the people and their lack of initiative forced on the Government of India a policy the inspiration of which cannot be obviously derived from the people. Mr. Ruthnaswamy referring to the statement of Sir T. Holderness in 1910 that British rule in India

'had to play the part of universal provider and special providence' points out that the theory of state socialism "accounts for the land policy which till recently looked upon land revenue as rent rather than tax as well as for the famine policy, the irrigation projects, the public works, the preponderantly agricultural interests and the indifferent industrial policy of the Government of India." It is rather far-fetched, one should think, to explain the land revenue policy consistently pursued by the Government of India in this country by reference to any theory of State socialism adopted by the rulers of British India. The land revenue policy of the Government of India which treated the Government as part proprietor or sole proprietor of the land was an inheritance from the Moghuls and was adhered to by the Government except during the period when the permanent revenue settlement was adopted with reference to certain regions in the country. The Government was in no mood to relax substantially the rigidity of that theory since there were not adequate alternative sources of revenue by depending on which alone to the exclusion of land revenue a civilised administration can be supported. The British Government in India addressed itself to the problem of making provision for the discharge of what may be called the primary functions of Government. They could obviously not run any risks in the matter of protecting the country from external aggression and had to lay the foundations for civilised life by way of maintaining internal order. Law courts had to be established and an incorruptible judiciary had to be evolved. Railway communications had to be developed partly for military ends and partly for the purposes of trade. An enlightened bureaucracy could not sit with folded hands while the failure of the monsoon subjected tracts of varying extent of the country to the horrors of famine. The British Government in India therefore necessarily had to look after the promotion of railways and irrigation works. The members of the bureaucracy in India could not go to the furthest extent even in the matter of developing the estate of India. Whereas the nineteenth century witnessed in other parts of the civilised world an increase in the standard of life of the bulk of the people, an application of science to industry and agriculture, and in short a modernization of the apparatus of production, the

British Government in India by the very circumstances of their relation to a vast heterogeneous population of an alien race were not in a position to achieve great triumphs in respect of raising the standard of life of the people and thus adding appreciably to the economic welfare of the average citizen. This limited success in the field of what Mr. Ruthnaswamy designates as political materialism was due among other causes to the necessity for the British Government in India to be very chary of adding to the burdens of the people. Any large policy of material expansion will have to be carried out either by private initiative or State enterprise. Indigenous private enterprise was not equal to the occasion and the state in India was not prepared to go further than undertake the construction of irrigation works and railways. Further the state socialism of the Government of India was of a particular brand. It went strangely enough hand in hand with an indifferent industrial policy. Thus the State socialism of the Government of India was not of the variety that developed in Europe to correct in some respects the evils of individualism that marked the progress of the Industrial revolution. It was rather a relic of the middle ages when the state was conceived of as the superior landlord and conceptions of sovereignty and landlordism were inextricably intermixed. Thus through the 19th century we find under British rule conditions that partook of the mediaeval as well as the modern. The political materialism of the Government of India did not go as far as lovers of progress desired on account of the obstacles presented by a lack of initiative and leadership in the country, the low taxable capacity of the people, the heterogeneous character of the population, and the alien character of the personnel that gave direction to the administration.

Referring to the educational policy of the Government of India Mr. Ruthnaswamy points out that "education as a means of material progress and administrative efficiency, and at the best of intellectual culture but not as a means of moral and political progress has been the motive of the educational policy of British rule in India." Primarily the educational system was designed to produce men and women who can man the administrative services of the Government. There was also the aim of making western

• knowledge and methods available to the higher classes of the Indian population. In the absence of an all embracing system of primary education and a determined effort on the part of the natural leaders of the people to bring about social reform and the breakdown of age-long prejudices and superstitions the educational programme of the Government could achieve moral progress only in a very limited measure.

• Mr. Ruthnaswamy has made clear that the Anglo-Indian administrators were positive that popular government would have mischievous consequences in India. While they honestly held such a view it should not be forgotten that the view did fit in with what most of them conceived to be the interests of Englishmen. While Sir Henry Maine in 1887 wrote that the introduction of democratic institutions will only help to lift into supremacy a small class of about 10,000 men or a particular caste, Lord Salisbury held that the educated classes could not be anything else than opposition in quiet times, and rebels in times of trouble. Such an attitude towards self-government was not quite a favourable condition for the conception and execution of an energetic programme of even material development. Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India 1895-1904 said, "I always felt that the more we raised the state of prosperity and the standard of efficient government in India under Pax Britannica, the stronger would be the demand for self-government." Thus we find that even the programme of political materialism, and the development of the estate of India could not have been full-blooded.

As for the other strand of political thought, that of liberty and self-government, Mr. Ruthnaswamy points out that there was a very general tendency among the great Anglo-Indian administrators to be very lukewarm towards it. Lord Ripon naturally occupies an honoured place in the evolution of self-government in India. But even he lays more stress on good government rather than on self-government and, though he emphasised the importance of local self government as a means of political education of the people it is not clear that even he was for popular self-government as applied to national affairs. As the Quarterly Reviewer puts it with reference to Lord Hardinge's work, political expediency was the guiding motive of the Indian Government.

Sir V. Chirol while suspicious of democratic government urged that 'our object, therefore, both in the education and political training of Indians should be to direct the activities of the new Western educated classes into economic channels which would broaden their own horizon'. It was precisely because much was not done in the direction indicated by Sir V. Chirol that the demand for national self government became so insistent and pressing in India since about 1910. Finding that the channels of economic progress were more or less blocked the educated classes threw themselves vigorously into the agitation for political and constitutional advance. In this connection it occurs to our mind that the wild demands for ultra democratic institutions put forward by the Chartists of 1848 in England were not followed up by the working classes in that country since the magnificent industrial and commercial progress of England after that date did much to blunt the edge of political agitation and promoted the industrial side of trade union activity.

Mr. Ruthnaswamy pays eloquent tribute to the part played by the Round Table group in creating a favourable atmosphere for the application of the principle of responsible self-government to the Government of India. In that connection he says "I have done it also to correct an erroneous view which holds the field that the new principle of Government in India was forged in the furnace of the Great War and was more or less a war measure. From the dates it will be seen that the new theory had begun to work in the minds of the rulers of India sometime before the war." Though further on in the course of his lecture he states the he does not want to minimise the influence of the war, he is still of the opinion that the thought of the Round Table group was mainly responsible for the new principle of government enshrined in the Constitutional Reforms of 1919. A close examination of the relevant dates fails, however, to establish this claim. It is said that in 1910 during a walk in one of the forests of the Pacific slopes Mr. Marris revealed to Mr. Curtis the view "that self-government however far distant was the only intelligible goal of British policy in India, that it only needed a guiding principle and no other was thinkable". We are further told that from 1912 onwards Mr. William Marris and Sir James Meston,

had been urging upon Mr. Curtis the need for the Round Table mind being brought to bear on the Indian problem. But we find Mr. Ruthnaswamy stating that Mr. Curtis visited India in 1916, and met a number of men with Round Table leanings and the influence of the Round Table mind on the political theory of the Government of India began. It will thus be seen that it was the notion that the German challenge was directed against free institutions and that the world should be made safe for democracy coupled with the loyalty of the princes and people of India, not to speak of the heroism and devotion of the Indian army and the impassioned plea for self-determination which swept the world that induced the hard headed British statesmen to extend the principle of responsible self-government by stages to the governance of India. After the splendid demonstrations of Indian loyalty since the outbreak of the war in 1914 it did not require particular generosity and political sagacity for Mr. Ker the Editor of the Round Table to write as follows in 1916. "The people of India and Egypt no less than those of the British Isles and Dominions must be gradually schooled in the management of their national affairs."

Referring to current politics Mr. Ruthnaswamy deplores that 'although the despotism is gone or going, the theory of an enlightened state doing things for unenlightened individuals is still there. Etatism and state socialism still reign supreme although the character and constitution of the institutions of the state is being modified.'

He doubts whether state socialism to which every political party in India adheres is compatible with democracy and urges that a numerous and powerful bureaucracy is the greatest enemy of modern democracy. He concludes this portion of his lecture with the lesson that "one of the first things that a free and self-governing India will have to do is to give battle to the theory of state action and state interference which, however tolerable in a period of foundations and of transition is incompatible with real liberty." While examining this part of his contribution one cannot but be moved to admiration over the sublime note that Mr. Ruthnaswamy strikes in favour of liberty and self-governing institutions. He is anxious that in the new era of responsible self-government at least, no bureaucracy should exercise its wither-

ing influence on liberty. In his dislike for bureaucracy Mr. Ruthnaswamy is quite representative of the Indian articulate opinion and political thought. Though Sir Alfred Lyall believed that 'in the subconscious mentality of the Indian people, bureaucracy holds the place which self-government occupies with us' Indian politicians of all parties declaim in no uncertain terms against bureaucracy, brown as well as white. This is a phenomenon which requires to be accounted for especially when one realises that in the nineteenth century bureaucracies in Germany, Austria, France, Japan and Italy had rendered yeomen service in promoting economic and administrative progress and thus helping to establish conditions favourable for democratic advance. It is rather remarkable that a people like that of India among whom the principle of authority in the field of social obligation is yet instinct with life should be so impatient of bureaucracy. The explanation for this attitude of mind lies, one should rather think, in the exaltation of private initiative and individual liberty by mid-Victorian English writers and statesmen from whom the intelligensia of India learnt their lessons. In the England of the nineteenth century there was sufficient inventiveness, capacity for organisation, and initiative among the people of England, so that the school of thought developed naturally which stood for distrust of government interference. In India though the conditions were different the English attitude was almost blindly followed which, one is led to think, having become crystallised as a hallowed tradition explains the prevalent distrust of bureaucracy. Perhaps, this attitude has received further reinforcement from the fact that the British bureaucracy which has governed the country all these years has not achieved striking success in dispelling ignorance, improving public health and in modernizing agriculture and industry. Further it need not be pointed out that liberty makes an appeal that is intoxicating in its incidence.

Adverting to the question of the relation between democracy and state socialism it is true that liberty stands in danger of encroachment by state socialism. In most democratic countries of the world including England modern industrial conditions are paving the way for the enthronement of a powerful bureaucracy. It is therefore incumbent on lovers of liberty and progress that

bureaucratic power is kept within narrowest bounds and that private initiative has as wide a scope for its exercise as conditions will permit. In India, particularly at present we should be on our guard in not imposing the burden of state socialism while our resourcefulness is being strained in adapting democratic institutions to our peculiar social and economic conditions. It is up to the leaders of public opinion in India to realise that by evoking and giving free play to whatever private initiative may be found among any community in the country an atmosphere of goodwill and a capacity for organisation and discipline should be created. The warning that Mr. Ruthnaswamy has given is, therefore, particularly pertinent since politicians of all parties in India are not sufficiently alive to the danger of state socialism especially in view of the rather crude and naive ideas which most of them have of promoting narrow communal ends.

Before bringing to a close this rather long review we may be permitted to refer to the almost seductive character of the style and diction of the lecturer. One cannot help remarking on the ease, naturalness and dignity of the style.

As the first lecturer under the foundation he has set a standard which we hope his successors will succeed in reaching and maintaining.

MADRAS.

T. K. DURAISWAMY AIYER.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF BUDDHISM. By Professor J. B. Pratt,
Pp. XII, 758, Macmillan & Co., 1928, 15 net.

IN these days of the undoing of faiths many thoughtful men the world over are drawn towards the highly ethical and at the same time rationalistic doctrine of Buddha. Professor Pratt's book is a sign of the growing interest in Buddhist teaching—and its significance for modern life. The author is not a Pāli scholar or a specialist in Buddhism. "It would be possible with sufficient study to write a learned book on Buddhism which should recite the various facts with scholarly exactness yet leave the reader at the end wondering how intelligent and spiritual men and women

of our day could really be Buddhists. I have sought to avoid this effect and have tried in addition to enable the reader, when he has turned the last page, to understand a little *how it feels to be a Buddhist*" (p. VIII). The author approaches the subject with sympathy and reverence. He not merely expounds the concepts but attempts to express those subtler sentiments and the emotional undertones which make Buddhism a live religion to-day.

After a brief statement of the founder's personality (I) we have a thoroughly well informed account of the teachings of Buddha. The four noble truths are expounded with an eye on modern conditions of thought and life. (II) Professor Pratt, is quite definite that the moral teaching of Buddha is "not primarily and chiefly negative." A whole chapter is devoted to the exposition of the positive side of Buddhist ethics. (III). The metaphysical background of Buddhism is set forth lucidly and the treatment of the difficult questions of the nature of the self and nirvana is scholarly and up-to-date. "Buddha believed in some sort of ultimate and noumenal self. . . . The moral earnestness of the Buddha and his insistence on responsibility would seem to demand some kind of real, identical and abiding self," a conclusion which seems to be much more definite than the facts warrant. Taking up the question of the implications of Buddha's silence on the nature of nirvana, professor Pratt says: "There are three possible ways of accounting for his silence. One is that he held a purely naturalistic view of things, considering the self to be nought, and nirvana to be complete nothingness, but refrained from telling what he thought for fear of hurting sensitive feelings. This view of the Buddha's position is so plainly out of harmony with most of the things he said that it needs no discussion here. The second hypothesis is that the Buddha was himself agnostic on all the ultimate problems; that he refused to answer the questions asked him because he did not know the answer himself. This is a perfectly possible hypothesis. It is the hypothesis of Professor Keith; and in the absence of more definite statements in the Nikâyas, it will probably always remain one of the possibilities. Personally I do not accept it. With Professor Radhakrishnan and (I gather) with Sir Charles Eliot, I prefer the third interpretation of the Buddha's silence. I prefer it chiefly because it is the inter-

pretation of the Buddha himself. Professor Pratt inclines to a positive view of the nature of nirvana. (Pp. 89—90).

The later growth of Buddhism in India is traced at some length and the account is based mainly on the records of the Chinese travellers, Fa Hien, Hiuen-Tsiang and I-Tsing. From Chapter VII onwards we have a somewhat detailed story of the adventures and achievements of Buddhism in the neighbouring lands of Ceylon and Burma, Siam and Cambodia. The mahâyâna religion and philosophy in its two forms of the *Madhyamika* and the *yogachara* systems are next considered (XII) and the author is inclined to interpret the doctrine of sunya in a positive way (pp. 239—240) and the *alayavijnana* in a cosmic sense. There is no account of Nepalese and Tibetan Buddhism but the details of the spread and growth of Buddhism in China (XIV—XX) Korea (XXI) and Japan (XXII—XXXI) are set forth with care and knowledge. No other book brings together such a large mass of information relating to Buddhism, from the birth of Buddha at Kapilavastu down to the founding of the Mahabodhi Society in London.

The concluding chapter gives a very sensible and true conception of the relation of Buddhism to Christianity. The writer has no sympathy with the narrow missionary propaganda. "There are four possible relations that the two religions may hold to each other in the future. They may continue in the state of mutual welfare which to a considerable extent characterises them to-day. Secondly, one of them may succeed in destroying the other. Thirdly they may conceivably coalesce or finally they might tacitly agree to settle down and live side by side, as partners, perhaps in a common business, as friendly rivals possibly, but not as foes. This last is in my opinion the consummation most devoutly to be wished." (p. 734). Such a view of free trade in religion is possible only to one who believes in the truth of Buddhism and capacity to do some of the common moral and spiritual work which all religions are expected to promote. "It seems to me an unfortunate and misleading question to ask, which of these two great religions is true and which false? For both possess much truth and neither one is wholly

beyond illusion. Nor can we say in any absolute and complete sense that either one is altogether better than the other. There are many souls whose inner life can be best nourished by what Christianity has to give and there are those who will find their spiritual needs best supplied by Buddhism. Neither of the religions could wholly supplant the other without a real loss to the human race. Such is its peculiar function in the spiritual economy of the human world." (p. 746). I doubt whether many liberal Christians even will accept such characteristically Hindu position.

Along with Holmes's *The Creed of Buddha*, Coomaraswamy's *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, Sir Charles Eliot's *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Professor Pratt's book deserves a place in every library of books on philosophy and religion. It will be extremely useful to the ordinary reader and of no small value to even the specialists.

S.

SOVIET RUSSIA BY PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, The Allahabad Law Journal Press, Allahabad.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru needs no apology for giving a permanent shape to the articles that had already appeared in the press. It is impossible, as he says, to be indifferent towards Russia. She is our neighbour and, much more than that she has been the stage where a momentous drama of modern history has been recently enacted. Again, on her soil a supreme experiment, fraught with grave possibilities for mankind, is being tried. India must needs know about Russia. It is very gratifying, therefore, to have in a small and engaging volume the impressions of a highly intelligent and enlightened Indian. Pandit Jawaharlal does not attempt a systematic exposition of the principles and practice of Soviet administration. Rather, he writes in the mood of a tourist and hence his impressions have the appearance of casualness. But throughout the book one can see the admiration and sometimes even enthusiasm for all that he has seen in Russia.

Pandit Jawaharlal relates in bitterness the tale of how Russia has been maligned and misrepresented. He shows us that the alarmist and sensational pictures drawn of Russia, depicting her in league with the devil are all false and that to-day she is as sober a country as one can find anywhere else in the world. The remarkable effort which she is making to build up her national resources and that against the organised antipathy of a vast majority of powerful nations, fills him with wonder and admiration. He sees industry, prosperity and contentment. He is impressed greatly with the methods of education, local self governments, criminal law and administration of the new regime. He tells us that the Russians have not glorified sex promiscuity and, that on the contrary women in Russia enjoy greater privileges and have greater sense of self respect and self-reliance than anywhere else in the world. Pandit Jawaharlal points out how the once wholly agricultural Russia is fastly becoming industrialised.

But we may venture to remark, that in spite of the efforts of the communists, Russia will for long retain the character of an agricultural country and peasants will be the most important factor. The material condition of the peasants according to Jawaharlal has greatly improved since the days of the Romanoffs. There is no longer the landlord squeezing out of the tenant the last rouble. The peasants have come into a new sense of dignity and importance. They are no longer at the mercy of an absentee owner. They are freer and more prosperous. Agricultural banks, and rural credit societies are keeping them off from indebtedness. The peasant homes and other centres are diffusing useful knowledge and are helping to make their lives more cheerful. Though in the early stages of the revolution the seats of authority had been filled by the city workers and intellectual classes, the peasants are, by slow degrees, coming into their own.

It is no doubt true that hitherto they have backed the politicians of Moscow and helped in the dismemberment of the historic Empire of Russia. But what is their real attitude towards communism? Is their support only temporary or one that would last for ever? The peasants know very little

about the socialist economies and care even less. They are after more concrete things. Pleasant homesteads are much more real to the peasants than the theory of surplus value. They want land, freedom to cultivate it, immunity from oppressive taxation, and a reasonable assurance of peace and security. Pandit Jawaharlal tells us that in the early stages of the revolution the peasants held aloof and it was Lenin's genius which won over the Peasants' Congress to his side. The peasants eager to extricate the land they till, and on which they live, from the clutches of an archaic landlordism did not require great persuasion to join the rebel camp. They were ready to rise, be the creed what it may. The nobility fell and Russia of history vanished. Land was liberated and distributed. The peasants awoke to a sense of ownership of land—a feeling that they had not experienced across the centuries. The doctrinaire communism was a bitter pill. The peasants would not have it. Lenin started compromising. The earliest decrees of the Soviet Government prohibited the alienation of land either by way of selling, or renting or pledging. Hiring of labour was also prohibited. But even by 1922 discontent grew and renting for a small period was allowed and in 1926 the period of renting was increased and also the hiring of labour was permitted. Communism is getting on by making concessions to the standpoint of the peasants. This impasse, as pointed out by Jawaharlal is reflected in the Stalin *vs.* Trotsky controversy. To our mind that way lies the future trouble for Soviet rule. Communism but must beware of the peasants.

Pandit Jawaharlal makes us see the freedom, and the almost delirious delight with which its advent has been heralded. The pent up life of the nation burst out into hysterical fits of liberty. With a violent swing Russia turned away from her past. The monarchy, the nobility, the priesthood are all gone. It is entirely a new Russia that Jawaharlal sees, something quite different from the Russia of history.

We are told again, of the remarkable pace with which modernization is going on. Peter the Great introduced the departments, smart official routine and manners of the western Europe into a country that had not emerged out of the stupor of the middle ages. And an unsettlement of life and values was

the result. The cupidity, and corruption of bureaucracy made matters worse. The soul of Russia had resisted all this. The sense of oppression that one feels in the brooding anthology of the Russian literature of the last century is nothing but the expression of that reaction. Russia did not know what to throw away. Everything looked oppressive and when the opportunity came she threw away all. To the credit of the communists, it must be said, that they do not prefer half measures. Russia is now modern with a vengeance.

Jawaharlal tells us that religion has been abolished in Russia. The churches are being turned into reading rooms. Where an altar stood, now stands a card table. For the moment, no doubt, the communist maxim 'religion is the opiate of the people' holds sway. But one asks 'for how long'? Can it be for ever or is this organized atheism only a passing phase? We know it is hard to answer that question, and we do not blame Jawaharlal for not answering it. But we suspect that the deeper yearnings of the Russian spirit as voiced in the work of her great artists, Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky cannot for long be satisfied with radio-sets and electric lights.

In the last chapter entitled 'Russia and India' Pandit Jawaharlal pleads that whatever might be the attitude of the British Empire, India at any rate has no need to harbour illwill or suspicion towards Russia. And this chapter we must admit has been written more in the vein of a politician than a critical student. In a chapter to which the title "Russia and India" had been given one would expect that a deeper analysis of the bearing of Russian experiment on the Indian situation or of its value, if any, to the work of nation building here, would have been attempted. But throughout the book he integrates the Russian experiment to the Indian conditions. This and the grace and clearness of the author's writing may lead the unwary into thinking that all will be well with India if she also turns communist. In the present economic state of this country, communism would spell disaster and even to play with the idea is to play with fire.

REVIEWS REVIEWED.

THE CRITERION (December, 1928).

Bernard Shaw's "*Intelligent Woman's Guide*" is the subject on which Mr. Laski, Dr. D'Arcy etc., write with discrimination and understanding. Mr. Laski believes that Shaw's indictment of capitalist civilisation is conclusive. He says

"If capitalist civilization is to go, what is to take its place? Mr. Shaw votes for equality of income; and he proceeds to demonstrate its adequacy by the annihilation of all alternatives. Here, as I think, he is logically successful, and empirically unsuccessful. It is not, I believe, logically possible to show that any differences in income are referable, in their exact proportions, to principle. You cannot prove that the average Lord Chancellor is justly or wisely remunerated at twice the salary of a judge of the High Court and nearly seven times the salary of a County Court judge. You cannot, either, prove that there is the slightest relationship between sound principle and the relative incomes, say, of Sir Ronald Ross and a fashionable women's doctor in Harley Street. Nor is it, I think, on the evidence deniable that a society on which, for whatever cause, there are wide disparities of income will be a society in which personality is largely evaluated in terms of the income to which it is annexed; men will be judged important not for what they do or think, but for what they can spend. This again, produces a society in which the realization of moral principle is irrelevant.

But this seems to me a case not for a rigorous equality of income, but rather for the simultaneous application of two principles: (a) the establishment of an upper limit of income, and (b) the attempt at a rough proportionality between income and function. Pace Mr. Shaw, I do not see why society is really better off if a professional boxer has the same income as Mr. Shaw; and I think that if we tried to pay the same income to a Prime Minister as to a milkman, we should be driven to juggling with systems of allowances which would make equality without any meaning. There is, moreover, the problem of establishing the equality; and to get it would, I believe, necessitate a bloody civil war in which the army supporting the government would be given a special rate of pay to persuade it not to desert to the other side."

On the question of equality of means, Dr. D'Arcy writes "If all are to share alike, then the strong and the weak, the skilled and the unskilled, the intellectual and the manual worker must get more or less than they earn. The two principles

must clash unless there is equality also in nature, human nature and in their products. Quite apart from the fact that men's wants and preferences differ so widely as to defy an arithmetical equality, there are, as we know, good and bad fields and material, climates and foods; there are best slices from the joint and best seats in a theatre, and there are jobs no one wants and jobs snug enough to attract everybody. Mr. Shaw admits that persons with a lucrative talent should be allowed to benefit by it, and he hides the gravity of this admission by joking about prima donnas and surgeons; but the truth is that once we admit this exception there is an end to his sacred painciple. He avoids the difficulty of unpleasant and easy work by suggesting that workers in the hardest occupations should be compensated by shorter hours. This measure would have as effect that greater numbers would have to be employed at the uncongenial labour, and if the work were injurious to the health or dangerous to life, we should have a state more like a Purgatorio than a Paradiso."

The article on the *Tragic Element in the Divine Comedy* is very thoughtful and provocative. The Book reviews are an important part of the issue.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (January, 1929.)

Right Hon. Neville Chamberlain writes with authority on the Local Government Bill and deals at length with many of the major reforms with which the Bill deals. Sir John Marriot compares the condition of England in 1838 with that in 1928 and concludes "The 'condition of England' to-day is not desperate. Even M. Sieffried does not believe that 'she will go to smash.' But it is grave, and it is the part of patriotism to face the facts, and, having faced them, not to quail before the application of the remedy. We are in the presence of an industrial situation which is literally without precedent. The traditional remedies will no longer avail. To discover new remedies demands wisdom: to apply them will call for courage. May neither be lacking." The Bishop of Durham has an article on "Disestablishment by Consent." The most interesting article in the whole number is that on *Human Nature* by Professor Elliot Smith. His article is a learned and eloquent plea for the view that man is naturally inclined to peace. The utopias of the Golden Age are not mere poetic fictions or fantasies of sentimental dreamers.

"No one questions the fact that there has been a refinement of manners and a tremendous increase in comfort and luxury in modern times; but it must not be forgotten that warfare and cruelty, injustice and brutality, are equally the results of civilisation and are not natural modes of behaviour. All men fight in defence of

their lives and for the safeguarding of their families; but the causes that provoke such conflicts are results of departures from the original Arcadian manner of living.

There should be least excuse for citizens of the British Empire, of all people, to harbour misunderstanding of human nature. For centuries our fellow-countrymen have governed primitive peoples in many outlying parts of the world and learned by personal experience to appreciate the true character and the good behaviour of Natural Man. A couple of recent experiences will perhaps give point to these general remarks.

In the course of conversation with a colonial administrator who has had more than thirty years' experience in the administration of the territory most commonly used as a symbol for the home of wild men, I asked what he considered the outstanding qualities of human nature. He gave the significant answer: How else could a couple of English youths, perhaps fresh from Oxford or Cambridge, administer a territory as big as Wales, and with a large population addicted to the practice of head-hunting, if men taken in the bulk were not peace-loving and good-natured?' A young man who is at present governing a population of half a million people in Africa tells me he has only a handful of native police to assist him in maintaining order in this vast population of savages. Yet the country is happy and peaceful. I might quote many other illustrations of similar experiences that have come to my own knowledge by direct contact with the people concerned. But I have said enough to remind my readers of considerations they should not overlook.

Yet, even with centuries of such experience on the part of our administrators, the claim that the true savage is the very reverse of the usual connotation of the word 'savage' is still received with widespread incredulity. This scepticism is entertained not merely by such of the general public as are lacking in personal experience of primitive peoples, but also by scientific men who have done field work in anthropology or whose business in life is to study human nature."

THE ROUND TABLE (December 1928.)

The opening article on "*A plea for an Independent Foreign Policy*" concludes with the following sane observations:

"The broad policy for Great Britain and the British Empire to pursue in the world is surely clear. So far as Europe is concerned it is to work whole-heartedly with both France and Germany through the League of Nations for the prevention of war and the settlement of all international disputes by pacific means. Before the war there were issues raised by the existence of the three military empires and the suppression of nationality, which could only be settled by war or revolution. There are no such issues to-day. The problems presented by the Balkan frontiers, the Anschluss, the Russian frontiers, even by the Polish Corridor and the present-day disparity in armaments, will be soluble by peaceful means, if France, Germany

and Great Britain are resolved that they must not be settled by war and that in due time reason and justice, as applied through the League, shall prevail.

The road is not going to be a simple one. It will not be easy to induce a reasonable spirit in both France and Germany about those readjustments of the Treaty of Versailles which will be necessary if there is to be real appeasement in Europe. Nor will it be easy to get rid of the tremendous preponderance of armaments possessed by France and her allies to-day, without drifting back to the old system of a balance between two great military groups. But it is certain that Great Britain will only be able to help Europe to reach the condition when all her problems can be settled on the basis of reason and justice at Geneva, under the leadership of France, Germany and herself, if she maintains an attitude both of resolute friendliness and of determined independence in her relations with both her neighbours. The method of entering into special understandings and military or naval ententes with either neighbour must inevitably be fatal to real co-operation with the third.

The need for independence is even more imperative when looked at from the Imperial and American points of view. The basis for Anglo-American relations must clearly be the Peace Pact—that is to say, the naval Powers should undertake never to settle their differences by war but only by pacific means, and, as the inevitable corollary, to use their influence and their power to prevent any international questions whatever being settled by war. But progress on this line is only possible if both Great Britain and the United States cease to provide for their security or the protection of their maritime trade either by preponderant armaments or by naval ententes with other naval Powers. If Great Britain tries to interpret "parity" as meaning a system in which, in fact, she has command of the sea outside American waters, or if the United States tries to interpret parity as giving her the right to ships and bases which will give her the power to protect her trade in every ocean, competition is inevitable, and competition, as all history shows, ends in war. The only way forward is that the two leading naval Powers should agree to try to "outlaw" war altogether, for if they succeed, the question of what is to happen to their trade when one is a belligerent and the other a neutral will never arise.

It is surely clear that a policy based upon any kind of special understanding with any other Power, France, the United States, Germany, Italy or Japan, can only lead to fatal difficulties, to the permanent entanglement of Great Britain in a new European balance, and to war both in Europe and on the high seas. There is only one policy to pursue and that is to make it clear to France, once and for all, that, as her best friend, we can enter into no unilateral ententes and alliances with her of any sort or kind, that our policy in Europe or outside is to do everything we can to bring nations together and to prevent war and to ensure the peaceful settlement of all international disputes, and that the only hope for France's own security is to work for good relations between Great Britain and both Germany and the United States, for if these four can put into practice in their respective spheres the ideals of the League, Locarno, and the Peace Pact, there is no Power on earth that dare challenge them to war.

The second article deals with the Presidential Election in the United States of America. The article on *Italy in 1928* may be of interest to Indian readers :

" As compared with the slow progress made under past regimes with their want of capacity, indifference, or parliamentary handicaps, Fascism, it must, in all fairness, be admitted, has shown a zeal, a quickness and an efficiency which are in many ways admirable. Whatever the future may have in store many of the things it has done will last and bring real benefit to the country. To give a list of them would take too long, but they comprise roads, railways, ports, hydraulic machinery, aqueducts, public buildings and many other undertakings. Only last September, the Council of Ministers issued supplementary estimates authorising an additional expenditure of 235 million lire. Particular attention has been paid to agriculture. The Minister of Public Works recently brought in a Bill providing for *bonifica integrale* as they are called, i.e., land reclamation, and for all that should go with it in the way of roads, houses, stables, drinking water, etc., to enable the settlers to live in comfort. The scheme was spread over a period of years and involved a total cost of five milliard lire. Communes and provinces show the same feverish activity in constructive work.

In the Fascist Government's own programme one notices an exaggeration which is typical of everything it does. And although one of its objects is to find work for a large number of workmen—the economic crisis is still acute—many of its works, particularly the plans for the embellishment of the cities, seem to be prompted more by national pride than by real necessity. But even works whose usefulness is indisputable often represent a burden which for the time being is beyond the financial capacity of the country. Fascist Italy embarks lightly upon expenditure which its citizens, deprived of their representation both in Parliament and the communes, have no means of controlling. The State finances are themselves a puzzle, but there is no mystery about the position of the Exchequer on May 24 last when, after eleven months of the financial year, a surplus of 150 millions of lire was shown on paper, though there was really a deficit of about a milliard. As for the communes, their expenditure is so extravagant that the Government had recently to circularise its Podestas—the officials who have replaced the old elected mayors—requiring economy. There is also the question of corruption. There is admittedly a great deal of exaggeration in the stories that go about the country, but there is no doubt that many unscrupulous officials contrive to line their own pockets.

All this money is spent, it is true, in the name of patriotism. It is the boast of Fascism to have stirred up the national conscience, restored the authority of the State, re-established order and discipline, revived religion and imposed respect for the church. This is the burden of every Fascist speech and article. But although the country owes it a great deal for the progress made on the material side, the same cannot be said of the moral side. For Fascism, which is nothing if not thorough, everything Fascist is good and everything non-Fascist bad. It was the same

with the despotisms of the past. It is natural that "bad citizens" should be kept out of public affairs, and prevented from writing in the newspapers in Fascist Italy, even when they are not quietly deported or obliged to fly the country. It is equally natural that too many should learn that it pays to become "good citizens," and there are disadvantages from the standpoint of character building in such a school.

The Fascist, to make use of an English slang expression, is a "whole hogger", and everything, including even justice, which should come before everything else, has been subordinated to Fascism. Judges and magistrates are looked upon as employees of the State, which, in Fascist Italy, means, of Fascism. The law has been made more severe, but its severity is reserved for those whose offence consists of opposition to the Regime. In the course of a couple of years the special tribunal has given more than 2,500 years of penal servitude to persons accused of communism. The following are a few instances of the administration of justice: The trial in Rome last August for the attempt at Bologna on Mussolini's life confirmed the doubt that the person who fired the revolver was not the boy Zamboni who was lynched by the crowd. Yet, the boy's father and aunt were each sentenced to 30 years' penal servitude on the charge of having instigated him to commit the crime, though no evidence came out from the proceedings which justifies this conclusion. Even more significant was a sentence passed by the special tribunal at a recent trial on a man who had shot a couple of Fascists near Lucca. After being condemned to death, he petitioned the King to pardon him. His petition was not even submitted to the sovereign. The man was shot by a squad of black shirts. Capital punishment has only recently been introduced into Italy and is limited to causes of attempts upon the life of the King or the Prime Minister, and offences against the security of the State. It was decided that a man who kills a Fascist because he is a Fascist, "is guilty of an attempt against the security of the State." This sentence was placarded in every commune in the country. It is typical of the way in which Fascists understand and apply justice. It becomes in their hands an instrument for the consolidation of their own power and for the intimidation of their opponents. Another of their instruments is the police. When the internal estimates were under discussion last May, a Senator stated—and his statement was not even challenged—that a milliard lire, an amount equal to the expenditure of France and England combined, are spent every year on them. If the country is really so quiet and contented, why waste all this on secret agents?

The truth is that the Fascist oligarchy does not really feel secure. It knows that buttonhole badges, Roman salutes, flag wagging, band music, and the homage paid to the Duce by thousands of people in the streets of Rome on anniversaries do not count for much. The bulk of the Italians, at heart, are not Fascists. They cannot speak their minds—they can only express their feelings by murmurs—but the myth is gone. The adoption of the Napoleonic year did not give Italy an empire, nor have all the official and economic

"battles" won prosperity for her people. The devices and exponents of Fascism are discredited. Nevertheless, organised opposition is inconceivable. Therein lies the real danger of the situation."

There are the usual articles on the affairs of the different members of the British Commonwealth, India, Newzealand, South Africa, Canada and Australia. On the whole an interesting number.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, (January 1929).

The opening article of Miss Eleanor F. Rathbone relates to Miss Mayo's "*Mother India*" and is written in a more balanced way. Her interest is more in the future than in the past. "Never mind who has been responsible in the past for this huge mass of long-drawn-out, continually renewed, unnecessary physical and mental suffering. What can be done to secure its prevention for the future?" Dr. Graham's paper on "*A Religion for the Educated Indian*" is rather slight and our readers are already familiar with his views. The editor's address to the conference on Industrial welfare in Balliol College, Oxford, September 1928 on "*The Ethics of Leisure*" is very illuminating. The Ethics of labour is fairly unobjectionable but "*The Ethics of Leisure*" has a much more forbidding sound. The words seem to convict one of a design to spoil the pleasures of one's fellow-men. Is not leisure a time of relaxation? And what would the value of relaxation be if the moral law were unrelaxed? Is not leisure the time for taking our moral holidays? Is it not then that we are off duty? Is it not enough that you persecute us with your moral imperatives while we are on duty, and cannot you leave us a little freedom to do as we like when we are off? We all remember the description Mr. Kipling gives of those regions East of Suez, which the British soldier so fondly remembers as the place where he has the time of his life.

"Ship me somewhere East of Suez, where the best is as the worst,
And there ain't no ten commandments, and a man can raise a thirst."

I imagine that a good many people look upon their leisure time in much the same way as Mr. Atkins looks on the regions East of Suez. They regard leisure as a smiling region where "there ain't no ten commandments, and a man can raise a thirst."

What else do they mean when they talk of being "off duty"? This division of life into two departments, on one of which we are on duty and in another off—are we not all more or less addicted to it? And are we not inclined to be a little indignant when the moralist comes along with his talk about the Ethics of Leisure, suggesting to us, as it does, that we are on duty in our leisure time as well as at other times? Is not that felt by many of us to be an invasion of one of our most cherished rights—the right to do as we please when we are "off duty" on condition, of course, that we behave ourselves properly while we are "on." Mr. Bertrand Russell indulges that strain rather freely in his *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*. His ideal is four hours' work under social discipline and unfettered liberty, as he calls it, for the rest of the day."

Principal Jacks believes in skill as the clue to the whole question.

"In a world where so many sure-founded faiths are being undone, the building up of a new faith in the moral value of skill seems to me a thing worth attempting, not only for the immediate effects it might have upon human life, but also as the point of departure for faith of much wider compass than itself. Whatever kind of skill you acquire, whether it be skill of the body or skill of the mind, you will find yourself acquiring at the same time another quality which lies at the root of all the virtues—the quality of self-control. Skill and self-control go together, so that education, as I conceive it, can have no higher object, no more ethical object, than that of developing the skill of the people. A man who has no skill that he can exercise is almost inevitably a man who is not master of himself. The moral dangers that arise when the multitude is unskilled are enormous.

I would assign to skill a more prominent place in our educational outlook than it now has. The word which now stands out most prominently in education is knowledge. I am not proposing to displace it, but only to broaden our conception of what knowledge really is. Knowledge, I would say, is never complete until it issues in some kind of corresponding skill, in some capacity for doing excellently what we know accurately. Skill might be defined as the business end of wisdom. Wisdom without skill is like a spear without a point, like a sword without an edge, like a tool which consists only of the handle. The defect of our present education is not in making too much of knowledge—it cannot do that—but in stopping short at the point when knowledge needs to be sharpened into the cutting edge of skill. For my own part I would deem no man educated until he has converted his knowledge into some kind of skill, the exercise of which shall be a source of satisfaction to himself and of benefit to his fellow-men, personally enjoyable on the one hand and socially valuable on the other. The test is a

severe one, I grant you. There are several "honours" graduates of my acquaintance who would miserably succumb before it, to say nothing of the children who pass out of our elementary schools." The right employment of leisure is the skillful employment of it.

Other articles of interest are "*Labour, a Manifestation of the Devil*," and "*The Tests of a Nation's Civilization: Can America meet them?*"

THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, (January, 1929.)

Commander Kenworthy writes an interesting sketch of the position of the colonies in world progress. In view of the recent controversy in India about independence *vs.* Dominion Status, some of his observations are noteworthy.

"So far as the British Empire is concerned, these Dominions are, to all intents and purposes, separate nations with full sovereign rights. The only Imperial connection is the Throne. The more shadowy the Imperial connection grows, the more secure it becomes, and time is likely to add to the truth of this seeming paradox. If England had adopted the Dominion policy earlier we should never have lost the New England settlements. Probably the capital of the Empire would now be Chicago." India will either become a Dominion or separate from the Empire. "In the latter event, after much chaos and suffering, she will establish her own independence. There are those who talk of Japan as being in a position to establish a Raj over India if we loosen our hold. But if we cannot hold India by a combination of force and concession the Japanese will certainly not be able to do so even if the other Sovereign States of the British Empire, including the Dominions, permitted the attempt. If, as a result of some future war, for example, the British Empire broke up, America would throw her weight into the scale to prevent Japanese Imperialism in the Indian Peninsula."

We can take either a short or a long view of colonies. The Liberal view is inherent in the mandate system of the League of nations. "To quote Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations:—

"The Mandatory Power in this latter case is to render 'administrative advise and assistance,' and, in the former case, to act as guide, counsellor, guardian and friend. This is high idealism. But no civilised government can openly disavow it. The cynics have dubbed it hypocrisy; but hypocrisy is the tribute paid by vice to virtue; and in the long run virtue triumphs.

"As an Englishman I am naturally most interested in the Colonies and mandated areas for which we are responsible. If we could combine the high idealism of Article XXII of the Covenant with the 'long view' of commercial statemanship described above, together with the generous fraternalism of the great French Colonial Administrator we shall yet write a chapter of world history of

which our descendants will be proud. We, like other nations, blundered and stumbled into the possession of colonies for a variety of motives, some of them frankly evil, others accidental. But good often comes out of evil. Little minds and great Empires go ill together; but if great minds are allowed to shape the Colonial policy of Downing Street true British Imperialism can be an example to all mankind."

Mr. Hedderwick's article on the *The Fictionising of the Press* is very interesting and has many lessons for Indian Journalism.

"Between the newspapers of yesterday and the standardised organs of to-day there is something of the difference between the work of a craftsman and the product of a power-driven factory. The one has touch of personality and a purpose beyond the mere earning of dividends. The other is part of national organisation, much more efficient in many ways than the former, but obviously turned out to uniform specification and controlled on the strictest actuarial principles."

There has been another note-worthy change which makes many think that the press is decadent. "The primary function of a newspaper is to provide news. Whatever may be said against the older type of newspaper, it is undeniable that this primary function was conscientiously performed. The historian may use files of the British Press for the nineteenth century and beyond as a reliable source of facts. There were, of course, certain journals which specialised in sensational items, but even there the main facts were reliable, however highly coloured they might be in the presentation. The elementary pride of the editor was to be able to stand by the account given of every event; the elementary duty of the reporter was to describe every occurrence as he saw it happen. The various news agencies contributed to the gathering of genuine information; and however varied the political views of newspapers might be, their news columns presented a reasonable degree of uniformity. Competition then was a rivalry in collecting and presenting the fullest and most accurate account of affairs.

"It may be freely admitted that this rather pedestrian ambition made for occasional dullness. Facts are not always exciting; and enthralling murder cases or lively divorce cases did not occur with sufficient frequency to keep a certain heaviness out of the news columns. In order to lighten the general effect, the newspapers which sought the widest circulation introduced all sorts of attractions which had little or nothing to do with news. They were really magazine items; to use the phrase of one of the greatest of newspaper magnates, they were 'special and unusual features which will bring a new gleam of brightness into a day's routine.'"

"The old-time reporter was a man who used shorthand to record what was said to him and what he saw; his skill lay in getting a well-written account in ahead of his rivals. The modern reporter is not a reporter at all: he needs no shorthand and takes little heed of dry facts; his skill lies in picking up or, if necessary, creating something bright and amusing which will tickle the fancy

of the reader. In short, he uses his material in precisely the same manner as a fiction writer who observes some quaint incident or curious trait of character and works it up into a sketch or a dramatic story which is indeed "true to life" but is certainly not a matter of fact."

It is a pity that this tendency has taken hold of our magazines also which are expected to be more sober and serious. Many of the readers of our Indian papers will find the concluding observations useful.

"There would be no need to worry if the millions who take the printed word as their oracle were able to distinguish between new and fictionised news. A good deal of perspicacity, guided by some knowledge of the inner workings of a newspaper, is required for such a selective process, and the millions, possess neither. They take all they read, sober or intoxicated, at its face value; and if they had no other contact with the world than is provided by the gay, triumphant press, they have hardly any contact at all. The effect upon their outlook on life is much the same as if they took Edgar Wallace and P. G. Wodehouse, sometimes in succession and sometimes together, as their instructors.

"Some consolation may be found in the fact that broad-casting, which does present the chief news of our own and other countries with a full sense of responsibility, has come to claim its millions in the heyday of big newspaper circulations. Consolation may also be derived from the fidelity with which many great newspapers still cling to the higher tradition. Yet, after all the sources of comfort are exhausted, there remains the fear that the gigantic newspaper organisations of today are prospering on the weakness of the public mind and are deepening them by subtly obscuring the boundaries between fact and fiction!"

The article on "*A Constitution for India*", by "A Nomad" pleads for an increased number of Indian States, federated or otherwise, in which greater elasticity could exist as regards races, customs and religions than is possible under the beneficent but rigid system obtaining in British India. The writer makes out a very plausible case for his view. "All through the East a personal ruler is the one form of government understood and preferred by the people. Democracy, in its Western sense, is impossible, and a republic could only exist if the president constituted himself a dictator. There is ample evidence of this."

"The personal ruler means the personal touch, and close relations between ruler and ruled. It is so in most of the Indian States. The *darbar* system exists, which enables the humblest subject to lay his petition or grievance before the ruler himself, with the added satisfaction of knowing that the latter, holding as he does an hereditary position, has a store of knowledge of State customs, precedents and history, imbibed from childhood up, which enables him in most cases

to decide the point at issue without reference to his officials, than whom he may quite likely be better informed. Among Orientals such things make for contentment, but they are impossible under the system existing in British India. The King-Emperor is separated from his Indian peoples by the *kala pani*, which millions of them may not cross, even if they could, without losing *caste*. The Viceroy, however eminent and dignified, is but the King's representative, and so at long last the British Raj exists among the humble peasants (who constitute over two-thirds of the total population of the country) in the person of the District Officer. True, he has his miniature *durbars* when on tour, but, generally speaking, the British official in India has become so overwhelmed with office work that the personal interview is becoming more and more impossible as years go by. So we get a vicious circle. Office files grow fat with correspondence on subjects which, in many cases, could be settled by the personal touch, while the necessary personal intercourse with the people grows less and less owing to the necessity of keeping abreast of the office files. It was once said of a parsimonious shipping company that it built its ships by the mile and cut them off in lengths by the yard. Much the same might be said of British administration in India. Two thousand years ago there were more than one hundred kingdoms in India. In the time of the Great Mogul there were fifteen provinces, a number still further reduced in British India, where three now have populations of over forty millions each roughly five-sixth of the entire population of the United Kingdom."

The main outlines of the scheme are the following.

"The Viceroy would remain as the representative of the King-Emperor. The existing Legislative Councils would remain to begin with. Certain subjects such as finance, foreign affairs, communications and the Indian Army, would at first be retained in the hands of the British Government of India. British India would gradually be divided into States as already described, new rulers being appointed where necessary. Each State would have British political officers, just as they have in the Indian States to-day, and such other British officials as might be necessary in the early stages of the transition. The latter would gradually give place to Indians. Education would be one of the most important subjects in each State. On a State being reported as having reached a certain educational level it would become qualified to appoint a State Assembly, non-official and elected by popular vote. Here the *panchayet* would come to its own."

Other articles of interest relate to Fascism and Disraeli.

LIFE AND LETTERS, (January 1929.)

Augustine Birrell with his intimate knowledge of Morley and his part in the fateful meeting of the Cabinet before the great war, comments on Morley's *Memorandum of Resignation* in 1914. Arnold Bennett has his *Notes from a French Journal*. George Santayana's remarks on Crime, Prudence etc., are written with his usual stylistic distinction and force.

"The first fundamental crime is to exist at all, existence being an inveterate cannibal, or worse, since it always feeds on some part of its own body. Vegetarians excuse themselves by ostentatiously not eating their own children, or other animals, and calling whatever they devour inanimate. But is anything inanimate? At least, nothing can be formless; and in destroying the form of things in the hope of preserving our own form, we commit an act of which the violence is certain and the success impossible. Yet we cannot abolish aggression: that would be to abolish the flush of youth, and to decree a general suicide in order to prevent an occasional murder. The only solution, since conflict must rage for ever, is to carry it on with as much chivalry as possible, suffering reason to moderate somewhat the love of life: to teach existence, since it must perish, to perish gracefully, and by a timely connivance to bring the will of the dying into harmony with that of their heirs. In saying this, I am far from wishing to emulate that ancient sage who was called the advocate of death, and whose eloquence drove those Greek young men and women, rapt in a divine despair, to cast themselves into the sea. The flux is in no haste to swallow us, it leaves room for many a feast; Nature is full of sustained repetitions, and it is as legitimate and feasible for us to cling to a pleasant custom as to push for some dire reform. But slowly and imperceptibly the Pyramids change their colour; we must die daily; and it is this gentle renovation of our being, no less than its catastrophes, major and minor, that wisdom might learn to greet with a smile: for there is much humour in it. Time laughs at ambition, and Eternity laughs at Time; and if we could relish this double irony, the great crime of existence, self-destruction would cease to seem an outrage, and the violence of it would become like a lover's violence, tragic but welcome."

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